The City of Chicago v. Sessions III
Filing
98
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 10/13/2017:Mailed notice(wp, )
Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 1 of 17 PageID #:1378
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17 C 5720
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD
SESSIONS III, Attorney
General of the United States,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The
Attorney
application
of
General
this
moves
Court’s
to
stay
preliminary
the
nationwide
injunction
against
imposition of certain conditions on the 2017 Byrne JAG grant
pending
resolution
Seventh
Circuit
herein,
Defendant’s
of
Court
the
of
Attorney
General’s
Appeals.
Motion
to
Stay
For
the
Nationwide
appeal
reasons
to
the
stated
Application
of
Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 80] is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of
this case as recited in its opinion granting in part the City of
Chicago’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
See, generally,
City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS
149847
(N.D.
Ill.
Sep.
15,
2017).
In
support
of
the
instant motion, the Attorney General has pointed to additional
Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 2 of 17 PageID #:1379
facts that merit discussion here.
The Attorney General’s office
has
applications
received
nearly
a
thousand
for
Byrne
JAG
funding for FY 2017, and nearly all those applications await
award
notifications
“Department”).
from
(See,
Hanson, ¶ 4.)
the
ECF
Department
No.
82,
Second
of
Justice
Decl.
of
(the
Alan
R.
In prior years, the majority of Byrne JAG awards
were already issued by this time of the year. (Id. ¶ 9.)
The
Attorney General argues that this Court’s nationwide preliminary
injunction prevents the Department from issuing the Byrne JAG
award notifications because, even if the appeal is successful,
the Attorney General will be unable to add the notice and access
conditions after the award notifications issue.
The Attorney
General
urges
process
past
imposing
budgets
under
that
which
significant
September
heavy
(id.
a
¶
of
burdens
11),
states
this
on
in
the
grant-making
raises
year
the
prospect
localities
disrupting
issue
delay
state
sub-awards
of
with
relatively
grant-making
Byrne
JAG
of
small
processes
funds
(id.
¶ 12), and undermining recovery efforts in jurisdictions that
have recently suffered natural disasters (id. ¶ 13).
this
delay
and
the
attendant
burdens,
the
requests a stay of the preliminary injunction.
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Attorney
To avoid
General
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The analysis for “granting a stay pending appeal mirrors
that
for
granting
Enters.,
Inc.
a
II,
preliminary
742
F.3d
injunction.”
763,
766
(7th
In
Cir.
re
A
&
2014).
F
In
determining whether to grant a stay, the court should consider
“the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, the
irreparable harm that will result to each side if the stay is
either
granted
interest
movant
issue.
(7th
or
favors
can
denied
one
in
side
demonstrate
error,
or
the
the
first
and
whether
other.”
two
Ibid.
factors
is
the
public
Whether
a
the
threshold
See, In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 115 F.3d 1294, 1300
Cir.
1997).
“If
the
movant
can
make
these
threshold
showings, the court then moves on to balance the relative harms
considering all four factors using a ‘sliding scale’ approach.”
Id. at 1300-01.
A stay pending appeal is intended “to minimize
the costs of error” and “to mitigate the damage that can be done
during
the
interim
period
resolved on its merits.”
before
a
legal
issue
is
finally
In re A & F Enters., 742 F.3d at 766.
As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[c]rafting a preliminary
injunction
dependent
is
as
an
much
exercise
on
the
of
discretion
equities
of
a
and
given
substance of the legal issues it presents.”
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judgment,
case
often
as
the
Trump v. Int’l
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Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)
(citations omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Attorney General argues that the City of Chicago (the
“City”)
lacks
Article
III
standing
beyond its alleged injury-in-fact.
for
any
remedy
that
goes
(The Court notes that this
argument may be mooted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ pending
Motion to Intervene, but in this Opinion does not consider the
effect of such an intervention.)
There is no dispute that the
City has standing vis-à-vis the notice and access conditions.
Nonetheless,
the
Attorney
General
contends
that
the
City’s
standing is cut off at its jurisdictional boundaries, preventing
the Court from fashioning a remedy any broader in scope than
that
required
disagrees.
to
redress
the
City’s
injury.
The
Court
Once a constitutional violation has been shown, “the
nature of the remedy must be determined by the nature and the
scope of the constitutional violation.”
Koo v. McBride, 124
F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1997); see also, Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) (“The nature of the . . . remedy is to be
determined
by
the
nature
and
scope
violation.”) (quotation omitted).
likely constitutional violation.
of
the
constitutional
The City has demonstrated a
It is the “nature and scope of
the constitutional violation” that defines the remedy for this
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violation,
not
the
particular
plaintiff.
Ibid.
Here,
the
constitutional transgression is national in scope because the
notice
and
access
conditions,
shown
unconstitutional, were imposed nationwide.
to
be
likely
Thus, a preliminary
injunction may “bind” the “part[y]” before the Court, in this
case
the
Attorney
General,
to
prevent
the
constitutional
violations at issue regardless of where they may occur.
CIV.
P.
65(d).
“[O]nce
a
constitutional
FED. R.
violation
is
demonstrated, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers
to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable remedies.”
Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d
300, 303 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
The Constitution vests a
district court with “the judicial Power of the United States.”
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
This power is not limited to the
jurisdiction in which the district court sits:
“[i]t is not
beyond the power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to
issue a nationwide injunction.”
188
(5th
Cir.
2015),
as
Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134,
revised
(Nov.
25,
2015),
aff’d
by
equally divided court, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016).
The
circumstances
here
are
appropriate.
Because
the
Attorney General’s authority, or lack thereof, will not vary by
jurisdiction,
the
cases
cited
- 5 -
in
support
of
a
stay
are
Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 6 of 17 PageID #:1383
inapposite.
In
Lewis
v.
Casey,
518
U.S.
343
(1996),
the
evidence failed to show systemic violations necessary to justify
a state-wide injunction in Arizona’s prison libraries, as the
challenged conduct could have been present in some prisons but
not
others.
Id.
at
359-60.
This
case,
on
the
other
hand,
implicates a facial challenge to a federal statute; the Attorney
General’s authority to impose Byrne JAG conditions on the City
will not differ from his authority to do so elsewhere.
No
additional evidence is needed to justify the nationwide scope of
the injunction because the Attorney General’s authority does not
vary
state
by
state
like
the
conditions
libraries may vary prison to prison.
of
access
to
legal
See, id. Town of Chester,
N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1648-49 (2017), is
also
unavailing.
There,
the
Court
analyzed
whether
an
intervenor as a matter of right has standing to claim a remedy
separate from that sought by the plaintiff.
found
no
case
extending
Town
of
Chester’s
This Court has
rationale
to
the
proposition advanced by the Attorney General - that, regardless
of
the
standing
likely
is
constitutional
barred
from
violation
injunctive
shown,
relief
a
broader
party
with
than
that
which directly impacts it.
Next, the Attorney General argues that equitable principles
require that the injunction be no more burdensome than necessary
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to resolve a plaintiff’s injury.
While true that an injunction
should be “no more burdensome than necessary to provide complete
relief,” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 778
(1994), a nationwide injunction is necessary to provide complete
relief from the likely constitutional violation at issue here.
See, McBride, 124 F.3d at 873; see also, Bailey v. Patterson,
323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963) (“The very nature of the
rights appellants seek to vindicate requires that the decree run
to the benefit not only of appellants but also for all persons
similarly situated.”).
As the City’s cited authority indicates,
nationwide injunctions have been upheld numerous times where the
remedy provided relief to non-parties as well as the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Decker v. O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th Cir.
1980);
Texas
nationwide
v.
scope
U.S.,
of
809
F.3d
at
preliminary
187-88
n.
injunction
211
(upholding
and
collecting
cases).
Most
validates
significantly,
the
injunction here.
a
nationwide
recent
Supreme
application
of
Court
the
decision
preliminary
In International Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 583 U.S.
__ (2017), the Fourth Circuit upheld the nationwide scope of a
preliminary injunction enjoining, inter alia, portions of the
President’s
executive
order
barring
- 7 -
certain
foreign
nationals
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from entering the United States.
The government appealed and,
while
moved
the
appeal
injunction.
was
pending,
for
a
stay
of
the
See, Trump v. IRAP, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the motion
to stay the nationwide injunction. Id. at 2089.
Although the
Supreme Court narrowed the categories of persons to whom the
injunction applied, the nationwide application of the injunction
was upheld “with respect to parties similarly situated to [the
plaintiffs].” Id. at 2088.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s
analysis, the scope of the nationwide preliminary injunction at
issue
here
includes
governments.
argument
injunction
situated
states
and
local
In fact, the dissenting Justices made the exact
the
criticizing
similarly
Attorney
the
for
General
majority
other
for
similarly
advances
upholding
situated
here,
the
specifically
scope
persons
and
of
the
ignoring
that “a court’s role is to provide relief only to claimants.”
Id. at 2090 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quotations and alterations
omitted) (“But the Court takes the additional step of keeping
the injunctions in place with regard to an unidentified, unnamed
group of foreign nationals abroad.”).
The Attorney General’s
argument to stay the injunction parallels that adopted by the
dissent
but
clearly
rejected
by
- 8 -
the
majority
of
the
Supreme
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Court. See, id. at 2088.
Thus, the Court is duty-bound to
reject it here as well.
Similarly,
injunction
the
where
Seventh
the
Circuit
evidence
involved one jurisdiction.
has
before
upheld
the
a
nationwide
court
primarily
In Decker, the appellant argued that
the district court erred by entering a nationwide injunction
where the fact-finding had focused on Milwaukee County.
Decker, 661 F.2d at 617-18.
See,
The court affirmed the nationwide
scope of the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the court’s
“analysis . . . relied primarily on the statute and regulation
and
ha[d]
used
the
evidence
on
funding
in
Milwaukee
County
merely as illustration.” Id. at 618.
The
Attorney
General’s
authority
for
cabining
injunctive
relief to only the plaintiff’s injury is distinguishable.
In
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010), the
Supreme
Court
violation
federal
of
reviewed
the
agency
statement
overturned
the
lawfully
completing
to
the
a
new
injunction
based
Environmental
Policy
complete
to
an
alfalfa.
emphasizing
partial
The
that
deregulation
a
where
a
environmental
impact
harming the plaintiffs. Id. at 165-66.
- 9 -
impact
Supreme
the
of
Act
on
environmental
deregulating
injunction,
approve
permanent
National
failed
prior
a
Court
agency
could
alfalfa
statement
before
without
Because the district
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court had enjoined the agency from approving not just a complete
but also a partial deregulation, the injunction was overbroad.
Ibid.
Monsanto
does
not
apply
here.
In
Monsanto,
the
injunction prevented the agency from using its lawful authority
to impose a partial deregulation that had not been shown to harm
the plaintiffs.
has
no
lawful
See, ibid.
authority
conditions.
An
inhibits
Attorney
the
Here, the Attorney General likely
to
injunction
statutory authority.
impose
is
General
not
the
assessed
injunction
defendants’
“whether
significant
burden
no
acting
and
access
it
merely
his
likely
where
beyond
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S.
government
Amendment
rights,
See, id. at 765.
the
more
Because the injunction there
First
applied a different standard.
Court
notice
overbroad
from
753 (1994), is also inapplicable.
restricted
the
challenged
speech
interest.”
than
There, the
provisions
necessary
Ibid.
Madsen
No
to
of
the
serve
similar
a
First
Amendment concern is present here.
With
General
respect
argues
to
that
equitable
staying
considerations,
the
nationwide
the
sweep
Attorney
of
the
injunction would allow the Department to include the notice and
access conditions in award notifications while a decision on the
merits is reached, thus preventing burdens on localities that
might attend a significant delay in Byrne JAG funding.
- 10 -
The
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difficulty
with
this
proposition
is
that,
in
essence,
the
proposed “fix” would allow the Attorney General to impose what
this
Court
has
ruled
are
likely
unconstitutional
conditions
across a number of jurisdictions prior to a decision on the
merits.
This is not an equitable result, particularly where the
Court’s preliminary injunction merely preserves the status quo
to await a final decision.
AND
PROCEDURE
§
Weinberger,
65.20
522
See, Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(2017);
F.2d
921,
see
926
also,
(7th
Am.
Cir.
Med.
1975)
Ass’n
v.
(upholding
preliminary injunction that preserved status quo for resolution
on the merits).
Finally, the Attorney General argues that applicants who
contest
the
conditions
may
file
their
own
lawsuits
while
jurisdictions that do not contest the conditions may receive
immediate
funding
conditions
while
by
the
acceding
appeal
is
to
the
notice
pending.
and
access
Considering
that
thirty-seven cities and counties have signed on as amicus curiae
in
support
of
the
City,
judicial
economy
counsels
against
requiring all these jurisdictions (and potentially others) to
file their own lawsuits to decide the same legal question before
this Court. (See, generally, ECF No. 51, Brief of Amici Curiae
County
of
Santa
Clara,
36
Additional
Cities,
Counties
and
Municipal Agencies, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National
- 11 -
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League
of
Cities,
International
the
National
Municipal
Association
Lawyers
of
Counties,
Association,
and
the
the
International City/County Management Association (“Amicus Brief
of
Counties,
Cities,
and
Others”).)
Furthermore,
all
jurisdictions remain free to adopt the substance of the notice
and access conditions if they wish to do so.
only
prevents
the
Attorney
General
conditions on the Byrne JAG funds.
from
The injunction
imposing
them
as
If, however, the Attorney
General wishes to reserve his right to tether the notice and
access conditions to eligibility for these funds, he must await
a decision that upholds his authority to do so.
Although not specifically raised by the Attorney General,
there
are
injunction.
reasons
to
be
cautious
when
imposing
a
nationwide
Recent legal scholarship has identified significant
concerns related to the use of nationwide injunctions at the
district court and circuit court levels.
See, generally, Samuel
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction
(February 9, 2017) (forthcoming publication), available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864175; Michael T. Morley, De Facto
Class Actions?
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in
Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 487 (2016); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation
for Me, but Not for Thee:
The Rise of Common Claims in Non- 12 -
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Class Litigation, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 2017 (2015).
injunctions
may
increase
forum
shopping,
lead
to
Nationwide
conflicting
injunctions, and stymie the development of the law within the
Circuits prior to Supreme Court review.
These concerns are not
insignificant but fail to overcome the benefits of a nationwide
injunction in this specific instance.
First and foremost, there
has been no evidence of forum shopping here and neither party
has
argued
as
such.
Second,
as
explained
above,
judicial
economy favors avoiding “a flood of duplicative litigation” from
other Byrne JAG applicants who want the same protections as the
City of Chicago.
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. United States Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Certainly, it
would at least include the thirty-seven cities and counties that
filed briefs in support of the City of Chicago as amici.
See,
ECF No. 51, Amicus Brief of Counties, Cities, and Others; see
also, A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 345, 358
(2001) (“It would be senseless to require the relitigation of
the validity of a regulation in all federal district courts”).
Nevertheless, issuing a nationwide injunction should not be
a default approach.
It is an extraordinary remedy that should
be limited by the nature of the constitutional violation and
subject to prudent use by the courts. See, Califano v. Yamaski,
442
U.S.
682,
702
(1979)
(noting
- 13 -
that
injunctive
relief
is
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limited to the “extent of the violation established”).
In this
case, the Court finds it an appropriate remedy based on the need
for
federal
uniformity
and
the
unfairness
resulting
from
disparate applications.
The rule of law is undermined where a court holds that the
Attorney
General
conduct,
but
jurisdictions
is
likely
nevertheless
across
the
engaging
allows
country.
in
legally
that
The
unauthorized
conduct
Courts
in
have
other
a
“well-
recognized interest in ensuring that federal courts interpret
federal law in a uniform way.”
362, 389–90 (2000).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
Further, the public interest and perception
of the law supports “having congressional enactments properly
interpreted
protection
and
of
applied.
the
public
.
.
.
interest
As
it
with
is
which
principally
[the
court
the
is]
concerned, no artificial restrictions of the court’s power to
grant equitable relief in the furtherance of that interest can
be acknowledged.”
Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534-
35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
All similarly-situated persons are entitled to similar outcomes
under the law, and as a corollary, an injunction that results in
unequal treatment of litigants appears arbitrary.
See, id. at
534 (“[Where] a lower court . . . has spoken, that court would
ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to
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it with an essentially similar cause of action. . . .
The rule
of law requires no less.”); see also, Sandford v. R. L. Coleman
Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he settled
rule is that whether plaintiff proceeds as an individual or on a
class suit basis, the requested injunctive relief generally will
benefit not only the claimant but all other persons subject to
the practice or the rule under attack.”) (internal quotations
and
alterations
scope
would
omitted).
leave
the
An
injunction
Attorney
more
General
restricted
free
to
in
continue
enforcing the likely invalid conditions against all other Byrne
JAG applicants.
This state of affairs flies in the face of the
rule of law and the role of the courts to ensure the rule of law
is enforced.
This is especially true considering the judiciary has an
important role to play in enforcing the separation of powers.
See, NLRB v. Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2559-60 (2014) (“[T]he
separation
of
powers
.
.
.
serve[s]
to
safeguard
individual
liberty, and . . . it is the duty of the judicial department —
in a separation-of-powers case as in any other — to say what the
law is.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
the
court
significant,
believes
it
right itself.”
may
the
write
underlying
injunctive
right
relief
to
as
be
broad
“When
highly
as
the
Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 636
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F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (quotations omitted).
District
courts
appropriate
Capitol
are
scope
Serv.,
given
of
Inc.,
an
broad
authority
injunction.
756
F.2d
to
See,
502,
determine
United
507
(7th
States
Cir.
the
v.
1985)
(“Geographical limitations regarding the issues at trial do not
alter the court’s broad remedial powers.”); Sprogis v. United
Air
Lines,
(affirming
Inc.,
the
444
F.2d
“district
1194,
court’s
1201-02
power
to
(7th
Cir.
consider
1971)
extending
relief beyond the named plaintiff” “where justice requires such
action”).
If this Court is incorrect, the appellate process is
the vehicle to correct the error.
The Court is sympathetic to the Attorney General’s quandary
and agrees that, ideally, a final decision on the merits would
be reached before practical constraints force a surrender of his
policy position (at least for FY 2017).
However, this concern
is better dealt with through expedited proceedings than a stay
that
would
likely
result
in
imposition
conditions on Byrne JAG applicants.
Attorney
General
opposed
the
of
unconstitutional
The Court notes that the
City’s
Motion
for
Expedited
Briefing that would have resulted in an earlier decision on the
City’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
(See, ECF No. 28,
Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite Briefing Schedule.)
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Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:1394
Applicants
for
a
stay
have
a
threshold
burden
to
demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and that
irreparable harm will result if the stay is denied.
Matter of
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d at 1300–01.
Where the
applicant “does not make the requisite showings on either of
[the threshold] factors, the court’s inquiry into the balance of
harms
is
unnecessary,
and
the
further analysis.” Id. at 1301.
stay
should
be
denied
without
Because the Attorney General is
not able to meet its threshold burden of showing some likelihood
of success on its motion to stay nationwide application of the
preliminary injunction, no further analysis is necessary.
See,
ibid.
IV.
For
the
reasons
CONCLUSION
stated
herein,
the
Attorney
General’s
Motion to Stay Nationwide Application of Preliminary Injunction
[ECF No. 80] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: October 13, 2017
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