Hunter v. University of Chicago Medicine

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. This matter is before the court on Defendant University of Chicago's (University) partial motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the partial motion to dismiss 25 is granted. Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/16/2017. Mailed notice (ags, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVTSION
TARA L. HUNTER,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

UNMRSITY OF CHICAGO,

No. L7 C 3456

)
)
)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPTNION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant University of Chicago's

(University) partial motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the partial
motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND
In Octobe r ZOl4,Plaintiff T araL.Hunter (Hunter), an African American
female, allegedly applied for a position as Human Resources/Academic Affairs and
Operations Administrator in the University's Department of Neurology. Hunter was

allegedly interviewed and had a final interview in November 2014. Hunter claims
that during the final interview she was asked

if

she had

children. In December 2014,

Hunter was allegedly informed that she was not selected for the position. Hunter

contends that a Caucasian female who did not have any young children or school age

children was chosen for the position. According to Hunter, the individual chosen
had less work experience than Hunter in human resource matters. Hunter includes in
her second amended complaint a claim alleging discrimination based on her race in

violation of Title

vII

of the

civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title

vII), 42 U.S.C. $ 2000 e/

seq. (Count I), a claim alleging discrimination based on her race in violation of 42

U.S.C. g 1981 (Section 1981) (Count II), a Title VII race plus discrimination claim
(Count III), a Section 1981 race plus discrimination claim (Count IV), and a Title

VII sex plus discrimination claim
the claims in Counts II,

(Count

V). The University now moves

to dismiss

I[, IV, and V.
LEGAL STANDARJ)

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure l2(bx6) (Rule 12(bX6)), a court mustooaccept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint" and make reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(stating that the tenet is "inapplicable
to legal conclusioos"); Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750,
753 (7th Cir. 2002). To defeat a Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Iqbal,129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations omitted)(quoting
in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that

contains factual allegations that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability . .
. stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief."

Iqbal,l29 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I.

Section 1981 Claim
The University contends that Hunter has failed to plead sufficient facts to state

a

valid Section 1981 claim. For a Section 1981 claim, a plaintiff must establish:

(l)

that she is a member "of a racial minority," (2) that "the defendant had an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race," and (3) thatoothe discrimination concerned one or
more of the activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making and enforcing of a

contract)." Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 41 l, 413-14 (7th Cit. 1996). The
University argues that Hunter has failed to allege facts that indicate an intent to
discriminate against her based on her race. Hunter specifically alleges that the

University had an intent to discriminate against her because of her race. (SA Compl.
Par. 51, 56).

Hunter alleges that she interviewed for a position and that the University
decided to hire a less qualified Caucasian female applicant. (SA Compl Par. 12-30).

Hunter fails to allege facts that would indicate that she was clearly more qualified
than the female applicant hired. Hunter's subjective belief as to how her

qualifications matched up to the female applicant hired are not sufficient, even under
the liberal notice pleading standard. Nor is Hunter's subjective belief that she was a
more qualified applicant sufficient. There are many factors that the University may
have taken into consideration when making its hiring decision. Alleging facts that

indicate the mere possibility of discrimination is not sufficient even under Twombly.

Iqbal,129 S.Ct. at 1949. Hunter must allege facts that plausibly suggest such
discriminatory intent and the mere fact that another female applicant was selected for
the position who was not African American is not sufficient to suggest that Hunter
was not chosen because of her race. Therefore, the University's motion to dismiss

the Section 1981 claim is granted.

II.

Race Plus and Sex Plus Claims

The University argues that the race plus and sex plus claims are not
cognizable claims. Although a Title

VII claim

is normally based upon one of the

protected characteristics, some circuits have allowed a Title

VII claim to be based

a combination of the protected characteristics. Napolitano,2013

(S.D.N.Y.2013). Race plus claims and

WL

sex plus claims are two types

on

1285164, at *9

of

oointersectional discrimination" claims that have been recognized in certain circuits.

Id.; Kimble v. Wisconsin Dep't of Worlcforce Dev.,690 F. Supp. 2d765,769 (8.D.
Wis. 2010). The Seventh Circuit, however, has not yet recognized such claims in
the Title

VII or Section 1981 context.

Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep't,578 F.3d

o'not yet
decided in this circuit
559,563 (7th Cir. 2009)(stating that the Court has

whether we recognize a 'sex-plus' theory of discrimination"); Logan v. Kautex
Textron N. Am.,259 F.3d 635, 638 n. 2 (7th Cir.2001))(addressing sex plus claims).

This court declines to recognize such novel causes of action pled by Hunter in this
case. The court also notes that even

if

such claims were cognizable claims, Hunter

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for such Title VII claims. Lavalais

v.

Vill. of Melrose Park,734F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the University's
motion to dismiss the race plus and sex plus claims is granted.

CONCLUSTON
Based on the foregoing analysis, the University's partial motion to dismiss is
granted.

United States District Court Judge

Dated: November 16,2017