Williams v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
411
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 3/31/2022. Plaintiff's Motions for Fees and Costs 374 , 403 is granted in part. Specifically, Plaintiff is awarded $435,142.10 in attorneys' fees and $10,511.77 in costs. In addition, the parties' Motions seeking extensions of time 380 , 396 and for leave to file Motions instanter 395 , 397 are granted. See Opinion for further details. Mailed notice(lk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
OMAR WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
MARCO GARCIA, and
DONALD HILL,
Defendants.
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No. 17 C 5186
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
On April 16, 2021, a jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff Omar Williams on one of his three
claims brought against Defendants City of Chicago, Marco Garcia, and Donald Hill (together, the
“Defendants”). Specifically, the jury found Hill and Garcia independently liable for Williams’
unlawful pretrial detention. (Dkt. 373 at 1). Conversely, the jury found in Defendants’ favor on
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and conspiracy claims. (Id. at 2). The jury ultimately awarded
Williams $100,000 in compensatory damages but denied punitive damages. (Dkt. 373 at 3).
Williams now moves for an award of $804,429.25 in attorneys’ fees and 17,657.75 in costs. (Dkt.
403 at 11). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s petition [374, 403] is granted in part and
denied in part. In addition, the parties’ motions seeking extensions of time [380, 396] and for
leave to file motions instanter [395, 397] are granted.
I. Attorneys’ Fees
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in an action to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court
may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. This fee-shifting
law is designed to ensure “effective access to the judicial process” for persons with civil rights
1
grievances. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Plaintiffs are considered “prevailing
parties” for attorney’s fees purposes “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
In calculating a reasonable fees award, courts first calculate a “lodestar” amount by
multiplying the attorneys’ hours on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433; Murphy v. Smith, 864 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2017); Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927,
929–30 (7th Cir. 2012); Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care, 664 F.3d 632, 640–43 (7th Cir. 2011).
After calculating the lodestar figure, the Court may then adjust the amount upward or downward
depending on a variety of factors – such as the litigant’s degree of success, the novelty and
difficulty of the issues, and awards in similar cases. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, 434; Estate of
Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). Although only disputed matters
are discussed in this opinion, the court has reviewed all of the materials submitted by the parties
in reaching its conclusions.
A. Calculating the Lodestar
The lodestar is determined by calculating the number of hours reasonably expended and
multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate for each moving attorney. Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 433. “An award of the originally calculated lodestar is presumptively reasonable, and it is the
City’s burden to convince [the court] that a lower rate is required.” Robinson v. City of Harvey,
489 F.3d 864, 872 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s request is summarized as follows:
Individual
Paul K. Vickrey
Patrick F. Solon
Gretchen L. Schmidt
Dylan M. Brown
Nicholas Niro
Total
Hours
803.25
234.3
412.6
676.5
109.80
2236.45
Hourly Rate
$525
$485
$250
$225
$125
(Dkt. 403 at 2).
2
Total
$421,706.25
$113,635.50
$103,150.00
$152,212.50
$13,725.00
$804,429.25
1. Hours Reasonably Expended
What qualifies as a “reasonable” use of a lawyer's time “is a highly contextual and factspecific enterprise,” and as such, the court has “wide latitude” in awarding attorney’s fees.
Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court considers whether hours are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”
and may reduce the lodestar calculation, for example, for hours spent on unrelated and
unsuccessful claims, hours attorneys would not bill to their clients, and hours for which the
prevailing party has failed to provide adequate support. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34.
i. Block Billing
Defendants take issue with the attorneys’ billing practice of “simply list[ing] various tasks
completed in a single day, without any delineation of which task took what amount of time.” (Dkt.
408 at 15 (further arguing that “a majority of the entries” are block billed); see also Dkt. 408-3
(presenting all of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ billed hours along with Defendant’s objections)). Plaintiff
represents that the fees petition includes over 1,250 time entries representing nearly five years of
work – and that Defendants object to 238 of these entries as block billed, far short of the “majority”
of the time entries. (Dkt. 410 at 6; see also Dkt. 408-3). “Although ‘block billing’ does not provide
the best possible description of attorneys’ fees, it is not a prohibited practice.” Farfaras v. Citizens
Bank & Tr., 433 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Brzowski v. Sigler, No. 17-cv-9339,
2021 WL 4283206, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021); Gibson v. City of Chi., 873 F. Supp. 2d 975,
986 (N.D. Ill. 2012). The Court is not also “obligated to conduct a line-by-line review of the bills
to assess the charges for reasonableness.” Rexam Beverage Can Co. v. Bolger, 620 F.3d 718, 738
(7th Cir. 2010). Defendants’ objections are therefore overruled.
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ii. Clerical Tasks
Defendants also assert that Williams has impermissibly billed for secretarial work. (Dkt.
408-1). “In calculating the number of hours reasonably expended on a case, courts should disallow
time spent on what are essentially clerical or secretarial tasks.” E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.
274, 288 n.10 (1989) (“[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate,
[much less an attorney rate] regardless of who performs them.”); Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of
Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “organizing file folders, document
preparation, and copying documents” were clerical or secretarial tasks); see also, e.g., Cloutier v.
GoJet Airlines, LLC, No. 16-cv-1146, 2019 WL 5260756, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2019); Morjal
v. City of Chi., Ill., No. 12-cv-185, 2013 WL 2368062, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2013). In
determining whether an entry includes a clerical or secretarial task, the Court must consider
whether the task was sufficiently complex enough to justify the use of non-clerical staff. See
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307, 1315 (7th Cir. 1996)
The Court agrees with Defendants that several of the challenged time entries involve
secretarial tasks. The Court will also exclude entries for time spent “organizing files . . . or
copying, formatting, processing, or preparing documents.” See, e.g., Cloutier, 2019 WL 5260756,
at *4; Morjal v. City of Chi., Ill., 2013 WL 2368062, at *2. The following entries will be excluded
from the final award:
Date
6/20/2018
7/27/2019
Individual
Brown
Brown
9/24/2018
Brown
9/28/2018
Brown
1/16/2019
9/16/2019
Brown
Brown
Description
Organizing files for production
Organize defendants officer’s discovery responses . . .
outstanding and future requests; confer with team.
Organize documents for our supplemental production;
confer with PKV re same
Prepare and serve grand jury transcripts on opposing
Counsel
Finalize and send D. Hill exhibits to court reporter.
Review Judge Kendall’s document regarding hyperlink
for summary judgment.
4
Time Billed
0.8
1
2.3
0.5
1
.3
9/19/2019
Brown
9/27/2019
Solon
10/1/2019
3/24/2021
Brown
Brown
4/1/2021
Brown
4/1/2021
4/1/2021
4/2/2021
Brown
Niro
Niro
4/2/2021
Niro
4/2/2021
4/2/2021
Niro
Niro
4/3/2021
Niro
4/6/2021
4/8/2021
Brown
Niro
4/9/2021
Solon
4/9/2021
Niro
4/12/2021
Niro
4/13/2021
Niro
4/14/2021
Niro
4/15/2021
Niro
Pull and organize exhibits for summary judgment
briefing.
Troubleshooting filing issues on ECF of papers with
hyperlinks.
Finalize courtesy copies of 56.3 documents for the Court
Continue organization of paper exhibits and video
exhibits
for trial
Confer with Lynn Kandziora and U.S. Marshall Steve
Linder re 285 form and service of trial subpoena
Update plaintiff’s exhibits
Preparing a list of Plaintiff's exhibits
Compiling Plaintiff’s exhibits and creating Plaintiff’s
exhibit binders to be used/referenced during trial;
preparing a list of exhibits
Updating defendant’s exhibits submitted later due to
“technical glitches” as expressed by Defendant’s counsel
Preparing a list of Defendant’s exhibits
Compiling Defendant’s Exhibits and creating
Defendant’s
Exhibits binders to be used/referenced during trial;
preparing a list of Defendant’s exhibits
Updating additional exhibits submitted by Defendant's
counsel, to Defendant's exhibit binder.
Finalize exhibits for opening statement and first witness
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
Attending morning session of trial and assisting in
scheduling of witnesses including Deacy appearance
pursuant to subpoena.
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
Retrieving and delivering important documents to the
court
3
0.4
1
1.2
1
3.5
0.8
5.2
1.4
1.2
4.6
2.2
4
0.8
3
1
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.6
Accordingly, Brown’s billable hours will be reduced by 19.6; Niro’s by 19.8; and Solon’s by 3.4.
iii. Vague Entries
Defendants next argue that approximately seventy of the time entries are “so vague that the
nature of the work cannot be determined.” (Dkt. 408 at 19). They specifically highlight 17.25
hours that Brown billed to “updat[ing] discovery responses” and question whether this work
“involved legal, paraprofessional or clerical work.” (Id.). Other entries challenged as vague
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include descriptions such as “[p]repare first amended complaint draft,” (Dkt. 408-3 at 12),
“[u]pdate draft discovery responses,” (id. at 14), and “[w]orking on motion and reply,” (id. at 28).
Another entry challenged as vague was Schmidt’s time spent “[p]reparing for trial.” (Id. at 62).
Although such entries do not articulate the specific legal tasks being performed, the Court
ultimately finds these entries to be sufficiently linked to work of a legal nature. The challenges
entries will not be excluded.
iv. Excessive Entries
Finally, Defendants challenge certain time entries as “patently excessive” because
Plaintiff’s attorneys billed in quarter-hour increments. (Dkt. 408 at 19). Defendants concede that
there is no per se rule regarding proper billing increments. (Id. (citing Schulten v. Astrue, No. 08cv-1181, 2010 WL 2135474, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2010))). See also, e.g., Garcia v. R.J.B.
Props., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 911, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[A] number of district judges within this
circuit have considered the matter and, in the main, have found ‘nothing inherently objectionable’
about the practice [of billing in quarter-hour increments].”). In addition, Defendants have refused
to provide their own time entries for the Court’s review, (see Dkt. 403 at 3; Dkt. 410 at 8), which
could have aided in the determination of whether Plaintiff’s attorneys spent an unreasonable
amount of time preparing their case. See also, e.g., Delgado v. Mak, No. 06-cv-3757, 2009 WL
211862, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2009) (“[I]f Defendants had been able to demonstrate that they
performed similar tasks with similar results in substantially less time, the Court may well have
reduced or eliminated certain entries from the lodestar.”); O’Sullivan v. City of Chi., 484 F. Supp.
2d 829, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (rejecting claim challenged time entries were excessive where
Defendant City of Chicago “offered no objective standard, no ‘reasonable number of hours to
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spend on a given activity, with which to compare” to Plaintiff’s fee request). The Court will thus
include the challenged entries in the lodestar.
2. Reasonable Hourly Rates
To determine the appropriate hourly rate for attorneys’ fees under § 1988, the Court
considers “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 (1984). A key reference point for ascertaining the market rate is the “amount charged by
attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation for similar work.” Gautreaux v. Chi.
Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 2007); McNabola v. Chi. Trans. Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 519
(7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the market rate can be determined by the “rate that lawyers of
similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type
of work in question”). To be considered similar enough to be a reference point, the work cannot
be “radically different.” E.g., Duran v. Town of Cicero, No. 01-cv-6858, 2012 WL 1279903, at
*16 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2012) (finding that an attorney’s previous work in finance, cross-border
transactions, private investment company matters, and merger and acquisitions “radically
different” from § 1983 litigation). Third-party affidavits attesting to the billing rates of comparable
attorneys are instructive in this inquiry, Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (7th Cir. 2011), although an
attorney’s own “self-serving affidavit attesting to a market rate” is unlikely to suffice on its own,
e.g., Edwards v. Rogowski, No. 06-cv-3110, 2009 WL 742871, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2009).
The Court may refuse to credit affidavits deemed overly general or which do not specifically
address fees in like cases. Nichols v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 4 F.4th 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2021).
i. Attorney Vickrey
Williams seeks an hourly rate of $525 per hour for Vickrey’s services. (Dkt. 403 at 3).
Vickrey has 41 years of litigation experience, and he has focused his practice on intellectual
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property and business torts. (Id.). Vickrey’s declaration and supporting documentation show that
he has some experience handling civil rights matters. (Id. at 1–3 (citing more than ten civil rightsrelated cases that Vickrey has litigated); see also Dkt. 403-4; Dkt. 403-5; Dkt. 403-6). Vickrey
has filed four civil rights actions since 2017, though the current matter is the first that proceeded
to trial. (Dkt. 408 at 10).
Plaintiff provides two third-party affidavits in support of Vickrey’s proposed rate.
Attorney Kenneth Flaxman, who supplied one such affidavit in support of the $525 rate, has
litigated over 700 civil rights cases throughout the past 48 years. (Dkt. 403-11 at 5). Flaxman has
also argued five cases before the United States Supreme Court, and has served as lead or cocounsel in “many class actions and individual civil rights cases.” (Id.). Flaxman’s billing rates
have ranged from $575 per hour in 2006 to $750 per hour in the present day. (Id. at 4). Attorney
H. Candace Gorman also submitted an affidavit in support if Vickrey’s proposed fee. (Dkt. 40310). Gorman was admitted to the Illinois Bar in 1983. (Id. at 1). Her practice is focused on public
interest and civil rights litigation and she has been a solo practitioner for her entire career. (Id. at
1). In 2017, more than thirty years into her career as a public interest lawyer, Gorman was awarded
$500 per hour in a civil rights case – a lower hourly fee than what Vickrey now seeks. (Id. at 3).
Rates charged in similar cases are also instructive here. In Johansen v. Wexford Health
Sources, No. 15-cv-2376, 2021 WL 1103349 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2021), the lead attorney requested
a rate of $600 per hour. Id. at *4. The attorney more than thirty years of litigation experience and
had appeared in over 200 cases – “all but one was classified as involving ‘civil rights’ claims.” Id.
The court considered these factors together with three supporting affidavits, among other things,
and ultimately awarded a rate of $475 per hour. Id. at *5. In another case, an attorney with 29
years of experience, but only some background in civil rights litigation, was awarded $310 per
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hour when he requested $350 per hour. Obrycka v. City of Chi., No. 07-cv-2372, 2013 WL
1749803, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2013). Where an attorney had 39 years of relevant civil rights
experience, a higher rate of $465 per hour was deemed appropriate. Nelson v. Lis, No. 09-cv-883,
2017 WL 1151055, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2017). In that same case, the court awarded $375 per
hour to an attorney with “significant experience in other areas of law,” but was not as developed
in the area of civil rights litigation. Id.
Defendants suggest that an appropriate hourly rate for Vickrey is $320 per hour. (Dkt. 408
at 13). This is based on (1) Vickrey’s “lengthy and accomplished legal career” in commercial and
intellectual property litigation, (2) his relative inexperience in the police misconduct litigation, and
(3) fees set by other courts in this jurisdiction. (Id. at 9–13).
Having review Vickrey’s experience and credentials, as well as recent case law in this
Circuit, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $425 is appropriate for Vickrey. This hourly fee
appropriately reflects Vickrey’s substantial litigation practice in the commercial and IP sectors and
persuasive case law where the Court limited fee awards for attorneys with greater experience in
civil rights litigation.
ii. Attorney Solon
Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $485 for Solon. (Dkt. 403 at 4). Solon was admitted to
practice in Illinois in 1991, and the focus of his practice today is business tort and intellectual
property litigation. (Id. (further noting Solon’s prior billing rate in those areas of law at $500 per
hour)). Solon drafted briefs at the dispositive stages of this litigation as well as motions in limine.
(Id.). In addition, the Vickrey Declaration explains that Solon assisted Vickrey in developing
opening and closing jury addresses and strategized witness examinations. (Dkt. 403-3 at 4–5).
The Flaxman Declaration encourages the Court to adopt Solon’s proposed fee of $485 per hour,
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claiming that it is lower than then market rate in this District for lawyers of comparable experience.
(Dkt. 403-11 at 1). Defendants request the Court to limit his hourly rate to $260. (Dkt. 408 at 13).
They argue that Solon was assigned tasks suited for a more junior attorney and emphasize his lack
of experience in the relevant areas of law. (Id.).
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rate is not appropriate in this case.
Although Solon has about 30 years of legal experience, Plaintiff points to only one civil rights
matter that Solon helped litigate. (Dkt. 403-3 at 3). The record is otherwise silent as to any relevant
experience Solon has in civil rights or police misconduct matters. Solon’s legal experience is
otherwise apparently limited to business and intellectual property cases. Thus, Defendants are
correct that he is “not entitled to rates reserved for seasoned civil rights litigators.” (Dkt. 408 at
13). Based on similar hourly rates granted in other cases, Solon’s overall qualifications, and his
work on this matter, the Court in its discretion reduces Solon’s hourly rate to $285. See, e.g.,
Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 2013 WL 1749803, at *3 (explaining that courts in this district have
approved hourly rates ranging from $285 to $310 for trial attorneys with significant litigation
experience but limited civil rights experience).
iii. Attorney Schmidt
For Schmidt, Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $250 per hour. (Dkt. 403 at 5). Schmidt
has 8 years of experience and has “worked on several significant civil rights case,” including an
unlawful detention case. (See id. (citing Dkt. 403-3 at 2)). Plaintiff also claims that in the present
case, Schmidt assisted in voir dire, helped in “addressing jury concerns,” and aided Vickrey in
preparing his opening and closing statements and witness examination outlines. (Dkt. 403 at 5).
Finally, Plaintiff refers the Court to Fields v. City of Chicago in support of this requested rate,
where the Court approved a rate of $325 per hour for attorneys with about eight years of litigation
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experience. Fields, 2018 WL 253716, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 1, 2018). Defendants argue for a
reduced fee of $200 for Schmidt. (Dkt. 408 at 13). They argue that she was “noticeably
underutilized” in that she did not examine any witness at trial and further note that this was her
first civil rights trial. (Id.). However, in light of Schmidt’s years of litigation experience, similar
hourly rates granted in other cases, and the complete record now before the Court, Plaintiff’s
requested rate of $250 per hour is reasonable.
iv. Attorney Brown
Brown’s requested rate is $225 per hour. (Dkt. 403 at 5). Brown has nearly ten years of
litigation experience, and Plaintiff has submitted evidence of numerous civil rights cases in which
he has been involved. (Id.). Brown provided significant assistance with discovery in this case and
examined a witness at trial among other things. (Id.). Defendants again argue that Brown was
“noticeably underutilized” at trial and notes that this was Brown’s first civil rights trial. (Dkt. 408
at 13). Defendants fail to rebut evidence adduced by Plaintiff concerning Brown’s litigation
experience – including his involvement in civil rights matters – and fails to rebut the persuasive
value of Fields, 2018 WL 253716, where an attorney with a similar level of experience was in fact
granted a higher billing rate of $325 per hour. Ultimately, the Court agrees that Brown’s rate of
$225 per hour is reasonable.
v. Paralegal Niro
Niro, a paralegal, billed his time at $125 per hour. (Dkt. 403 at 6). Defendants argue that
paralegals’ time is non-compensable under Section 1988, which governs awards for reasonable
attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. 408 at 14). However, Courts in this jurisdiction have awarded fees for
paralegals’ work. For example, hourly rates of $125 and $150 were approved for paralegals in
Fields v. City of Chi., No. 10-cv-1168, 2018 WL 253716, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 1, 2018). In
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Blackwell v. Kalinowsk, No. 09-cv-7257, 2012 WL 469962 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2012), the court
approved $100 per hour as an appropriate rate for a paralegal, down from plaintiff’s request for
$125 per hour. Id. at *9. The Blackwell Court found that the requested $125 rate was unreasonable
because the plaintiff failed to submit “sufficient information (such as [the paralegal’s] years of
paralegal experience) in order to justify this rate.” Id. Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff provides
scant information about Niro’s background – noting only that he is a law school graduate and
planned on taking the Illinois Bar Exam. (Dkt. 403 at 6). Following Blackwell, the Court awards
Plaintiff a $100 per hour fee for Niro’s work on this case. His time is compensable but the Court
lacks sufficient documentation supporting a higher rate.
3. Total Lodestar Calculation
Based on the foregoing, the Court’s revised lodestar calculation is as follows:
Individual
Paul K. Vickrey
Patrick F. Solon
Gretchen L.
Schmidt
Dylan M. Brown
Nicholas Niro
Total
Hours
803.25
230.9
412.6
Hourly Rate
$425
$295
$250
Total
$341,381.25
$68,115.50
$103,150
656.9
90
2,193.65
$225
$100
$147,802.50
$9,000
$669,449.25
4. Further Adjustments to the Lodestar Amount
The lodestar figure is the “starting point” in fee determinations and may by adjusted for a
variety of factors. Enoch, 570 F.3d at 823. These factors include, among other things, “the degree
of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation.” Schlacher v. Law Offs. of
Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., 574 F.3d 852, 856–57 (7th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, proportionality
between the amount of fees sought and the amount of recovery obtained is a relevant factor; any
fee award “should evidence increased reflection before awarding attorney’s fees that are large
multiples of the damages recovered or multiples of the damages claimed.” Moriarty v. Svec, 233
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F.3d 955, 968 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Cole v. Wodziak, 169 F.3d 486, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1999)
(expressing view that fee award exceeding damages is rarely justified). Defendants argue for a
reduction in the lodestar amount on several grounds. The Court addresses each of these factors in
turn.
i. Degree of Success
In adjusting the lodestar calculation, courts consider the “results obtained” in the litigation,
which “becomes particularly significant in cases where a technically prevailing party succeeds on
only some of his claims for relief.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1998).
Williams originally filed a seven-count complaint against six defendants, (see Dkt. 1); three counts
and three defendants ultimately proceeded to trial. Following a jury trial, the jury found for
Williams only on his unlawful pretrial detention claim and for Defendants on his malicious
prosecution and conspiracy claims. (Dkt. 373). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s unlawful pretrial
detention claim was “insignificant in comparison to the overall goals here,” which they content
warrants a lodestar reduction. (Dkt. 408 at 22).
A prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to fees for time expended pursuing unsuccessful
claims; however, when claims are related to one another, “time spent pursuing an unsuccessful
claim may be compensable if it also contributed to the success of other claims.” Jaffee, 142 F.3d
at 413. When viewing attorney records of time spent, it is often difficult “to divide hours expended
on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). When faced with partial
success at trial, the Court “may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it
may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Sotoriva, 617 F.3d at 975
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37); accord Alcazar-Anselmo v. City of Chi., No. 07-cv-5246,
2011 WL 3236024, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2011). In this matter, the disparity between Plaintiff’s
13
claims and his ultimate success at trial, limited to only a single count, merits a global reduction in
the lodestar.
ii. Proportionality
In fashioning a reasonable attorney’s fee, proportionality is a particular concern; the court
should employ “increased reflection before awarding attorneys’ fees that are large multiples of the
damages recovered or multiples of the damages claimed.” Moriarty, 233 F.3d at 968 (noting,
however, that there are no mechanical rules “requiring that a reasonable attorney’s fee be no greater
than some multiple of the damages claimed or recovered”); but see Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill.,
275 F.3d 579, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants argue in favor of a downward adjustment given
the disproportionality between the fees sought and the amount of recovery. (Dkt. 408 at 23).
Plaintiff essentially contends that the between the amount requested from the jury during closing
arguments and the final jury verdict is irrelevant to the fee determination. (Dkt. 410 at 11). In this
case, Plaintiff asked the jury to award him $5.25 million and received $100,000 – slightly under
two percent of his requested amount. This low jury award indicates a disproportionate relation to
the requested jury amount and is an element rightfully factored into any decrease in the lodestar
calculation.
See Schlacher, 574 F.3d at 856–57.
In addition, the lodestar calculation of
$669,449.25 is nearly seven times greater than the jury verdict of $100,000. Because the lodestar
calculation is well in excess of what Williams recovered at trial, a reduction in the lodestar is
appropriate given this Court’s discretionary authority to do so based in part on proportionality.
Schlacher, 574 F.3d at 856–57.
iii. Public Interest
The Court also considers the public purpose served by plaintiff’s suit, assessing principally
whether plaintiff’s “victory vindicat[ed] important rights and deterr[ed] future violations.”
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Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 110 (7th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff argues that his pursuit of the case
successfully promoted the public interest. (Dkt. 410 at 13). Plaintiff asserts that through this
litigation, he “established that the police kept a man in jail without probable cause for five years.”
(Id.). However, in nearly all Section 1983 cases where a plaintiff prevails, it can be observed that
the public interest can be served by “exposing to light disturbing police malfeasance and grave
municipal institutional failures.” Robinson, 489 F.3d at 872; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such,
this factor is not satisfied merely because a plaintiff establishes, as Williams did here, that his
constitutional rights have been infringed. A more nuanced approach to the public interest is
appropriate in a lodestar calculation. The Court considers, for example, where Plaintiff’s victory
“expos[ed] some deeper institutional problem within the department transcending the individual
case.” See, e.g., Ragland v. Ortiz, No. 08-cv-6157, 2012 WL 4060310, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,
2012). Although Plaintiff regrettably suffered unlawful pretrial detention, the facts here are limited
to his Plaintiff’s particular case and the particular officers involved, and thus has minimal impact
on the public interest at large. This, too, weighs in favor of a reduction in the lodestar.
iv. Final Fees Award
The Court, in its discretion, finds it appropriate to reduce the lodestar amount by 35%. As
such, Plaintiff is granted fees in the amount of $435,142.10. This reduction takes into account the
foregoing analysis and credits the diligent work that Plaintiff’s attorneys put forth on their client’s
behalf for nearly five years litigating this case.
II. Fees and Costs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides, in relevant part, that “costs other than
attorney's fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). The Rule “provid[es] a strong presumption that the prevailing
15
party will recover costs.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2003); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
This presumption, however, applies only to costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Winniczek v.
Nagelberg, 400 F.3d 503, 504 (7th Cir. 2005); Sommerfield v. City of Chi., No. 06-cv-3132, 2017
WL 3675722, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2017). Section 1920, in turn, authorizes a party to recover
the following “taxable” costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk or marshal;
(2) Fees of the printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; [and]
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section
1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920. Only where it is immediately apparent that the costs were necessary and
appropriate will the Court grant them due to the “narrow scope of taxable costs.” Taniguchi v.
Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 572 (2012). “Taxable costs are limited to relatively minor,
incidental expenses as is evident from § 1920, which lists such items as clerk fees, court reporter
fees, expenses for printing and witnesses, expenses for exemplification and copies, docket fees,
and compensation of court-appointed experts. Indeed, the assessment of costs most often is merely
a clerical matter that can be done by the court clerk.” Id. (citations omitted). Taxing costs against
a losing party requires two inquiries: (1) whether the cost imposed on the losing party is
recoverable and (2) if so, whether the amount assessed for that item was reasonable.” Majeske v.
City of Chi., 218 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). “There is a presumption that the prevailing party
will recover costs, and the losing party bears the burden of an affirmative showing that taxed costs
are not appropriate.” Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Tr. Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005).
16
That presumption does not, however, relieve the prevailing party of the burden of establishing that
potentially recoverable costs it incurred were reasonable and necessary. See, e.g., Trs. of Chi.
Plastering Inst. Pension Tr. v. Cork Plastering Co., 570 F.3d 890, 906 (7th Cir. 2009); Telular
Corp. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 01-cv-431, 2006 WL 1722375, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 16,
2006). The district court’s determination whether particular costs are reasonable and necessary is
given considerable deference. Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945; SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 1988).
A. Plaintiff’s Requested Taxable Costs
Williams requests $17,657.76 in taxable costs. (See Dkt. 403 at 11; Dkt. 403-12). His
request includes the following:
1. Copying expenses: $728.50
2. Court reporter fees for hearing transcripts: $319.50
3. Witness fee: $45.00
4. Deposition invoices: $5,876.15
5. Filing fee: $400.00
6. Lexis research invoices: $6,527.70
7. Overtime trial preparation by Legal Assistant Regalado: $1,194.39
8. Process service invoices: $896.50
9. Plaintiff’s hotel expenses during trial: $1,489.68
10. Trial transcript fees: $429.30
11. Travel expenses to conduct a deposition: $52.50
(Dkt. 403-12). The Court will address each request in turn.
1. Copying Expenses
Copying costs are explicitly authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) when they are “necessarily
obtained for use in the case.” Even when costs are permitted by statute, the “cost must be. . .
reasonable.” Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008). The
district court “has discretion to determine which copies were necessary.” Montanez v. Simon, 755
F.3d 547, 558 (7th Cir. 2014). In order to recover copying costs, a party is required to “provide
17
the best breakdown of obtainable from retained records . . . and certainly enough information to
allow the court to make a determination that the costs sought are, in fact, authorized by § 1920.”
See, e.g., Lally v. City of Chi., No. 10-cv-5011, 2013 WL 1984422, at *12 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2013);
Shanklin Corp. v. Am. Packaging Mach., Inc., No. 95-cv-1617, 2006 WL 2054382, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 18, 2006). Copies merely for an attorney’s convenience are non-compensable. Haroco, Inc.
v. Am. Nat’l. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 38 F.3d 1429, 1441 (7th Cir. 1994).
Williams requests $728.50 for copying expenses. (Dkt. 403-12 at 2). However, with
respect to the first two line items for copying expenses, he failed to provide any details regarding,
for example, how many pages were copied or what was copied. (Dkt. 403-12 at 2). Instead, the
first two entries are simply billed as “Copying Expense[s]” for various dates. (Id.). As such, it is
impossible to determine whether these charges were reasonable. Furthermore, while the final line
item for copying expenses does include the number of pages copied, and notes that these pages
were for Plaintiff’s trial binder, it lacks any detail about what was copied. (Id.). Based on this
record, the Court is unable to decide whether these copying costs are recoverable. See, e.g., Lally,
2013 WL 1984422, at *12 (holding that a party could not recover copying costs identified only as
“[c]opies and printing for trial prep”). Plaintiff is disallowed from recovering copying costs given
the absence of the requisite specificity.
2. Court Reporter Fees
Section 1920(2) allows for recovery of court reporter fees and transcriptions “necessarily
obtained for use in the case.” Defendants do not contest awarding these expenses. Defendants are
therefore ordered to pay Plaintiff’s costs for Court hearing transcripts amounting to $319.50. (See
Dkt. 403-12 at 2).
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3. Thomas Deacy Witness Fee
Witness fees are expressly authorized by Section 1920(3). Courts in this jurisdiction have
found witness fees between $40 and $55 per witness to be reasonable. See Ayala v. Rosales, No.
13-cv-04425, 2016 WL 2659553, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2016) (finding witness fees of $50.88 per
witness reasonable); Dishman v. Cleary, 279 F.R.D. 460, 466 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (deeming witness
fees between $40 and $51.95 reasonable). As such, the Court awards Plaintiff $45.00 for the
witness fee charged for Thomas Deacy.
4. Deposition Expenses
Deposition costs are authorized under Section 1920(2). See also Weeks, 126 F.3d at 945.
Defendants dispute several of Plaintiff’s claimed expenses on the basis that (a) they were
unnecessary, and/or (b) Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient documentation showing the
reasonableness of the asserted costs. (Dkt. 408-7; Dkt. 395 at 5–7 (disputing the necessity of five
depositions), 7–8 (disputing seven deposition costs lacking proper documentation)).
Necessity of the Challenged Depositions. In determining whether a deposition’s costs can
be taxed, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether the deposition was ‘reasonably necessary’ to the case at
the time it was taken, not whether it was used in a motion or in court.” Nwoke v. Univ. of Chi.
Med. Ctr., No. 20-cv-2242, 2021 WL 3483434, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2021) (citing Cengr v.
Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 455 (7th Cir. 1998)). When deciding this, “introduction
of a deposition at trial is not a prerequisite for finding that it was necessary to take the deposition,”
as long as the deposition was not “purely investigative in nature.” Hudson v. Nabisco Brands,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Provident Bank v. Manor
Steel Corp., 882 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1989). In Cengr, depositions were deemed reasonably
19
necessary because they were taken of individuals who witnessed the events giving rise to the
plaintiff’s claims. 135 F.3d at 455.
Defendants submit that Plaintiff’s depositions of the following individuals were
unnecessary: Julia Ramirez, Carol Maresso, Thomas Deacy, Charles Daly, and Henry Conforti.
(Dkt. 395 at 5). Accordingly, they urge the Court to exclude $1,808.18 from Plaintiff’s relevant
expenses. (Id.).
To begin, Williams agreed to exclude the $160 claimed with respect to the Ramirez
deposition, and so this amount will be deducted from his requested sum. (Dkt. 405 at 4). Next,
Defendants argue that Maresso’s deposition cannot be taxed as costs because Williams voluntarily
dismissed her from the case. (Dkt. 395 at 6 (further noting that Maresso is thus the “prevailing
party”)). However, Maresso testified at trial and Plaintiff’s counsel used her deposition transcript
for impeachment. (Dkt. 4-5 at 3 (framing Maresso as a “key fact witness at trial”)). As such, her
deposition was necessary to the case. See, e.g., Smith v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 12-cv-8716, 2015
WL 2149552, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2015) (“But, in this case, Mr. Smith's deposition was used
both at summary judgment and at trial, and as in Cengr, was ‘entirely reasonable’ for the defendant
in this case to order the transcripts of the plaintiff's deposition”).
Defendants further argue that the claimed costs related to Deacy, Daly, and Conforti are
non-compensable essentially because their depositions related to Plaintiff’s failed malicious
prosecution and conspiracy counts. (Dkt. 395 at 8–9; Dkt. 408 at 23 (“[M]ost of the depositions
were unnecessary, geared as they were to the unsuccessful claim that the detectives surreptitiously
investigated the deceased Keith Slugg as the prime murder suspect.”)). Williams explains that
these depositions sought information pertinent to his underlying criminal investigation, and
whether probable cause existed at the time of his arrest. (Dkt. 405 at 3–4). The Court grants the
20
costs requested for these depositions because at the time they were taken, it was reasonable to
believe that these individuals could have provided information probative of Plaintiff’s claims he
intended to pursue at trial. See Nwoke, 2021 WL 3483434, at *2. In addition, Deacy and Conforti
testified at trial, (Dkt. 405 at 4), further supporting an award of the costs associated with their
depositions.
Reasonableness of the Claimed Costs.
Defendants challenged certain requested
transcription fees as unreasonable because Williams initially failed to adduce proper
documentation substantiating his costs. (Dkt. 395 at 7–8 (challenging transcript fees associated
with Maresso, Daly, Hill, Garcia, Deacy, and Goldish)).
Williams provided additional
documentation in response, which allows the Court to assess the reasonableness of his claimed
fees. (See Dkt. 405-1). Still, Defendants maintain their objections to the following costs as
unreasonable, (see Dkt. 395 at 8):
Deponent
Carol Maresso
Charles Daly
Donald Hill
Marcio Garcia
Thomas Deacy
Megan Goldish
Total
Claimed Cost
$334.35
$302.75
$543.70
$429.15
$252.70
$572.50
$2,435.15
(Dkt. 405 at 4).
In general, prevailing parties can recover money spent on deposition transcripts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(2), so long as the transcript was “necessarily obtained” and its cost did not exceed the
“regular copy rate as established by the Judicial Conference of the United States and in effect at
the time the transcript . . . was filed.” L.R. 54.1(b); see also Cengr, 135 F.3d at 456 (“The Judicial
Conference rates apply to deposition charges by private court reporters.”). The current regular
copy rate, in effect since January 26, 2012, is $3.65 per page for original transcripts delivered
21
within
30
days.
See
https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/Pages.aspx?rsp2kxYIAI6Z3skP0PESA+q3bXKkfRyo
(last
accessed Mar. 31, 2022). Local Rule 54.1(b) also allows recovery of court reporter “appearance
fees,” which are capped at $110 where the court reporter was present for four hours or fewer. See
id. Guided by these principles, the Court finds that Williams would be entitled to the following
costs:
Deponent
Carol Maresso
Charles Daly
Donald Hill
Marcio Garcia
Thomas Deacy
Megan Goldish
Number of
Transcript
Pages
73
65
126
97
53
135
Transcript
Cost ($3.65
per page)
$266.45
$237.25
$459.90
$354.05
$193.45
$492.75
Court Reporter
Hours Worked
Court Reporter Fee
($110 maximum)
2 ($75/hr)
2 ($75/hr)
3.5 ($75/hr)
3.5 ($75/hr)
2 ($65/hr)
3.5 ($65/hr)
$110
$110
$110
$110
$110
$110
Total:
Maximum
Costs
Allowed
$376.45
$347.25
$569.90
$464.05
$303.45
$602.75
$2,663.85
Plaintiff’s total requested amount for his deposition transcript costs comes within this maximum
reasonable allotment. (See Dkt. 405 at 4 (presenting Williams’s request for $2,435.15 in transcript
costs)). Defendants are ordered to reimburse Williams for the total amount he requested for the
challenged transcript costs: $2,435.15.
5. Filing Fee
Williams paid $400.00 to file the Complaint in this case. This fee is recoverable as a
“[f]ee[] of the clerk.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). Also, because the amount of the fee is set by this
District and must be paid to file a case in this District, the fee is reasonable and necessary. Thus,
Plaintiff is awarded the $400.00 cost to file its Complaint.
6. Lexis Research Expenses.
The cost of computerized legal research is generally compensable as part of an attorneys’
fee award because the “added cost of [such] research is normally matched with a corresponding
reduction in the amount of time an attorney must spend researching.” Davis v. Budz, No. 99-cv22
3009, 2011 WL 1303477, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Haroco, 38 F.3d at 1440).
However, a party seeking recovery for research expenses must provide “information from which
the court may determine whether the computerized legal research charges were reasonably
incurred.” Williams v. Z.D. Masonry Corp., No. 07-cv-6207, 2009 WL 383614, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb.17, 2009) (disallowing electronic legal research costs where petition did not “describe what
research was performed”); see also Eng’d Abrasives, Inc. v. Am. Mach. Prods. & Serv., No. 13cv-7342, 2015 WL 1281460, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2015) (same); Harris N.A. v. Acadia Invs.
L.C., No. 09-cv-6661, 2012 WL 1681985, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2012) (same where plaintiff did
not provide information regarding what attorneys charged for research or the nature and subject of
the research); Davis, 2011 WL 1303477, at *8 (same where “[a]ll that Plaintiff here has offered is
a list of dates on which legal research was purportedly performed and the dates on which
WESTLAW billed for the service”).
Williams requests $6,527.70 for his attorneys’ research activities on Lexis. (Dkt. 403-12
at 3). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Lexis charges should be disregarded because they are
overly vague. (Dkt. 408 at 24–25 (noting Plaintiff’s “overall failure to detail the nature of this
research or how it applied to the litigation”)). They highlight that of Plaintiff’s eighteen Lexis
charges, sixteen of them “lack any type of specificity,” and the remaining two are also lack
sufficient detail. (Id. (emphasis added); see also Dkt. 408-8 (compiling Plaintiff’s Lexis charges)).
For example, Plaintiff requests $1,124.34 for a February 28, 2021 Lexis invoice. (Dkt. 408-8 at
2). The description associated with this charge states: “Lexis Research Invoice #3093131256:
Lexis Advance access charge and document access for U.S. cases.” (Id.). Plaintiff provides no
information regarding the nature, subject, or time expended on this research. The two relatively
more detailed Lexis charges broadly indicate motions for which research was being performed and
23
relevant date ranges. For example, Plaintiff’s September 30, 2017 charge was for “access [to] US
cases re opposition to cities [sic] motion to bifurcate (9/27-9/28/2017).” (Dkt. 408-8 at 1).
Because these charges lack sufficient detail regarding the subject of and time spent on the research,
Williams cannot recover these costs.
7. Expenses for Legal Assistant’s Overtime Work
Williams requests $1,194.39 for Legal Assistant Angelica Regalado’s assistance with trial
preparation. (Dkt. 403-12 at 3; Dkt. 410 at 15). The expense report provides no detail at all
regarding what services Regalado performed. (Id.). Defendants argue that the Court should deny
this expense given that Regalado is a non-attorney, and the nature of her overtime work is vague
and undefined. (Dkt. 408 at 25). In Plaintiff’s reply brief, he explained that Regalado “worked
overtime during the trial on exhibits, witness outlines, and court filings.” (Dkt. 408 at 15). Even
still, Plaintiff’s request lacks sufficient particularity. First, Plaintiff’s claim for Regalado’s work
“during the trial” is confused by the expense report itself, which bills for her time on February 11,
2021 and on three separate dates in April before the trial began. (Compare id. (emphasis added),
with Dkt. 403-12 at 3; see also Dkt. 349 (noting that voir dire commenced on April 6, 2021)).
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s filings make it impossible for the Court to determine the nature of
Regalado’s work and whether it was merely clerical. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553 (“[T]he district
court should disallow time spent on what are essentially ‘clerical’ or secretarial tasks.”); see also,
e.g., Morjal, 2013 WL 2368062, at *2 (“[T]ime spent organizing file folders, preparing
document[s], assembling filings, electronically filing documents, sending materials, docketing or
logging case events into an internal case tracking system, and telephoning court reporters is
noncompensable.”). Defendants will not be required to reimburse Williams for this expense.
24
8. Expenses for Process Servers
Defendant seeks $896.50 for the cost of engaging process servers in this case. (Dkt. 40312 at 3). Fees for service are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1) but may not exceed the U.S.
Marshals rate at the time that process was served. See Collins v. Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th
Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Williams v. Fico, 2015 WL 3759753, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2015).
The applicable rate currently used by the U.S. Marshals is $65 per hour, plus travel costs and any
other out-of-pocket expenses. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3) (establishing fees for service of
summons); 78 Fed. Reg. 59819 (setting effective date of October 30, 2013 for new rates).
Here, Defendant seeks $130.00 in service fees incurred by the U.S. Marshalls Service, and
$766.50 in fees incurred by a private process server on at least three separate dates. (Dkt. 403-12
at 3). However, there is no indication of how long it took the private company to effectuate service,
the amount charged per hour, or any travel costs or other out-of-pocket expenses. The Court is
constrained to reduce those costs to $65.00 per line item so as not to exceed the U.S. Marshals rate
in place at the time of service. See, e.g., Dockery v. Maryville Acad., No. 16-cv-6188, 2020 WL
9396486, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2020); Serwatka v. City of Chi., No. 08-cv-5615, 2011 WL
2038725, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2011) (collecting cases); Trading Techs. Int'’l, Inc. v. eSpeed,
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 962, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (awarding USMS rate for one hour of service where
invoices “d[id] not indicate the amount of time required to effectuate service”). Accordingly, the
court awards $325 for Plaintiff’s service costs in total, including $130.00 billed by the U.S.
Marshals and $65 for each of the three invoices from the private process server ($195.00 in total).
9. Plaintiff’s Hotel Lodging Costs
Williams seeks reimbursement for hotel costs incurred during his trial between April 5 and
April 16, 2021. (Dkt. 403-12 at 3 (requesting $1489.68 for hotel stay)). He argues that this is a
25
covered expense under Section 1920(3), which allows costs for witnesses’ reasonable lodging
expenses. (Dkt. 410 at 15 (citing Majeske, 218 F.3d at 825–26 (granting costs for “out-of-town
witnesses’ hotel rooms”))). Plaintiff explains that he lived in DeKalb, Illinois during the trial and
“counsel needed him to stay in a hotel so that he could meet with counsel before and after trial
days, including over the weekend.” (Dkt. 410 at 15). He further notes that he was called as a
witness by both parties at different times throughout the trial, requiring his continued presence in
Chicago. (Id.). Defendants emphasize that Williams is not merely a witness, but the plaintiff in
this litigation, and that he sought venue in the Northern District of Illinois. (Dkt. 408 at 25). They
further argue that Williams should have traveled to Chicago as need, since he lives about an hour
and fifteen minutes away in DeKalb. (Dkt. 395 at 4). Finally, Defendants assert that his hotel
costs on April 9 and 10 were “entirely unnecessary to the trial” because they were weekend nights,
when no trial would take place the following morning. (Dkt. 395 at 5).
Plaintiff concedes that “neither party cites authority directly on point” to the present case,
where a litigant (rather than an attorney or a witness) seeks lodging costs. (Dkt. 410 at 15). That
said, the Seventh Circuit in Calderon v. Witvoet determined that a plaintiff could not be reimbursed
for travel costs related to his trial. 112 F.3d 275, 276 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court’s
grant of such travel costs, stating they are not authorized by Section 1920). In addition, courts that
have granted lodging expenses did so for witnesses traveling from “out-of-town,” see Majeske,
218 F.3d at 825, and for attorneys who were “not local” and traveled from distances “more than
two hours away,” see Capps v. Drake, No. 3:14-cv-00441-NJR-DGW, 2019 WL 859779, at *8
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2019). The weight of these precedents disfavors Williams’ request for hotel
reimbursement. Absent any authority to the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot recover
the costs of his hotel stay because he is a litigant before the court – rather than a non-party witness
26
– and lived within a reasonable distance of the courthouse for him to travel there as desired or as
needed.
10. Trial Transcript Expenses
Again, Section 1920(2) contemplates recovery of court reporter fees and transcriptions.
Defendants do not contest Plaintiff’s claim for these claimed expenses. Defendants are therefore
ordered to pay Plaintiff’s costs related to trial transcripts amounting to $429.30.
11. Travel Expense
Plaintiff claims $52.50 for travel expenses related to witness Gladney’s deposition. (Dkt.
403-12). Travel expenses are typically reimbursable not as part of a bill of costs, but as attorneys’
fees. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285–89; Calderon, 112 F.3d at 276. In any case, Defendants do not
object to this expense and are therefore ordered to pay the $52.50 charge.
B. Summary of Costs Awarded
Plaintiff requested $17,657.76 in taxable costs. (See Dkt. 403 at 11; Dkt. 403-12). As set
forth above, his request is reduced by a total sum of $10,511.77. Thus, the Court awards Williams
$7,145.99 in costs.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motions for Fees and Costs [374, 403] is granted in part. Specifically, Plaintiff
is awarded $435,142.10 in attorneys’ fees and $10,511.77 in costs. In addition, the parties’
motions seeking extensions of time [380, 396] and for leave to file motions instanter [395, 397]
are granted.
Date: March 31, 2022
____________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Judge
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