Shields v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
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ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/2/2018: The Court denies Defendant City of Chicago's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim as alleged in Count V of the Complaint. 31 . Status hearing set for March 21, 2018 is stricken and reset to March 12, 2018 at 8:30 a.m. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALAN SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 17 C 6689
Judge Amy St. Eve
ORDER
The Court denies Defendant City of Chicago’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim as alleged in Count V of the Complaint. [31]. Status
hearing set for March 21, 2018 is stricken and reset to March 12, 2018 at 8:30 a.m.
STATEMENT
On December 20, 2017, Plaintiff Alan Shields filed the present five-count Amended
Complaint against the City of Chicago and individual Chicago Police Officers bringing
constitutional claims, along with a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Before the Court is the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim
alleged in Count V pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court denies
Defendant’s motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a
plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining
the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts accept all well-pleaded facts
as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Forgue v. City of Chicago,
873 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2017); Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled and substantially limited in the ability to move, and
that during the relevant time period he required ambulatory aids because of his paraplegia. (R.
28, Compl. ¶ 5.) At 11 p.m. on June 6, 2016, Chicago Police Officers stopped Plaintiff, who was
using crutches to ambulate. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Officer Shane Coleman approached Plaintiff
and ordered him to place his hands on the police vehicle. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff objected because he
could not put down his crutches to walk. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Coleman nonetheless searched
Plaintiff, which caused him to lose balance and fall. (Id. ¶ 9.) While he was on the ground,
Defendant Coleman handcuffed Plaintiff and then Defendant Officers Coleman and Michael
McAuliffe gave him commands to stand up. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff repeatedly told Defendant
Officers that he was paraplegic and could not stand. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Coleman and McAuliffe nonetheless dragged him to the door of the police vehicle and threw him
in the backseat. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Officers then transported Plaintiff to the Seventh District
Police Station. (Id.)
After arriving at the Seventh District, Defendants McAuliffe and Coleman ordered
Plaintiff to ambulate from the police vehicle to the station without any aid, after which Plaintiff
told them he could not ambulate without his crutches. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Defendants Coleman and
McAuliffe then summoned the attention of Defendant Sergeant Patrick Josephs and other
officers, after which these officers started to drag Plaintiff into the police station. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Immediately prior to entering the station, police removed Plaintiff’s handcuffs and allowed him
to use crutches to ambulate. (Id.)
Once in the processing room, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Officers Coleman,
McAullife, Josephs, Raul Nava, Robert Bandola, Wayne Wiberg, and Jacob Wojtaczka used
unreasonable force on him. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff contends that the officers then handcuffed him
and dragged him on the floor, which was captured on surveillance video. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff
states that at all relevant times, Defendant Officers knew he was unable to walk without crutches.
(Id. ¶ 18.) He also maintains that he requested medical attention due to the injuries caused by
Defendant Officers’ use of unreasonable force. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the officers
nevertheless placed him into a cell and left him on the floor without crutches. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff made numerous requests for medical attention, yet Defendant Officers failed
to respond. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff then started a fire in his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
thereafter Defendant Officers took him out of the cell and “stomped” on him. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Subsequently, Plaintiff was transferred to Mt. Sinai Hospital where he was intubated due
to a crushed larynx. (Id. ¶ 22.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant Officers completed paperwork,
including a Tactical Response Report (“TRR”), and Defendant Lieutenant Wiberg approved the
amount of force Defendant Officers used when arresting and detaining Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.)
According to Plaintiff, the Commander of the Seventh District also approved this use of force.
(Id. ¶ 26.)
At some point later, Plaintiff requested that the Independent Police Authority (“IPRA”)
investigate Defendant Officers’ use of force. (Id. ¶ 27.) To that end, the IPRA took Plaintiff’s
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statement, obtained the police department records relating to Plaintiff’s arrest, including the
surveillance video, and interviewed two members of the Chicago Fire Department. (Id. ¶ 28.)
The IPRA, however, did not interview any member of the CPD regarding Plaintiff’s allegations
of misconduct. (Id.) The IPRA did not recommend disciple for any of the individual Defendant
Officers. (Id. ¶ 29.)
In Count V, Plaintiff brings a claim against the City based on Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times, the CPD
engaged in a custom or practice of using excessive force due, in part, to deficiencies in training,
supervision, and accountability. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff maintains that the City has delegated
complete responsibility to the IPRA to investigate and recommend discipline for CPD officers
accused of use of excessive force and that the IPRA is understaffed and limited by the Chicago
Police Officers’ collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). (Id. ¶¶ 45, 46.) In particular,
Plaintiff explains that the CBA with the Fraternal Order of Police bars the IPRA from
interviewing accused police officers until all other investigative steps are completed and that this
agreement substantially impairs the IPRA’s ability to investigate police misconduct resulting in
no disciple for officers who use excessive force. (Id. ¶ 46.)
In addition, Plaintiff states that it is common knowledge among the CPD that misconduct
complaints reviewed by the IPRA do not result in immediate discipline. (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff
further asserts that when he was detained on June 6, 2016, Defendant Officers knew the City had
a policy or practice that did not hold officers accountable for their use of excessive force. (Id. ¶¶
52, 53.) Also, Plaintiff states that Defendant Officers Josephs and Wiberg knew from their past
experience with IPRA complaints that it was highly unlikely that the IPRA would recommend
discipline for the alleged misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 54.) Further adding to this custom or practice,
the IPRA did not request statements from the Defendant Officers (as barred by their CBAs). (Id.
¶ 55.) Plaintiff also highlights the United States Justice Department’s (“DOJ”) January 2017
Report concluding that the CPD has engaged in a custom or practice of unreasonable force, due
in part, to deficiencies in training, supervision, and accountability. (Id. ¶ 57.) Further, Plaintiff
points to the existence of a “code of silence” where Chicago Police Officers conceal police
misconduct such as excessive force, including that a Police Accountability Task Force Report
found that the CBAs between the police unions and the City have essentially turned the code of
silence into an official policy. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 56.) According to Plaintiff, the above widespread
custom or practice was deliberately indifferent to his rights secured by the United States
Constitution and was the moving force behind his constitutional injuries. (Id. ¶ 58.)
ANALYSIS
To recover under Monell, Plaintiff must eventually show that (1) he suffered a
deprivation of a constitutional right; (2) as a result of an express policy, widespread custom, or
deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policy-making authority, that was; (3) the cause of
his constitutional injury. See Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir.
2017). As to the causation element, Plaintiff must offer evidence that the unconstitutional
custom, policy, or practice was the “moving force” behind his constitutional injury. See Daniel
v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2016). At this procedural posture, however, the Court
need only determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his Monell claim against the City
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under the dictates of Iqbal and Twombly. See White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th
Cir. 2016) (federal courts may not apply a “heightened pleading standard” to Monell claims).
In the present motion, the City argues that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege his
Monell claim because he only mentions a single incident, namely, the alleged excessive force
surrounding his arrest and detention on June 6, 2016. In response, Plaintiff asserts that he can
allege a failure to train claim based on his own experience without alleging other, similar
violations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility that in a narrow range of
failure to train cases, a plaintiff need not prove a pattern of similar violations to establish
deliberate indifference. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011); Bd. Cnty. Comm’rs
of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390
n.10 (1989); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir.
2004) (“The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that evidence of a single violation of
federal rights can trigger municipal liability if the violation was a ‘highly predictable
consequence’ of the municipality’s failure to act.”). Outside of this exception, “Monell claims
based on allegations of an unconstitutional municipal practice or custom—as distinct from an
official policy—normally require evidence that the identified practice or custom caused multiple
injuries.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016).
That being said, the Supreme Court’s discussions in Connick, Brown, Canton, and the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Chatham concern proving a failure to train Monell claim, not
pleading one. See White, 829 F.3d at 844. In White, the Seventh Circuit recognized the
difference in the standards for pleading a Monell claim based on a widespread practice or custom
and proving one. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit clarified that Monell claims are not subject to
a heightened pleading standard in the context of allegations that the CPD has a custom or
practice where police officers submit arrest warrant applications without enough information to
establish probable cause for arrest. Id. at 839. In his complaint, the plaintiff in White alleged his
own experience in which the officers submitted an inadequate application for his arrest warrant
and also included the standard CPD form used for arrest warrants, which on its face did not
require specific factual support. Id. at 844. Under these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a Monell custom or practice claim because he
alleged more than his own constitutional injury based on the attached form. Id.; see also Doe v.
Grosch, No. 17 C 1214, 2017 WL 3970515, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017).
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his Monell claim against the City by alleging
factual details concerning the CPD’s alleged widespread practice or custom of covering-up
police officers’ unconstitutional use of excessive force and that this practice was the moving
force behind his constitutional injuries. In particular, not only has Plaintiff alleged his own
Fourth Amendment excessive force injury, but he has also alleged that the Police Accountability
Task Force Report and January 2017 DOJ Report highlight the deficiencies in relation to the
CPD’s use of excessive force that are sufficiently similar to Plaintiff’s excessive force
allegations – raising a reasonable inference that he is not alone in suffering constitutional injuries
resulting from this alleged practice or custom. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a complaint is
plausible on its face when plaintiff alleges “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); see also Catinella
v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 881 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2018) (“the complaint ‘must give enough
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details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.’”) (citation
omitted).
Moreover, despite the City’s argument to the contrary, Plaintiff’s allegations – read as a
whole – include more than mere legal conclusions and boilerplate language. See Catinella, 881
F.3d at 517-18 (“[L]egal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint so long as they
are supported by factual allegations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted, citation omitted). In
particular, Plaintiff gives context to his Monell claim by explaining that Chicago Police Officers’
CBAs prohibit the IPRA from properly investigating complaints of excessive force and that by
delegating responsibility to the IPRA to investigate and recommend discipline of Chicago Police
Officers, the City enables the “code of silence” of covering-up police misconduct involving the
use of excessive force. In addition, the City’s arguments that Plaintiff’s allegations do not
“establish” the existence of a widespread policy are misplaced because at this stage of the
proceedings, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief,
not that he has “established” or “proven” his claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). For these reasons,
the Court denies the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim as alleged in Count V of
the Amended Complaint.
Dated: March 2, 2018
____________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge
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