Norwood v. Dart et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: This Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss 98 the Fourth Amended Complaint as to Sheriff Dart, Cook County, Conley, Shebel, and Gresham-Trotter with prejudice, and denies the motion as to Anderson, Dr. Davis, Dr. Baker, and Guerrero. Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 11/5/2019. Mailed notice. (ym, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RANDY NORWOOD,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, Cook County Sheriff,
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, SGT. THOMAS
CONLEY, KIM ANDERSON, DR. DAVIS,
SUSAN SHEBEL, DR. TERRENCE BAKER,
MIREYA GUERRERO, TORRENCE
GRESHAM-TROTTER,
Defendants.
Case No. 17-CV-5769
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Randy Norwood filed his Fourth Amended Complaint asserting claims against
defendants Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Cook County, Illinois, Sgt. Thomas Conley, Dr.
Davis, Dr. Terrence Baker, Mireya Guerrero, Kim Anderson, Susan Shebel, and Torrence GreshamTrotter, alleging that they were deliberately indifference to his medical condition in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss [98]. For the following reasons, the
Court grants defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.
Background
Randy Norwood is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections and was housed at
the Cook County Jail at all relevant times in this case. In April 2016, Norwood began suffering from
swelling and extreme pain in his right groin area, so on April 14 Norwood submitted a request for
medical attention. Kim Anderson, a registered nurse, evaluated Norwood on May 29, 2016, where
1 Although Norwood lists Cook County Health Services as a defendant, Cook County Health Services has not been
served. Further, Defendants contend that Cook County Health Services is not a separate entity from Cook County.
Norwood does not respond to this argument. Thus, the Court clarifies that Cook County Health Services is not a
defendant.
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Norwood told her that his symptoms included swelling and extreme pain in his right side groin area,
painful urination, painful defecation, limping, and a knot in his groin area. Anderson informed
Norwood that he did not have a hernia and prescribed him 200 mg Advil. Norwood submitted
another request for medical treatment that same day, which was denied by Sgt. Thomas Conley.
Norwood continued to submit medical requests, and Anderson recommended that he be given
special underwear to hold ice packs, which Norwood never received. Anderson continued to treat
Norwood with Advil and placed Norwood on bed rest, despite the “swelling and deformity” in
Norwood’s groin area that had grown to the size of a tennis ball. Norwood continued to receive
pain medication, and on July 18, 2016, Torrence Gresham-Trotter, also a registered nurse, informed
Norwood that a doctor would see him.
Two days later, on July 20, 2016, Dr. Davis diagnosed Norwood with two hernias and
determined that Norwood did not need surgery. Norwood requested additional treatment methods,
which Dr. Davis denied. Norwood filed a grievance shortly after, which Susan Shebel, another
registered nurse, denied because Norwood had recently seen a doctor related to the hernia issue.
Norwood filed another grievance on September 6, 2016; Shebel responded to Norwood, advising
him to continue submitting medical forms. Dr. Terrence Baker and Physician’s Assistant Mireya
Guerrero examined Norwood on September 13 and prescribed pain medication. Norwood
continued to file grievances and appeal their denial. Guerrero again saw Norwood on November 8,
2016, where Guerrero again prescribed Norwood pain medication and denied surgery.
Norwood filed another grievance in November 2016, which Shebel denied on December 20
because Norwood was scheduled to see a doctor in January 2017. Dr. Baker and Guerrero saw
Norwood on January 10, 2017, again denying his request for surgery. Dr. Davis, Guerrero, and
Anderson continued to see Norwood on multiple occasions between January 10 and June 18, 2017.
On May 11, Anderson treated Norwood and denied his request to see his medical file. Norwood
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filed a grievance on June 16 requesting an outside appointment regarding his hernia, which was
denied; Norwood appealed, which was also denied. Norwood informed Dr. Davis on July 18 that
he was having difficulty urinating and continued to have extreme pain due to the hernia. Norwood
further alleges that he gained forty pounds over the course of 18 months as a result of the hernias
and that he had difficulty with tasks associated with daily living, including walking, bathing, and
using the facilities. Norwood ultimately received surgery for his two hernias in June 2018.
Legal Standard
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all of the plaintiff’s
allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lavalais v. Vill. of
Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 632 (internal
quotations omitted). The plaintiff does not need to plead particularized facts, but the allegations in
the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action and allegations that are merely legal conclusions are not sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009).
Discussion
To sufficiently allege a claim for deliberate indifference, Norwood must allege that he had an
objectively serious medical need and that the defendants were aware of and refused to take
reasonable steps to address it. Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). As to medical
professionals, deliberate indifference only occurs when a physician’s treatment decision is such a
departure from accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually
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based on a medical judgment. Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006). When
determining whether deliberate indifference can be inferred from a physician’s treatment decision,
courts focus on what the physician knew at the time of treatment. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d
675, 680 (7th Cir. 2008). Nonmedical personnel, on the other hand, are generally entitled to rely on
the judgment of treating health professionals, Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010), and
generally will not be found to be deliberately indifferent unless they have reason to believe that the
medical personnel are mistreating or not treating a prisoner. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th
Cir. 2008).
As to whether Norwood’s hernia pain constitutes an objectively serious medical need, the
factual allegations support the claim that he had a serious medical condition that required medical
treatment. The Seventh Circuit has recognized hernias as objectively serious medical conditions for
the purposes of deliberate indifference claims. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F. 3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir.
2006). Therefore, the Court focuses on whether Norwood sufficiently alleges that defendants were
deliberately indifferent.
Defendant Conley
Defendants assert that because Norwood’s allegations against Conley are limited to
processing grievances, he should be dismissed. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “the law
encourages non-medical … and administrative personnel at jails and prisons to defer to the
professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating the prisoners in their care
without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440 (collecting cases). To allege medical
indifference, a plaintiff must contend that he gave the defendant sufficient notice of an excessive
risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). At that
point, an official’s “refusal or declination to exercise the authority of his or her office may reflect
deliberate disregard.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Norwood alleges that Conley denied a medical request that Norwood filed in May 2016.
When Conley received the request, Norwood had already been seen and treated by a medical
professional for the underlying issue the same day he filed the request. As a sergeant employed by
Cook County Jail, Conley was permitted to rely on the expertise of the medical professionals who
were treating Norwood. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 755. Norwood does not sufficiently allege that he gave
Conley notice of an excessive risk to his health or safety. Thus, the Court grants defendants’ motion
to dismiss as to Conley.
The Nurse Defendants
Norwood asserts his medical indifference claim against three nurses. A nurse can generally
defer to a treating physician’s orders and instructions. Berry, 604 F.3d at 443. This deference may
not be blind; a nurse can act with deliberate indifference if he or she ignores “obvious risks to an
inmate’s health” in deferring to the physician. Holloway v. Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075
(7th Cir. 2012).
Turning first to Gresham-Trotter, Norwood’s only allegation regarding him is that on July
18, 2016, Gresham-Trotter informed Norwood that a doctor would see him on July 20, 2016.
Norwood also alleges that Dr. Davis did, in fact, see him on July 20, 2016. Norwood has not alleged
that Gresham-Trotter acted, or failed to act, in deliberate indifference to Norwood’s objectively
serious medical need. Rather, Norwood’s allegations indicate that Gresham-Trotter facilitated
Norwood’s receipt of medical care. Norwood simply does not allege “enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence supporting [his] allegations.” Arnett, 658
F.3d at 752 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court grants defendants’ motion to
dismiss as to Gresham-Trotter.
Regarding Shebel, Norwood alleges that she denied two of his medical requests and advised
him to continue submitting medical forms. Norwood further alleges that Shebel denied his requests
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based on recent or upcoming medical appointments and deferred to the doctors that were treating
Norwood. As noted, a nurse can generally defer to a physician’s orders. Berry, 604 F.3d at 443.
Norwood makes no allegation that Shebel ignored an obvious risk to his health when she deferred
to the treating physicians’ ongoing treatment plan. The allegations against Shebel fail to state a claim
of relief, and thus the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Shebel.
Finally, Norwood alleges that Anderson was the first medical professional to treat Norwood
for his hernias, beginning in April 2016. Anderson examined Norwood on multiple occasions and
prescribed him Advil, special garments, and instituted bed rest for Norwood. However, Anderson
also allegedly made these decisions despite being informed that Norwood’s symptoms included
swelling and extreme pain in his right side groin area, painful urination, defecation and limping, and
a knot in his groin area. Although this course of treatment did not improve Norwood’s pain,
Anderson continued to treat him with Advil and bed rest before a doctor or other medical
professional saw Norwood. Norwood sufficiently alleges that Anderson’s course of treatment
caused him substantial pain and constituted medical indifference. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 752–53.
Therefore, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Anderson.
The Doctor and Physician Assistant Defendants
Norwood alleges deliberate indifference claims against two doctors and a physician assistant
that treated him. Turning first to Dr. Davis, Norwood alleges that Dr. Davis was the first physician
that treated him for his hernias. Although Dr. Davis diagnosed Norwood with two hernias in July
2016, Dr. Davis denied Norwood’s request for surgery on multiple occasions and prescribed pain
medications that had proven ineffective multiple times prior. Dr. Davis still did not change his
course of treatment when a year later, Norwood informed Dr. Davis that he was having difficulty
urinating and continued to have extreme pain due to the hernia. Further, Norwood alleges that as a
result of the ineffective treatment and two year delay in receiving surgical treatment he gained forty
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pounds, had difficulty with daily living tasks, and experienced ongoing pain and suffering. See Arnett,
658 F.3d at 752; McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). These allegations are
sufficient to state a claim of medical indifference against Dr. Davis, and so the Court denies
defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Dr. Davis.
Similarly, Dr. Baker and Guerrero treated Norwood after being diagnosed with hernias
beginning in September 2016. They, too, prescribed Norwood pain medication that had previously
proven ineffective and inadequate to treat his condition. Knowingly continuing a course of
ineffective treatment or delaying the proper treatment can constitute deliberate indifference.
McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640. Dr. Baker and Guerrero continued to see Norwood and deny his
requests for surgery through 2017, despite Norwood’s allegations that he experienced ongoing
extreme pain. Norwood also plausibly alleges a claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Baker
and Guerrero. The Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Dr. Baker and Guerrero.
Defendants Thomas Dart and Cook County
Norwood alleges a claim for deliberate indifference against Cook County Sheriff Dart in his
official capacity and against Cook County, arising from Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Defendants contend that Norwood has failed to allege
any facts to support a Monell claim. Norwood does not offer any response, asserting simply that
Cook County should remain in the lawsuit for indemnification purposes. Thus, Norwood waived
his argument, conceding that his Monell claim should be dismissed. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651
F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995).
Even if Norwood had not waived this claim, the Court would dismiss it for failure to state a
claim. Under Monell, a governmental entity is liable if through some official policy, it causes a
constitutional deprivation to a plaintiff. Shields v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
Although Norwood asserts that it is the widespread practice of Sheriff Dart and Cook County to fail
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to properly examine detainees, provide proper medication, and respond to detainees who request
medical attention, he does not allege any facts to support this claim, and in fact concedes that he was
examined and treated many times by the multiple defendants in this case between April 2016 and
June 2018. Even had Norwood not waived the Monell claim, he fails to allege any facts to support it.
Lastly, Norwood contends that Cook County should remain in this lawsuit for
indemnification purposes. Because Norwood fails to state a claim against Sheriff Dart in his official
capacity or Cook County, there are no remaining defendants for whom Cook County is a necessary
party for indemnification purposes. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cty., Illinois, 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th
Cir. 2003). As such, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Sheriff Dart and Cook
County.
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, this Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss [98] the Fourth
Amended Complaint as to Sheriff Dart, Cook County, Conley, Shebel, and Gresham-Trotter with
prejudice, and denies the motion as to Anderson, Dr. Davis, Dr. Baker, and Guerrero.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 11/5/2019
Entered: _____________________________
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Court Judge
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