Harlem Ambassadors Productions, Inc. v. ULTD Entertainment LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Harlem Productions' motion to dismiss, R. 57 , is denied as to the breach of contract claim but granted as to the "pain and suffering" and defamation claims. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 10/9/2018:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HARLEM AMBASSADORS
PRODUCTIONS, INC,
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Plaintiff,
v.
DORON LOWE, AND
BRITTANY DORSEY,
Defendants.
No. 17-cv-3609
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Harlem Ambassadors Productions, Inc., (“Harlem Productions”) sued
four defendants, including defendant Brittany Dorsey, alleging claims for breach of
contract, tortious interference with business relations, misappropriation of trade
secrets, defamation, and conspiracy. On December 14, 2017, the Court entered an
order dismissing in part and granting in part the defendants’ various motions to
dismiss. R. 31. The Court will assume familiarity with that opinion as relevant
background here. On June 28, 2018, pro se defendant Dorsey filed a counterclaim
alleging three causes of actions—(1) breach of contract; (2) “pain and suffering”; and
(3) defamation. Before the Court is Harlem Production’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss that counterclaim. For the reasons explained below, Harlem Production’s
motion is denied in part and granted in part.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g.,
Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.
2009). The legal standard for a motion to dismiss a counterclaim is the same as the
standard applied to a motion to dismiss a complaint. See Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel
Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 729 (7th
Cir. 2015). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to
provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Mann v. Vogel, 707
F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this
standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mann, 707 F.3d at 877.
DISCUSSION
In her counterclaim, Dorsey alleges she was a former coach, road manager,
announcer, and show woman of the Harlem Ambassadors. She lists three separate
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causes of action, but as explained below, Dorsey pleads only a breach of contract claim
and a defamation claim. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Breach of Contract
In the breach of contract claim, Dorsey alleges she had a contract with Harlem
Productions for the 2012-2013 and 2015-2016 show years. Under her performer
agreement, Harlem Productions agreed to pay Dorsey $3,000 per month. R. 49 at 6.
If Dorsey renewed the agreement, she was entitled to receive $3,500 for the following
year. Id. at 9. In the counterclaim, Dorsey alleges she often received payments late
or did not receive the full amount. Id. at 2. Dorsey attaches a number of exhibits to
support these allegations, including bank account statements that showed she
received less than $3,000 a month. Id. at 15-21. She also attaches various emails
between her and Harlem Productions’ owner, Dale Moss, in which she indicates the
company did not have enough funds to pay her and other performers their agreedupon salaries or their hotel room fees, gas charges, and other expenses while traveling
for performances. Id. at 23-31. Dorsey often served as a messenger between the owner
and the other performers when the performers questioned the status of their pay and
the lack of funds to pay their expenses. Id.
Harlem Productions moves to dismiss Dorsey’s claim, arguing that the contract
only agreed to pay Dorsey $3,000 per month and did not specify which days of the
month she would be paid. R. 57 at 3. It argues that payments made a day later, or
even earlier, than Dorsey hoped are not breaches of the contract. While the Court
agrees that Dorsey’s allegations that she was paid later than she anticipated are not
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violations of the performer agreement, Dorsey plausibly alleges she was not paid the
full $3,000 in some months. See R. 49 at 2 (“Dale failed to make the installment
payment of $1,750 due on February 22,2017. Instead he made an installment
payment of $1,348.95. . . .Dale Moss verbally agreed to pay me for the entire month
of May upon completion of the 2017 tour. Last minute, he decided against it and only
paid me $903.20 on May 22, 2017.”). In her response to Harlem Production’s motion
to dismiss, Dorsey confirms that at times she was paid less than the agreed $3,000
per month and was not reimbursed when she used her own funds to purchase hotel
rooms, fuel, and other expenses. R. 65 at 2.
The Court finds that these allegations, construed liberally, 1 plausibly allege
Harlem Productions breached the performer agreement by failing to pay Dorsey the
agreed upon monthly payments. Harlem Productions’ motion to dismiss on that basis
is denied.
B. Defamation
Dorsey’s second and third causes of action are titled “pain and suffering” and
“defamation.” In response to the motion to dismiss, Dorsey acknowledges that she
“misarticulated” her pain and suffering claim, and intended it to reflect an emotional
distress claim resulting from the lawsuit. R. 65 at 2. The defamation claim alleges
Harlem Productions defamed Dorsey by filing this lawsuit. R. 49 at 4. The Court will
Pro se complaints are to be construed more liberally than others, and this liberal
construction relates to both the pro se plaintiff’s factual allegations and her legal
theories. See White v. City of Chicago, 2016 WL 4270152, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15,
2016).
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construe Dorsey’s “pain and suffering” claim as a request for damages resulting from
the emotional distress this lawsuit caused her as part of her defamation claim.
Dorsey’s “pain and suffering” claim is dismissed as a stand-alone claim.
Harlem Productions moves to dismiss Dorsey’s defamation claim because it is
barred by the litigation privilege. The Court agrees. Statements made in a legal
proceeding are privileged against defamation actions. Mitchell v. Plano Police Dep’t,
2017 WL 4340118, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (dismissing defamation complaint
and recognizing that “false statements made in a legal proceeding are absolutely
privileged against defamation actions”); Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 156 (7th Cir.
1994) (“[I]n Illinois . . . anything said or written in a legal proceeding . . . is protected
by an absolute privilege against defamation actions.”); Weiler v. Stern, 67 Ill. App. 3d
179, 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (under Illinois law, “[a]bsolute privilege in defamation
actions protects anything said or written in a legal proceeding, so long as it is
pertinent and material to the matter in controversy.”). Dorsey’s defamation claim is
dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Harlem Productions’ motion to dismiss, R.
57, is denied as to the breach of contract claim but granted as to the “pain and
suffering” and defamation claims.
ENTERED:
--------------------------------------------Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: October 9, 2018
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