Kyle v. Brennan

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 7/2/2018: For the reasons stated, the Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss and directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mailed notice. (pjg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

IMMANUEL J. KYLE,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General, )
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Defendant.
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Case No. 17 C 5257

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Immanuel Kyle is a former mail handler for the United States Postal
Service (USPS). He has sued Postmaster General Megan J. Brennan, alleging that
USPS retaliated against him based upon his prior disability-based litigation. Mr. Kyle
seeks relief under the Rehabilitation Act. He claims he was denied complete health
benefit restoration because USPS refused to comply with document requests made by
the Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP). He contends that USPS
Health and Resource Management Specialist Palmaline Daniels knew of his disability
and prior EEO litigation and that this motivated her to interfere with his receipt of proper
OWCP benefits. USPS has moved to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction
to adjudicate Mr. Kyle's claim.
Background
On December 17, 2015, OWCP sent Mr. Kyle a letter accepting a claim for
benefits with regard to certain occupational diseases related to his foot. In this letter,

OWCP instructed Mr. Kyle to utilize a Form CA-7 to claim compensation for work lost
due to his condition. On July 19, 2016, Mr. Kyle sought compensation for leave without
pay from July 14 to July 18, 2016. On August 2, 2016, OWCP sent Mr. Kyle and USPS
a response seeking additional information from USPS necessary to determine the
correct compensation rate. OWCP informed Mr. Kyle that in the meantime his
compensation would be calculated using a temporary rate, subject to future adjustment.
Mr. Kyle sent USPS three separate requests to provide OWCP with the required
information. The parties disagree about whether USPS provided the appropriate
information regarding Mr. Kyle's benefits claim. Though evidence suggests Ms. Daniels
may have provided the necessary information via telephone, Mr. Kyle suspects this
documentation is fraudulent. Regardless, on October 24, 2016, OWCP sent a letter to
Mr. Kyle and USPS outlining his entitlement to compensation benefits. On December 1,
2016, Mr. Kyle filed an additional claim with OWCP based on USPS's refusal to provide
his documentation. OWCP rejected this claim on June 1, 2017.
Mr. Kyle filed an internal EEO complaint against USPS on December 13, 2016,
alleging that USPS's refusal to provide documentation was in retaliation for prior EEO
activity. On December 29, 2016, a final agency decision deemed his claim a "collateral
attack" on the OWCP process that was not cognizable via the USPS EEO process.
After an appeal, the EEOC's Office of Federal Operations affirmed the dismissal of Mr.
Kyle's complaint. Mr. Kyle then filed the present lawsuit.
In his complaint, Mr. Kyle asks the Court to order the USPS to comply with all
OWCP document requests and refrain from further interference with the OWCP
process. He also seeks to bar the Central Illinois District Injury Compensation Unit

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(CIDICU) from interfering with his past, present, and future compensation claims.
Finally, Mr. Kyle seeks damages for loss of benefits.
In her motion to dismiss, Ms. Brennan argues this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Kyle's case and argues in the alternative that Mr. Kyle has state a
claim. In his response to this motion, Mr. Kyle cites a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1922, as the "true basis" for his complaint. After Ms. Brennan filed her reply brief, Mr.
Kyle moved to strike it, citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f), 11(b)(3), 11(b)(4), and 9(b).
Discussion
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer,
Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014). The Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA) establishes the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) as the exclusive arbiter of issues regarding federal workers' compensation
benefits and proscribes judicial review of such decisions. 5 U.S.C § 8128(b)(2). The
Supreme Court has interpreted section 8128(b) as "an 'unambiguous and
comprehensive' provision barring any judicial review of the Secretary's determination of
FECA coverage." Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1990) (quoting Lindahl v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 780 n. 13 (1985)). An employee dissatisfied with a
benefits decision can appeal within the DOL's administrative process. 5 U.S.C. § 8124.
"As a subdivision of the Department of Labor, the OWCP's decision to award or
deny benefits is not subject to judicial review." Kroggel v. Runyon, No. 92-1995, 1993
WL 164625, at *3 (7th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). In Kroggel, a postal employee filed a
disability discrimination suit against both USPS and DOL, claiming a USPS supervisor

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submitted false information to the OWCP. Id. at *1. Because the plaintiff sought relief
for denial of OWCP benefits, the Seventh Circuit held only the Secretary of Labor had
jurisdiction to redress the claim. Id. at *3. See Brown v. U.S. Postal Serv., 67 F. App'x
368, 370 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal of discrimination claim accusing USPS of
interfering with OWCP benefits determination, as "such decisions are not subject to
review by other federal agencies or the courts"); see also Czerkies v. U.S. Dept. of
Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1443 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (affirming dismissal of "claim for
benefits 'cloaked in constitutional terms'"). Even where a plaintiff does not disagree with
OWCP's benefits determination, section 8128(b) blocks federal court jurisdiction over
any claim that requires a review of a benefits determination. See White v. Kilgore, No
1:10-CV-00053, 2011 WL 144916, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). In White, a former
employee filed a discrimination suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority for failing to
send his CA-7 form to the OWCP and for interfering with his OWCP benefits by
submitting false information. Id. at *2-3. Though the plaintiff did not "explicitly challenge
OWCP's decisions," the district court dismissed the claim because the relief sought, an
award of benefits denied, required a review of OWCP's decision to deny benefits. Id. at
*4.
In this case, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because Mr. Kyle's
complaint requires a review of OWCP's decision to deny benefits. In his complaint, Mr.
Kyle seeks compensation based on the failure to restore what he contends are his
proper benefits. He also requests injunctive relief to prevent USPS and CIDICU from
interfering with his benefits claim. Although Mr. Kyle does not describe what CIDICU is
or how it interfered with his benefits, an injunction against USPS or CIDICU would be

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aimed at remedying the deprivation of his benefits. In short, like the plaintiff in Kroggel,
Mr. Kyle asks this Court to review OWCP's actions. In his reply, Mr. Kyle clarifies that
he does not disagree with OWCP's decision, because he views the agency's final
decision to be in his favor. The parties' briefs reflect that they disagree over the
existence of an OWCP final decision. Nevertheless, under the view most favorable to
the plaintiff, Mr. Kyle wants USPS to provide the necessary information so that OWCP
will award his proper benefits. And although Mr. Kyle argues that a review of OWCP's
benefits determination is unnecessary, as in White, any evaluation of Mr. Kyle's
retaliation claim would require this Court to determine whether he suffered an adverse
employment action, which in turn would require the Court to assess whether he was
entitled to benefits different from those OWCP awarded. In short, Mr. Kyle's complaint
necessitates an evaluation of OWCP's actions. Because FECA bars review of OWCP
benefit awards, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Kyle's claim.
In his reply, Mr. Kyle identifies 18 U.S.C. § 1922 as the "true basis for the
complaint." However, there is no private right of action under this criminal statute.
Finally, Mr. Kyle filed a motion to strike the entirety of Ms. Brennan's reply for
putting forth false and misleading statements. The Court denies the motion. Though
the parties may have different views of the relevant events, the Court has disregarded
Ms. Brennan's statements in the reply to the extent they are inconsistent with the
relevant records or contradict well-pleaded allegations in Mr. Kyle's complaint.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss
and directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction.
Date: July 2, 2018
________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

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