Watson v. Riverdale Police Department et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendant Village of Riverdale's motion to dismiss and to strike is denied 61 . Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 10/11/2018:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMELL DESHAUNE CHARLES WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF RIVERDALE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 17 C 6771
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Jamell DeShaune Charles Watson sues defendants Officer Trenton
Jordan and Officer Lakeisha Gray for excessive force and denial of medical
treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Watson also sues defendant Village of Riverdale
on a Monell theory. Currently before the Court is the Village’s motion to dismiss
Watson’s Monell claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and to strike his punitive
damages claim against the Village pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). R. 61. For the
following reasons, the Court denies the Village’s motion.
Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Berger v.
Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to give defendant “fair notice” of
the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
This standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed
factual allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay,
Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying
this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d
634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Background
On March 15, 2017, Watson was a passenger in a car that was the subject of
a burglary investigation. R. 60 ¶ 11. Police began pursuing the car, and the car
crashed into a fire hydrant. Id. After the crash, Watson exited the car and fled. Id.
¶ 12. Officers, including defendants Jordan and Gray, pursued him. Id. Jordan
unsuccessfully attempted to tase Watson as he fled. Id. ¶ 13.
Eventually, when Watson was surrounded by officers about 50 yards from
where he stood, he knelt on the ground and told the police officers that he
surrendered. Id. ¶ 14. Watson alleges that even though he was not resisting, Jordan
kicked him to the ground, hit him on the head, and then proceeded to alternately

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tase and hit and kick Watson while he was on the ground. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Jordan
tased Watson a total of around seven times. Id. ¶ 18. At one point, Gray joined in
kicking and hitting Johnson. Id. ¶ 19. Eventually, Jordan and Gray handcuffed
Watson and walked him back to the field where the car crashed. Id. ¶ 21. While
Jordan was handcuffing Watson, Jordan told Watson his injuries could have been
worse because Jordan could have shot him. Id. ¶ 33. When Watson verbally
confronted Jordan about the assault, Jordan told Watson that “he assaulted anyone
who fled from him.” Id. ¶ 22.
When Watson arrived at the Riverdale Police Department, his eye was
swollen shut and he had difficulty standing. Id. ¶ 24. He began vomiting into a
trash can, and while he did, Jordan picked him up and kicked the trash can away,
telling him there was nothing wrong with him. Id.
When a detective later interviewed Watson, Watson told the detective about
the beating, and the detective told Watson that Jordan had beat other individuals
before. Id. ¶ 26. Watson does not allege that either the detective or anyone else
followed up on Watson’s allegations or that the Riverdale Police Department took
any action in response to the beating. Watson remained in custody for three days,
during which time he was given no medical treatment. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. He was
ultimately charged with theft, burglary, battery, and resisting arrest, and later pled
guilty to theft. Id. ¶ 31. Watson suffers from daily headaches and psychological
trauma as a result of the beating and denial of medical treatment. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
Watson alleges that his “beating is part of a larger policy, pattern, and practice

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employed by the Riverdale Police Department. Because of Defendant Riverdale’s
utter failure of supervision and oversight, other members of the public have been
hurt by at least some of the same police officers.” Id. ¶ 27.
In August 2018, Watson filed his third amended complaint against
defendants. Counts I and III of the complaint are claims against Jordan and Gray
for excessive force and denial of medical treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II
is a Monell claim against the Village. Watson alleges that the Village’s officers
“followed an unwritten and ongoing policy or custom . . . of beating individuals who
flee from the Riverdale Police Department.” R. 60 ¶ 52. He claims the Village “knew
that its officers beat individuals who flee from them, but that as a custom and
practice, the Department was not taking steps to reasonably investigate the
allegations.” Id. ¶ 53. He claims that “Riverdale’s custom, policy, and/or practice of
failing to investigate allegations that its officers beat individuals who flee from
them . . . intentionally deprived [Watson] of his constitutional rights and caused
him other damages.” Id. ¶ 54. In his requests for relief, Watson seeks, among other
remedies, “punitive damages against all Defendants jointly and severally in an
amount to be determined at trial.” Id. at p. 24.
Discussion
The Village moves to dismiss Count II for failure to state a claim and moves
to strike Watson’s request for punitive damages against the Village. The Court
addresses each argument in turn.

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I.

Count II – Monell
“Under Monell [v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-

91 (1978)], a municipality like the Village may be liable under § 1983 for
constitutional violations caused by (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a
widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal
agent with final policymaking authority.” Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 832 F.3d
785, 799 (7th Cir. 2016). “The Seventh Circuit recently has cautioned that district
courts may not apply a ‘heightened pleading standard’ to Monell claims.” Williams
v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 3169065, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2017) (quoting White
v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016)). “[A] plaintiff raising a Monell
claim may rely solely on his own experience, rather than being required to plead
examples of other individuals’ experiences.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 1060, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing White, 829 F.3d at 844).
Here, Watson has plausibly pleaded “a widespread, though unwritten,
custom or practice,” Kristofek, 832 F.3d at 799, on the part of the Village of allowing
and failing to adequately address a specific type of repeated misconduct by its
officers: beating individuals who flee. Watson’s third amended complaint pleads
specific statements by Jordan and a Riverdale detective supporting that Jordan has
a known history of using excessive force in the arrest of individuals who flee.
Watson’s allegations that both Jordan and the detective spoke openly about
Jordan’s repeated misconduct when dealing with arrestees who flee, coupled with
the fact that the Village appears to have taken no action in response to Watson’s

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injuries and complaints to the detective, supports an inference that the Village
knew about and had a custom or practice of allowing and failing to address this type
of misconduct. And the fact that another officer (Gray) allegedly joined in the
beating of Watson bolsters the inference that the Village had a custom or practice of
turning a blind eye to that misconduct by its officers. See, e.g., Brown v. Bryant,
2018 WL 2201584, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2018) (allegations of custom or policy
allowing and turning a blind eye to correctional officers beating inmates stated a
Monell claim); Williams, 2017 WL 3169065, at *8-9 (“Plaintiff’s allegations of a
pattern or practice of ignoring complaints of discrimination are enough to survive a
motion to dismiss,” where plaintiff alleged the City’s failure to adequately respond
only to her own allegations of repeated discrimination by her supervisor).
The Village claims that Watson “provides no factual basis” for its allegations
of a custom or practice. R. 61 at 4. But the Village fails to directly address or
grapple with Watson’s allegations of Jordan’s and the detective’s statements, which
support an inference that the Village knew about and condoned repeated
misconduct. Unlike in Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 1997), Gill
v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017), and Johnson v. Cook Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 2018 WL 2193235, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2018), on which the
Village relies, Watson alleges more than simply isolated instances of individual
misconduct to support his claim. The fact that misconduct in the form of beating
arrestees who flee was openly discussed and (based on the facts as pleaded) no one
addressed it or put a stop to it supports an inference that the treatment of Watson

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was not a case of individual misconduct. Conversely, if this type of conduct was
unusual, it would be unlikely to be openly discussed, and the detective and the
Riverdale Police Department likely would have followed up on Watson’s complaints.
The Court therefore finds the facts as currently pleaded sufficient to state a Monell
claim and declines to dismiss Count II.
II.

Punitive Damages
The

Village

also

asks

the

Court

to

strike

Watson’s

request

for punitive damages against the Village. The Village objects to that request as
premature, relying on this Court’s decision in Karney v. City of Naperville, 2016 WL
6082354, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016). Like in Karney, the Court “declines to
strike [Watson’s] prayer for” a form of relief “to which [Watson] may be entitled as
against one or more of the other defendants in this case.” Id. “The [Village’s]
arguments that it (as opposed to either of the officer defendants) cannot be held
liable for punitive damages . . . are preserved for later proceedings in the case.” Id.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court denies defendant Village of Riverdale’s motion
to dismiss and to strike [61].
ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: October 11, 2018

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