Sullivan v. White et al

Filing 138

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 10/18/2023: Mailed notice (lp, )

Case: 1:17-cv-06635 Document #: 138 Filed: 10/18/23 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:1233

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL SULLIVAN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
GHALIAH OBAISI, as EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF SALEH
OBAISI, M.D.,
Defendant.

No. 17 C 6635
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment [Doc. No. 126] and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
127]. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is denied, and Defendant’s
motion is granted.
DISCUSSION
I.

MATERIAL FACTS 1

1.

Plaintiff Michael Sullivan is an inmate serving a life sentence at Stateville

Correctional Center.
2.

Defendant Saleh Obaisi, M.D. was the former Medical Director at Stateville,

The following facts are undisputed and are derived from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1
statements and responses.

1

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a position Dr. Obaisi held from August 2012 to December 2017. 2
3.

On October 28, 2014, Plaintiff injured his left knee while playing basketball

at the prison yard.
4.

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a left displaced distal patella fracture (broken

knee) with tendon avulsion and surgery was recommended.
5.

On October 30, 2014, Dr. Obaisi referred Plaintiff to go offsite and consult

with an orthopedic surgeon regarding the patella fracture.
6.

On November 18, 2014, Plaintiff consulted with Dr. Thomas White – an

orthopedic surgeon at Dreyer Medical Clinic – who scheduled Plaintiff for an open
reduction internal fixation surgery on his left leg.
7.

On November 25, 2014, Dr. White operated on Plaintiff and performed the

open reduction internal fixation surgery.
8.

During the November 25, 2014 surgery, two drill bits from medical devices

used in the operation broke off in Plaintiff’s knee, and one of the drill bits was later
removed, but the other was not.
9.

On November 26, 2014, Plaintiff returned to Stateville post-surgery, and Dr.

Obaisi admitted Plaintiff to the prison’s infirmary and prescribed Tylenol 3.
10.

On December 1, 2014, Dreyer Medical Clinic determined that the first

surgery did not succeed in creating a stable fusion, and a second, revision surgery
was needed.
11.

On December 8, 2014, Dr. Obaisi authorized Dr. White to perform a second

Following Defendant Saleh Obaisi, M.D.’s death on December 23, 2017, Ghaliah Obaisi
was substituted as Defendant as the executor of Dr. Obaisi’s estate
2

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surgery.
12.

On December 9, 2014, Dr. White operated a second time on Plaintiff’s left leg.

13.

During the second surgery, Dr. White determined that the fixation method he

chose during the first surgery to reattach the knee was broken.
14.

For the second surgery, Dr. White chose to use a wire in a figure eight

pattern instead of the previously-used cotton sutures.
15.

On December 30, 2014, Dr. Obaisi issued permits to assign Plaintiff to a low

gallery and low bunk bed and to allow Plaintiff to carry two crutches, shower twice
a week, and be cuffed at the waist to minimize body strain.
16.

On January 21, 2015, Dr. White performed a follow-up examination with

Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff’s leg had not healed properly.
17.

On February 23, 2015, Plaintiff returned for another follow-up examination

with Dr. White and it was again determined that Plaintiff’s leg was not properly
healing.
18.

On February 24, 2015, Dr. White recommended that his colleague, Dr. Steven

Rabin – who specializes in problem fractures and non-union surgeries – evaluate
Plaintiff and give a second opinion.
19.

Dr. White scheduled Plaintiff for an appointment with Dr. Rabin.

20.

On February 24, 2015, Dr. Obaisi made a referral for Plaintiff to get a second

opinion at UIC Medical Center, rather than a second opinion from Dr. Rabin.
21.

On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff was evaluated and received a second opinion

from Dr. Danil Rybalko, an orthopedic surgeon at UIC.

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22.

After evaluating Plaintiff, Dr. Rybalko recommended physical therapy and a

gentle range of motion.
23.

Dr. Rybalko did not recommend that Plaintiff undergo a third surgery.

24.

Dr. Rybalko recommended that Plaintiff have a two-month follow-up

appointment, but the follow-up appointment at UIC did not ultimately occur until
nine months later.
25.

On March 16, 2015, Dr. Obaisi referred Plaintiff for the physical therapy

evaluation recommended by UIC and Plaintiff started physical therapy.
26.

Dr. Obaisi also referred Plaintiff for a follow-up at UIC and authorized a

medical permit allowing Plaintiff to receive ice three times a day for two months.
27.

On March 18, 2015, Dr. Obaisi made a referral allowing Plaintiff to walk the

hallways twice daily for thirty days.
28.

On April 8, 2015, Dr. Obaisi authorized a six-month medical permit for

Plaintiff for low gallery, low bunk, two crutches, shower three times a week, a waist
chain, a knee brace, and slow walk.
29.

On April 21, 2015, Dr. Obaisi followed up with Plaintiff and noted he was

ambulating well and receiving physical therapy as ordered.
30.

On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Matthew Marcus,

another orthopedic surgeon at UIC.
31.

Upon evaluating Plaintiff, Dr. Marcus noted that Plaintiff was “holding back

from playing basketball” but was otherwise “doing well” and “has a full range of
motion,” though his “strength [was] improving, but not there yet.”

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32.

Dr. Marcus recommended that Plaintiff be seen again in a few months, but

the next appointment at UIC did not ultimately occur until six months later.
33.

Dr. Marcus did not recommend that Plaintiff undergo a third surgery

34.

On February 3, 2016, Dr. Obaisi noted that Plaintiff had chronic pain in his

knee but the pain was alleviated by heat.
35.

On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff was evaluated again by Dr. Marcus.

36.

Upon evaluating Plaintiff, Dr. Marcus noted, inter alia, that Plaintiff

continued to have knee pain but was able to play basketball.
37.

Dr. Marcus continued the same physical therapy treatment plan for Plaintiff

with pain medication of ibuprofen or Tylenol.
38.

Dr. Marcus again did not recommend that Plaintiff undergo a third surgery.

39.

On June 9, 2016, Dr. Obaisi made a referral for physical therapy as

recommended by UIC orthopedics.
40.

A physical therapy note from March 2017 stated that Plaintiff was playing

high-level sports, had no functional deficit, and was being discharged to a home
exercise plan.
41.

However, Plaintiff testified that, due to pain, he has been unable to run, play

basketball, exercise, or walk for extended periods.
42.

Plaintiff testified that the pain medication prescribed has not been effective

and has caused side effects.
43.

Plaintiff testified that he asked Dr. Obaisi for a third surgery at least seven

times due to the pain he was experiencing, but Dr. Obaisi never approved a third

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surgery.
44.

Plaintiff testified that Dr. Obaisi said he would not approve a third surgery

for budgetary reasons.
45.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on September 14, 2017.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Accordingly, “[t]he mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will be
insufficient.” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quotations and alterations omitted). Where, as here, the parties submit crossmotions for summary judgment, “the Court considers each motion separately and
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom each
motion is under consideration.” Fifth Third Mortg. Co. v. Kaufman, No. 12 C 4693,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63869, at *13-14 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2016) (citation omitted).

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III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has asserted a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Obaisi.
Plaintiff’s claim is brought under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel
and unusual punishment” and “imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable
measures to ensure that inmates receive adequate medical care.” White v. Woods, 48
F.4th 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment
proscribes “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners amounting
to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Arce v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). To determine if the Eighth Amendment has been violated in the prison
medical context, courts “perform a two-step analysis, first examining whether a
plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and then
determining whether the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that
condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
To establish that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff
must provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a
substantial risk of harm.” White, 48 F.4th at 862 (citation omitted). “[M]ere
negligence is not enough,” and “[e]ven objective recklessness – failing to act in the
face of an unjustifiably high risk that is so obvious that it should be known – is
insufficient to make out a claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

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In the case of deliberate indifference claims against medical professionals, “a
prisoner must demonstrate that the medical professional’s response was ‘so
inadequate that it demonstrated an absence of professional judgment.’” White, 48
F.4th at 862 (citation omitted). To show an absence of medical judgment, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that “no minimally competent professional would have
so responded under those circumstances.” Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d
982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998). Along those lines, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s treatment was “so far afield of accepted professional standards as to
raise the inference that it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” Dean v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
“But where the evidence shows that a decision was based on medical judgment, a
jury may not find deliberate indifference, even if other professionals would have
handled the situation differently.” Id. (citation omitted). As such, “a difference of
opinion among physicians on how an inmate should be treated cannot support a
finding of deliberate indifference.” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir.
2006) (citation omitted); see also Petties, 836 F.3d at 728 (“[P]laintiffs must show
more than mere evidence of malpractice to prove deliberate indifference.”). Rather,
the plaintiff must show that the medical professional’s treatment was “so blatantly
inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate
the prisoner’s condition.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996).

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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment argues that Plaintiff cannot
established the elements of deliberate indifference against Dr. Obaisi. As an initial
matter, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s patella fracture qualifies as an
objectively serious medical condition. (Def.’s Memo. at 4.) Accordingly, the question
becomes whether Dr. Obaisi’s treatment of Plaintiff evinced deliberate indifference
pursuant to the standards set forth above. Though Plaintiff equivocates as to the
precise basis of his claim, his claim centers around his personal desire to have a
third surgery. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs because Dr. Obaisi “refused to authorize a third surgery.” (Pl.’s Resp.
at 1.) As stated above, to succeed on his deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff must
show that Dr. Obaisi “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.”
White, 48 F.4th 853 at 862 (citation omitted). In the context of surgery, “it is not
enough to show that a doctor should have known surgery was necessary; the
plaintiff must instead show that the doctor knew surgery was necessary and then
consciously disregarded this fact.” Oliphant v. Cook Cnt. Dep’t of Corr., No. 09 C
3876, 2012 WL 3835818, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2012).
Defendant’s expert – a board certified orthopedic surgeon specializing in
adult reconstruction surgery – has opined that he would not recommend a third
surgery for Plaintiff because a third surgery “would place unnecessary risk on the
patient without a high likelihood of providing any benefit” and “[t]he chances of
improvement are so low that it does not outweigh the risks of the surgery.” [Doc.

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No. 129-1 at 47.] 3 Defendant’s expert has further opined that Dr. Obaisi correctly
referred Plaintiff to “the appropriate orthopaedic consultant in a timely manner”
and “followed the direction of the orthopaedic surgeons appropriately.” [Id. at 4647.] Defendant’s expert testified that he would not expect Dr. Obaisi to know
whether the fracture had healed and “would expect him to rely on a specialist.” [Id.
at 224.] Overall, it is Defendant’s expert’s opinion that Dr. Obaisi handled Plaintiff’s
treatment “exactly how [he] would expect a primary care physician to do so with
this injury,” such that Dr. Obaisi did “not violate the standard of care.” [Id. at 4647.] Plaintiff “has not challenged Defendant’s expert’s competency” and Plaintiff’s
expert agreed that a “primary care physician should not have known the intricacies
and details regarding advanced orthopaedic care.” (Pl.’s LR 56.1 Resp. at ¶ 58; Doc.
No. 129-1 at 289.)
Considering these opinions and the undisputed facts, Plaintiff has not
presented evidence that Dr. Obaisi “knew surgery was necessary” and “consciously
disregarded this fact.” Oliphant, 2012 WL 3835818 at *11. To the contrary, the
Plaintiff argues that “[b]ecause [Defendant’s expert] Dr. Levine’s opinions are based on
‘experience,’ and not methodology, they are inadmissible.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 8.) The Court
summarily rejects Plaintiff’s argument. An expert may be qualified based on knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Walker v. Soo Line R. Co., 208
F.3d 581, 591 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 702 specifically contemplates the admission of
testimony by experts whose knowledge is based on experience.”); Metavante Corp. v.
Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 761 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An expert’s testimony is not
unreliable simply because it is founded on his experience rather than on data.”); Kirkland v.
Sigalove, No. 11 C 7285, 2015 WL 231875, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2015) (“At his deposition,
[the doctor] confirmed that his opinions are ‘based on [his] experience in performing the
procedure and training [and] that’s it.’ This is sufficient.”) (citations omitted). Further,
Plaintiff is incorrect that Dr. Levine did not explain why he reached his conclusions
concerning the propriety of a third surgery, as Dr. Levine explained that a third surgery
was not advisable because, inter alia, a third surgery would entail risky bone grafting
procedures or highly unpredictable mesh procedures. [Doc. No. 129-1 at 225.]
3

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undisputed facts show that the two orthopedic surgeons who evaluated Plaintiff
following his second surgery – the specialists who were qualified to determine if
Plaintiff required a further surgery – did not recommend a third surgery. Dr.
Obaisi, who essentially acted as a primary care physician, was not qualified to
independently determine that a third surgery was in fact necessary. Accordingly, in
light of the orthopedic surgeons’ determinations that a third surgery was not
necessary, it unavoidably follows that Dr. Obaisi could not know that a third
surgery was necessary.
The Court finds instructive the decision in Johnson v. Estate of Obaisi, No.
14-CV-10117, 2019 WL 4674587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2019). In that case – in which
Dr. Obaisi was also a defendant – the plaintiff brought a deliberate indifference
claim with respect to Dr. Obaisi’s treatment of a varicocele on his left testicle. As
part of his treatment for that condition, the plaintiff was approved for a urology
evaluation at UIC, and the plaintiff later went to UIC and was evaluated by Dr.
Simone Crivellaro, a urologist. Upon evaluating the plaintiff, Dr. Crivellaro
determined that surgical treatment was not indicated. The court granted Dr.
Obaisi’s motion for summary judgment as to the varicocele condition. In evaluating
the plaintiff’s claim that Dr. Obaisi should have approved surgery, the court
reasoned as follows:
Johnson also argues that Dr. Obaisi’s refusal to recommend surgery
caused needless suffering. But Johnson was twice examined by Dr.
Simone Crivellaro, a board-certified urologist. . . . [A] jury could only find
that Dr. Crivellaro considered Johnson’s reports of pain, and yet still did
not believe that surgery was indicated. So Dr. Obaisi’s decision to follow
a specialist’s recommendation for a non-operative course of treatment
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was reasonable and did not amount to recklessly disregarding Johnson’s
condition. . . . [T]here is nothing in the record to suggest that Crivellaro
was not minimally competent or that his non-surgical treatment plan
was so off base that Obaisi should have, on his own, contradicted the
specialist’s recommendation. . . . All in all, even viewing the evidence in
Johnson’s favor, the factual record does not permit a reasonable jury to
find that Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s varicocele
condition.
Id. at *8 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
In this case, as in Johnson, the examining specialists did not believe that a
third surgery was indicated. Accordingly, Dr. Obaisi acted appropriately in
following the specialists’ recommendations that Plaintiff receive physical therapy
rather than surgery. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 659
(7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he undisputed evidence shows that these two denials [of
surgery] were consistent with the medical advice from the outside orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. Koth, to avoid ACL reconstruction surgery unless and until it became
‘absolutely necessary.’ This exercise of medical judgment by the outside specialists
makes it difficult at best to show that Wexford’s delay in going through with the
surgery amounted to deliberate indifference to Howell’s serious medical needs.”).
Moreover, quite plainly, Dr. Obaisi’s decision not to approve a third surgery (that
was not recommended by any specialists) was not “blatantly inappropriate” or so far
afield of professional standards so as to evince deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
medical needs. See Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2021)
(“[Defendants] determined a surgery referral was not appropriate. This
determination . . . was not ‘blatantly inappropriate’ or made in the absence of
professional judgment.”).
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This brings the Court to Plaintiff’s expert’s opinions. Per his testimony,
Plaintiff’s expert has not rendered an opinion regarding the UIC surgeons’ decisions
not to recommend a third surgery, and he does not “think the UIC doctors did
anything wrong.” [Doc. No. 129-1 at 264.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s expert has opined
that he would recommend that Plaintiff undergo a third surgery. Unfortunately for
Plaintiff, this does not get him very far. That is because Defendant’s expert has
contrarily opined that a third surgery is not advisable and, as set forth above, “a
difference of opinion among physicians on how an inmate should be treated cannot
support a finding of deliberate indifference.” Norfleet, 439 F.3d at 396 (citation
omitted); see also Petties, 836 F.3d at 729 (“[E]vidence that some medical
professionals would have chosen a different course of treatment is insufficient to
make out a constitutional claim.”). Indeed, Plaintiff’s expert testified that “different
surgeons would disagree” as to whether a third surgery was advisable. [Doc. No.
129-1 at 179]
Perhaps recognizing the fundamental deficiency in his assertion that Dr.
Obaisi should have flat out gone ahead and authorized a third surgery (despite no
specialist recommending that he do so), Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Obaisi “was
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by refusing to authorize
Plaintiff for a recommended surgical evaluation.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 3 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 6 (“Refusal to authorize recommended surgical evaluation on these
facts constitutes deliberate indifference.”); Pl.’s LR 56.1 Resp. at ¶ 6 (“Plaintiff
admits that he sued Defendant for refusing to authorize a third surgical evaluation

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of Plaintiff’s broken leg.”).) The problem for Plaintiff, of course, is that Dr. Obaisi
did in fact refer Plaintiff to UIC to get a second opinion and further evaluations.
There is no evidence that Dr. Obaisi told Drs. Rybalko and Marcus not to evaluate
whether Plaintiff required surgery, and it would be ludicrous to conclude that the
UIC orthopedic surgeons did not consider Plaintiff’s history and determine whether
a third surgery was advisable (i.e., a “surgical evaluation”). So, Plaintiff’s implied
assertion that the UIC orthopedic surgeons did not perform “surgical evaluations”
must be rejected. 4
Another fundamental problem for Plaintiff is the fact that his expert has not
actually provided any opinions directly criticizing Dr. Obaisi’s treatment. The
closest Plaintiff’s expert comes to offering an opinion concerning Dr. Obaisi’s
treatment is his generalized statement that “complaints of continued pain in a
previously twice operated knee should have resulted in a new referral for an
updated or second orthoaedic opinion.” [Doc. No. 129-1 at 289.] In pointing to this
generalized statement, what Plaintiff is really asserting is that Dr. Obaisi should
While Plaintiff focuses on the fact that Dr. Obaisi referred him to UIC rather than Dr.
Rabin (who his first surgeon had recommended), Plaintiff was not entitled to see any
particular specialist or one of his choosing. See Moore v. Tomlin, No. CV 20-1892, 2021 WL
1131811, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2021) (“That an inmate’s medical care . . . may not have
been the best money could buy is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation, and a
prisoner is not entitled to medical treatment of his choosing simply upon request.”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted); Jones v. Vadlamudi, No. 9:13-CV-00025, 2015
WL 670474, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015) (“Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Vadlamudi
acted with deliberate indifference when he denied his request to visit with an outside
specialist of his choosing. In particular, Plaintiff complains that he was not allowed to
return to Dr. German at Albany Medical Center for follow-up care, but instead was referred
for consultation with a neurosurgery specialist located at Walsh. . . . Plaintiff falls short of
demonstrating that Dr. Vadlamudi acted with reckless disregard to his back condition by
referring him to a different neurosurgery specialist. . . . Plaintiff was seen by various
specialists to care for his back pain.”).
4

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have referred him to a fourth orthopedic surgeon (after Drs. White, Rybalko, and
Marcus) for a fourth opinion. However, Plaintiff’s expert has not opined that Dr.
Obaisi not sending Plaintiff for a fourth opinion violated the standard of care, much
less that it was blatantly inappropriate or so far afield of accepted professional
standards. The other statement of Plaintiff’s expert that he points to is his expert’s
statement that “[i]f not incarcerated, [Plaintiff] could have at least benefited from a
second opinion or re-evaluation so that he could have understood the risks and
benefits [of] a revision surgery.” [Doc. No. 129-1 at 291.] While it may be true that
Plaintiff could have sought a fourth opinion if he was in the outside world, Plaintiff
points to no authority suggesting that the standard in deliberate indifference cases
is that an inmate should be provided precisely the type of medical treatment the
prisoner himself would pursue if he were not incarcerated.
Though Plaintiff’s main focus is on surgery, he also argues that Dr. Obaisi
was deliberately indifferent because he caused a delay in Plaintiff’s appointments at
UIC. That assertion is easily disposed of because Plaintiff has not come forward
with any evidence that Dr. Obaisi is directly involved in the details of scheduling
outside medical appointments for prisoners. See Walker v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 966 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[N]othing in the record suggests that Dr.
Obaisi’s actions or inaction caused any of the scheduling delays with Walker’s
appointments at UIC. Such a lack of personal involvement saves Dr. Obaisi from
liability here.”); Johnson, 2019 WL 4674587 at *7 (“Johnson offers no evidence to
suggest that Obaisi himself caused the delay. In deliberate-indifference cases like

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this one, the plaintiff ought to use the tools of discovery to ferret out the reasons for
delays in treatment, but Johnson points to nothing in the record that lays the blame
at Obaisi’s feet.”); Smith v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C 3730, 2017 WL
5464367, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2017) (“[T]here is no suggestion in the record that
Dr. Obaisi was aware of Smith’s rescheduled appointments or any lapses in
rescheduling; other staff members were responsible for scheduling.).
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs because he “persist[ed] in an ineffective treatment plan.” (Pl.’s Resp.
at 3.) Though Plaintiff clearly believes that his treatment plan was ineffective, Dr.
Obaisi undertook the treatment plan recommended by the specialists and Plaintiff’s
“[m]ere dissatisfaction or disagreement with a doctor’s course of treatment is
generally insufficient” to establish deliberate indifference. Johnson v. Doughty, 433
F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Dr. Obaisi “exercised [his] professional
judgment in responding” to Plaintiff’s medical condition, Plaintiff’s “ultimate
disagreement with [Dr. Obaisi’s] course of treatment provides no basis to support
[Dr. Obaisi’s] deliberate indifference.” Johnson, 5 F.4th at 825-26; see also Lockett v.
Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 2019) (“It is firmly established, however, that
mere ‘[d]isagreement between a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two
medical professionals, about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient,
by itself, to establish and Eighth Amendment violation.’”) (citation omitted).

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Ultimately, courts look at “the totality of an inmate’s medical care when
considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 716 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). In this
case, the undisputed facts are that after Plaintiff injured his knee, Dr. Obaisi
referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon at an outside medical clinic, approved
two surgeries, provided Plaintiff lifestyle accommodations such as low bunk
permits, referred Plaintiff to UIC for a second opinion, approved several rounds of
physical therapy, and provided on-site examinations. Based on the undisputed facts,
no reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s treatment of Plaintiff was
blatantly inappropriate or so far afield of accepted professional standards.
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim.
B.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he record
evidence establishes that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs by refusing to authorize a recommended surgical evaluation”
and “persisting in [an] ineffective treatment plan.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 1.) The Court
has rejected those arguments above. Further, the Court finds that the undisputed
facts dictate but one conclusion whether they are viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff or the light most favorable to Defendant – no reasonable jury could
conclude that Dr. Obaisi’s treatment of Plaintiff was blatantly inappropriate or so

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far afield of accepted professional standards. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is
denied.
C.

Plaintiff’s Remaining Counts

In addition to his deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff’s operative Third
Amended Complaint also asserts counts for denial of basic needs under the Eighth
Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court finds that these latter counts are duplicative and are subsumed by Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim. See Hruby v. Hodge, No. 13-CV-386, 2013 WL
2403272, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2013) (“Although Plaintiff’s complaint outlined his
cruel and unusual punishment claim in a separate count from his deliberate
indifference claim, both legal theories arise from the ‘cruel and unusual
punishment’ clause of the Eighth Amendment.”); Calloway v. California Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., No. C 07-2335, 2009 WL 1011728, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2009)
(“Although plaintiff alleges two separate claims in his complaint, the court
concludes that both claims can be subsumed in one allegation of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment.”); Adell v. Manlove, No. 19-C-438, 2019
WL 2211024, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May 22, 2019) (“The Eighth Amendment protects an
inmate from a governmental actor’s deliberate indifference to his basic needs,
including an inmate’s medical needs.”). Accordingly, because Defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim, he is also
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s remaining counts.

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Case: 1:17-cv-06635 Document #: 138 Filed: 10/18/23 Page 19 of 19 PageID #:1251

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment
[Doc. No. 126] is denied, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
127] is granted.
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

DATE:

___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge

October 18, 2023

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