McFields et al v. Cook County et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 4/13/2018. Mailed notice(gel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
COURTNEY MCFIELDS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 17-cv-7424

v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, and
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,

Judge John Robert Blakey

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Courtney McFields, Pierre Brunt, Tarik Page, and Anthony Dixon
sued Defendants Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of a proposed class, allege that Defendants violated their
Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating deliberate indifference to dental pain
they experienced while confined at the Cook County Jail. The Sheriff moved to
dismiss. [20]. For the reasons explained below, this Court denies that motion.
I.

Background
A.

The Complaint’s Allegations

Defendants operate the Cook County Jail and share responsibility for
providing medical care to detainees. [1] ¶¶ 4–6. Defendants require that detainees
with dental pain complete a “health service request form” before receiving
treatment. Id. ¶ 11. The appropriate standard of care dictates that a registered
nurse or similar provider would review any complaints of dental pain and conduct a
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face-to-face evaluation with a complaining detainee within 48 hours of the detainee
submitting a request form. Id. ¶ 12. Prompt face-to-face evaluations would allow
nurses to give detainees antibiotics and over-the-counter medications for pain relief
before detainees see a dentist. Id. ¶ 8. Defendants follow a different practice at the
jail, however: nursing staff forward request forms for dental pain to dental staff
without evaluating patients or giving them pain medication. Id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ failure to ensure timely screening and pain
relief caused Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to experience gratuitous dental
pain while confined at the jail. Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, Page started experiencing
dental pain in January 2014 and submitted several request forms complaining
about the pain. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. He never had a face-to-face evaluation with a nurse,
and he suffered untreated dental pain for about 90 days before seeing a dentist. Id.
¶ 33. Dixon, whose dental pain began in May 2014, also never had a face-to-face
evaluation with a nurse despite submitting multiple request forms. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
Dixon’s dental pain went untreated for 60 days before he saw a dentist. Id. ¶ 30.
McFields submitted a request form for dental pain in late October 2014. Id. ¶
21. A registered nurse reviewed the form one day after McFields submitted it;
without conducting a face-to-face evaluation or providing McFields with pain
medication, the nurse forwarded McFields’ request form to a dentist.

Id. ¶ 22.

McFields continued experiencing severe dental pain and submitted a second request
form several weeks later when he still had not seen a dentist or received any pain
medication. Id. ¶ 23. A dentist finally examined McFields in late November 2014

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and removed an infected tooth. Id. ¶ 24. In fall 2016, Brunt experienced dental
pain and submitted multiple request forms and grievances complaining about his
pain. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Brunt never saw a nurse for a face-to-face evaluation. Id. ¶ 27.
He endured untreated dental pain for about 60 days before he saw a dentist. Id.
B.

Smentek Litigation 1

McFields, Page, and Dixon originally belonged to the plaintiff class in
Smentek v. Sheriff of Cook County, No. 09-cv-529 (N.D. Ill.), a similar § 1983 case.
Id. ¶ 34. In August 2011, the Smentek court certified the following class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3): “All inmates housed at Cook County
Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who have made a written
request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and
unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment.” [20-1] at 2 (October 2016 Opinion
and Order). In December 2014, the court ordered the parties to confer regarding a
closing date for the class period. Id. Instead of suggesting a single end date, the
Smentek plaintiffs proposed five subclasses for different periods of time. Id. at 2–3.
The court rejected the proposed subclasses in an October 2016 opinion and set a
class closing date of October 31, 2013.

Id. at 8.

That closing date excluded

McFields, Page, and Dixon, who suffered untreated dental pain in 2014. [1] ¶¶ 21–
33. McFields, Page, Dixon, and Brunt filed this suit in October 2017. [1].
II.

Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide

This Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, such as court filings. See Cancer
Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 676 n.2 (7th Cir. 2009).
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a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader merits relief,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has “fair notice” of the claim “and the
grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also contain
“sufficient factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim to relief—one that
“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the defendant committed
the alleged misconduct.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility” that a defendant acted unlawfully. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432,
436 (7th Cir. 2013).
In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts all wellpleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This Court does not, however, accept a complaint’s
legal conclusions as true. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Rule
12(b)(6) limits this Court to considering the complaint, documents attached to the
complaint, documents central to the complaint (to which the complaint refers), and
information properly subject to judicial notice. Williamson, 714 F.3d at 436.
III.

Analysis
The Sheriff seeks to dismiss all claims except Brunt’s as time-barred. [20] at

2. 2 The Sheriff also argues that, even if Plaintiffs’ claims proceed, they should not
proceed as a class action. Id. at 6.
The Sheriff also moved to dismiss the complaint as a whole for “failure to state a cause of action,”
[20] at 2, but then failed to develop that argument in any way, and thus waived it, see Crespo v.
Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016).
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A.

Tolling

The Sheriff argues that the statute of limitations expired for McFields, Page,
and Dixon’s claims because this case does not involve “exactly the same cause of
action” as Smentek. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs respond that the statute of limitations for
each of their claims did not begin running until October 2016, when the Smentek
court set the class closing date. [27] at 5. This Court agrees.
Because § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, § 1983 actions
borrow the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Illinois has a two-year statute of limitations for
personal-injury torts.

735 ILCS 5/13-202.

When federal courts borrow a state

statute of limitations for a § 1983 case, they must also apply state tolling rules. See
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 662 (1983); Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 485 (1980).
In Illinois, filing a proposed class action “suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class.” Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch.,
371 N.E.2d 634, 645 (Ill. 1977) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,
554 (1974)). Illinois courts follow American Pipe and its progeny for tolling rules.
See Mabry v. Vill. of Glenwood, 41 N.E.3d 508, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (collecting
cases). Thus, in Illinois, a tolled limitations clock starts ticking again only when a
court denies class certification, or when certain procedural events happen (for
example, the limitations period starts running again for a class member who opts
out of a certified class). See Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 875 F.3d 839, 843–44

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(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v.
Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983)).
Plaintiffs (except Brunt) belonged to the Rule 23(b)(3) class that the Smentek
court originally certified in August 2011. See [20-1] at 2. Consistent with that class
definition, Plaintiffs allege that—after January 1, 2007—they made written
requests for dental care because of acute pain and they suffered prolonged and
unnecessary pain when they did not receive appropriate treatment. See generally
[1].

Thus, Smentek tolled the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ claims until

October 2016, when the court set a class closing date that excluded Plaintiffs. See
Steinberg, 371 N.E.2d at 645; Collins, 875 F.3d at 843–44. Plaintiffs filed this case
in October 2017, [1], well within the two-year limitations period triggered in
October 2016.
The Sheriff emphasizes that Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their
rights by not providing them with face-to-face nursing evaluations within 48 hours
of Plaintiffs submitting their request forms, but the relevant proposed subclass in
Smentek challenged the failure to provide face-to-face evaluations within 24 hours.
[20] at 5. Thus, the Sheriff says, tolling should not apply because this case and
Smentek “do not involve or require the same factual information.” Id. The Sheriff
relies too much upon the proposed subclasses. The Smentek court rejected those
proposed subclasses, so they do not define the relevant class at issue here.
Plaintiffs’ claims belonged to the certified class in Smentek until that court, in
October 2016, set a class closing date that excluded them. See [20-1] at 2, 8. Thus,

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Plaintiffs get the benefit of tolling from Smentek; the two-year limitations period did
not begin running for their claims until October 2016. See Steinberg, 371 N.E.2d at
645; Collins, 875 F.3d at 843–44.
The Sheriff also argues that American Pipe tolling does not apply “when the
class claim and subsequent individual claim turn on the same factual allegations
but advance different legal theories.” [20] at 5 (citing In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,
436 F.3d 782, 794 (7th Cir. 2006)).

True, but again irrelevant here.

Copper

Antitrust held that a class action filed in state court—under state antitrust law—
did not toll the statute of limitations for a subsequent federal suit under federal
antitrust law.

436 F.3d at 793–97.

That decision confirms what this Court

explained above: federal law determines the tolling effect of a suit governed by a
federal statute of limitations, while state law determines the tolling effect of a suit
governed by a state statute of limitations, “even if all litigation occurs in federal
court.” Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 562–63
(7th Cir. 2011). This case advances the same legal theory as Smentek: § 1983 claims
for Eighth Amendment violations arising from deliberate indifference to dental
pain. Thus, Copper Antitrust’s exception does not apply here. In sum, Plaintiffs
timely filed this case because their two-year limitations period did not start running
until October 2016, when they no longer belonged to the Smentek class.
B.

Proceeding with Class Claims

Relying upon one case from outside this district, the Sheriff also argues that
Plaintiffs’ claims, if they survive a motion to dismiss, should not proceed as a class

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action because “plaintiffs cannot stack one class action on top of another and
continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely.” [28] at 4 (citing In re Copper
Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811–12 (W.D. Wis. 2003)).

But the

Western District of Wisconsin held only that the plaintiffs in that case could not
stack the tolling effect from multiple unsuccessful class actions in which courts
denied class certification. Copper Mkt., 300 F. Supp. 2d at 812. Plaintiffs here
belonged to a successful class action until the Smentek court set a closing date prior
to when they experienced untreated dental pain.
Besides, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the argument that “successive suits
that rely on American Pipe’s tolling principle never may proceed as class actions.”
Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 563–64. Plaintiffs have not yet moved for class certification.
When they do, Defendants will have the chance to address that issue if necessary.
IV.

Conclusion
This Court denies the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss [20].

All dates and

deadlines stand.

Dated: April 13, 2018

Entered:
____________________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge

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