Daniels v. Grady et al
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 4/2/2018: Defendants' motions to dismiss 22 , 38 , 40 , and 43 are granted. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice in part (for lack of jurisdiction and with respect to relinquished state-law claims) and with prejudice in part (for failure to state a claim). Enter judgment and terminate civil case. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAHUL-EBENEZER DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
No. 17 CV 6775
v.
JOSEPH GRADY, KATHRYN KARAYANNIS,
FREDERICK JOHN STEFFEN, JR., LISA
NYULI, and DONALD KRAMER,
Judge Manish S. Shah
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Rahul-Ebenezer Daniels filed this suit pro se alleging that the
attorney, state-court judges, guardian ad litem, and sheriff involved in his statecourt divorce proceedings violated state and federal civil and criminal laws, court
rules, and rules of professional conduct, and also infringed on his constitutional
rights by conspiring against him during the divorce proceedings. The defendants
move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For
the reasons stated below, the motions are granted.
I.
Legal Standards
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the federal court’s jurisdiction. On such a
motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction is proper and
must allege facts sufficient to plausibly suggest that subject-matter jurisdiction
exists. Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173–74 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations that
plausibly suggest a right to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).
With a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider allegations in the complaint and
documents attached to the complaint. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th
Cir. 2013). When analyzing a motion under either a Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor, but need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Silha, 807 F.3d at 174.
II.
Background
Daniels’s wife, Tanuja Daniels, filed for divorce in the Circuit Court of the
Sixteenth Judicial Circuit on May 6, 2015. [4-4] ¶ 1.1 Tanuja hired attorney
Frederick John Steffen to represent her in the divorce proceedings. Id. ¶ 3. Daniels
hired his own attorney. Id. ¶ 6. During the proceedings, Daniels noticed that there
was no attorney certification on his wife’s dissolution of marriage petition, which he
understood to be a violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137. Id. ¶ 8. He also
realized there was no affidavit of service in the summons he had received. Id. ¶ 10.
Judge Kathryn Karayannis was the presiding judge at this time. Id. ¶ 11. In late
2015 or 2016, Daniels began to notice inconsistencies in Steffen’s signatures on
various court documents. Id. ¶ 14. Believing these violations demonstrated a lack of
respect for due process, Daniels required his attorney to withdraw during open
Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. The factual allegations
forming the basis of Daniels’s complaint are laid out in an affidavit attached to his
complaint, [4-4].
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court. Id. ¶ 15. Judge Joseph Grady (now presiding over the divorce case) granted
that request, and Daniels filed an entry of appearance the same day. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
In March 2016, Daniels filed a counterclaim raising the issue of Steffen’s
signatures and the Rule 137 violation. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. A month later, Daniels showed
Judge Grady the inconsistent signatures, but Judge Grady accepted Steffen’s incourt acknowledgment that the signatures were his and entered an order denying
Daniels’s objections to the legibility of the signatures (although Daniels complained
about their inconsistency, not legibility). Id. ¶¶ 21–25. Daniels then hired an expert
forensic document examiner to review Steffen’s signatures, and the examiner issued
a report stating he had found evidence strongly suggesting that the signatures were
fraudulent. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. In June, Daniels’s mother received a subpoena. Id. ¶ 29.
Daniels brought the expert examiner’s findings to Judge Grady’s attention and
argued that the subpoena issued to his mother had been fraudulent. Id. ¶ 31.2 He
also accused Steffen of violating his notary oath and committing perjury. Id. ¶ 32.
Judge Grady said, “Mr. Daniels, it’s only a signature,” and denied all of Daniels’s
motions. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Daniels next filed a motion to hold Steffen in contempt of
court for issuing a fraudulent subpoena and then accused him of violating the
Illinois Notary Public Act in a 2011 (apparently unrelated) marriage settlement
agreement. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. Judge Grady acknowledged Daniels’s claim about Steffen’s
criminal violations, but stated that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
Daniels repeatedly asserts that the defendants acted fraudulently. See, e.g., [4-4] ¶ 56.
These are legal conclusions which need not be accepted as true. Instead, I consider the facts
that Daniels alleges which could support an inference that the defendants acted
fraudulently.
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matter. Id. ¶ 37. At this point, Daniels came to believe that Judge Grady was
colluding with Steffen. Id. ¶ 40.
Daniels submitted a FOIA request to the court clerk seeking access to
Steffen’s case files. Id. ¶ 43. After reviewing those files, Daniels reported his
findings to the Illinois Attorney General, the State’s Attorney, and the Illinois
Secretary of State, alleging that Steffen had repeatedly violated the Illinois Notary
Public Act. Id. ¶¶ 47–50. Following the advice of the State’s Attorney’s Office,
Daniels then filed a complaint with the Chief of Police of the Village of South Elgin,
who did nothing in response. Id. ¶¶ 52–53.
The petition for divorce that Steffen drafted on behalf of Tanuja Daniels cited
irreconcilable differences or mental cruelty as reasons for the divorce. Id. ¶ 57.3 On
Steffen’s advice, Tanuja also began working with a guardian ad litem, Lisa Nyuli,
and took the couple’s children for an interview with Nyuli without telling Daniels.
Id. ¶¶ 74–75. Nyuli and Tanuja prepared a petition to have Daniels evicted from his
home. Id. ¶ 77.4 Tanuja, Nyuli, and Steffen met before the eviction hearing in June
2016, and along with Judge Grady, ganged up on Daniels and his parents during
the hearing, treating them as though they had committed a crime. Id. ¶ 78. Judge
Grady issued an eviction order removing Daniels and his parents from their home
Daniels suggests that citing irreconcilable difference or mental cruelty as justifications for
the divorce, instead of choosing one or the other, evidences fraud. I disagree—pleading
alternative grounds for relief is a typical approach in a lawsuit, and it provides no basis to
suspect anything nefarious.
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Daniels claims the petition contained false allegations based on the fact that the
allegations used verbs such as “tells” and “allows.” Id. ¶ 77. Using these verbs is not
evidence of falsity.
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and giving them four days to comply. Id. ¶ 80. Daniels objected to the order,
asserting that it was based on false allegations, interfered with his freedom to
exercise his religious beliefs, and required a full hearing. Id. ¶ 81. Judge Grady
interrupted Daniels, but Daniels continued to voice his objections. Id. ¶ 82. Judge
Grady, Steffen, and Nyuli all failed to consider Daniels’s parents role in taking care
of the children. Id. ¶ 86. Just before issuing the order, Judge Grady turned to
Steffen and said, “Mr. Steffen, shall we cut him some slack?” and then told Daniels
to “be glad that I did not issue the Order to have you out within 24 hours.” Id. ¶ 80.
Daniels filed a motion to reconsider the eviction order, arguing that it would cause
undue hardship on his elderly parents. Id. ¶ 89. Daniels gave a copy of the motion to
the Sheriff’s office asking that it halt the forced removal. Id. ¶ 90.
After Judge Grady refused to rescind the eviction order, Daniels filed a
motion to stop the divorce case pending an administrative determination regarding
his claims of fraud. Id. ¶¶ 93–94. Citing a policy of only accepting one motion per
case, the sheriff’s office refused to accept this motion. Id. ¶ 95. So instead, Daniels
sent a letter to the sheriff informing him of these events. Id. ¶ 96. Despite his
knowledge of these events, Sheriff Kramer sent an officer to Daniels’s home to
ensure that he and his parents were not there. Id. ¶ 98. Had they been there,
officers would have forcibly removed them. Id. The officer later called Daniels and
told him that he had never seen such an extreme measure taken before a case had
been fully adjudicated. Id. ¶ 101.
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Daniels filed an administrative claim to alert administrative agencies to the
violations of law he had observed. Id. ¶ 106. Daniels informed Judge Grady and
Steffen of his administrative complaint, but neither recused himself from the
divorce proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 109, 112, 114. The Secretary of State investigated
Steffen’s notarial violations. Id. ¶ 108. In February 2017, Daniels filed a motion to
show cause in his divorce proceedings, followed by a notice to vacate and hold
plaintiff in default when an answer was not returned in a timely manner. Id.
¶¶ 115–116. Judge Grady denied both. Id. ¶ 117. The court prevented Daniels from
seeing his children from April through July 2017 and compelled him to get a mental
evaluation. Id. ¶ 122.
III.
Analysis
Unhappy with many aspects of his state-court divorce proceedings, Daniels
filed this lawsuit against his wife’s attorney (Steffen), the guardian ad litem (Nyuli),
the two judges who presided over the proceeding (Judges Karayannis and Grady),
and the sheriff (Kramer). The defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Defendants Steffen, Nyuli, Judge
Karayannis, and Judge Grady assert immunity from suit. Steffen argues that to the
extent there is subject-matter jurisdiction over any of the claims, Younger
abstention is appropriate to avoid interfering with the ongoing state-court
proceedings.
Daniels invokes numerous legal principles, statutes, and constitutional
provisions. His complaint is at times difficult to follow and uses legal labels and
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conclusions that are not informative. The factual allegations against each
defendant, however, are clear. And because Daniels is pro se, I read his complaint
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). For relief, Daniels asks for
money damages, disciplinary action for the defendants’ official misconduct, felony
and fraud charges against Steffen, the return of his children and home, and the
restoration of honor to the judicial and legal profession.
A.
Rooker-Feldman
Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state
courts in civil cases. The only federal court that does is the United States Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir.
2008). To prevent federal district courts from acting outside of the scope of their
jurisdiction, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits them from deciding cases where
“the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings
ended.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)
(emphasis added). Rooker-Feldman does not affect a district court’s jurisdiction
when the state-court action is ongoing. See Anderson v. Anderson, 554 Fed. App’x
529, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2014) (unpublished and nonprecedential). Because the statecourt proceedings were ongoing at the time this suit was filed, Rooker-Feldman does
not bar Daniels’s claims.
Rooker-Feldman also does not bar claims alleging that the defendants “so far
succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable
judgment.” Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 441–42 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting
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Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995)). Because Daniels alleges that
the state-court judges participated in fraud and corruption, and that this fraud
caused them to rule against him, Rooker-Feldman would not bar Daniels’s claims
even if the state suit were final.
B.
Domestic Relations Exception
Though Rooker-Feldman does not apply, this court does not have jurisdiction
to hear all of Daniels’s claims. The domestic-relations exception to federal
jurisdiction bars federal courts from issuing or modifying decrees in divorce cases.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also Anderson, 554 Fed.
App’x at 530. To the extent Daniels’s request that his children and home be restored
to him asks this court for an award of child custody or to modify his divorce decree,
his allegations run into this exception to federal-court jurisdiction. See Friedlander
v. Frielander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998); Anderson, 554 Fed. App’x at 530.
C.
Criminal and Professional Misconduct
As part of the relief he seeks, Daniels asks for criminal prosecution for the
defendants’ professional misconduct and for Steffen to be charged for the felonies
and fraud he has committed. As a private citizen, however, Daniels lacks standing
to demand the criminal prosecution of another person. Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Daniels mistakenly reads a letter from the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts as granting him standing to pursue these claims. The
letter provides, “if you are dissatisfied with this agency’s disposition of your claim,
you have the right to file suit in an appropriate United States district court within
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six months of the date of mailing of this notification.” [4-3]. That Daniels could
challenge the Administrative Office’s determination is not the same as granting him
the authority to bring criminal claims against the defendants. And even if the letter
meant what Daniels argues it does, Article III standing is a constitutional principle
and not a requirement that can be waived. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). Daniels also cannot base his claims on professional conduct or
Illinois court rule violations that may have taken place during the state court
proceedings. See ILCS S. Ct. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Preamble, ¶ 20; Johnson v.
Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 2014 Ill. App. (1st) 122677 at ¶ 19 (2014).
D.
Remaining Allegations
To recap, Daniels cannot challenge the divorce decree or award of child
custody entered by the state court, nor can he use this lawsuit to initiate criminal
charges or bring claims based on violations of state-court rules or rules of
professional conduct. But Daniels also alleges § 1983 violations, including a
conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and violations of the Illinois
Notary Public Act.
1.
Defendants Karayannis and Grady
Daniels alleges that Judge Karayannis overlooked irregularities in the
paperwork Steffen filed and that Judge Grady refused to act on information
revealing Steffen’s misconduct and entered an eviction order without letting Daniels
fully object. This conduct, Daniels argues, violated his equal protection and due
process rights. But claims against Judge Karayannis and Judge Grady are barred
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by absolute judicial immunity. A judge is immune from liability—even if the action
taken was done in error, maliciously, or in the excess of authority—unless she acts
in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57
(1978). Daniels argues that the defendants never proved that the state court had
jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings, but Illinois Circuit Courts have original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters. Ill. Const. art. 6 § 9. As such, it is not the case
that Judges Karayannis and Grady acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
Because all of the acts Daniels complains of occurred while Judge Karayannis and
Judge Grady were acting in the scope of their judicial capacity, they enjoy absolute
immunity. See Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000).5
2.
Defendant Nyuli
Daniels alleges that Nyuli worked with his wife, Steffen, and Judge Grady to
gang up on Daniels during the divorce proceedings. He also asserts that Nyuli failed
to take into account his parents’ role in the children’s lives and wrongly concluded
that Daniels was unfit to have custody of his children. Daniels’s claims against
Nyuli are barred because of her absolute immunity. Individuals asked to advise the
court on the best interests of a child need “to be able to fulfill their obligations
without the worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents.”
Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
A complaint should not be dismissed based on an affirmative defense, like immunity,
unless the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint. See Parungao v. Comm.
Health Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the detailed allegations of
Daniels’s affidavit and complaint establish that his claims against the judges and the
guardian ad litem are based entirely on conduct for which they are immune from liability,
making dismissal appropriate.
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As a result, guardians ad litem are entitled to absolute immunity when they act at
the court’s direction. Id. That a guardian ad litem lied or misrepresented facts does
not defeat absolute immunity, as long as the conduct complained of occurred while
she was acting within the scope of her role as a child representative. Golden v.
Helen Sigman & Assoc., Ltd., 611 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2010). Because all of
Nyuli’s conduct occurred within the course of her court-appointed duties, Nyuli is
absolutely immune from Daniels’s allegations.
3.
Defendant Kramer
Daniels alleges that, despite being on notice that the eviction order was
deficient, Kramer sent an officer to Daniels’s home to enforce that order and ensure
Daniels was not there. Had Daniels been present, he alleges, the officer would have
forcibly removed him. Daniels further asserts that the sheriff’s office’s policy to
accept only one motion to reconsider is a violation of due process. Daniels does not
address whether he is suing Kramer in his individual or official capacity. This
distinction is important because it “determines both the source and the nature of
[any] damages award.” Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991).
Based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears Daniels sues Kramer in his
official capacity. The complaint includes Kramer’s title as sheriff in the heading and
uses the terms “the sheriff” and “the sheriff’s office,” as opposed to referring to
Kramer by name, which indicates intent to sue in the defendant’s official capacity.
See id. at 1373; Kolar v. Sangamon Cty. of Ill., 756 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1985).
And when a complaint does not expressly state whether a defendant is sued in his
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official or individual capacity but “alleges that the conduct of a public official acting
under color of state law gives rise to liability under Section 1983, we will ordinarily
assume that he has been sued in his official capacity and only in that capacity.”
Kolar, 756 F.2d at 568. Because Daniels uses Kramer’s title and because he alleges
that Kramer acted pursuant to a state policy not to accept his motion to reconsider,
I assume he sues Kramer in his official capacity.
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An action against a government official in his
official capacity is essentially a claim against the government entity. Ford Motor
Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463–464 (1945) (overruled on other grounds
by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Geo., 535 U.S. 613 (2002)). A
municipality is a person for § 1983 purposes and so can be liable for depriving
someone of his constitutional rights. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A state, however, is not, and so cannot be sued under
§ 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). The Eleventh
Amendment also prevents § 1983 suits against a state. See id. at 65. When
enforcing the state-court eviction order Kramer was a state actor, and Daniels
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cannot allege a § 1983 claim for that action. See Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 372
(7th Cir. 1992).
To the extent the complaint can be read to assert claims against Kramer in
his capacity as a county official for damages (and not an alteration of the divorce
decree, which avoids the domestic relations exception), Daniels has failed to state a
claim against Kramer. To hold a municipal actor liable in his official capacity under
§ 1983 a plaintiff must show that the defendant acting under color of some official
policy caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at
692. Though he asserts that Kramer acted pursuant to a policy of accepting only one
motion per case, Daniels has failed to allege facts showing that this policy violated
his constitutional rights. As any litigant is entitled to do, Daniels disputes the
outcome of the state court’s eviction order. But he alleges no facts to support an
inference that the lack of ability to challenge that decision with the sheriff violated
his due process rights. And Daniels’s allegation that the sheriff would have forcibly
removed him from his home had he been present is too speculative to support a
claim.6
4.
Defendant Steffen
Daniels alleges that Steffen made written and oral misrepresentations
throughout his representation of Tanuja Daniels, violating state and federal law
Reading the complaint to be an individual-capacity claim against Kramer would not help
Daniels. Such a claim must allege that the defendant “caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Even if
Kramer personally sent an officer to enforce the order or refused to accept Daniels’s motion
to reconsider, neither of these acts amounts to a constitutional deprivation, and so Daniels
has also failed to state a § 1983 claim against Kramer as an individual.
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and Daniels’s constitutional rights. Daniels’s § 1983 claims against Steffen fail
because Steffen is not a government actor. Though all attorneys are “officers of the
court,” merely representing a client in court is not acting “under the color of state
law” as required for § 1983 liability. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318
(1981). A private actor who conspires with a government official, however, even a
government official who is immune, acts under the color of state law and may be
liable. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980).
But here, Daniels has not alleged facts to support his contention that any of
the government actors were part of a scheme to deprive him of his rights. A bare
allegation of conspiracy is not enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Cooney,
583 F.3d at 971. None of the facts Daniels alleges suggest that Steffen conspired
with a state actor to deprive Daniels of his rights. That Steffen met with Nyuli does
not support an inference that the two conspired against Daniels. Daniels’s
contention that Nyuli, Steffen, and Judge Grady then ganged up on him during the
eviction hearing is conclusory and similarly does not support an allegation of
conspiracy. As for the judges’ conduct, a refusal to enter an order to address an
attorney’s fraudulent conduct is insufficient to infer that the judge must have been
acting in concert with the attorney. See Anderson, 554 Fed. App’x at 531. The
comment Judge Grady made to Steffen about cutting Daniels some slack by giving
him four days to comply with the eviction order perhaps failed to reflect the
seriousness of the matter to Daniels and his parents, but it does not show that
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Judge Grady conspired with Steffen to purposefully deprive Daniels of his rights. As
such, there is no government action to support a § 1983 claim against Steffen.7
Daniels also alleges that Steffen violated the Illinois Notary Public Act. But
because all of his federal claims have been dismissed, I relinquish my jurisdiction
over these remaining state-law claims.8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Al’s Serv. Ctr. v.
BP Prods. N. America, Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When all federal
claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is that
the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law
claims.”).
E.
Younger abstention
The Younger abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from
interfering with ongoing state court proceedings. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 437 (1982); Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d
661, 666 (7th Cir. 2002). Only Steffen asked this court to abstain pursuant to
Younger. Because there is no jurisdiction to address many of the claims in the
Steffen also argues that he is immune from Daniels’s claims, relying on the Illinois
litigation privilege, which affords attorneys immunity from liability arising out of
statements or conduct made in connection with litigation. See O’Callaghan v. Satherlie,
2015 Ill. App. (1st) 142152 ¶ 27 (2015). However, a “state absolute litigation privilege
purporting to confer immunity from suit cannot defeat a federal cause of action.” Steffes v.
Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 1998). And though federal courts often look to
state law to define the contours of federal litigation privilege, because Daniels’s federal
claims against Steffen are dismissed on other grounds, I decline to do so in this case.
7
Despite Daniels’s contention to the contrary, there is no diversity jurisdiction over his
claims. An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled (defined as the state
that he considers to be his permanent home). Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729,
730 (7th Cir. 1991). Though Daniels lists Steffen as a citizen of Washington D.C. per the
Fourteenth Amendment, or of the U.N. per the International Organizations Immunities Act
of 1945, the address provided and the facts asserted in the complaint indicate that Steffen
is actually a citizen of Illinois.
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complaint, there is no need to decide whether abstention (which is not a
jurisdictional bar, see Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 212 F.3d 995, 997
(7th Cir. 2000)) is also appropriate. As for the remaining claims, Younger abstention
would not apply to all of them. For example, deciding a damages claim against
Steffen would not disrupt the state-court proceedings, and so abstention would be
unnecessary. But because it is clear from the complaint that Daniels has failed to
state a claim, I decline to exercise Younger abstention.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss [22], [38], [40], and [43] are granted.
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice in part (for lack of jurisdiction
and with respect to relinquished state-law claims) and with prejudice in part (for
failure to state a claim). Enter judgment and terminate civil case.9
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: April 2, 2018
Daniels understandably seeks recourse in the federal courts, but his complaint is really a
matter of state law. The state authorities are the proper officials to hear Daniels’s
arguments, and although they have not been receptive to his complaints, that does not
mean the federal courts can hear this dispute. Amendment of this lawsuit would be futile
because Daniels cannot bring federal claims against these defendants arising out their
connection to his divorce case.
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