Myers, Jr. v. Berryhill
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Michael T. Mason on 12/20/2018.(rbf, )
0IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID MYERS, JR.
Claimant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the U.S. Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
17 CV 4908
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Myers, Jr. (“Claimant”) filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”), denying his claim for disability benefits. The Commissioner has filed
a cross-motion asking the Court to uphold the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). For the reasons set forth below, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
13) is granted and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 20) is
denied.
I. Background
A. Procedural History
Claimant filed his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on September 5, 2013, alleging that his disability
began on January 9, 2013. (R. 177-89.) Claimant’s applications were denied initially
and on reconsideration. (R. 110-14, 118-21.) Claimant requested a hearing before an
ALJ, which was held on April 4, 2016. (R. 30-57.) On June 24, 2016, the ALJ issued a
1
written decision finding that Claimant was not disabled. (R. 10-29.) On May 4, 2017,
Claimant’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied, making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6.) This action followed.
B. Relevant Medical Evidence
1. Examining and Treating Sources
Claimant filed for benefits after suffering from depression following the death of
his wife in 2012. (R. 513.) In March of 2013, Claimant was hospitalized for suicidal
ideation among other things, and the hospital psychiatrist Mehta Harsha, M.D.,
diagnosed him with major depression, recurrent with suicidal potential. (R. 332.)
Following this hospital stay, Claimant began seeing Dr. Milton Daugherty, who cleared
Claimant for work as of April 22, 2013. (R. 501.) Claimant stopped seeing Dr.
Daugherty due to insurance issues. (R. 468.) In June of 2014, Claimant again sought
treatment for his depression, and his primary care physician, Dr. Lionel Barberousse,
diagnosed anxiety and depression, psychotic. (R. 427-31.) He prescribed three
psychiatric medications after Claimant reported hearing voices telling him to hurt
himself. (R. 427-31.)
One month later, in July of 2014, Claimant began seeing psychiatrist Dr. Carl Bell
(R. 468.) Dr. Bell diagnosed Claimant with depressive disorder, NOS; anxiety disorder,
NOS; and mixed development disorder. (R. 469.) Dr. Bell also noted a severe memory
impairment, impaired intellectual functioning, depressed and blank mood, flat affect, and
slowed motor activity. (Id.) In October of 2014, Dr. Bell noted that Claimant had poor
judgment and insight, bland mood, and impaired intellectual functioning. (R. 466.) In
January of 2015, Claimant stated he was losing his home. (R. 464.) At this time, Dr.
2
Bell again noted impaired memory and impaired intellectual functioning. (Id.) In April of
2015, the utilities in Claimant’s home had been shut off, and he began sleeping in his
car. (R. 462.) Dr. Bell stated he was “intellectually challenged” and found a minor
impairment in memory and poor judgment and insight. (Id.) Dr. Bell also stated he was
easily distractible. (Id.) By July of 2015, Claimant was completely homeless, and Dr.
Bell again noted he was living in his car, was easily distractible, and was impaired in
memory and intellectual functioning. (R. 460.) Dr. Bell continued to note that
Claimant’s depression was worse due to his homelessness through January of 2016.
(R. 456, 458.)
On July 15, 2015, Dr. Bell completed a Mental Impairment Questionnaire. (R.
471.) He repeated his diagnoses of depressive disorder, NOS; anxiety disorder, NOS;
and mixed development disorder. (Id.) He also noted that Claimant was easily
distractible, had poor memory, sleep disturbance, recurrent panic attacks, difficulty
thinking or concentrating, and generalized persistent anxiety. (Id.) He assessed a low
IQ or reduced intellectual functioning. (Id.) He opined that Claimant would miss work
about once a month due to his impairments. (Id.) He also indicated that Claimant
would be moderately limited in the ability to sustain ordinary routine work without special
supervision. (Id.) Dr. Bell opined that Claimant would have no restriction in activities of
daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace, and would have one or two episodes of
decompensation in work settings. (R. 473.)
2. Consultative Examiner
3
Dr. Kenneth M. Levitan completed a consultative examination on November 24,
2013. (R. 414.) Dr. Levitan noted underlying anxiety. (Id.) He also noted that Claimant
became more “overtly depressed” with underlying anger as the interview progressed.
(Id.) Claimant reported occasional hallucinations and paranoid concerns. (Id.)
Claimant also acknowledged a history of alcohol and drug abuse. (R. 415.) Claimant
also reported that his 29 year-old daughter died five years ago from heart disease, and
Dr. Levitan noted that Claimant’s sadness increased after reporting it. (R. 416.)
Claimant explained that he managed his own finances, and was capable of washing
clothes, cooking, cleaning, and mopping. (Id.) Dr. Levitan noted difficulty in
concentrating, fair memory, limited insight, good judgment, and an affect that was
outgoing, very sad, and with “much underlying anger.” (R. 417.) Dr. Levitan diagnosed
major depression, past chronic alcoholism and chronic alcohol abuse, chronic drug
abuse, and hypertension. (Id.) He stated that Claimant could perform simple and
routine tasks, would have difficulty handling moderate work pressure and stress, and
could follow, understand, and retain instructions. (R. 417.)
3. Agency Physicians
Dr. Kirk Boyenga reviewed Claimant’s medical records and assessed his
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) on December 6, 2013. (R. 58-68.) He opined
that Claimant was partially credible, finding him capable of performing simple tasks. (R.
64.) He believed that Claimant’s adaptation abilities are limited, but that he could
complete routine, repetitive tasks and could follow instructions. (Id.) He further opined
that Claimant had moderate limitations in his ability to understand and remember
detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; work in
4
coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted; to complete a normal
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and
to interact appropriately with the general public. (R. 66-67.) On reconsideration, Dr.
Thomas Low affirmed Dr. Boyenga’s assessment with little discussion. (R. 82-93.)
C. Claimant’s Testimony
Claimant appeared at the administrative hearing with counsel on April 5, 2016.
Claimant testified that he currently lives in his car, and that he had done so for two and
a half years or more. (R. 39-40.) Claimant’s car is parked outside of a friend’s house,
and it no longer is a working vehicle. (R. 40.) Claimant stated that he could take
showers, use the bathroom, or microwave food either at his friend’s house or at his
brother-in-law’s house. (Id.)
Claimant testified that his only previous job was at Keebler, where he put boxes
on the “skids,” tagged them, and took them to the shipping area. (R. 40-41.) Claimant
retired early in 2013 when he felt he could no longer work. (R. 41.) Claimant reported
that he lived off food stamps after he lost his house. (R. 42.) Claimant stated he was
on medication for depression, anxiety, and hypertension, but that he was receiving no
counseling. (Id.) He had also been in touch with Social Services about low-income
housing. (R. 43.)
Claimant reported having no social life and that he was not close with his family.
(R. 46.) He stated he has not looked for a job since he retired from Keeble because he
did not have the desire to get a job. (Id.) Claimant walked from his car to his brother-inlaw’s house or to another friend’s house, which amounted to a couple of miles. (R. 47.)
He also stated that he did not leave his car if it rained. (R. 48.) Claimant could go to
5
the store if he borrowed a car, where he would buy TV dinners to store at his friend’s
house. (Id.) When he had the chance to cook, Claimant stated he could fry chicken on
a skillet. (R. 49.) He also reported that he occasionally watched television at his
friend’s house. (Id.)
Claimant testified that his medication only worked for a few hours, and that even
on his medication, he did not feel well enough to work at his old job. (R. 50, 53.) He
also stated that he had a hard time being around people and did not have the energy or
desire to work or do much else. (R. 51-52.)
D. Vocational Expert Testimony
Vocational Expert (“VE”) Pam Tucker also appeared at the hearing. The ALJ
asked the VE to consider someone of Claimant’s age, education, and work history, who
could perform simple, routine tasks, make simple work-related decisions, and be around
the public occasionally. (R. 55.) The VE stated that such an individual would be
incapable of performing Claimant’s past work, as his past work required more than
simple, routine tasks. (Id.) The VE testified that such an individual could, however,
perform work as a laundry worker, machine feeder, or transportation cleaner. (R. 56.)
Next, the ALJ asked the VE to consider the same limitations in the first hypothetical, but
add that the individual would be absent at least two days a month. (Id.) The VE stated
that all competitive work would be precluded. (Id.)
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
This Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence
and free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940
6
(7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence; it is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). We must consider
the entire administrative record, but will not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d
863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)). This Court will “conduct a critical review of the evidence” and
will not let the Commissioner’s decision stand “if it lacks evidentiary support or an
adequate discussion of the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539 (quoting Steele, 290 F.3d
at 940).
In addition, while the ALJ “is not required to address every piece of evidence,” he
“must build an accurate and logical bridge from evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford,
227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must “sufficiently articulate [his] assessment of the evidence
to assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence ... [and to enable] us to
trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.” Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir.
1993) (per curiam) (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985)).
B. Analysis under the Social Security Act
In order to qualify for SSI or DIB, a claimant must be “disabled” under the Social
Security Act (the "Act"). A person is disabled under the Act if “he or she has an inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a
7
claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the following five-step inquiry: “(1) whether
the claimant is currently employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment,
(3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that the Commissioner considers
conclusively disabling, (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling
impairment, whether he can perform past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is
capable of performing any work in the national economy.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d
1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). The claimant has the burden of establishing disability at
steps one through four. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001). If the
claimant reaches step five, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that “the
claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.” Id. at 886.
Here the ALJ applied the five-step process to reach his decision denying
Claimant’s application for benefits. Prior to step one, the ALJ found that Claimant met
the insured status requirements through December 31, 2017. (R. 15.) At step one, the
ALJ determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
January 9, 2013, the alleged onset date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ determined that
Claimant had the severe impairment of depression. (Id.) The ALJ found that Claimant’s
hypertension and obesity were non-severe. (R. 16.) At step three, the ALJ concluded
that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the Commissioner’s listed impairments. (Id.)
The ALJ went on to assess Claimant’s RFC, finding Claimant had the residual
functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the
following nonexertional limitations: he can perform simple, routine tasks, make simple
work-related decisions, and be around the public occasionally. (R. 18.) At step four,
8
the ALJ found that Claimant was unable to perform his past relevant work. (R. 21.)
Finally, the ALJ found that Claimant could perform work in the national economy,
including in the positions of laundry worker, machine feeder, or transportation cleaner.
(R. 23.)
Claimant now argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence and requires remand because (1) the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE and RFC
failed to account for Claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, (2) the
ALJ improperly weighed Dr. Daugherty’s opinion, and (2) the ALJ erred in his subjective
symptom determination by improperly relying on activities of daily living. We address
Claimant’s argument below, ultimately finding that the ALJ’s opinion should be
remanded.
C. The ALJ Erred in His Hypothetical to the VE with Respect to Claimant’s
Moderate Limitations in Concentration, Persistence, or Pace.
Claimant first contends that the ALJ failed to account for his moderate limitations
in concentration, persistence, or pace in his hypothetical to the VE. For the reasons
that follow, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the VE did not
properly include those limitations, necessitating remand.
At step five, the Commissioner must demonstrate the existence of “significant
numbers of jobs in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(5)(ii). To do so, the
ALJ may rely on the testimony of a VE, to whom he poses hypothetical questions that
account for the claimant’s age, education, work history, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). In the Seventh Circuit, “both the hypothetical question posed to
the VE and the ALJ’s RFC assessment must incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations
supported by the medical record.” Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014); see
9
also O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Our cases, taken
together, suggest that the most effective way to ensure that the VE is apprised fully of
the claimant’s limitations is to include all of them directly in the hypothetical”); Indoranto
v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If the ALJ relies on testimony from a
vocational expert, the hypothetical question he poses to the VE must incorporate all of
the claimant’s limitations supported by the medical evidence in the record.”).
“Among the mental limitations that the VE must consider are deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace.” Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813-14 (7th Cir.
2015). Although it is not necessary that the ALJ use the precise terminology of
“concentration,” “persistence,” or “pace,” the Court cannot assume that a VE is apprised
of such limitations unless he or she has independently reviewed the medical record or
has heard testimony that directly addressed Claimant’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace. Id. at 814; Yurt, 758 F.3d at 857; O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at
619. Here, the VE testified to having listened to Claimant’s testimony regarding work
history, but nothing else. (R. 55.) There was no indication that the VE independently
reviewed any portion of the record. Furthermore, although the VE was present at the
hearing and thus heard Claimant’s testimony, the record does not indicate that the VE
based his conclusions on anything other than the ALJ’s hypotheticals. See Simila v.
Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 521 (7th Cir. 2009).
Whereas here, the ALJ determined that Claimant had moderate difficulties with
concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ must include those limitations in the
hypothetical posed to the VE. See O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 619. However, the
ALJ only asked the VE to consider an individual limited to simple, routine tasks, simple
10
work-related decisions, and only occasional interactions with the public. (R. 18.) These
terms refer to “unskilled work,” which the regulations define as work that can be learned
by demonstration in less than 30 days. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1568, 404.1520. “[W]hether
work can be learned in this manner is unrelated to the question of whether an individual
with mental impairments – e.g., with difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace – can perform such work.” Varga, 794, F.3d at 814. For this reason, the
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected the idea that “confining the claimant to simple,
routine tasks and limited interactions with others adequately capture[] temperamental
deficiencies and limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.” Yurt, 758 F.3d at
858-59 (citing Stewart v. Astrue, 561, 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases)).
The Commissioner does not address Claimant’s objection to the hypothetical to
the VE. Rather, the Commissioner focuses on arguments relating to the validity of the
ALJ’s RFC determination. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly relied on
opinions from the state agency doctors and the consultative examiner, who all
concluded that Claimant could perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks. (R. 20, 68,
78, 91, 103, 417.) While this is true, this does not address the issue of whether the VE
was apprised of Claimant’s moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.
See Yurt, 758 F.3d at 858 (“The first and most obvious problem with the
Commissioner’s argument is that it focuses entirely on the ALJ’s mental RFC when it is
in fact the hypothetical she posed to the VE that [claimant] attacks.”) Claimant’s treating
physician noted that he had poor memory, was easily distractible, and had difficulty with
thinking and concentration. (R. 460, 464, 466, 469, 471.) The ALJ provided no
explanation as to how these difficulties were accommodated by limitations to simple,
11
routine tasks. As stated above, limiting Claimant to simple, routine tasks does not
adequately apprise the VE of Claimant’s moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, or pace. This error necessitates remand. 1 See O’Connor-Spinner, 627
F.3d at 620-21.
D. The ALJ Improperly Weighed the Opinion of Dr. Daugherty.
Next, Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly gave great weight to the opinion
of Dr. Milton Daugherty, M.D. At the time of the hearing, the records indicated that Dr.
Daugherty saw Claimant during his March 29-31, 2013 hospitalization. (R. 304.) He
also saw him again on April 8, at which time he opined that Claimant would be capable
of returning to work on April 22. (R. 300.) Claimant asserts that Dr. Daugherty’s
opinion should not be given great weight, as he only saw Claimant during the time
between March 29 and April 8, 2013. Furthermore, Claimant did in fact return to work
on April 22, 2013. However, shortly after that, Claimant determined that he was unable
to continue working, and he stopped working on June 28, 2013. (R. 223.) The ALJ
states that Dr. Daugherty’s opinion deserves great weight because it was consistent
with the improvement that occurred after his hospitalization. (R. 20.) While Claimant
did experience improvement after his hospitalization for suicidal ideation, his depression
worsened shortly after Dr. Daugherty’s limited relationship with Claimant.
Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to analyze the regulatory factors in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527 and 416.927. These factors include length of treatment relationship and
Claimant also briefly argues that the ALJ improperly accounted for consultative examiner Dr. Levitan’s
opinion that Claimant would have difficulty handling moderate work pressure and stress. (R. 417.)
However, as the Commissioner points out, Dr. Levitan provided no functional limitations related to stress,
but did state that Claimant could perform simple and routine tasks despite his difficulty in handling
pressure and stress. (R. 417.) Therefore, the ALJ properly accounted for Dr. Levitan’s opinion.
1
12
frequency of examination, which was short. The Commissioner responds that Dr.
Daugherty’s opinion is consistent with future mental examinations that yielded
“unremarkable findings, such as normal mood and affect.” (R. 20.) However, the ALJ
ignores significant portions of the record wherein Claimant’s depression is noted. In
June of 2014, Claimant was diagnosed with anxiety and depression, psychotic. (R.
427-31.) He was given three psychiatric medications after reporting hearing voices
telling him to hurt himself. (R. 427-31.) One month later, in July of 2014, Claimant was
diagnosed with depressive disorder, NOS; anxiety disorder, NOS; and mixed
development disorder. (R. 469.) Claimant also was noted to have a severe memory
impairment, impaired intellectual functioning, depressed and blank mood, flat affect, and
slowed motor activity. (Id.) The ALJ impermissibly cherry-picked information to support
his conclusion that Dr. Daugherty’s opinion deserved great weight, without addressing
the regulatory factors or the multiple records indicating Claimant’s depression may have
warranted functional limitations.
E. The ALJ Erred in Relying on Claimant’s Activities of Daily Living in the
Subjective Symptoms Analysis.
Finally, Claimant asserts that the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis was proper.
The Courts give ALJ credibility determinations deference based on the ALJ’s ability to
hear, see, and assess witnesses. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 2012.)
An ALJ’s credibility determination will only be overturned if it is patently wrong. Elder v.
Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must “explain [his] decision in
such a way that allows us to determine whether []he reached [his] decision in a rational
manner, logically based on [his] specific findings and the evidence in the record.”
McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ should consider the
13
entire case record and give specific reasons for the weight given to an individual’s
statements. See Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that an
ALJ must “articulate specific reasons for discounting a claimant's testimony as being
less than credible”). Factors that should be considered include the objective medical
evidence, the claimant’s daily activities, allegations of pain, aggravating factors, the
types of treatment received, any medications taken, and functional limitations.
Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006); See also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3). A reviewing court must be mindful that reversal on this ground is
appropriate only if the credibility determination is so lacking in explanation or support
that it is “patently wrong.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008).
Claimant argues that the ALJ improperly considered his activities of daily living.
The ALJ found that Claimant was capable of driving, praying, making microwave foods,
cooking chicken, reading the newspaper, managing his finances, and watching
television. (R. 17.) When analyzing Claimant’s activities of daily living, the ALJ must
explain any perceived inconsistencies between the activities and the medical evidence.
See Voigt v. Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 878 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the ALJ stated that
Claimant’s activities are ones which typically require at least some level of
concentration, persistence, or pace. The ALJ points to Claimant’s ability to drive as an
ability to read signs, pay attention enough to follow road signs, and obey traffic rules.
The ALJ also points to Claimant’s ability to use public transportation.
Claimant takes issue particularly with the ALJ’s reliance on Claimant’s ability to
pray as proof of concentration. (R .17.) The ALJ offers no explanation as to how an
ability to pray equates to an ability to concentrate for the length of a work day.
14
Moreover, the ALJ relied on the ability to watch a Cubs game. The Seventh Circuit has
expressed that it is “skeptical that the ability to watch television for several hours
indicates a long attention span[.]” Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ also misstated Claimant’s ability to watch TV, as Claimant testified that he only
watched a portion of the Cubs game. (R. 49.) The ALJ did not build a logical bridge to
explain how Claimant’s ability to pray or watch a portion of a baseball game equates to
an ability to concentrate for the duration of a work day. Nor has the ALJ explained how
an ability to microwave foods equates to an ability to concentrate for a work day.
Finally, the ALJ alleges that Claimant’s ability to manage his finances shows an ability
to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 17.) The ALJ ignores the fact that
Claimant is homeless and has very little to manage. He testified that he went to grocery
stores to buy TV dinners and could go to restaurants to order breakfast, but that he
received food stamps to pay for his TV dinners. (R. 45, 48.) The ALJ has exaggerated
Claimant’s activities of daily living, and he has failed to build a logical bridge between
Claimant’s daily activities and his ability to work full time.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment is granted,
and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is denied. This case is
remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion. It is so ordered.
DATED: December 20, 2019
______________________________
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?