Satterfield v. HSBC North America Holdings Inc. et al

Filing 33

Enter memorandum Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 10/31/2017: For the reasons set forth below, Defendants motion to dismiss 22 is granted. This case is dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in part for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and in part on the merits with prejudice. Plaintiff may pursue in state court any state law claims he has arising from Defendants alleged conduct in 2016 and 2017 (see Doc. 7 at 74-105). The 12/11/2017 status hearing 32 is stricken. Enter judgment order. Civil case closed.Mailed notice.(jlj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHANIEL SATTERFIELD, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS INC., HSBC
BANK USA, N.A., HSBC FINANCE CORPORATION,
and HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES INC.,
Defendants.

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17 C 3123
Judge Gary Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This suit, brought by Nathaniel Satterfield, Jr., against what appear to be the successors to
the mortgagor of the home previously owned by his mother and sister, was preceded by two
closely related state court suits. The first was the mortgagor’s successful foreclosure suit against
Satterfield’s mother and sister. See Beneficial Ill., Inc. v. Satterfield, 2013 IL App (1st) 122470U (Ill. App. 2013) (reproduced at Doc. 25-1), app. denied, 3 N.E.3d 794 (Ill. 2014); see also
Docs. 23-1, 23-2 (trial court orders). The second was Satterfield’s own suit against entities
related to the mortgagor—and also that partially overlap with or are closely related to Defendants
here—alleging various misdeeds related to efforts to take possession of the property foreclosed
in the first suit. See Satterfield v. Beneficial Financial I Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 151483-U (Ill.
App. 2016) (reproduced at Doc. 25-3), app. denied, 60 N.E.3d 882 (Ill. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1076 (2017), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1617 (2017).
In this case, brought about one week after the United States Supreme Court denied his
petition for rehearing of its denial of his certiorari petition seeking review of the state appellate
court’s judgment in his state court suit, Satterfield once again complains of actions taken during
the course of the foreclosure proceedings and thereafter. This court dismissed without prejudice
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the initial complaint; the federal claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim and, given the
lack of diversity, the state law claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Doc. 5. The court gave Satterfield a chance to file an amended complaint, which
he did. Doc. 7. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. 22.
Many of the amended complaint’s claims seek review of, or allege harm arising from, the
state court’s foreclosure judgment; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this court of subject
matter jurisdiction over those claims. See Nora v. Residential Funding Co., 543 F. App’x 601,
602 (7th Cir. 2013); Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2004); Di
Cosola v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 4808188, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2011). Other of the
amended complaint’s claims seek to re-litigate claims (some of the legal theories changed, but
the underlying factual allegations are the same) that were dismissed in Satterfield’s state court
suit; those claims fail on the merits on preclusion grounds. See Walczak v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 739
F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2014); Easley v. Russ, 247 F. App’x 823, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007);
Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000).
Still other of the amended complaint’s federal claims pertain to conduct that post-dated
the judgments entered in the state court suits. Those claims are dismissed on the merits.
Satterfield has no claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986 because Defendants are not
state actors and the amended complaint does not come close to alleging the kind of concerted
conduct between private and public actors that could support such claims against private actors.
See Holm v. Clark, 2012 WL 1015988, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2012). And while Plaintiff
mentions in passing a pastiche of other federal statutes, Doc. 7 at ¶ 145, none are implicated by
his allegations, and his opposition brief does not cogently argue that he has any claim under

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those statutes, so any such claims are forfeited. See Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d
822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] party generally forfeits an argument or issue not raised in
response to a motion to dismiss.”); G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 538
(7th Cir. 2012) (“We have repeatedly held that a party waives an argument by failing to make it
before the district court.”); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
where the plaintiff “did not present legal arguments or cite relevant authority to substantiate [his]
claim in responding to defendants’ motion to dismiss,” his “claim has been waived”); Stransky v.
Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen presented with a
motion to dismiss, the non-moving party must proffer some legal basis to support his cause of
action. The federal courts will not invent legal arguments for litigants.”) (internal citations
omitted).
Any state law claims that Satterfield might have pertaining to conduct post-dating the
judgments entered in the state court suits are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Satterfield
and Defendant HSBC Finance Corporation are Illinois citizens, so there is no diversity
jurisdiction over those claims. The only jurisdiction arises under § 1367(a), which the court
relinquishes under § 1367(c)(3) given the case’s early stage and Satterfield’s ability under
Illinois law to refile those state law claims in state court. See 735 ILCS 5/13-217.

October 31, 2017
United States District Judge

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