Barnes v. ARYZTA LLC

Filing 71

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Barnes' counsel a total of $28,236.00 in fees. Aryzta's request for oral argument is denied. 70 Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 1/22/2019:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMEL BARNES,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-cv-7358

v.

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

ARYZTA, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jamel Barnes brought this case on behalf of himself and a class of
similarly situated individuals alleging that Defendant Aryzta, LLC violated the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. Aryzta removed this case on October 12,
2017, but the Court remanded it on December 20, 2017 and awarded Barnes
attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Currently before the Court is Barnes’ petition
for attorney’s fees. R. 64. For the following reasons, the Court awards Barnes’ counsel
$28,236.00 in fees.
Background
As detailed in the procedural history below, most of the fees sought in Barnes’
petition were incurred after remand.
After Aryzta removed the case to this Court, it filed a motion to dismiss under
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on November 2, 2017. R. 16. Under Rule 12(b)(1), Aryzta
argued that Barnes had not alleged a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III

standing. Barnes’ counsel quickly e-mailed Aryzta’s counsel to advise that a similar
motion had resulted in a remand—with fees—in Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F.
Supp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Barnes’ counsel offered an agreed remand without fees.
R. 64-3.
Aryzta’s counsel did not agree to the offer. Instead, on November 6, 2017,
Aryzta moved to withdraw its motion to dismiss and sought leave to file an amended
version raising only Rule 12(b)(6) arguments for dismissal. R. 22. The Court granted
the motion to amend on November 8, 2017. R. 26.
But Aryzta’s amendment did not solve its jurisdictional problem, and on
November 22, 2017, Barnes filed a motion to remand the case to state court. R. 29.
On December 20, 2017, drawing heavily on Mocek, the Court granted the motion to
remand without deciding whether there was Article III standing because Aryzta, who
bore the burden of proof on the matter, did not attempt to persuade the Court that
federal jurisdiction existed:
The Court declines to decide whether there is Article III standing
because neither party is willing to address the issue. On the one hand,
Plaintiff seeks remand to the state court and therefore does not want to
argue to this Court it has sustained a concrete injury-in-fact because
then it would be conceding subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.
Defendant, on the other hand, would like to argue that Plaintiff has not
sustained an Article III injury but has withdrawn any argument to that
effect in a ploy to avoid being forced out of federal court. The difference
between the two parties is that Plaintiff does not have to take a position
on the standing issue while Defendant does, because Defendant bears
the burden of establishing jurisdiction in this Court.
R. 39 at 8. The Court also explained that Aryzta’s admission that the issue of Article
III standing was unsettled with respect to the claims brought was an alternative

2

ground for remanding the case to state court. Id. at 9 (“That consideration alone
supports remand, as any doubt regarding jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of
the states. Indeed, as a general matter, federal courts should interpret the removal
statute narrowly and presume that the plaintiff may choose his or her forum.”) (citing
Mocek, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 912-13)). Finally, the Court awarded fees to Barnes, citing
the reasoning in Mocek. See Mocek, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 914-15 (“In short, it should
have been obvious to defendant, based on well-settled law, that with no party asking
for the merits of plaintiff’s claim to be decided in federal court, and both sides arguing
against federal jurisdiction, the only possible outcome was for the case to end up right
back where it started: in state court. Under these circumstances, I have no trouble
concluding that defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal.”). At that point, Barnes claims it had incurred only $18,799.70 in fees. R. 64
at 15.
Instead of paying Barnes’ fees, Aryzta appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit
on January 19, 2018. R. 42. But because this Court had not quantified the amount of
fees Aryzta was to pay, on January 25, 2018 the Seventh Circuit questioned its
jurisdiction and ordered Aryzta to file an additional memorandum as to why the
appeal should not be dismissed. R. 48-1. Aryzta dismissed the appeal on February 8,
2018. See R. 54.
While the appeal was pending, on January 29, 2018, Aryzta filed a motion
before this Court, urging the Court to reconsider whether Aryzta had a reasonably
objective basis for removal under the Class Action Fairness Act and accordingly

3

reconsider its award of fees. R. 49. Two weeks into the briefing schedule, on February
16, 2018, Aryzta withdrew its motion to reconsider “in light of the risk that further
proceedings before this Court continue to increase the fee award if affirmed and
Defendant’s concerns that Plaintiff’s counsel continues to engage in excessive and
unnecessary work to inflate its claim for fees and costs.” R. 56 at 2.
Unable to agree to a full resolution on Barnes’ fees, the parties filed this Joint
Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 54.3(e) on May 2, 2018.
Analysis
Courts calculate fee awards beginning with the lodestar amount, which
involves multiplying hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the hourly rate
reasonably charged by the attorneys who spent them. Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d
547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). The lodestar yields the “presumptively reasonable” fee. Id.
Barnes’ fee petition seeks $48,420.20 for 128.8 hours of work performed by six
attorneys from Edelson, P.C. through the filing of this petition1:
Lawyer
Sydney
Janzen
Todd Logan
Alexander
Tievsky
Eli WadeScott
Ryan D.
Andrews
Roger
Perlstadt

Years of
Experience
2

Rate
(2017/2018)
$270

Hours
Worked
4.1

Total

3
3

$270
$350

13.0
13.5

$3,510.00
$4,725.00

4

$295/$375

37.8/45.8

13

$610/$650

2.7/5.0

16

$610/$675

2.3/4.6

$11,151.00/
$18,540.50
$1,647.00/
$3,250.00
$1,384.70/
$3,105.00

$1,107.00

The Court rounds to the nearest tenth of an hour, for the sake of simplicity, but uses
Barnes’ calculations. See R. 64 at 1-2.

1

4

Total:

128.8

$48,420.20

Aryzta argues only $18,778.70 should be paid. The parties’ disputes are
relatively limited. First, Aryzta disputes the hourly rates of the two partners, Ryan
D. Andrews and Roger Perlstadt. Second, Aryzta disputes several categories of time
entries. The Court first addresses the reasonableness of the disputed hourly rates
claimed and then the reasonableness of the disputed hours.
A.

Hourly Rates

A reasonable hourly rate should reflect the market rate for the attorney’s
services. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 1307,
1310 (7th Cir. 1996). The market rate is “the rate that lawyers of similar ability and
experience in the community normally charge their paying clients for the type of work
in question.” Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 555 (7th Cir. 1999).
“The burden of proving the ‘market rate’ is on the fee applicant; however, once the
attorney provides evidence establishing his market rate, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate why a lower rate should be awarded.” Id. at 554-55. The
fee applicant can meet his initial burden “either by submitting affidavits from
similarly experienced attorneys attesting to the rates they charge paying clients for
similar work or by submitting evidence of fee awards the attorney has received in
similar cases.” Id. at 556.
Barnes asserts that a reasonable hourly rate for Ryan Andrews is $610.00 per
hour for 2017 and $650.00 per hour for 2018 and that a reasonable hourly rate for
Roger Perlstadt is $610.00 per hour for 2017 and $675.00 per hour for 2018. Barnes
contends Edelson’s rates are paid by hourly-paying clients, see R. 64-6 ¶¶ 7-10, which
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by definition represents the attorney’s market rate. See People Who Care, 90 F.3d at
131 (“The attorney’s actual billing rate for comparable work is presumptively
appropriate to use as the market rate.”).
Other evidence also supports these rates. Edelson’s rates, including the rates
of Messrs. Perlstadt and Andrews, have been approved by several courts in the
context of class action settlement approvals. See e.g., Goodman v. Hangtime, Inc., No.
14-cv-1022 (N.D. Ill. 2015), dkt. 126, ¶ 14 (approving Mr. Andrews’ rate of $570 an
hour in 2015); Haught v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 12-cv-2515 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20,
2014), dkt. 86 (approving Mr. Perlstadt’s rate of $515 an hour in 2014, see dkt. 79).
When increasing for inflation and skill of the attorneys, these prior awards are
evidence that the hourly rates are reasonable here. See Pickett v. Sheridan Health
Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 2011) (“a previous attorneys’ fee award is useful
for establishing a reasonable market rate for similar work”); Fox ex rel. Fox v. Barnes,
2013 WL 4401802, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“hourly fees often increase over
time, both because of inflation and because of the increasing skill and reputation of
the attorney.”). Aryzta argues that these rates are not representative of counsel’s
hourly rates because the parties in those cases did not object to counsel’s fees. Aryzta
cites no support for that argument and the Court sees no reason why an hourly rate
approved by a court should have any less merit simply because it was agreed to by
the parties.
Aryzta’s primary argument against these rates relies on an expert report
offered by Edelson in another case, Aranda v. Carribean Cruise Line, Inc., No. 12-cv-

6

04069, dkt. 533-4. R. 64-1. In that report, the expert analyzed rate approvals in class
action litigation by courts in the Northern District of Illinois, and, from 343 individual
hourly rates, determined that Edelson’s rates were approximately 17% higher than
the average plaintiff’s class action firm. Id. ¶ 40. Aryzta advocates that Edelson
partners deserve only average rates, and for that reason, the rates here should be
reduced by 17% in both 2017 and 2018. But in his report, the expert made clear that
Edelson attorneys should not command an average rate. Instead, he noted that they
should “be counted among the elite of the profession generally and this area of law
specifically” because of their expertise in the area. Id. & n.3 (listing cases praising
Edelson). Numerous courts have likewise commended Messrs. Perlstadt and
Andrews for their expertise and skill in privacy litigation and in Article III issues,
both of which were implicated and were important here. See R. 64 at 25 (citing to a
number of cases in which Mr. Andrews or Mr. Perlstadt argued and/or briefed (and
won) important privacy-related and case-in-controversy cases in circuits across the
country). The issues in this case were relatively unique and addressed new Supreme
Court caselaw on Article III standing, thus implicating and warranting counsel’s
expertise (and their higher hourly rate) in this area.
Counsel’s rates are reasonable given the market rate that hourly clients are
willing to pay, judicial approval of their rates, and their level of reputation and
expertise in the area. Accordingly, the Court awards counsel their requested rates.
B.

Hours Worked

7

The hours worked component of the lodestar excludes hours “not reasonably
expended,” including “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “[T]he court should disallow not only
hours spent on tasks that would normally not be billed to a paying client, but also
those hours expended by counsel on tasks that are easily delegable to nonprofessional assistance.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 553. The Court also may reduce the
hours calculation “[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate.” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433.
Aryzta questions counsel’s entries spent litigating the remand and its related
briefings as excessive and duplicative. Aryzta also questions the amount of time
Barnes spent preparing this fee petition. Out of the total 128.8 hours claimed by
Barnes’ counsel, 92.9 hours were spent litigating the merits, while 35.9 hours were
spent litigating this fee petition. The Court will address each category in turn.
1. Merits Petition
Motion to Remand. Aryzta first argues that in light of counsel’s familiarity
with and work on Mocek, it was excessive for Edelson to have spent a total of 59.8
hours analyzing, preparing, and briefing the motion to remand. Aryzta also
specifically challenges the 37.4 hours spent by associate Eli Wade-Scott as excessive.
The Court has reviewed both the briefs filed in Mocek and the briefs filed here
and disagrees with Aryzta’s contention that they are so similar that Barnes’ counsel
should have spent a minimal amount of time on the briefs. While Edelson did have
the benefit of having filed and succeeded on Mocek, this case had additional

8

considerations due to Aryzta’s withdrawal of the motion to dismiss. Regardless, it
would have been improper for any firm to merely copy and paste a previous brief. The
Court also disagrees with Aryzta’s statement that the length of the briefs (12 pages
for the initial brief and 7 pages for the reply) are not commensurate with the time
spent on those briefs. In this Court’s experience, long briefs on limited issues are
ineffective, and much less effective than simple, straightforward briefs that succinctly
address the pertinent issues. 2 The brevity of the briefs here is likely representative
of the time Edelson put into refining the ultimately successful motion to remand.
However, the Court does agree with Aryzta that the amount of time spent on
the briefs was excessive. First, it was unreasonable for associates Todd Logan and
Sydney Janzen to have spent almost 4.5 hours reviewing Aryzta’s motions to dismiss
given that they spent no time drafting the motion to remand. While it appears Mr.
Logan briefly researched issues related to the motion to dismiss and sent emails to
Aryzta’s counsel, the hours spent on those tasks sufficiently encompass any time he
would have spent merely reading the motions. Ms. Janzen did even less—the extent
of her time regarding the motion to dismiss was exchanging emails with Mr. Logan
regarding reaching out to Aryzta’s counsel. But Mr. Logan communicated with
opposing counsel, so it is unclear why Ms. Janzen (a more junior attorney) needed to
discuss with Mr. Logan the details of that email. The Court finds these hours
inappropriate. Accordingly, Ms. Janzen’s time is reduced by 1.4 hours (reflecting the

Mark Twain once said, “I didn’t have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long
one instead.” Good editing takes time. A long, poorly edited brief is often a sign of a
lack of effort and work to produce it.

2

9

time spent reviewing the motion and the time spent communicating with Mr. Logan),
and Mr. Logan’s time is reduced by 3.3 hours.
Second, the Court agrees that the time spent by Mr. Wade-Scott was excessive
because although the issues here were different, he did have the benefit of the Mocek
briefing. Accordingly, the Court cuts the time Mr. Wade-Scott spent on the briefing
by 50%, for a total reduction of 18.7 hours. Finally, the Court cuts by 50% the hours
partners Ryan Andrews and Roger Perlstadt spent editing the reply on the motion to
remand. The partners spent over 2.5 hours reviewing the reply draft, which is
excessive given that Mr. Perlstadt spent only 1.2 hours reviewing the initial brief (an
amount the Court finds reasonable). Rather than choosing to reduce the hours of just
one of the partners, the Court will reduce both by half because they have different
hourly rates. Accordingly, Mr. Perlstadt’s time will be reduced by .4 hours, and Mr.
Andrews’ time will be reduced by .9 hours. With these reductions, the total Edelson
spent on the motion to remand and its reply equates to 35.3 hours, which the Court
finds reasonable.
Internal Communications. Aryzta next argues that the 12.9 hours Edelson
billed for internal discussions would not have been paid by a client, and thus should
not be paid by Aryzta. Courts may award fees for inter-office communications so long
as the time spent communicating is “reasonably expended.” Tchemkou v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2008). In fact, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that
“[t]he practice of law often, indeed usually, involves significant periods of consultation
among counsel.” Id. This is because “[t]alking through a set of authorities or seeking

10

advice on a vexing problem is often significantly more efficient than one attorney’s
trying to wade through the issue alone.” Id. at 512. To ensure that the amount of time
billed to internal communications was “reasonably expended,” attorneys should
“identify explicitly the subject matter of their discussions.” Id.
After reviewing the billing records, the Court finds the amount of time spent
by Barnes’ counsel on internal discussions (a total of 13 hours over the course of
almost four months) reasonable given the various stages this case has seen. That
these conferences were generally brief—many were only 0.10 or 0.20 hours long—also
suggests that the time counsel billed for these conferences was not excessive. More
importantly, counsel’s entries identify the particular legal task or stage of litigation
actually discussed during these conferences, such as the motion to remand or strategy
for responding to Aryzta. And, it is reasonable that the associates in this case (who
did the vast majority of the substantive work) would have regularly discussed work
assignments with Mr. Andrews and Mr. Perlstadt, the two main partners on the case.
In short, these hours are reasonable.
Duplicative Entries. Aryzta also argues that the involvement of several
different attorneys at all stages of the proceedings generated overlap such as
unnecessary internal communications and duplicative work. The Court has reviewed
Aryzta’s line by line objections and does not find the challenged work unreasonable
except for a few entries regarding the status hearings. First, on November 7 and 8,
2017, associates Sydney Janzen and Todd Logan billed over two hours together to
prepare for the initial status hearing. Mr. Logan appeared by phone and led the

11

relatively short status hearing where the parties did little else but set a briefing
schedule. Mr. Logan billed 1.8 hours for “prep for hearing; hearing” without specifying
how much time was spent toward either task. Because he appeared by phone, the
Court doubts he spent more than .2 hours for the “hearing” task. The Court will award
Mr. Logan .5 hours to prepare for the hearing, but will reduce the remainder of the
time. The Court also deducts all the time Ms. Janzen spent preparing for the hearing
and attending the hearing, as it appears that her role was more of a junior observer
rather than a meaningful participant. Clients do not typically pay for training time
of more junior associates, and neither should Aryzta here. Barnes argues that because
the initial status hearing was more important strategically, it was appropriate to
have two attorneys present rather than one associate. That argument would be
persuasive if a partner had appeared at the hearing, but having two of the most junior
associates on the team appear for a short status makes little sense. Mr. Logan’s time
thus is reduced by 1.1 hours and Ms. Janzen’s time is reduced by 2.5 hours.
The Court also finds the time billed for the hearing on February 1, 2018
excessive. Mr. Perlstadt spent 2.2 hours preparing for the hearing and 1.9 hours in
court at the hearing. Mr. Wade-Scott spent 2.5 hours in total for the hearing, which
included .6 hours preparing for the hearing, 1.4 hours traveling to and from court and
appearing in court, and .5 hours debriefing with Mr. Andrews. Mr. Wade-Scott was
the primary attorney during the hearing, and Mr. Perlstadt made only a couple of
brief procedural comments. While the Court commends Edelson for allowing junior
attorneys to lead and manage cases as Mr. Wade-Scott did here, it was excessive for

12

Mr. Perlstadt to have spent as much time as he did preparing for the hearing when
Mr. Wade-Scott only needed .6 hours. This case moved relatively quickly, so it is
unlikely Mr. Perlstadt needed that much time to refamiliarize himself with the case.
Accordingly, the Court deducts 2.2 hours from Mr. Perlstadt’s time as excessive and
duplicative of Mr. Wade-Scott’s work.
Clerical Work. Finally, the Court will deduct 1.3 hours for clerical work billed
(such as reviewing the Court’s standing order and deadlines, calling the court clerk,
and preparing appearances). Accordingly, Ms. Janzen’s time is reduced by .2 hours;
Mr. Wade-Scott’s time is reduced by .5 hours; and Mr. Tievsky’s time is reduced by .6
hours.
The above results in a reduction of 31.7 hours for a total of 61.2 hours awarded
for the time Edelson spent litigating the remand petition up to Aryzta’s withdrawal
of its motion to reconsider.
2. Fees on Fees
Finally, Aryzta contends Barnes’ counsel expended excessive time litigating
this fee petition. The Court agrees. After the reductions above, Edelson spent 61.2
hours litigating the remand and dealing with Aryzta’s notice of appeal and motion to
reconsider. Edelson seeks 35.9 hours (or 60% of the time spent on the merits) for the
time it spent complying with the Local Rule 54.3 process, negotiating with opposing
counsel, and drafting this memorandum.
The Seventh Circuit has held that, while the time spent preparing a fee
petition is compensable, lawyers often “litigate fee issues with greater energy and

13

enthusiasm than they litigate any other type of issue.” Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d
983, 987-88 (7th Cir. 1988); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 873 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (N.D.
Ill. 2012). One factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of time spent
preparing a fee petition is “the comparison between hours spent on the merits and
the hours spent on the fee petitions.” Gibson, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 992. “Where the time
expended preparing a fee petition is disproportionate to the time spent on the merits
of the case, courts reduce the amount of time recoverable for the preparation of the
fee petition.” Id. (citing Spegon, 175 F.3d at 554).
Courts in this circuit have found that the proper ratio of time spent on the
merits to time spent on the fee petition is less than 25%. In Ustrak, for example, the
Seventh Circuit reversed a fees-on-fees award for which “[f]or every hour spent
litigating the merits the plaintiff’s attorney’s devoted almost 15 minutes to preparing
a petition requesting fees for that hour.” Ustrak, 851 F.2d at 987-88. The Seventh
Circuit “disallow[ed] two-thirds of the lawyer and student hours allowed for the
preparation of the fee petitions,” explaining that “[t]he allowance [wa]s still a
generous one.” Id. at 988. See also, Spegon, 175 F.3d at 554 (affirming district court’s
reduction for “hours spent on the fee petitions” from 9.2 hours to 1.6 hours); Gibson,
873 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (10 minutes to prepare fee petition for every hour on the merits
was excessive; reducing request by half); Mays v. Springborn, 2014 WL 12730575, at
*7 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2014) (100:1 ratio of work on merits compared to fee preparation
reasonable).

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The Court agrees that 35.9 hours is disproportionate to the time spent on the
merits of this case. See Ozinga v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2018
WL 2320933, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2018) (“[I]t is hard to imagine that plaintiffs’
counsel would ask a paying client to compensate counsel for 35.94 hours to figure out
how much the client owes. And hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also
are not properly billed to one’s adversary.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court
will reduce the requested hours spent litigating the fee petition by 60%. With this
reduction, Mr. Andrews is awarded 1 hour; Mr. Tievsky is awarded .6 hours; and Mr.
Wade-Scott is awarded 12.8 hours. These 14.4 hours generously amount to 23% of the
hours spent litigating the merits.
*

*

*

After all of the above reductions are taken into account, the Court awards the
following:
Lawyer
Sydney
Janzen
Todd Logan
Alexander
Tievsky
Eli WadeScott
Ryan D.
Andrews
Roger
Perlstadt

Years of
Experience
2

Rate
(2017/2018)
$270

Hours
Worked
0

Total

3
3

$270
$350

8.6
12.1

$2,322.00
$4,235.00

4

$295/$375

18.6/26.6

13

$610/$650

1.8/3.6

16

$610/$675

1.9/2.4

Total:

75.6 3

$5,487.00
$9,975.00
$1,098.00/
$2,340.00
$1,159.00/
$1,620.00
$28,236.00

$0

The Court finds these hours reasonable when compared to Aryzta’s own hours,
which are a useful comparator. See Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs.,
Inc., 200 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Because [defendant] knew from the start that

3

15

*

*

*

One final note. On June 8, 2018, Aryzta filed a notice of supplemental authority
and request for oral argument in opposition to Barnes’ petition for fees. R. 69, 70.
While Aryzta styles the notices as pertinent to this opinion, it is clear that Aryzta
filed that notice and the cases attached to it in an effort to convince this Court to
reconsider its opinion granting Barnes his request for attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447. Aryzta had its opportunity to ask for reconsideration of that opinion, but it
chose to withdraw its motion to avoid incurring additional fees. See R. 56. The Court
will not revisit its decision now. Accordingly, Aryzta’s request for oral argument on
that issue (R. 70) is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Barnes’ counsel a total of
$28,236.00 in fees.
ENTERED:

______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge

Dated: January 22, 2019

it would be required to foot its own legal bill, the amount it incurred cannot have been
influenced by moral hazard. That [plaintiff] laid out less than [defendant] implies
that it, too, engaged in prudent cost control and therefore is entitled to full
indemnity.”). Aryzta billed 234.60 hours, almost three times what Barnes will be
awarded. But, Aryzta presumably spent more time drafting the notice of appeal and
motion to reconsider—although Barnes billed some time researching issues related
to those later filings, he did not file written responses to either because Aryzta
withdrew them shortly after filing the motions.
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