Mayfield v. Colvin
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 8/24/2018: Mailed notice (lp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BRIAN TERAI MAYFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.
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No. 17 C 2919
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Bryan Terai Mayfield’s
claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 2 [Doc. No. 17]
is denied and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 25]
is granted.
Nancy Berryhill is substituted for her predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
2 Plaintiff’s brief is titled “Opening Brief;” however, it will be construed as a motion for
summary judgment.
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BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his claim for SSI on October 24, 2011, alleging disability since
February 15, 2008. (R. 301–06.) The claim was denied initially and upon
reconsideration, after which Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on March 4, 2014, 2015. (R. 37–
94.) Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented
by counsel. (Id.) Medical expert Allen W. Heinemann, Ph.D. and vocational expert
Craig Johnston also testified. (Id.)
On March 14, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for SSI, finding him not
disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 152–166.) On June 3, 2015, the Appeals
Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the case to an ALJ. (R. 167–72.)
The Appeals Council gave the ALJ the following instructions on remand: obtain
additional evidence concerning Plaintiff’s mental impairments; obtain evidence from
a medical expert to clarify the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairment;
further evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairment in accordance with 20 CFR
416.920a; give further consideration to Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional
capacity during the relevant period and provide references to the record in support
of assessed limitations; and evaluate the treating source opinion and explain the
weight given to the evidence. (R. 170.)
A second hearing was held on January 11, 2016. (R. 95–149.) Plaintiff
personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel.
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(Id.) Plaintiff’s fiancée, Nicole Howlett, medical expert Allen Heinemann, Ph.D., and
vocational expert, Caroline Ward-Kanize, also testified. (Id.)
On February 2, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for SSI, finding him
not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 9–36.) The ALJ then proceeded
through the five-step sequential evaluation process required by the Social Security
Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and 416.902(a). At step one, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 24, 2011,
the application date. (R. 14.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
following severe impairments: learning disability, borderline intellectual
functioning, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and major depressive
disorder. (R. 15.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s chronic kidney disease was a nonsevere impairment. The ALJ concluded at step three that the impairments, alone or
in combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment.
(Id.) See C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (Id.)
Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the
following nonexertional limitations: Plaintiff can perform simple, repetitive and
routine work tasks, with routine changes and oral instructions only. He can have
occasional contact with the general public; and is limited to jobs that are not fastpaced, do not have high production quotas, and require little independent judgment.
(R. 20.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not capable of performing
his past relevant work. (R. 28.) At step five, based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work
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experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform including
hand packager, warehouse worker, and inspector. (R. 28–29.) Because of this
determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 29.)
The Appeals Council then denied Claimant’s request for review, leaving the
ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable
by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d
621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005); (R. 1–6.).
DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant
presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform her former
occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4).
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An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Id.
Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d
at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
ALJ’s decision must be affirmed even if “’reasonable minds could differ’” as long as
“the decision is adequately supported”) (citation omitted).
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The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning
behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th
Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence
with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex
rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496
F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before
drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we
can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir.
2005).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors
his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994); see Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698
(7th Cir. 2014) (“This ‘sound-bite’ approach to record evaluation is an impermissible
methodology for evaluating the evidence.”).
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III.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s pro se brief includes multiple exhibits, the
majority of which are already in the record. Plaintiff attaches three documents,
however, that are not in the record. The Social Security Act does not allow the Court
to review evidence that was not made available to the ALJ. See U.S.C. 405 § 205(g).
Plaintiff’s brief is limited to three pages of statements. The Court construes these
statements as three arguments: (1) a remand is necessary to consider treating
psychiatrist Dr. Robert Grunsten, M.D.’s opinion statement from May of 2016 as
new and material evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff’s credibility
with regard to his activities of daily living (“ADLs”); and (3) the ALJ did not
properly consider Plaintiff’s IQ scores and alleged illiteracy in determining
Plaintiff’s RFC. For the reasons that follow, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.
A. New and Material Evidence Before the Appeals Council
Plaintiff contends Dr. Grunsten’s most recent opinion statement corroborates
his assertion that he is unable to function productively due to his severe mental
impairments. Pl.’s Br. at ¶B. Dr. Grunsten completed Mental Health Impairment
Forms in May and June of 2016 for the Appeals Council. (R. 701–706.) In May 2016,
Dr. Grunsten listed Plaintiff’s diagnoses, and opined that he was “completely
disabled from being able to work on an indefinite basis.” (Id.) He further listed
Plaintiff’s attention deficit disorder as “disabling.” (Id.) Dr. Grunsten also opined
that Plaintiff could participate in activities/work for zero hours a day, and that his
stage three kidney failure would limit him physically. (Id.) In order to corroborate
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these findings, Dr. Grunsten pointed the Appeals Council to old records which also
indicated limited cognitive function. (Id.)
In June 2016, Dr. Grunsten assigned Plaintiff a GAF 3 score of 48, found that
Plaintiff would be unable to meet competitive standards in twenty-one of twenty-six
mental abilities and aptitudes, and opined that Plaintiff has a low IQ. (Id.) Dr.
Grunsten did not, however, reference specific test results in support of this finding,
and simply stated that “patient has documentation.” (Id.) Dr. Grunsten further
opined that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than four days per month,
that he read at a third-grade level, and that he could not manage benefits in his
own best interest. (Id.)
The Court may review Dr. Grunsten’s new opinion only if the Appeals
Council found it to be “new and material” and evaluated the evidence, or if the
Appeals Council rejected the evidence as not qualifying under the “new and
material” standard. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970; Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 722 (7th
Cir. 2016.) (“If the Council determined [the plaintiff’s] newly submitted evidence
was, for whatever reason, not new and material, and therefore deemed the evidence
‘non-qualifying under the regulation,’ we retain jurisdiction to review that
The GAF includes a scale ranging from 0–100, and indicates a “clinician's judgment of the
individual's overall level of functioning.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. Text Rev. 2000) (hereinafter DSM-IV).
The Court notes that the fifth edition of the DSM, published in 2013, has abandoned the
GAF scale because of “its conceptual lack of clarity . . . and questionable psychometrics in
routine practice.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013); see Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing that the American Psychiatric Association abandoned the GAF scale after
2012).
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conclusion for legal error”.) Here, the Appeals Council stated that it considered “the
additional evidence listed” and “found this information does not provide a basis for
changing the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision.” (R. 2.) The Seventh Circuit has
held that this language is insufficient to show that the Appeals Counsel considered
the evidence. Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding similar
language was not specific enough to confirm that the Appeals Council had reviewed
and accepted the new evidence.) Instead, such boilerplate language is considered a
rejection of the evidence as not meeting the “new and material” standard required
by the regulation. Id. (“We thus interpret the Appeals Council decision as stating
that it has rejected [a claimant’s] new evidence as non-qualifying under the
regulation.”) Therefore, the Court will review the evidence de novo to determine
whether Dr. Grunsten’s opinion qualifies as “new and material” evidence.
Dr. Grunsten’s opinion is dated both May 24, 2016, and June 20, 2016. (R.
704, 706.) Both dates occur after the ALJ’s written decision in January of 2016. The
opinion is undeniably “new” as defined by the regulation. Perkins v. Chater, 107
F.3d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1997) (records are “new” if they were “not in existence or
available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). The real question is whether the evidence
qualifies as “material.” For evidence to qualify as “material” under §404.970, it must
create a “reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have reached a
different conclusion had the evidence been considered.” Stepp, 795 F.3d at 725,
citing Perkins, 107 F.3d at 1296 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Dr. Grunsten made several statements regarding Plaintiff’s ability to work. (R.
705.) He opined that Plaintiff “is completely disabled from being able to work on an
indefinite basis” and had “disabling attention deficit disorder.” (Id.) Such
statements are not medical opinions, but are findings reserved for the
Commissioner. Loveless v. Colvin 810 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court is not
obligated to credit Dr. Grunsten’s assertion that Plaintiff is disabled or incapable of
working. “[A] claimant is not entitled to disability benefits simply because her
physician states that she is ‘disabled’ or unable to work.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270
F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001).
Dr. Grunsten’s new opinion also includes a GAF score of 48. (R. 701.) The
ALJ discussed GAF scores in her determination and stated GAF scores are
subjective and not dispositive for Social Security Disability purposes. (R. 26.) The
ALJ dismissed other GAF scores in her determination, finding that the three factors
used to determine a score can vary independently over time, and the assessment
itself lacks standardization. (Id.) Therefore, the new GAF score does not create a
reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have reached a different
conclusion had the evidence been considered. Dr. Grunsten also continues to point
to old documentation to back up his claim that Plaintiff has a low IQ and limited
cognitive functioning. (R. 701–706.) Dr. Grunsten checks off multiple boxes opining
that Plaintiff would be unable to meet competitive standards in a work environment
(Id.) However, as ALJ states in her decision, Dr. Grunsten’s own treatment notes
contradict his opinions. (R. 26–27.) His treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff was
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well oriented, logical, coherent, had goal directed speech, appropriate affect, good
mood, and was able to maintain attention and make good eye contact. (R. 677, 682,
686, 688.) To corroborate his new opinion, he states that “[p]atient has
documentation,” and to “see old records referring to patient’s limited cognitive
function.” The ALJ had these records and documentation at the time of her
determination, and therefore this new opinion evidence would not have altered her
decision. Dr. Grunsten’s new opinion consists of conclusory language, a GAF score,
and a few checked boxes regarding Plaintiff’s mental abilities and aptitudes. There
is no information within Dr. Grunsten’s new opinion that creates a reasonable
probability that the Commissioner would have reached a different conclusion had
the evidence been considered.
B. Credibility
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility with regards
to his ADLs. 4 The reviewing court grants the ALJ substantial deference in her
credibility determination unless it is "patently wrong" and not supported by the
In 2016, the Commissioner rescinded SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4 and issued SSR 163p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, eliminating the use of the term “credibility” from the symptom
evaluation process, but clarifying that the factors to be weighed in that process remain the
same. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *1, *7 (March 16, 2016). The ruling makes clear
that ALJs “aren't in the business of impeaching claimants' character,” but does not alter
their duty to “assess the credibility of pain assertions by applicants, especially as such
assertions often cannot be either credited or rejected on the basis of medical evidence.” Cole
v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). However, the SSA
recently clarified that SSR 16-3p only applies when ALJs “make determinations on or after
March 28, 2016,” and that SSR 96-7p governs cases decided before the aforementioned date.
See Notice of Social Security Ruling, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462 n.27 (Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ
issued her opinion on February 2, 2016. (R. 57.) Therefore, the ALJ properly applied SSR
96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4. Nonetheless, SSR 16-3p will apply on remand. See Notice of
Social Security Ruling, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462 n.27 (Oct. 25, 2017).
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record. Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207
F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Elder, 529 F.3d at 413 (holding that in
assessing the credibility finding, courts do not review the medical evidence de novo
but "merely examine whether the ALJ's determination was reasoned and
supported"). An ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a claimant's
testimony, and "[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence and must be
'sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for
that weight.'" Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88); see SSR 96-7p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 4, 1996
WL 374186, at *4 (S.S.A. 1996). An ALJ's "failure to adequately explain his or her
credibility finding . . . is grounds for reversal." Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937
(7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff alleges that his fiancée assists him with all aspect of activities of
daily living except for bathing and dressing himself. The ALJ, however, found that
Plaintiff had only a moderate restriction in activities of daily living. (R. 18.)
Although the ALJ noted that both Plaintiff and his fiancée testified as to significant
limitations, the ALJ also looked to other portions of Plaintiff’s testimony and
evidence and found it contradictory. (Id.) For instance, Plaintiff’s fiancée testified
that he can do nothing without assistance and requiring reminders to brush his
teeth and change his clothes. (R. 125–26.) Plaintiff testified, however, that he can
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dress his children and occasionally bathe them, and that he bathes and dresses
himself and can cut the lawn. (R. 108, 109–10, 114.)
Moreover, Plaintiff indicated to Dr. Gregory C. Rudolph, Ph.D., that he was
capable of taking care of his basic needs, including dressing, grooming, and personal
hygiene. (R. 564.) The ALJ also noted Plaintiff reported that he was unable to cook,
but this was contradicted by his education, work history, and resume. (R. 16, 464–
65.) His resume indicates that Plaintiff attended a Culinary Arts school and worked
at Buffalo Wild Wings as a cook. (R. 16) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff has an
extensive job history, and although the jobs are relatively short in duration, all
include job skills that contradict Plaintiff’s claims of being incapable of functioning
on his own. (Id.) For instance, Plaintiff asserted he was capable of managing
multiple tasks from start to finish in a timely fashion, was dependable, and could
work cooperatively with team members. (Id.) Plaintiff also listed experience with
operating machinery, preparing menu times at a restaurant, and working on an
assembly line. (Id.)
The ALJ also stated that the only evidence that corroborated Plaintiff’s
claims of an inability to function was the testimony of his fiancée. (R. 18.) The ALJ
gave the fiancée’s testimony little weight, as there is no evidence linking claims of
an inability to function with his intellectual functioning or intellectual testing. (Id.)
Moreover, Plaintiff’s fiancée is not a disinterested party, and there were multiple
adults living with Plaintiff at the time, and Plaintiff’s help may not be needed
around the house. (Id.) The ALJ was not “patently” wrong in her determination of
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Plaintiff’s credibility with respect to his ADLs. The ALJ gave reasons for her
assessment, and she used the record evidence to build a logical bridge to her
conclusion that Plaintiff is only moderately restricted in activities of daily living.
C. RFC
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to accommodate for his low IQ
score, his illiteracy, and his limitations in functioning when making her RFC
determination. Pl.’s Br. at ¶G. Plaintiff contends that his IQ is in the forties, that he
is illiterate, and that his impairments are managed by, but not improved on,
medication. The ALJ has explained her reasoning for discrediting certain IQ scores,
claims of illiteracy, and extreme limitations in functioning. The ALJ noted that the
two physicians who found Plaintiff to have a lower IQ score, Dr. Laura Pyter, Psy.D.
and Dr. Rudolph, both acknowledged that Plaintiff’s scores were adversely affected
by outside factors. (R. 21–22, 24–25, 665, 672.) Both doctors noted that the cognitive
scoring was invalid. (Id.) Plaintiff’s assertion that his IQ is in the forties and the
other statements in his brief that contradict the ALJ’s findings appear to ask the
Court to reweigh the evidence. Plaintiff’s statements contend that the ALJ did not
properly weigh the evidence regarding his IQ and his RFC. However, it is not the
job of the courts to reevaluate facts, reweigh evidence, or decide questions of
credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841. A reviewing court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.; see also Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d
306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own
judgment for that of the ALJ; if reasonable minds differ over whether the applicant
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is disabled, we must uphold the decision under review.”). Plaintiff has not identified
any legal argument for why the ALJ was incorrect in her treatment of the evidence,
nor can this Court find a legal argument within the language of Plaintiff’s
allegations. The Court may not reweigh the evidence, and the ALJ’s decision is
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
17] is denied and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
25] is granted. Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
August 24, 2018
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