Young v. City Of Chicago et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 11/27/2019. Mailed notice. (mgh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Joshua Young,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Chicago, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 17 C 4803
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this action, Joshua Young sues defendants the City of
Chicago and Chicago police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
several state law theories in connection with his 2015 arrest,
detention, and ensuing prosecution. After Young voluntarily
dismissed two counts of the complaint,1 the following counts
remain:
II. § 1983 – Unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment
IV. § 1983 – Deprivation of Due Process
V. § 1983 – Failure to intervene
VI. § 1983 – Conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights
VII. Malicious prosecution under Illinois Law
VIII. Civil conspiracy under Illinois Law
IX. Respondeat Superior against the City
X. Indemnification against the City
1
Young voluntarily dismissed his claims for false arrest, Count
I, and unlawful search and seizure, Count III. Dkt. No. 44.
1
Defendants seek summary judgment. Dkt. No. 51. For the reasons
that follow, their motion is granted.
I.
The facts are set forth as favorably to Young, the nonmoving party, as permitted by the record and Local Rule 56.1.
See Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2012).
On July 2, 2015, around 11:30am, Young took his childhood
friend Corey Hughes to get a haircut in Chicago. Hughes had been
shot the week before and was on crutches. As Young drove to the
barbershop, Hughes told Young he had a gun. Young had never seen
Hughes possess or talk about possessing a firearm before then.
Young started to turn the car around and told Hughes he needed
to take the gun back. Hughes said the person who gave him the
gun was at the barbershop and he would return it to him there.
At the barbershop, Young greeted a few people, then left,
without Hughes, to visit his son. After several hours, Young
returned to the barbershop to pick Hughes up. Young did not ask
Hughes if he had gotten rid of the gun.
That same day, defendant City of Chicago police officers
Anthony Pavone, Robert Peraino, and Nathaniel Warner (the
“defendant officers”) were conducting a street stop for a drug
transaction they had witnessed. At some point during this stop,
Warner received information from an anonymous citizen or
confidential informant that Young and Hughes had been seen
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nearby in a white Chevy sedan with a gun. Warner told Pavone and
Peraino that there were “two male blacks” in a white Chevy with
a gun and provided a location and direction of travel. Dkt. No.
53-4, Peraino Dep. at 30:8–17. Pavone and Peraino left to search
for the car.
A. Stop and Arrest
Pavone and Peraino soon found a white Chevy sedan and
observed the rear-seat passenger was not wearing a seatbelt, a
traffic violation. Pavone and Peraino approached the car with
guns drawn and yelled “freeze” and “let me see your hands.” Dkt.
No. 53-5, Young Dep. at 72:2–8. As the officers approached,
Hughes, sitting in the rear seat, told Young “take this.” Id. at
72:6–22. Young, sitting in the driver seat, saw Hughes was wiping
a gun on his shirt. Young had never handled or owned a firearm;
he responded “hell no.” Id. at 68:10–12. Young put his hands up,
and Hughes placed the gun on the car’s armrest. Young felt the
gun poke him for a few seconds. Pavone and Peraino contend that
they did not see any occupants moving while they approached.
Pavone ordered Young to exit the vehicle and he complied.
Pavone maintains that Young then told him there was a gun in the
car. Young maintains he denied having a gun when Pavone asked.
The officers soon noticed a gun on the center console of the car
and asked Young about the gun. Young responded the gun was not
3
his and it belonged to Hughes. Pavone denies that Young ever
said the gun was Hughes’s.
Hughes and Young were arrested around 6:45pm. They were
then taken to the 15th District, placed in separate interview
rooms, and advised of their Miranda rights. At some point, the
defendant officers learned Young and Hughes were convicted
felons. Warner and Peraino knew Hughes was a high-ranking member
of the Mafia Insane Vice Lords, but none of the defendant
officers had heard of or met Young before that day.
Hughes was interrogated first and told the officers that
the gun was the “block’s gun.” Dkt. No. 62 at ¶ 32. Hughes
argued he could not have carried the gun as he was wearing
sweatpants and on crutches and stated that Young better have a
gun on him because Hughes had recently been shot. At some point,
one of the officers accompanied Hughes to the hospital because
his gunshot wound needed cleaning.
Young was interrogated next. He repeatedly told the
officers that the gun was not his. He testified that Warner told
him that Hughes said the gun was his and he responded that was
not true. According to Young, Warner then showed him a cellphone video of Hughes in which Hughes claimed that he didn’t
know the gun was in the car or that Young had the gun. Defendant
officers deny there was ever a video taken of Hughes and that
Young was ever shown such a video. Young also testified that
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Warner told him he knew the gun belonged to Hughes and that
Young would be released and could go home in a few hours. Warner
denies he said as much.
Defendant officers also prepared various police reports,
which all list Hughes as the possessor and owner of the gun
recovered from the white Chevy. Warner testified that the
reports only allowed officers to list one owner and possessor of
a gun, and he could have listed Young instead. However, Officer
Pavone did not know why Hughes, rather than Young, was listed as
the gun’s owner on the reports.
Warner then called the State’s Attorney’s office. Assistant
State’s Attorney Liam Reardon returned the call and Warner told
him what Hughes and Young had said. Reardon suggested that
Warner obtain written statements from Hughes and Young if they
were willing. Hughes, then at West Suburban Hospital, made the
following written statement:
I Corey Hughes is giving this statement on July 2,
2015 without coerced. I did not handled the firearm on
this day but did in the past month. As a result my
prints may be on the firearm.
Dkt. No. 62 at ¶ 64.
Young also agreed to provide a written statement. Young
wrote that he picked up Hughes, Hughes said he had a gun but
would drop it off at the barbershop, Young dropped off Hughes at
5
the barbershop, left, then returned to pick Hughes up. Young
also wrote the gun was not his.
Young testified that Warner read his statement, told him
there was information he could leave out, crumpled the statement
into a ball, provided Young another sheet of paper, and told him
to write another statement. Warner then instructed Young to
write that he was not being coerced, then asked Young questions
and instructed Young to write out the answers to those questions
on the statement. Young also testified that Pavone and Peraino
were present for Warner’s actions, read Young’s second
statement, and agreed on it. Defendant officers deny all three
of them were present, that Young wrote more than one statement,
that his first statement was rejected by Warner, that Warner
coached Young about what to include on the second statement, and
that they agreed to any of Young’s statements. The parties,
however, agree that Young’s second (or, rather, only) statement
reads:
I’m giving this statement of my own free will. Without
being coercesed (sic). On 7/2/2015 at around 2:00p.m.
I picked up Corey Hughes at Chicago Ave. and Waller.
Then I helped him into the vehicle to go to the Barber
Shop. After driving around for a while we pulled up to
the Barbershop. He stated that “I got the Pipe on me.”
After leaving the Barbershop, we was driving on
Cicero, I turned into the gas station on Adams and was
approached by law enforcement. They instructed us to
show our hands upon raising my hands I felt a poke in
my back. I slightly turn while simultaneously raising
my hands I felt a poke in my backside. There was a
gun. The police ordered me out of the vehicle and ask
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if anything was in the vehicle. I said yes a gun. . .
. When Corey stated “I got pipe” that’s slang for
handgun.
Dkt. No. 62 at ¶ 53.
Young maintains he was never told he could write what he
wanted in the second statement and was not given the opportunity
to add what he believed were important facts, namely that he did
not know Hughes initially had a gun, he believed Hughes left
that gun at the barbershop, he did not know Hughes still had a
gun when he picked Hughes up, and did not learn Hughes still had
that gun until he was pulled over. Defendants dispute this and
claim that Warner merely told Young to write about his day
before he was stopped. In either event, Young admitted that
everything contained in that statement was true. Young, however,
admitted that the video of Hughes he was shown did not influence
him to make a written statement or the content of that
statement.
B. Legal Proceedings
Warner then relayed Hughes and Young’s written statements
to the felony review department of the State’s Attorney’s
office, which approved felony charges for unlawful use of a
weapon and armed habitual criminal offenses. Generally, the
State’s Attorney’s office will rely on the information provided
by police to determine whether to approve felony charges and
defendant officers knew the information they provided would be
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used to criminally prosecute Young. Peraino signed criminal
complaints for those charges.
On July 9, 2015, Young had a preliminary hearing in front
of Judge Ann O’Donnell in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois. Peraino testified that Young stated Hughes told him he
had a handgun on the way to the barbershop, and that after the
barbershop, he was stopped by police and felt a poke in his
back, he was ordered out of the vehicle, and a handgun was
recovered from the vehicle. Peraino also testified that Hughes
stated that Young better have a gun on him because he had been
shot at and that Hughes said he did not handle the gun on that
day. Judge O’Donnell found probable cause was established for
both Young and Hughes.
Young received a $100,000 bond at his bond hearing. He
could not pay it and was held in jail for over a year while he
awaited trial. At trial, the prosecution dropped the unlawful
use of a weapon charge and proceeded solely on the armed
habitual criminal charge. Young’s written statement was not used
as evidence. Young and Hughes were found not guilty.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving
party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
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district court of the basis for its motion . . . .” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “To survive
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish some
genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in her favor.” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d
769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
A. Unlawful Detention
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on
Young’s unlawful detention claim because the undisputed evidence
establishes that the defendant officers had probable cause to
arrest and detain Young. Specifically, Defendants point to i)
the tip Warner received, ii) officers Pavone and Peraino finding
a gun on the center console of the car Young was driving, iii)
Pavone and Peraino’s testimony that they did not see Hughes
place the gun there, iv) Young’s written statement that Hughes
told him he had a gun in the car, and v) Hughes’s statement that
he did not handle the gun on the day he was arrested. Young
responds that defendants overlook the core constitutional wrong
he complains of: the use of “false information” to initiate
criminal proceedings against him. Dkt. No. 61, Resp. Br. at 8.
He also responds that there are factual disputes about how
police collected his and Hughes’s statements, who provided the
tip Warner received, whether the arresting officers saw Hughes
9
with the gun as they approached the car, and whether police
reports undermine the conclusion that Young possessed the gun.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and is effective against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. Amd. IV, XIV. A seizure,
including pretrial detention, is reasonable only if based on
probable cause to believe the detainee has committed a crime.
Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill. (“Manuel I”), 137 S. Ct. 911,
919–20 (2017). “[P]robable cause is a common-sense inquiry
requiring only a probability of criminal activity[.]” Whitlock
v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
“Probable cause is assessed objectively” based on the
information known to officers and the conclusions that might
reasonably be drawn from that information. Holmes v. Vill. of
Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). To determine
whether probable cause existed, I may consider the officers’
collective knowledge of facts. See United States v. Howard, 883
F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2018).
The undisputed facts demonstrate the defendant officers had
probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Young.
There is no dispute that Hughes told Young he had a gun, the
arresting officers found a gun on the center console of the car
Young was driving, the only other occupant of that vehicle,
Hughes, stated that he did not handle the gun that day, and
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Young had prior felony convictions. On these facts, a reasonable
officer would reasonably believe that Young had committed the
offenses of unlawful use of a weapon by a convicted felon and
being an armed habitual criminal. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (“It
is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess . . . any firearm
or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a
felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.”)
and 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (“A person commits the offense of being an
armed habitual criminal if he or she receives, sells, possesses,
or transfers any firearm after having been convicted a total of
2 or more times of any combination of” certain enumerated
offenses).
The fatal flaw in Young’s arguments is that a jury could
not reasonably find that the purported false statements and
factual disputes that Young points to would make the defendant
officers’ probable cause determination unreasonable. The false
information Young complains of is his second written statement,
which the officers relayed to the State’s Attorney’s office for
charging approval. Young admits that all the facts in that
statement are true. But he contends the omissions in that
statement created a “false impression” that he had knowledge
that a gun was in the car when he was pulled over. Dkt. No. 61,
Resp. Br. 7. According to Young, that statement omitted the
facts that he picked up Hughes for two trips and believed Hughes
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had disposed of the gun in between those two trips. In essence,
Young is arguing that a jury could reasonably conclude that his
omitted statements negate the other evidence establishing
probable cause because they indicate he did not know Hughes
still had a gun when he was pulled over. I disagree. The
officers had no obligation to resolve the issue of whether Young
knew of the gun found next to his seat in the car he was
driving. Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Once an officer has established probable cause, “he need not
continue investigating in order to test the suspect’s claim of
innocence.”) (citation omitted).
None of the other factual disputes Young points to create a
triable issue over whether the defendant officers had probable
cause to initiate proceedings against him. Young challenges the
use of his and Hughes’s statements as a basis for probable cause
because the officers allegedly made and destroyed a video
recording of Hughes. Young argues this “establishes that
Defendants are willing to play fast and loose with the taking
and preserving of statements given by suspects and have no
qualms about doing whatever it takes to get suspects charged.”
Dkt. No. 61, Resp. Br. at 8. Young, however, admits that this
video had no impact on his decision to make a written statement
or on the content he decided to include therein. As such, I
cannot say that this video raises an issue as to whether the
12
officers had probable cause beyond the insinuation that they
engaged in generalized misconduct. Springer v. Durflinger, 518
F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (Speculation cannot “be used to
manufacture a genuine issue of fact.”).
Young also argues that foundational issues about Hughes’
written statement make it “patently unreliable.” Dkt. No. 61.
Resp. Br. at 7-8. True, the officers’ testimony and police
reports do not present a clear record of which individual
officer took Hughes’s statement or how that statement was taken.
That said, Young does not explain how the unreliability of this
written statement would make the defendant officers’ probable
cause determination unreasonable, especially when Hughes’s oral
statements reiterate his denial that he possessed the gun.
Young also argues that there are fact issues over whether
Warner received information from an “anonymous citizen” or a
“confidential informant” and whether that person named Hughes
and Young or “two male blacks.” Dkt. No. 61, Resp. Br. at 5.
Young contends that these issues show Warner is trying to
“artificially enhance the presence of probable cause for the
stop[.]” Id. However, even if Warner did so, it would not negate
a later probable cause determination based on evidence collected
at that stop. Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir.
2019) (“[T]he fact that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal
detention does not make it any less relevant to establishing
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probable cause for the arrest because the exclusionary rule does
not apply in a civil suit under § 1983 against police
officers.”) (citations omitted).
Young asserts there is also a fact issue as to whether the
officers saw Hughes with the gun as they approached the car.
Young points to his testimony that Hughes placed the gun on the
center console as police approached the car and the arresting
officers’ admission that they could see Hughes sitting against
the rear window at the same time. Similarly, Young argues that
police reports list Hughes, not him, as the owner of the
firearm. These issues are not material to the question of
whether there was probable cause to institute proceedings
against Young because Illinois law recognizes that two
individuals can be in joint possession of a firearm. People v.
Hill, 589 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1992) (“The law
is clear that the exclusive dominion and control required to
establish constructive possession is not diminished by evidence
of others’ access to the contraband.”) (citations omitted).
Evidence that Hughes handled or owned the gun would not make it
unreasonable for the officers to conclude that Young had
constructive possession of the gun found next to his seat in the
car. See Holmes, 511 F.3d at 679 (“Probable cause requires more
than a bare suspicion of criminal activity, but it does not
require evidence sufficient to support a conviction.”).
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Summary judgment is granted on Count II.
B. Due Process
Defendants argue that Lewis bars Young from proceeding on
the theory that defendants violated his due process rights by
fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence. Young
concedes that he is not pursuing a claim that defendants
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). Young, however, argues that Lewis should not
bar his due process claim based on fabricated evidence because
i) Lewis is inconsistent with McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.
2149 (2019), ii) Lewis is inconsistent with prior Seventh
Circuit decisions, and iii) Lewis does not bar his claim that
defendant officers corrupted the criminal process by “providing
false information, reports, and testimony to prosecutors and the
criminal court.” Dkt. No. 61, Resp. Br. at 11.
Defendants are correct that Young cannot bring a due
process claim for unlawful pretrial detention. Manuel I
abrogated older Seventh Circuit precedent holding that pretrial
detention after legal process started did not give rise to a
Fourth Amendment claim but could constitute a due process claim
if state law failed to provide an adequate remedy. Manuel I, 137
S. Ct. at 916 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe,
256 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2001). After Manuel I, the Seventh
Circuit explained that all § 1983 claims for wrongful pretrial
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detention sound in the Fourth Amendment. Manuel v. City of
Joliet (“Manuel II”), 903 F.3d 667, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2018).
Then, in Lewis, the Seventh Circuit applied these decisions to
overrule its prior precedent in Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831 (7th
Cir. 2018) to the extent it held the injury of wrongful pretrial
detention may be remedied under § 1983 as a violation of the Due
Process Clause. Lewis, 914 F.3d at 479.
McDonough does not limit Lewis’s application to this case.
In McDonough, the Court considered when the statute of
limitations begins to run for evidence fabrication claims. 139
S. Ct. 2154-55. The Court noted that the Second Circuit
interpreted the claim as arising under the Due Process Clause
and assumed “without deciding that the Second Circuit’s
articulations of the right at issue and its contours are sound”
as certiorari was not granted on those issues. Id. at 2155.
Nor does earlier Seventh Circuit law, explaining that the
use of fabricated evidence to deprive a person of liberty is a
due process violation, save Young’s claim. See Armstrong v.
Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 556 (7th Cir. 2015); Saunders-El v. Rhode,
778 F.3d 556, 560-61 (7th Cir. 2015); Whitlock v. Brueggermann,
682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). As the Lewis panel noted,
prior decisions holding that pretrial detention based on police
fabrications violates the Due Process Clause “cannot be
reconciled” with Manuel II. 914 F.3d at 479.
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Young’s argument that he has a due process claim based on
defendant officers’ use of false evidence in his pretrial
proceedings likewise fails. He contends that false evidence had
a “real life effect on the bond court, preliminary hearing, and
trial judge. . . .” Dkt. No. 61, Resp. Br. at 11. He does not
specify which information was false and the only such effect he
identifies is that his bond was set at an amount too high for
him to pay. In other words, he complains he was detained due to
false evidence. Consequently, Young’s claim that false evidence
tainted his pretrial proceedings sounds in the Fourth Amendment
and fails for the same reasons as his unlawful detention claim.
Summary judgment is granted on Count IV.
C. Malicious Prosecution
To prove malicious prosecution under Illinois law, Young
must establish: “(1) he was subjected to judicial proceedings;
(2) for which there was no probable cause; (3) the defendants
instituted or continued the proceedings maliciously; (4) the
proceedings were terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; and (5)
there was an injury.” Martinez v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 838,
849 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sneed v. Rybicki, 146 F.3d 478,
480–81 (7th Cir. 1998)). As Young has not mustered facts from
which a jury could reasonably find the absence of probable
cause, summary judgment is granted on Count VII.
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D. Conspiracy
As Young’s other § 1983 claims fail, so does his § 1983
conspiracy claim because “conspiracy is not an independent basis
of liability in § 1983 actions.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613,
617 (7th Cir. 2008). Likewise, Young’s state law conspiracy
claim fails because he has not marshalled evidence that “a
combination of two or more persons for the purpose of
accomplishing, through concerted action, either an illegal
object or a legal object by an illegal means.” Rodgers v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 733 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2000). Summary judgment is granted for Counts VI
and VIII.
C. Derivative Liability
To succeed on his failure to intervene claim, Young “must
demonstrate that the [defendant officers] (1) knew that a
constitutional violation was committed; and (2) had a realistic
opportunity to prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d
335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017). As Young has not offered evidence that
he suffered a constitutional violation, his failure to intervene
claim fails.
The failure of Young’s constitutional claims likewise dooms
his claims against the City of Chicago. The City cannot be
liable for indemnity or on the theory of respondeat superior as
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the defendant officers are not liable for any underlying
constitutional violation. Gordon v. Degelmann, 29 F.3d 295, 298
(7th Cir. 1994) (“You can’t have vicarious liability without
primary liability.”).
Summary judgment is granted on Count V, IX, and X.
ENTER ORDER:
_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: November 27, 2019
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