Nadzhafaliyev et al v. Hardy et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss 40 pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed, without prejudice to re- raising their claims before an appropriate Illinois court. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 8/29/2019. Notice mailed by judge's staff (lf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALI NADZHAFALIYEV, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
DANIEL HARDY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17 C 4469
Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants move to dismiss this case on Younger abstention grounds, see Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiffs, Ali Nadzhafaliyev, Sean Gunderson, Paul Olsson, Abby Grason, James Baker,

Mark Owens, and Daniel Padilla, have been involuntarily committed to the custody of the Illinois
Department of Human Services and confined at Elgin Mental Health Center (“EMHC”), after a
state court found them either not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) or unfit to stand trial
(“UST”) on criminal charges. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of EMHC’s “loss of
privileges” (“LOP”) disciplinary policy, alleging that defendants, employees of EMHC, took
advantage of the policy to violate plaintiffs’ due process rights.
Plaintiffs allege that, in an effort to “incorporate therapeutic methods,” EMHC has adopted
a “coercion-free environment,” in which patients are governed not according to a system of rules
and punishment but according to a set of “expectations.” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 38.) The
posted “Environmental Expectations” are as follow:

(a) We are expected to practice respect and dignity for other patients and staff—
which include no violence or fighting and no foul language.
(b) We are expected to adhere to safety practices which maintain the safety of all
patients and staff.
(c) We are expected to maintain and respect the environment which includes no
destruction of [any] other’s property and keeping our living spaces and working
spaces clean.
(d) We are expected to take care of our own property and not to borrow, lend, share,
or give things away—which includes any other personal items.
(e) We are expected to keep ourselves appropriately clean, groomed, and dressed
both on and off the unit.
(Id. ¶ 29.) If an EMHC staff member “determines in his or her sole discretion” that a patient is not
meeting the community’s “expectations,” the staff member can place the patient on LOP status.
(Id. ¶ 32.) The consequences of being put on LOP status may include the following:
(a) No vending, pop time, or snack box.
(b) No order out the following week.
(c) No gym time
(d) No library
(e) No 1-South
(f) May attend all structured groups off unit. Must be escorted by staff.
(Id. ¶ 33.) Additionally, a patient on LOP status may be prohibited from certain “treatment
activities” including “physically active treatment.” (Id. ¶ 34.)
Placement on LOP status is documented in the patient’s medical chart, and plaintiffs allege
that it can affect whether they are issued “Pass Privileges,” which permit them to travel around
and off the EMHC campus. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 36; see id. ¶ 47.) NGRI and UST patients generally
must be held in a “secure setting,” and any loosening of restrictions on their security, in the form
of off-grounds or unsupervised on-grounds privileges, must be approved by court order, which
“may include such conditions on the defendant as the Court may deem appropriate and necessary
to reasonably assure the defendant’s satisfactory progress in treatment and the safety of the
defendant and others.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (NGRI); 725 ILCS 5/104-31 (UST). Every ninety
days, EMHC must file a “treatment plan report” with the supervising court, which must “provide
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a current summary” of progress on the items covered by the patient’s treatment plan. 1 730 ILCS
5/5-2-4(b) (NGRI); 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (UST). The report may also recommend off-grounds
privileges or unsupervised on-grounds privileges for the court’s consideration and approval. 730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(b); 725 ILCS 5/104-31. For a UST patient, the supervising court is to set a hearing,
with notice to the defendant and his attorney, every 180 days to review the progress of the patient’s
treatment. 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2). An NGRI patient has the right to file a “petition for treatment
plan review” every 180 days, upon which the supervising court “shall set a hearing to be held
within 120 days.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(e).
At court hearings, LOP status can be—and, allegedly, “regularly is”—the basis of denial
of a conditional release, see 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2); 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4, or of pass privileges for
EMHC patients. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 38; see id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that the “review process”
for LOP status is “grossly lacking,” “ineffective,” and “futile,” and they have “presented
Defendants with numerous . . . grievances pertaining to the . . . LOP system” (id. ¶¶ 43, 56; see id.
¶ 52), but nothing has changed.
Plaintiffs each describe specific incidents in which they were put on LOP status arbitrarily,
unjustly, or based on false accusations of wrongdoing. For example, Nadzhafaliyev was put on
LOP status for restraining another patient during a soccer game, but only after the other patient
tried to punch him; Baker was accused of surreptitiously passing contraband to Nadzhafaliyev, but
they were only conversing; Gunderson was accused of keeping contraband food items, despite no
notice that keeping the food in his room was wrongful; Olsson was blamed for an insect infestation

For each patient in its custody, EMHC is required to prepare a “treatment plan,” which must include “(1)
an assessment of the defendant’s treatment needs, (2) a description of the services recommended for
treatment, (3) the goals of each type of element of service, (4) an anticipated timetable for the
accomplishment of the goals, and (5) a designation of the qualified professional responsible for the
implementation of the plan.” 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b); see 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2).
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in his room that he did not cause; Owens was blamed for an unprovoked attack on him by another
patient; and Padilla was blamed for not knowing the expectations, despite his learning disabilities.
Plaintiffs allege that they were denied pass privileges or conditional releases based in part on these
LOP incidents and others, as documented in their medical records.

In some cases, plaintiffs

suffered other harmful or demeaning consequences. For example, Baker and Nadzhafaliyev were
strip searched in the incident concerning the alleged passing of contraband, and Nadzhafaliyev,
Baker, Gunderson, and Olsson were deprived of computer equipment, at least temporarily,
sometimes as a consequence of their LOP status, sometimes after searches by EMHC staff.
II.

Legal Standards for Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).

“Both a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion share the same purpose: not to decide
the merits of the case, but to test the sufficiency of the complaint.” O’Pere v. Citimortgage Bank,
N.A., No. 14-CV-10230, 2015 WL 6859289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015).
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states
a claim on which relief may be granted. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012).
Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under
Rule 8(a)(2) must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; that is, the “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has

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facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must]
accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ] not accept as true legal
conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.’” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Only when the plaintiff pleads itself
out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense—may a complaint that
otherwise states a claim be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).
“A motion to dismiss on abstention grounds does not fit neatly into Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule
12(b)(6),” but when such a motion “asks the Court to decline jurisdiction,” as defendants’ motion
does, “it fits more comfortably under Rule 12(b)(1).” Bolton v. Bryant, 71 F. Supp. 3d 802, 809
n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see also Powell v. Saddler, No. 12 C 2928, 2012 WL 3880198, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 6, 2012) (“Because Younger abstention concerns whether courts should exercise
jurisdiction that they have over the parties’ claims, motions to dismiss on Younger grounds are
best construed as motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.”). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of an action over which
a court allegedly lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” O’Pere, 2015 WL 6859289, at *2. The Court
analyzes the motion the same way it analyzes Rule 12(b)(6) motions, accepting as true plaintiffs’
allegations and drawing reasonable inferences in their favor, except that it may “‘look beyond the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the

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issue’” to determine whether the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. (quoting
Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)).
III.

Analysis
Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their constitutional right to due process by

arbitrarily punishing them under the LOP system and denying them access to adequate medical
care. In response, defendants argue that (1) plaintiffs fail to state a claim rising to the level of a
constitutional deprivation, and (2) even if plaintiffs do state a claim, this Court must abstain from
adjudicating it under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court will address the Younger
argument first. See Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 708 F.3d 963, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[I]t [is] improper for courts to skip over jurisdictional issues in order to reach the merits, even
when ‘the merits question is more easily resolved.’”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998)).
“Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal
constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” FreeEats.com,
Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007). “‘The rule in Younger . . . is designed to permit
state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.’” Id. (quoting Forty One
News, Inc. v. Cty. of Lake, 491 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2007)). Under the Younger doctrine, “a
party to a state proceeding affecting important governmental interests must resolve the dispute in
the state’s preferred tribunal,” Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1995), rather than by
filing a conflicting federal lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit has explained the principles undergirding
the doctrine as follows:
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that absent extraordinary circumstances
federal courts should abstain from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings.
401 U.S. at 53. That holding rested partly on traditional principles of equity, but
was based primarily on the “even more vital consideration” of comity. Id. at 44.
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Comity refers to “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.” Id. The Court has extended the holding in Younger to cases in which the
relief requested was something other than an injunction in state court. See,
e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (abstention appropriate when relief
sought is a declaratory judgment, which would have same disruptive effect on state
proceedings as an injunction).
Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations altered) (extending Younger
to § 1983 civil rights action seeking “damages for misconduct in an underlying [state] criminal
case”).
A district court’s decision to abstain under Younger “‘does not rest on a mechanical
checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given
case.’” Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit has
identified three “paramount concerns” on which courts must focus their analysis in deciding
whether to abstain:
(1) the judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings must be on-going;
(2) the proceedings must implicate important state interests; and
(3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court proceeding to raise
constitutional challenges.
Id. “When confronted with circumstances that clearly implicate Younger concerns, a federal
court must abstain.” Id. (emphasis added).
In May 1990, after two patients caused a security crisis by escaping while traveling on offgrounds passes, EMHC canceled all off-grounds passes and curtailed unescorted on-grounds
movement for all patients. Both NGRI and UST patients filed § 1983 lawsuits in federal court,
challenging the policy as arbitrary and violative of due process and seeking damages. In both
cases, citing the Younger doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district courts’ decisions to

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abstain. See Barichello, 98 F.3d at 951, 954-56; 2 Nelson, 44 F.3d at 499, 501-03. In both cases,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs were subject to ongoing state proceedings, namely,
the criminal cases filed against them; although these cases were not proceeding as such, the
plaintiffs’ confinement was subject to supervision by the criminal courts, and the state was required
to file regular treatment-plan reports for the state judges’ information and approval. Barichello,
98 F.3d at 955; Nelson, 44 F.3d at 501-02; see 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b); 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2).
The proceedings implicated important state interests, having grown out of criminal charges.
Barichello, 98 F.3d at 955; Nelson, 44 F.3d at 501-02. And in both cases, the court concluded that
there was adequate opportunity in the state proceedings for the plaintiffs to raise their
constitutional issues. Barichello, 98 F.3d at 956 (“[I]n the spirit of the abstention cases cited above,
we defer to the capacity of the state court to accord to the plaintiffs the constitutional relief (if any)
to which they are entitled.”); 3 Nelson, 44 F.3d at 499, 501-03 (“No one doubts that the state courts
had jurisdiction to consider the precise constitutional claims that have been raised in this litigation.
. . . Instead of presenting objections to treatment plans, plaintiffs filed an independent suit in federal
court.”).
Defendants argue that this case calls for Younger abstention no less than Nelson, and the
Court agrees. Nelson and, to a lesser extent, Barichello control the outcome of this case. In this
In Barichello, the district court abstained only from the injunctive claims; it granted summary judgment
on the damages claims on qualified immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision in all
respects.
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In Barichello, the Seventh Circuit admitted to some uneasiness about the degree of process available in
the state system, observing that in People v. Owens, 645 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), the Illinois
Appellate Court had held that an NGRI inmate had no right to a hearing on a petition to modify his treatment
plan to include unaccompanied on-grounds passes. Barichello, 98 F.3d at 956. This uneasiness might have
given this Court pause, except that the statute has been amended since Barichello and Owens. It now
explicitly provides that the supervising state court “shall” set a hearing within 120 days on an NGRI
inmate’s “petition for treatment plan review.” See Public Act 91–536, 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-536
(S.B. 849) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(e) to add “treatment plan review” as a basis for a petition requiring
a hearing).
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case, as in those cases, NGRI or UST patients at EMHC are objecting essentially to EMHC’s
arbitrary or unjust denial of certain passes to move about or off the EMHC campus unsupervised.
At the core of plaintiffs’ complaint about the LOP system is that it results in the denial of such
passes, due to the documentation of LOP incidents in plaintiffs’ medical charts, which in turn
makes a negative impression on the supervising state court. This is the sort of claim, rooted in the
denial of off-grounds or unsupervised on-grounds passes, that the Seventh Circuit held to require
Younger abstention in Nelson and Barichello.
In response, plaintiffs argue that they are challenging the LOP system itself, not the state
court’s review of the treatment plans submitted to it. First, the Court doubts whether that argument
is consistent with the allegations of the complaint, which plainly connect the decisions the state
court makes with respect to approval of plaintiffs’ treatment plans, particularly concerning
plaintiffs’ privilege passes, conditional releases, and the like, to the challenged LOP incidents.
(See, e.g., 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38, 47.) Second, and more importantly, the distinction is one
without a difference. The LOP system is integral to the treatment process, and plaintiffs do not
and cannot dispute that the conditions of plaintiffs’ confinement are subject to state-court
supervision, to the extent that they impact the treatment process. Plaintiffs themselves allege that
the LOP disciplinary system is part and parcel of EMHC’s “coercion-free” environment, which
intentionally “incorporate[s] therapeutic methods.” (Id. ¶ 28; see id. ¶¶ 28-31, 39.) In other words,
the LOP system is EMHC’s means of enforcing its system of “expectations,” and EMHC has
imposed both systems for a “therapeutic” purpose. (Id.) There is no meaningful distinction
between, on the one hand, objecting to the treatment plans submitted for the state court’s approval
and, on the other hand, objecting to the LOP incidents documented in the medical records

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submitted in support of those treatment plans; either way, the objection is essentially to the courtapproved plans for treatment of the patients.
Illustrating the point is Gunderson v. Pharis, No. 13-CV-3792, 2014 WL 1613051, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2014) (St. Eve, J.), in which the plaintiff Sean Gunderson—also one of the
plaintiffs in this case—asserted claims arising out of EMHC’s allegedly unconstitutional
restrictions on certain activities, including computer-facilitated university coursework, conjugal
visitation, and yoga and meditation time. The district court dismissed these claims, agreeing with
the defendants that they “involve conditions appropriate and necessary to reasonably assure the
Plaintiff’s satisfactory progress in treatment and the safety of himself and others.” Id. at *4.
Because these conditions-of-confinement claims overlapped with ground covered by the statecourt-supervised treatment plans, they were “not properly before [the federal district court]
pursuant to Younger.” Id.
This case is no different. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of conditions of their confinement that
are subject to ongoing supervision by an Illinois court under Illinois law. Under the Younger
doctrine, as the Seventh Circuit has explained in Nelson and Barichello, this Court must abstain
from hearing such claims.
The Court need not reach the parties’ arguments concerning whether plaintiffs state a claim
for violation of their due process rights. Even if they do, this Court must abstain from hearing it.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

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IV.

Conclusion
The Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to the Younger abstention

doctrine, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed, without
prejudice to re-raising their claims before an appropriate Illinois court. Civil case terminated.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 29, 2019

______________________
HON. JORGE ALONSO
United States District Judge

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