Haywood v. People Stat of Illinois et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 2/5/2018: For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Haywood's petition for writ of habeas corpus [dkt. no. 1]. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealab ility, concluding that Haywood has not made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), as reasonable jurists would not dispute that the Illinois Appellate Court's application of Strickland was reasonable. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). Mailed notice. (pjg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

FREDRIC HAYWOOD,
Petitioner,
vs.
GENE BEASLEY, Warden,
FCI – Forrest City, and
LISA MADIGAN, Illinois Attorney General,
Respondents.

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Case No. 17 C 4899

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
On December 27, 2012, after pleading guilty in state court to charges relating to
his participation in a mortgage fraud scheme, Frederic Haywood was sentenced by a
state court judge. Haywood argues his attorney in that case rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in allowing the sentencing to go forward on that date. He
contends that there was an understanding that he was not to be sentenced in state
court until after he was sentenced on related federal charges but that his attorney
allowed the state-court sentencing to go forward despite this. Haywood contends that
as a result, the sentence later imposed in the federal case was longer than it would
have been if the sentencing proceedings had occurred in the agreed-upon sequence.
Background
Between 2002 and 2007, Haywood participated in a scheme to provide
fraudulent mortgage applications to banks and profit from the resulting loans. The

federal charge against Haywood alleges that he "fraudulently obtained in excess of $10
million in mortgage loan proceeds from mortgage lenders by submitting loan
applications and supporting loan documents containing materially false and fraudulent
statements." Ex. F at 35-36 (federal indictment). 1 After federal and state grand juries
each indicted Haywood on charges arising from his participation in this scheme, he pled
guilty to federal charges in April 2012 and state charges in August 2012. Haywood was
represented by different attorneys in the federal and state proceedings.
Haywood contends the attorney in the state-court case botched an agreement
with the prosecution to defer his state sentencing until after the federal sentencing. The
sequence of the sentencing hearings was significant because the imposition of a
sentence in Haywood's state-court case would increase Haywood's criminal history
score under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In short, a more extensive criminal
history could lead to a longer federal sentence.
On November 8, 2012, Haywood's attorney told the state judge that Haywood
would be sentenced in federal court on December 14, 2012. Ex. M at 204 (Nov. 8, 2012
transcript). Although this was true at the time, on the day before the federal sentencing
was set to take place, the federal judge presiding over the case continued it to a later
date—at Haywood's request because his attorney in that case needed more time
(Haywood was present in court when this took place). United States v. Haywood, Case
No. 08 C 1023-2, dkt. nos. 267, 273 (N.D. Ill.). Thus on December 27, 2012, when the
state court sentenced Haywood to twelve years in prison, it acted before the federal
court imposed a sentence. Ex. M at 219 (Dec. 27, 2013 transcript). Indeed, the federal
1

The Court uses the ECF numbering, as many of the exhibits contain multiple
documents with inconsistent numbering.
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court did not impose a sentence until December 10, 2013. Haywood, Case No. 08 C
1023-2, dkt. no. 285.
The impact of the state sentences upon Haywood's federal sentence is unclear.
Several months after state sentencing, the federal officer tasked with compiling
Haywood's presentence report added the new sentences to the report. See Ex. F at 92
(Statement of Correction). Based on this modification, the corrected report
recommended a higher Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. Yet Judge Guzman, who
issued Haywood's federal sentence, stated that "if the guideline range is found to be
improperly calculated the sentence would remain the same, because the sentence is
based upon the Court's consideration of the §3553 factors." Habeas Mem. at 18
(Statement of Reasons). Judge Guzman sentenced Haywood to 151 months and later
reduced this to 145 months. Haywood, Case No. 08 C 1023-2, dkt. no. 390.
Haywood filed both direct and post-conviction appeals. On direct appeal,
Haywood argued the trial court did not adequately warn him of certain procedural steps
required before he could appeal his conviction. Ex. B at 1 (direct appeal brief). The
Illinois Appellate Court dismissed Haywood's appeal. People v. Haywood, 2015 IL App
(1st) 130859-U. The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal
(PLA). Ex. E at 1 (direct appeal PLA and order).
While his direct appeal was pending, Haywood filed a post-conviction petition,
alleging his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to delay the state
sentencing. Ex. H at 1 (post-conviction brief). Haywood argued that the state court
wrongly relied upon evidence outside the record to deny his ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim. Id. at 11. The trial court denied his post-conviction petition, and the

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Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. People v. Haywood, 2017 IL App (1st) 142949-U. The
appellate court held that Haywood could not present a colorable ineffective assistance
claim, even if the contested evidence outside of the record was not considered. Id. ¶¶
14-15. The court noted that Haywood's attorney successfully delayed the plea and
sentencing for months. Id. ¶ 15. The court also noted that Haywood was aware of the
possible consequences in federal court, but willingly proceeded to sentencing in state
court before the federal court sentenced him. Id. Haywood filed a PLA on the same
ground, which the Illinois Supreme Court denied. Ex. K at 1 (post-conviction PLA and
order).
Discussion
I.

Timeliness
Haywood filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A section 2254 motion must be brought within a one-year period of limitation that runs
from the latest of four dates listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The only date relevant to
Haywood's petition is "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Haywood was sentenced on December 27, 2012. Ex. M at 207 (Transcript for
Dec. 27, 2017). He filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2013, Ex. L at 9 (state
docket), and a PLA that was denied on May 25, 2015. Ex. E at 1 (direct appeal PLA
and order).
Respondents contend that Haywood's limitation period expired while he tried to
seek direct review because he did not comply with procedural prerequisites under state
law for appealing a conviction after pleading guilty. Resp. Br. at 8. For this reason,

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respondents contend, the habeas corpus statute of limitations kept running during the
pendency of Haywood's direct appeal. Id. But respondents cite no cases supporting
this proposition. Id. And as the plain text of the statute makes clear, the one-year
limitations period began to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), which did not occur until the
petitioner's PLA was denied. Ex. E at 1 (direct appeal PLA and order). Haywood filed a
timely notice of appeal, and his case was pending on direct review at all times through
May 25, 2015. Nothing in the statute suggests that the time that a criminal conviction is
on direct appeal tolls the statute only if the direct appeal has been "properly filed," in
contrast to the parallel provision tolling the statute during the time that a "properly filed"
state post-conviction petition is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In short, the
time for Haywood to file a federal habeas corpus petition did not begin to run until his
direct appeal was concluded by the denial of his PLA.
Haywood's petition is timely, as the limitation period was tolled by his filing of a
state post-conviction petition on April 29, 2014, while the case was still pending on
direct appeal. "The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be counted toward any
period of limitation." Id. As a result, the one-year limitations period was tolled until the
end of post-conviction review, May 24, 2017. Ex. K at 1 (Order denying post-conviction
PLA). Haywood's habeas corpus petition, filed on June 22, 2017, is therefore timely .
II.

Analysis
A habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to relief if an underlying state judgment

"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

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clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Haywood contends his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. To prevail on his claim, Haywood must
demonstrate (1) objectively unreasonable performance and (2) resulting prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Haywood contends the state court
that reviewed his post-conviction petition unreasonably applied Strickland when it
concluded that his attorney had not performed in an objectively unreasonable manner
by failing to further continue his state sentencing hearing so that it would take place
after his federal sentencing. Habeas Mem. at 4.
To demonstrate the attorney rendered "objectively unreasonable" performance,
Haywood must show his attorney's performance "fell outside the wide range of
competent representation" permitted under the Sixth Amendment. United States v.
Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2011). But "[e]stablishing that a state court's
application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential' and when the
two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105
(2011) (citations omitted).
In affirming the dismissal of Haywood's post-conviction petition, the state
appellate court stated it was evaluating his argument under the "objectively
unreasonable" performance element of Strickland. Haywood, 2017 IL App (1st)
142949-U ¶ 13. The state appellate court correctly described the Strickland
performance standard, and it did not unreasonably apply that standard. The court relied
on three points to conclude the attorney's representation was not deficient. First,

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counsel's failure to further continue the state-court sentencing did not violate any right to
which Haywood was legally entitled. Haywood, 2017 IL App (1st) 142949-U ¶ 15.
Second, the attorney's decision occurred after nearly two years in which he had
continued the state-court sentencing. Id. The Court notes that Haywood's federal
sentencing hearings were being continued alongside his state sentencing hearings, see,
e.g., United States v. Haywood, No. 08 C 1023-2, dkt. no. 267 (Motion to Continue
Sentencing Hearing), so Haywood's attorney reasonably could have concluded that the
continued delays of state sentencing were no longer productive. Finally, Haywood
himself was aware of the possible federal sentencing consequences but still agreed to
allow the state-court sentencing to proceed. Haywood, 2017 IL App (1st) 142949-U ¶
15. As the appellate court stated, "we cannot conclude defense counsel was deficient
for permitting defendant to proceed to sentencing after fully informing him of the
potential enhanced sentence in federal court." Id. (emphasis added). The Court
concludes that Illinois Appellate Court's application of Strickland to Haywood's counsel's
conduct is supported by adequate reasoning. Because Haywood's Strickland claim fails
on the unreasonable performance element, the Court does not consider the prejudice
element. Strickland, 466 U.S. 697 ("there is no reason for a court . . . to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.").
For these reasons, the Court denies Haywood's petition.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Haywood's petition for writ of habeas
corpus [dkt. no. 1]. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability, concluding
that Haywood has not made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

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right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), as reasonable jurists would not dispute that the Illinois
Appellate Court's application of Strickland was reasonable. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 483-84 (2000).

________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: February 5, 2018

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