Easterwood v. Village of Dolton et al

Filing 76

MOTION by Defendants Ryan Perez, Philip Sheehan, Village of Dolton for judgment As a Matter of Law Rule 50(a) (Murphey, John)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SAQUEENA EASTERWOOD,
as Administrator of the Estate of
DONTE L. JOHNSON, deceased,
Plaintiff,

vs.
VILLAGE OF DOLTON,
PHILIP SHEEHAN and RYAN PEREZ,

Defendants.

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)
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) No. 17 CV 2888
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) Honorable Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
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) Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier
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) Jury Demand
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)

DEFENDANTS’ RULE 50(a) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Defendants, by and through their attorneys, John B. Murphey and Rosenthal, Murphey,
Coblentz & Donahue, move prior to submission of the case to the jury for judgment as a matter of
law pursuant to F.R.C.P. 50(a) as to each count of the complaint.
In support of this motion, Defendants state:
I.

COUNT I – EXCESSIVE FORCE
A.

Merits.

1.

The undisputed evidence shows that Officers Sheehan and Perez used deadly force

against Mr. Johnson after:


Sheehan observed Johnson pistol-whipping Mr. Duncan.



Sheehan issued a command to Johnson to drop the gun.



Johnson did not comply with Officer Sheehan’s command.



Instead, Johnson wheeled around and aimed the gun at Sheehan.



In the case of Perez, Officer Perez observed the beating.




Perez heard the word, “Gun.”


2.

Perez saw Johnson pointing the gun in the direction of Sheehan.

Perez saw Johnson running with what appeared to be the gun in his hand.

It is also undisputed that Johnson was armed with a loaded hand gun, which was

recovered next to his body.
3.

Under these circumstances, the use of deadly force was not excessive. In addition

to the various cases cited in the defense summary judgment material, see, e.g. Caitlin v. City of
Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2009).
4.

Therefore, this Court should find “that a reasonable jury would not have a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to find” for Plaintiff on Count I.
5.

As required by Ortiz v. Jordan, 520 U.S. 180 (2011), and in the alternative,

Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of their qualified immunity. At a
minimum, this Court should find that Plaintiff did not carry her burden of establishing that the
split-second decisions of these two officers to use deadly force to eliminate a reasonably perceived
threat to themselves and others posed by the gun-wielding, pistol-whipping Johnson, was so
unreasonable as to violate clearly-established law under the relevant Supreme Court and Seventh
Circuit precedents cited in our summary judgment materials. To this end, we incorporate the cases
cited in support of our motion for summary judgment.
II.

COUNT II – STATE LAW WILLFUL AND WANTON
5.

For similar reasons, a reasonable jury does not have a legally sufficient evidentiary

basis to find for Plaintiff on the Count II willful and wanton claim under Illinois law.
6.

In addition to the reasons set forth with respect to Count I, the use of force by the

officers in this case is privileged under Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/7-5 authorizes a police officer to

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use deadly force (that is, force likely to cause death or great bodily harm) “if he reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or other persons.”
The undisputed evidence shows that those circumstances are present in this case. In addition,
Section 7-5 authorizes the use of deadly force if an officer reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and the person to be
arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of great bodily harm; or that person is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon
or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested
without delay. All of those elements are present in this case. Therefore, a jury would not have a
reasonable basis to rule for Plaintiff on Count II.
Respectfully submitted,

VILLAGE OF DOLTON, PHILLIP
SHEEHAN AND RYAN PEREZ
By:

JOHN B. MURPHEY
AMBER M. SAMUELSON
Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Donahue
30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1624
Chicago, Illinois 60602
[phone]
[phone] (fax)
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

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/s/ John B. Murphey
One of Their Attorneys

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 8, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing document
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of
said filing to all parties listed below:
Mark F. Smolens
Nicole L. Barkowski
MOTTWEILER & SMOLENS, LLP
1627 Colonial Parkway
Suite 301
Inverness, IL 60067
Tel: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
Brian W. Coffman
Coffman Law Offices
2615 N. Sheffield, Suite #1
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Tel: [phone]
[e-mail]

By:

John B. Murphey
Amber M. Samuelson
Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Donahue
30 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1624
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Tel: [phone]/Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

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/s/ John B. Murphey