Toth v. Rich Township High School District 227 et al
Filing
126
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/3/2021: For the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 111 is granted, and plaintiff's motion to strike 122 is denied. Due to the ongoin g COVID-19 pandemic, and the consequent backlog of criminal and civil cases, the court is unable to set a trial date in this case at this time. The parties are directed to file a final pretrial order using this court's form on or before April 8 , 2022. Answers to any motions in limine are to be filed on or before April 22, 2022. The court will set a pretrial conference after review of these filings. The status hearing previously set for December 10, 2021 is stricken. Mailed notice (cn).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TRACI TOTH,
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)
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Plaintiff,
v.
RICH TOWNSHIP HIGH
SCHOOL 227, et al.,
Case No. 17 CV 6186
Judge Robert W. Gettleman
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)
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Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Traci Toth brought a three-count complaint against defendants Rich Township
High School District 227 (“District”) and Board of Education (“Board”) members Antoine Bass,
Randy Alexander, Shannon Ross-Smith, and Dr. Delores Woods, all in their individual capacities
(collectively “defendants”), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Counts II and III), and the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III). �e parties cross-moved for
summary judgment, and the court denied both motions, holding that there were genuine disputes
of material fact. (Doc. 98). Plaintiff now brings a second motion for summary judgment on the
sole issue of whether the Board’s Resolution provided adequate notice that plaintiff was entitled
to a private or public hearing. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 111) is
granted, and plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 122) is denied.
BACKGROUND
On September 25, 2020, the court denied the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment. �e background facts are described in detail in that opinion and need not be repeated
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here. Toth v. Rich Township High School Dist. 227, 2020 WL 5751187 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25,
2020). During the first round of summary judgment briefing, plaintiff and defendants crossmoved for summary judgement on plaintiff’s procedural due process claim. �e elements of a
procedural due process claim are “(1) deprivation of a protected interest and (2) insufficient
procedural protections surrounding that deprivation.” Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 528
F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). �e court denied both motions, holding that
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had a protected interest in her early
retirement benefits and whether there was a deprivation of that interest.
�e court similarly held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact for the second
element of plaintiff’s due process claim, stating:
Plaintiff argues that she received no notification that her benefits or salary would be
reduced. �e letter informing her of her demotion says nothing about salary or
benefits. In fact, the record indicates that officials repeatedly promised her that her
benefits and salary would not change. �e parties agree that plaintiff did not receive
any sort of hearing prior to, or after, termination. Defendants counter that a
reclassification hearing was available after plaintiff’s demotion under either the
collective bargaining agreement or the school code, and that plaintiff failed to
utilize the procedures available to her. Additionally, in response to plaintiff’s Local
Rule 56.1 statement of facts, defendants attach a Board resolution authorizing
reclassification of several administrators, including plaintiff. �at resolution states
that reclassified employees may seek a private or public hearing regarding their
reclassification. Defendants further argue that it was “not incumbent on the District
to request that Plaintiff file a grievance. It is her obligation to assert her own rights.”
(Doc. 93, 10).
Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive and do little more than demonstrate
questions of material fact. First, a hearing after termination is insufficient process;
a plaintiff is entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d
1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2013) (“�e due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
does require a state to afford an opportunity for a hearing before depriving someone
of a property right created by state law.”) (emphasis added). Second, it is
unreasonable for defendants to fault plaintiff for failing to request a reclassification
hearing when defendants provided repeated assurances that her salary and benefits
would remain unchanged in her teaching role (and ignoring her counsel’s requests
for an explanation once it was clear the District reneged on its promise). �ird, it
is unclear from the record whether plaintiff had any notice of the available
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reclassification hearing. A question of fact remains regarding whether the
resolution itself is sufficient notice of plaintiff’s procedural rights, and whether the
Board provided the resolution to plaintiff. See Dunesbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161,
168 (2002) (governmental entity bears the burden of showing that the procedures
used were “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances” to apprise the party
of the pendency of the action). Finally, it is incumbent on the Board to provide
plaintiff with sufficient process, and that includes reasonable notice regarding the
available grievance procedures. A reasonable jury could find the Board’s process
inadequate.
Given the material questions of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. �e court
denies both plaintiff’s and defendants’ motions.
(Doc. 98, 10-11) (emphasis added).
Several months after the court’s ruling, on January 8, 2021, the parties filed a joint status
report in which plaintiff stated that she had identified Lora Sheehy as a witness who could provide
evidence on whether the Board sent plaintiff the Resolution before her demotion. �e parties asked
for permission to depose the witness, as discovery had already closed. �e court granted the
request, and the parties deposed Lora Sheehy on March 3, 2021.
At her deposition, Ms. Sheehy testified that she was the Executive Assistant to the Director
of Human Resources for the District. It was her responsibility to handle all personnel matters for
the District’s administrative employees, including plaintiff. In March 2016, the Board issued the
relevant Resolution, which listed eight administrators, including plaintiff, whose contracts would
not be renewed. Two letters were attached to the Resolution: (1) Statement of Facts Concerning
Reclassification of [Employee Name] Notice of Non-Reclassification; and (2) Statement of Facts
Reclassification letters. Both letters were hand-delivered to each affected employee, informing
them that their contracts would not be renewed and that they would be reassigned to a teaching
position. �e Resolution stated that employees could seek a private hearing before the Board to
address their reclassification, and if they were unsatisfied with the results of that hearing, they had
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a right to a public hearing. Neither the Resolution nor the letters mention the termination of any
benefits.
Ms. Sheehy testified that it was her responsibility to send the letters to the administrators.
She read the contents of the letters into the record and stated that these were the only documents
sent to plaintiff and the other administrators. She did not send the Resolution to plaintiff or any of
the reclassified administrators. Ms. Sheehy further testified that it was the District’s policy to not
send the Resolution to protect the other employees’ privacy, and that in her nearly sixteen years on
the job, she never sent the Resolution to an employee who had a dispute over their retirement
benefits.
Plaintiff brings a second motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff
received the Resolution apprising her of her right to a hearing, and whether the Resolution
constitutes sufficient notice of plaintiff’s right to a hearing.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper where there is “no dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to
any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). �e party
seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatosky v.
Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). But the nonmovant “is only entitled to
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the benefit of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those ‘supported only by
speculation or conjecture.’” Grant v. Trus. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017).
As noted above, the elements of a procedural due process claim are “(1) deprivation of a
protected interest and (2) insufficient procedural protections surrounding that deprivation.”
Michalowicz v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment addresses whether the Resolution satisfies the
second element of a procedural due process claim. Specifically, plaintiff argues that she never
received the Resolution, and that the Resolution does not constitute sufficient notice of plaintiff’s
right to a hearing.
Plaintiff has provided the testimony of Lora Sheehy, which states that Ms. Sheehy did not
send the Resolution to plaintiff, and that it was the District’s practice to not send the Resolution
in order to protect the other administrators’ privacy. Plaintiff further argues that defendants have
not provided any evidence indicating that plaintiff received the Resolution. Even if plaintiff
received the Resolution, plaintiff argues that it would not have sufficiently apprised plaintiff of
her rights because it did not mention the early retirement program or that her retirement benefits
would be terminated or altered as a result of her reclassification.
Defendants’ response brief is impressively unresponsive. Defendants spend the first half
of their brief arguing that plaintiff does not have a property interest in her employment—an issue
on which the court has already ruled and which no party has currently contested. Defendants
have also switched their position on the issue of the Resolution. In the first round of summary
judgment briefing, it was defendants who identified the Resolution and argued that the
Resolution provided notice to plaintiff of her right to a reclassification hearing. Plaintiff has filed
the instant motion in response to defendants’ argument, claiming that it is uncontested that
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defendants never sent the Resolution and that in any event it would constitute inadequate notice.
But now defendants argue that the Resolution is completely irrelevant because it involves
plaintiff’s employment agreement and accuse plaintiff of attempting to “misguide” the court.
Defendants proceed to make arguments regarding the collective bargaining agreement, and claim
that Count III “is nothing more than a state law claim for breach of contract.” �e court
addressed these arguments both in its ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss and the first
motions for summary judgment. It need not address them for the third time, especially when
they do not resolve the instant motion.
Ultimately, the court agrees with plaintiff. �ere is no dispute that the Board did not send
the Resolution to plaintiff, and that plaintiff never received the Resolution. Indeed, defendants
concede that it was the District’s practice to not send the Resolution to the affected employees.
Further, even if plaintiff had received the Resolution, it would not constitute adequate notice
because it did not inform plaintiff that her retirement benefits would be terminated or otherwise
altered. �e court grants plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. 1 To be clear, summary judgment
is granted only to the extent that the court finds that the resolution constitutes inadequate notice
under the second element. �e court’s earlier ruling on the first element—that there are disputed
issues of fact regarding whether there was a deprivation of a protected interest—still stands.
Plaintiff has additionally moved to strike defendants’ response to her Rule 56.1 statement
of facts (Doc. 122). She objects that defendants’ responses are inappropriately argumentative
and too long. She also moves to strike defendants’ Exhibit F, which is a copy of an employment
Although partial motions for summary judgment are permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), they are generally
disfavored as they result in piecemeal litigation and a waste of judicial resources. �is is especially so when the partial
summary judgment motion does not resolve an entire claim, but rather addresses only a single element. Plaintiff’s
current motion is more like a pretrial motion in limine, seeking a ruling on the particular issue discussed above.
Nevertheless, because the parties have briefed the issue as a request for partial summary judgment, the court will treat
it as such.
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agreement that plaintiff did not sign. Plaintiff claims that Exhibit F was not produced to her
during discovery. Defendants respond that they in fact produced this document, and attach the
produced version with the Bates stamp to their response brief. �e court declines to strike this
exhibit because it appears that defendants produced it to plaintiff, and because the Exhibit has
little bearing on the outcome of the instant motion.
As for defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s statement of facts, the court agrees that the
responses are excessively lengthy and inappropriately argumentative. However, the court
declines to strike these paragraphs, and will consider each party’s statement of facts to the extent
they are supported by the record.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 111) is
granted, and plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 122) is denied. Due to the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, and the consequent backlog of criminal and civil cases, the court is unable to set a
trial date in this case at this time. �e parties are directed to file a final pretrial order using this
court’s form on or before April 8, 2022. Answers to any motions in limine are to be filed on or
before April 22, 2022. �e court will set a pretrial conference after review of these filings. �e
status hearing previously set for December 10, 2021 is stricken.
ENTER:
__________________________________________
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge
DATE: December 3, 2021
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