Saverson v. The Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, et al

Filing 37

ORDER: The defendants' motion to dismiss 25 is granted. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 2/15/2018. Mailed notice.(ym, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN T. SAVERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE NORTHEAST ILLINOIS RAILROAD
COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION
d/b/a METRA; JAMES M. DERWINSKI, in
his individual and official capacity as METRA
Chief Mechanical Officer; ROGER PEDEN, in
his individual and official capacity as METRA
Senior Recruiter; KEVIN NEIR, in his
individual and official capacity as Director HR
Operations and HR Operation; and
ROBERTO SALDIVAR, in his individual and
official capacity as METRA Supervisor of
Electrical Maintenance,
Defendants.

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) Case No. 17-cv-6591
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) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
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ORDER
The defendants’ motion to dismiss [25] is granted.
STATEMENT
The plaintiff, Kevin Saverson, brought this action against Metra and a number of Metra
officials alleging that the defendants improperly denied him transfers based on his race and gender
in violation of VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., engaged in racial
discrimination and harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and retaliated against him in
violation of Title VII and Section 1983. The defendants filed a detailed, multipart motion to dismiss
challenging the adequacy of Saverson’s allegations, arguing that his harassment claims were outside
the scope of his EEOC complaint, asserting that specific incidents of discrimination fell outside the
applicable statutes of limitations, and arguing that his claims are preempted by federal statute.

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Saverson, in response, filed a six page brief, the majority of which is dedicated to alleging
additional facts regarding coworkers who Saverson asserts received preferential treatment based on
their race or gender. The Court, however, cannot consider these additional allegations, because on a
motion to dismiss the Court may only consider allegations contained in the plaintiff’s pleadings. See
Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
Saverson’s brief is devoid of any legal citations outside of its statement of the plaintiff’s
claims. It also fails to reference the legal standard applied to motions to dismiss or the legal
elements of any of the plaintiff’s claims. Indeed, the only legal argument that Saverson’s response
contains is a conclusory, unsupported claim that “[r]acial discrimination is not the purview of the
RLA” and a similarly unelaborated assertion that the defendants conduct constitutes “a continuing
violation.” It is beyond well established that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments such as these
are to be considered waived. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653, 664 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Because it is not the obligation of this
Court to research and construct the legal arguments available to parties . . . , these [unsupported]
arguments are waived and warrant no discussion.”). Saverson has accordingly failed to offer any
substantive response to the alleged deficiencies raised in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and has
therefore waived his opposition to that motion. Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005).
The defendants’ motion to dismiss is accordingly granted.

SO ORDERED.

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Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Court Judge
DATED: 2/15/2018
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