Vargas v. Brennan
Filing
52
OPINION and Order. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 12/30/2019. Mailed notice. (sxb, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE L. VARGAS,
Case
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of
the United States Postal
No. l :17-cv-05085
Judge Charles R. Norgle
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jose L. Vargas ("Plaintiff') filed this action against the Postmaster
General
("Defendant") alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. $2000e, et seq., and a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act,42 U.S.C. $12101, et seq. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on
November 16,
2017. Plaintiff
specifically alleged discrimination on the basis
of
race,
discrimination on the basis
of national origin, retaliation for opposing discrimination,
discrimination on the basis
of disability, specifically failure to accommodate. Dkt. 21, and
and
Defendant answered, Dkt.23, on November 21,2017. Defendant has now moved for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to
all claims except the national origin discrimination claim, which is dismissed without prejudice
as
it has not been administratively exhausted.
I. BACKGROUNDI
l The following undisputed facts were taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1
statements, including: Defendant's
Statement of Material Facts ("Def.'s SOMF"); Plaintiff s Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ("PI.'s
Resp. to Def.'s SOMF"); Plaintiff s Statement of Additional Facts ("P1.'s SOAF"); and Defendant's Response to
Plaintiff s Statement of Additional Facts ("Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s SOAF"). The Court notes that "[a]ll material facts set
forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement
The facts are as follows. In approximately 2005, Plaintiff began working for the Postal
Service as a
"City Carrier"
at the Romeoville Post Office in Romeoville,
Illinois. A City Carrier's
duties included casing mail (sorting the mail for easier delivery), carrying the mail, and then
delivering the mail. The Postal Service requires City Carriers to be able to carry mail weighing up
to 35 pounds in shoulder satchels and to load and unload containers of mail weighing up to
70
pounds. The Romeoville Post Office consists of two separate facilities, one located in Romeoville
and the other located in Lockport, under the management of a single Postmaster.
Facts Relevant to
Plaintiff s Injury and the Bureaucratic Injury Claims Process
On May 6, 2008, Plaintiff suffered a foot injury on the job and was diagnosed with plantar
fasciitis. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a claim for worker's compensation indicating that his
foot injury was caused by his duties as a carrier. Plaintiff s claim was ultimately accepted, and he
was paid medical benefits. As part of his 2008 claim for worker's compensation, Plaintiff
completed aCA-2 form claiming compensation.
In July 2010, Plaintiff was the successful bidder on mail route C-27 out of the Romeoville
facility. The duties of route C-27 included collections, delivery of express mail,
and approximately
two hours of miscellaneous functions per day to be assigned by a supervisor. Miscellaneous duties
that Plaintiff was asked to perform as part of route C-27 included shuttling mail and equipment
weighing up to 75 pounds between the Lockport postal store and the Romeoville Post Office.
In January 2011, Plaintiff filed EEO complaint 4J-604-0001-l I alleging that, among other
things, the Postal Service prevented him from delivering mail on route C-27 and prevented him
from using his desired vehicle to deliver mail in August and September 2010. In September 2011,
of the opposing party." N.D. Ill. L.R. 56. I (bX3)(C); Banks v. Dart, No. l2 C 4333,2014 WL 625865, at *2 (N. D. Ill.
Feb. 18,2014).
Plaintiff withdrew EEO complaint 4J-604-0001-ll in its entirety. The administrative case was
dismissed with prejudice on November 1,2011.
In March 2011, Plaintiffls foot pain worsened. Beginning on March 1,2011, Plaintiff
s
foot doctor put Plaintiff on work restrictions, including that Plaintiff should not lift or carry heavy
weights over 15 pounds. Plaintiff was on vacation from March 1,2011 through March 13,2011.
Plaintiff intended to return to work on March 14,201L Upon return, Plaintiff asked officer-incharge Chuck Keeney whether he could do part of his route (route C-27). Plaintiff intended to do
the collections portion of the route, though, as he admits, there were miscellaneous duties for route
C-27 that he could not perform under his work restrictions. Plaintiff asked Keeney to be excused
from performing the shuttling mail and equipment portion of route C-27.
After Plaintiff anived at the Romeoville Post Office on March 14,2011, he informed
supervisor Carol Johnson of his medical restrictions, including the restriction that he not lift more
than 15 pounds. After spending some time determining what to do, Johnson sent Plaintiff home.
Johnson told Plaintiff that no light duty work was available for him.
Supervisors at the Postal Service told Plaintiff that he needed to submit form CA-2A which
is a notice of recurrence of injury form to be transmitted to the U.S. Department of Labor Office
of Workers Compensation Programs ("OWCP"). Instead, on March 15,201l, Plaintiff submitted
form CA-2, which is a different claim for compensation to OWCP. On his CA-z form, Plaintiff
wrote that he had plantar fasciitis. He wrote he first became aware of his foot injury on May 6,
2008, and that the injury has continued since that time. On the form, he further asserted that he
could no longer perform the essential functions of his position.
After Vargas submitted the CA-2 form, his supervisors repeatedly told him that he had
submitted the wrong form and that he was required to submitaCA-2A form because his injury
was a recuffence of an injury that had previously been accepted by OWCP.
Keeney believed that a CA-2 form was the appropriate form to submit when an employee
was injured for the first time, but that when an employee suffers a reculrence of a previous injury
he should complete
aCA-2Aform instead. Because Plaintif?s injury was a reculrence of the
same
foot injury he had suffered in 2008, Keeney believed he was required to submit a CA-2A form.
Vargas submitted aCA-2ANotice of Recurrence form on March 22,2011.
On his CA-2Aform, Plaintiff wrote that his original foot injury occurred in May 2008, and
that the injury had been continuous since that time. He again wrote that he could no longer perform
the essential functions of his position.
Plaintiff s CA-2A claim for recurrence was forwarded to the OWCP on March 29,2011.
Between March
l5 and March 22, 201l, Plaintiff continued to request a light duty assignment
every workday. Postal Service supervisors denied Plaintifls request, telling him that no light or
limited duty work was available for him.
On April 5,2011 , Plaintiff sent a letter to Keeney again asking for light duty work that he
could perform according to his medical restrictions. Keeney responded to this letter on April 7,
2011, denying Plaintiff s request for light duty work by stating that no light duty work was
available. Plaintiff has admitted that he does not know of any mail routes at the Romeoville Post
Office that he would have been able to perform in their entirety under his medical restrictions in
the spring of 201
l.
In early June 2011, Postal Service management informed Vargas that he was in a light duty
status because his
CA-2A had not yet been accepted. They also informed him that they never have
light duty work available.
Postal Service employees who are injured outside of work and cannot perform their work
duties are placed in light duty status and are eligible for light duty work. The Postal Service has
claimed that this district's policy was not to split up routes or otherwise alter positions to create
light duty work assignments to be performed by employees in light duty status; Plaintiff
has
disputed this assertion, pointing to Keeney deposition testimony in which Keeney stated that in
certain limited circumstances, including where there were multiple sick calls from carriers on the
same day, routes were split among carriers.
District supervisors Keeney and Johnson do not know
of any instance in which a Postal Service employee in light duty status was given light duty work.
Within the Postal Service, a distinction exists between "light duty" and "limited duty."
Postal Service employees who are injured on the job and whose claims for workers compensation
have been accepted are placed in limited duty status and are eligible for limited duty
work. A
Postal Service employee whose claim that he was injured at work has not yet been accepted by
OWCP is not eligible for limited duty work. After an employee's workers compensation claim is
accepted by OWCP, the Postal Service
during the recovery process.
will provide a limited duty assignment to the employee
If a full-time limited duty assignment
employee's work restrictions, workers compensation
is not available given the
will pay for the difference between the
amount of limited duty work that is available and full-time. OWCP determines whether a Postal
Service employee is entitled to workers compensation benefits.
When Plaintiff submitted his CA-2A form, Keeney was responsible for sending the form
to the district office to be processed. Keeney had no involvement in approving or disapproving
Plaintiff s claim. In May and June 201 I Keeney attempted to check on the status of Plaintiff
OWCP case. The response the Postal Service received from the Department of Labor was that
s
as
of June 15,2011, the case had not been accepted. The Department of Labor also warned that it
usually takes 90 days or more for a decision on claims.
On June 8, 2011, OWCP contacted Plaintiff about his claim for recurrence and informed
him that is case was currently open. On June 9,2011, Plaintiff stated that he had called OWCP
several times and had been told that his CA-2A claim was still pending.
On October 26,2011, OWCP accepted Plaintiffs workers compensation claim for
recurrence. OWCP further notified Vargas that compensation for his leave without pay for the
dates between June
27,2011 and September 29,2011, would be forthcoming. On October 27,
2011, Keeney offered Plaintiff a limited duty assignment in which he was asked to case mail for
one hour per
day. During his limited duty assignment, in addition to being paid for one hour per
workday for casing mail, Plaintiff was paid seven additional hours by workers compensation.
Plaintiffs Time and Attendance Collection System Report indicates that on March
14,
2011, Plaintiff was credited for working2.6 hours and the remaining 5.4 hours were credited as
paid sick leave. Between March 15 and May 7, Plaintiff continued to take paid sick leave. From
May
10 through
May 14, Plaintiff took paid annual leave. From May
again took paid sick
16
through June
27 ,
Plaintiff
leave. Beginning on June 27, 2071, Plaintiff was placed on leave without
pay.
Beginning on October
3l,20ll through November
15,2011, Plaintiff was paid for the
approximately one hour per day that he worked and he received OWCP compensation for the
remaining seven hours of the day. Beginning onNovember 16,2011, Vargas was paid forthe
eight hours he worked per day.
After OWCP accepted Vargas's claim for recurrence, Vargas was paid for the period June
27
,201I through November 4,2011, during which
he had previously been in a leave without pay
status.
Facts Relevant to the Reassignment of
Plaintiff s Mail Route
In the Postal Service, mail routes are assigned by seniority. Whenever a route becomes
available, that route goes up for bid, and the carrier in the office with the highest seniority who
wants the route
will
get
it. Seniority is the only factor considered when assigning routes.
In May
2011, the Postal Service performed a route adjustment and nearly every route in the Romeoville
Post Office was put up for bid.
Plaintiffls former route, route C-27, was bid on by another carrier, Ed Pearce. Pearce was
more senior than Plaintiff. Therefore he was entitled to select a route before Plaintiff. When it
was Plaintiff s turn to bid on a new route, he selected route
C-l7. Plaintiff
does not know of any
less senior carrier who was allowed to select a route that he wanted.
When a route is put up for bid, Postal Service policy dictates that "proposed adjustments
. . . will be communicated with the carrier in advance of implementing route adjustments." Dkt.
45-1, at
l.
Moreover, the carrier is supposed to receive a written statement related to the proposed
adjustment. Vargas claims that the Postal Service violated his rights by not informing him of the
route adjustment and re-bidding in advance. Plaintiff admits that earlier notice about a route
adjustment would not allow a less senior carrier to take a route away from someone who is more
senior.
Procedural History
Plaintiff first initiated contact with an EEO counselor on April 28. 2011, complaining that
he had been told there was no
light or limited duty work available for him. In June 2011, Plaintiff
filed EEO complaint 4J-604-0081-ll. In his EEOC complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he
was
discriminated against between March 14 and March 22,2011, when the Postal Service refused to
give him light or limited duty work. Vargas checked the boxes stating that he was alleging race,
retaliation, and disability discrimination. Plaintiff did not check the box indicating national origin
discrimination.
Plaintiffs EEO claim was ultimately denied, he appealed, and the EEOC affirmed
the
decision that Plaintiff was not subjected to disparate treatment discrimination based on race,
disability, or reprisal, and that he was not denied
a reasonable
accommodation. This suit followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'
Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124,
ll28 (7th Cir.2012)
(quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Wells v. Coker,707 F.3d756,760 (7th Cir. 2013) (intemal quotation marks
and citation
omitted). "On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations,
weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for
a
factfinder." Pa),ne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767,770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.
Inc.,477 U.5.242,255 (1986)). The Court must view "the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and [avoid] the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more
likely true."
Id.
Finally, "to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present
evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact on all essential elements of its case." Lewis
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698,702 (7th Cir. 2009).
B. Plaintiffs
14,20ll
National Origin Claim and Claims Relating to Conduct Before March
As an initial matter, a Title VII plaintiff may not bring claims in a lawsuit that were not
included in his administrative complaint. Jenninss v. Panetta, 492 Fed. App'* 698, 699 (7th Cir.
2012); Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009). An exception to the exhaustion
requirement exists for claims that are "like or reasonably related" to the charge and "can be
reasonably expected to grow out of an [agency] investigation of the charge." Sitar v. Ind. Dep't
of Transp., 344 F .3d 720,726 (7th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff argues that his national origin claim falls within this exception to the exhaustion
requirement because "[w]hile Plaintiff did not check the box for national origin discrimination, his
national origin discrimination claim arose out of the same set of facts, and was reasonably related
to his claims of race and disability discrimination and retaliation." Dkt. 46, at2-3.
The Court disagrees. The totality of the relevant EEOC complaint stated as follows:
March 14,2011 I was sent home by Ken Kronberg that was on the
phone instructing Carol Johnson to send me home. Carol Johnson
said if I use sick leave I would not be able to buy it back because
they never have lite [sic] duty work for me. March 15-21,2011 I
was sent home because Robert Clark and Carol Johnson said that
they never have any lite or limited duty for me. There has been other
city carriers that were able to work lite or limited duty work.
Management accommodated them but not me. (See attachments.)
March 22,2011 I was forced by management Chuck Keeney to
submit aCA2A after I submitted aCA-2 that they failed to process.
See attachment.
Dkt.38-2, at 308. The EEO complaint, which was dated June 9,2011, contained checked boxes
for race and disability discrimination and for retaliation for specific prior EEO activity. The box
for national origin was not checked.
Even liberally construed,
it
how any claim related to national origin
is
discrimination would be discovered in the course of investigating the other claims arising out of
these barebones allegations.
within it
a
Plaintiff effectively argues that any claim related to race encompasses
claim related to national origin. This is an improper application of the law and as such
the national origin claim has not been exhausted.
Moreover, Defendant argues that claim is limited in its temporal scope to actions taking
place in March 2011. Plaintiff did not address this timing argument in its brief. The Court agrees
with Defendant on this point and as such the national origin claim and any claim purporting to deal
with actions prior to March 2011 are dismissed without prejudice.2
C. Plaintiffs Claims Related to His Injury
The ADA prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against their
employees because of a disability. 42 U.S.C. $
has failed to accommodate his
l2l l2(a). Plaintiff claims that the Postal Service
disability in violation of the ADA. To establish
to accommodate, Plaintiff must showthat:
"(l)
a
claim fbr failure
he is aqualified individual with adisability; (2)
the Postal Service was aware of his disability; and (3) the Postal Service failed to reasonably
accommodatethatdisability." Preddiev. BartholomewCons. Sch. Corp.,799F.3d 806,813 (7th
Cir.20l5).
Defendant attacks this claim on two grounds. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does
not meet the definition be being a "qualified individual" under the statute. Second, Defendant
argues that even
if Plaintiff is a qualified individual, he still
loses on summary judgment because
the accommodation he asked for was not reasonable because, in effect, Plaintiff was requesting
2 The Court reads Plaintiffs allegations to deal with actions occurring in or after March 20ll regardless of this
argument as to timeliness. The Court thus views this argument essentially as a moot point but in light of Plaintiff s
lack of response
will adopt the Defendant's position.
t0
the Postal Service to split up his duties or create a new position for Plaintiff. The record contains
evidence that could support a finding that Plaintiff was a qualified individual for purposes of the
ADA, but the Court agrees with Defendant on its second point
as
to the reasonableness of the
requested accommodation, and thus grants summary judgment as to the
ADA claim on this latter
ground.
1. Some evidence suggests that
Plaintiff may have been a qualified individual.
The ADA defines a "qualified individual" with a disability as "an individual who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. $ 121 I I (8). On the record before the
Court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Plaintiff does not meet the definition of a qualified
individual under the ADA.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the mail carrier
job and
as such he does not
qualify for protection under the ADA. Dkt. 37, at 8 (citing 29 C.F.R.
$ 1630.2(nX2Xl)). Defendant points to two main types of evidence in making this argument-(1)
two "admissions" by Plaintiff in his worker's compensation paperwork in which he wrote
he
"could no longer perform the essential functions of [his] position," DSOF flfl 14, 18, and (2) the
written job requirements for a mail carrier and published by the Postal Service.
As to this first contention, Defendant attaches much weight to what it classifies as an
admission by Plaintiff in his EEOC charge that he could not perform the essential functions of the
mail carrier position. The Court hesitates to attribute controlling weight to these statements, which
were made by a lay person who likely was unaware of the legal significance of those terms at the
time he wrote them.
lt
Moreover, as to what the "essential functions" of his job were, and whether lifting more
than 15 pounds was one such essential function (recall that Plaintiffs doctor restricted him to
no more than 15 pounds beginning in March
20ll),
there is evidence that could cut in
Plaintiff s favor on this point, and thus summary judgment would be improper on this ground.
See
Feldman v. Olin Corp.,692F.3d748,756 (7th Cir. 2012).
Specifically, the job description for a general mail carrier is as follows:
Delivers and collects mail on foot or by vehicle under varying road
and weather conditions in a prescribed area, maintains professional
and effective public relations with customers and others, requiring a
general familiarity with postal laws, regulations, products and
procedures commonly used, and with the geography of the area.
May be required to carry mail weighing up to 35 pounds in shoulder
satchels or other equipment and to load or unload container of mail
weighing up to 70 pounds.
The description as to the specific route in question, C-27, stated the following:
Qualifications: Ability to case and carry all mail distributed to your
route in a safe and efficient manner and [maintain] a valid state
driver's license. The employee is required to maintain and stay
qualified with (CDL) license. [Additionally], required to stay
qualified on 2 ton vehicle. Route will not be awarded until qualified
on CDL and 2 ton.
Bidders: Only regular city carriers are able to bid.
The fact that the general mail carrier position uses the term "may" in its sentence related
to the lifting requirements leaves some ambiguity as to whether, in a given circumstance, lifting
35 pounds in a shoulder satchel and containers up to 70 pounds is an essential requirement of the
job. Although common sense would weigh in favor of a finding that carrying these quantities of
mail would be an essential function, the Court will not make that determination as a matter of law
at summary judgment. Moreover, the C-27 notice of vacancy contained no explicit reference to
lifting. On this record,
summary judgment would be improper.
l2
2. The Requested Accommodations Were Not Reasonable
The ADA obligates an employer to provide a qualified individual with a reasonable
accommodation. See, e.e.. Rehling v. Cit), of Chicago" 207 F.3d 1009, 1014 (7thCir.2000); see
also 42 U.S.C. $
l2l l l(9XB) (listing examples of reasonable
accommodations). "For instance, an
employer may be required to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position if the employee no
longer can perform the essential functions of the job she holds." Majors v. General Elec. Co., 714
F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 2013). However, the employer is not required to "manufacture
will
enable the disabled worker
to work
despite his disability."
Id. (citing
a
job that
Hansen v.
Henderson. 233 F.3d 521,523 (7th Cir. 2000). "The employer need only transfer the employee to
a position
for which the employee is otherwise qualified." Jackson v. Cit-y of Chicago, 414 F.3d
806, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2005).
In this case, Plaintiff admits that he requested to do only a portion of his route and that he
be excused from performing the shuttling mail and moving equipment portion of the
44,
at3. In essence, this request was for the Postal
route. Dkt.
Service to manufacture a new position for
Vargas, whichthe law does notrequire. Dargis v. Sheahan,526F.3d 981,987 (7th Cir.2008).
Plaintiff specifically argues that others had been given this kind of accommodation-which at
times is referenced as "light duty" in his briefing. According to Plaintiff, the Postal Service would
at times allow others-specifically individuals of different races from
Plaintiff-to work light
duty. In this way, Plaintiff makes a blended argument that he was not reasonably accommodated
for his disability, and the underlying basis for the Postal Service's failure to accommodate was
motivated by racial discrimination.
Plaintiffhas provided no evidence to support either contention. First, as noted above, the
Postal Service was not required to make up a new position for Plaintiff or to divvy up his work
l3
among multiple people. Second, Plaintiff has provided no evidence at all to support the contention
that the failure to accommodate was motivated by racial animus. On this latter point, Plaintiff has
attempted to provide evidence to suggest that similarly situated individuals of different races were
treated differently than
Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff points to a number of individuals who were
injured on or outside the job and were later given accommodations.
The Court agrees with the Postal Service that these individuals are not similarly situated to
Plaintiff. The key distinction in each instance is the difference between "light" duty and "limited"
duty. Postal Service employees who
are injured outside
of work and cannot perform their work
duties are placed in light duty status and are eligible for light duty work. Postal Service employees
who are injured on the job and whose claims for worker's compensation have been accepted are
placed in limited duty status and are eligible for limited duty work.
Plaintiff in this case asked to be accommodated by requesting "light" duty work prior to
the OWCP's determination as to his workers compensation claim related to his reinjury. Plaintiff
has provided no evidence to suggest that others were given light duty work prior to the acceptance
of their workers compensation claim. To the contrary, Plaintiffls evidence is consistent with the
Postal Service supervisors' testimony that a policy was in place not to give light duty work, but
rather to wait until the OWCP had accepted an injury claim and then assign the injured individual
to limited, not light, duty work. This is precisely what happened to Plaintiff. On these facts,
Plaintiff fails as a matter of law.
Once Plaintiff followed the proper bureaucratic procedures, he was accommodated. In this
respect he was treated the same as the other employees he has compared himself to and consistent
with the policies of this Postal Service district.
D.
Plaintiffs Claim Related to the Route Readjustments
t4
The Court agrees with the Postal Service that PlaintifPs receipt of late notice as to
a
rebidding of the various routes in that district was not an adverse employment action. To show an
adverse employment action, a
plaintiff "must show some quantitative or qualitative change in the
terms or conditions of his employment." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus.. Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901
(7th Cir. 2003). There are three general categories of actionable, materially adverse employment
actions:
(l)
termination or reduction in compensation; (2) transfers or changes in job duties; and
(3) unbearable changes in job conditions. Barton v. Zimmer. Inc. ,662 F.3d 448, 453-54 (7th Cir.
2011).
Plaintiff s theory with respect to the late notice of the route readjustment,
as he argues
in
his response to summary judgment, is that he could have challenged the readjustment. Plaintiff
has offered no evidence to suggest that such a challenge would have had any impact on the decision
to move forward with the readjustment. Plaintiffls entire claim is speculative and unsupported by
evidence, and as such the Court enters summary judgment as to this claim as well.
III. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above, summary judgment is granted
in favor of Defendants as to
Plaintiff s ADA and racial discrimination claims. Plaintiff s national origin claim is dismissed
without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGL
United States District Court
DATE: December 30,2019
t5
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