Chew-Harris v. Dart et al
ORDER; Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 13 is granted, and this case is therefore dismissed without prejudice. The Court grants Chew-Harris 30 days in which to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. If such a motion is not timely filed, the dismissal will automatically convert to one with prejudice. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 12/7/2017 Mailed notice (rth)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ROSALES
(Star 17653), and COOK COUNTY,
) Case No. 17-cv-4958
) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim  is granted, and this case is
therefore dismissed without prejudice. The Court grants Chew-Harris 30 days in which to file a
motion for leave to amend the complaint. If such a motion is not timely filed, the dismissal will
automatically convert to one with prejudice.
The plaintiff, Junius Chew-Harris, was injured as a result of an attack by fellow inmates.
Chew-Harris alleges that he warned his tier officer that he had been threatened and requested a
transfer to another living unit. The tier officer, Rosales, disregarded that request, and on the next
day Chew-Harris was attacked and injured. Chew-Harris further alleges that the Sheriff failed to
preserve video footage from the day prior to the attack that would have shown him being threatened
by fellow inmates, failed to take action to discipline Rosales, and exonerated the inmates who
Chew-Harris alleges the existence of a policy or practice supporting employees who violate
the constitutional rights of inmates. This policy or practice, Chew-Harris alleges, consists of (1)
shielding employees from contemporaneous discipline by referring all misconduct allegations to
OPR, which conducts delayed and lengthy investigations; (2) failing to conduct recorded interviews
with employees involved in misconduct; and (3) modifying the grievance procedure to make it more
difficult for inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies, thus insulating employees from civil
In order to establish liability against a government entity under section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that the purported constitutional violation occurred as the result of an official policy, custom,
or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Here, Chew-Harris has not alleged with adequate specificity how the injury in this case resulted from
the policies, practices, or procedures alleged in the complaint. See Vukadinovich v. McCarthy, 901 F.2d
1439, 1444 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to prevail on a failure to investigate Monell claim a
plaintiff must prove that the deficiency in the investigation actually caused the officer’s conduct).
Chew-Harris has accordingly failed to state a claim for Monell liability at this time. Accordingly, this
Court need not address the defendants’ arguments concerning the specific policies, practices, or
customs alleged, although it may behoove plaintiff to address those arguments should he elect to
amend his complaint.
Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Court Judge
DATED: December 7, 2017
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