Robinson v. Sheridan Correctional Center et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 8/31/2020. Mailed notice. (dm, )

Case: 1:17-cv-08556 Document #: 108 Filed: 08/31/20 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:619

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-08556

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Robinson, a former inmate at Sheridan Correctional Center,
brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant Robin Rose, the Health
Care Unit Administrator at Sheridan, was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical condition in violation of his Eight Amendment rights. Plaintiff also brings a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. Before the Court
is Defendant Rose’s motion for summary judgment [88]. For the following reasons,
Defendant’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Anthony Robinson is a former inmate at Sheridan Correctional Center
(“Sheridan”), an Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) facility. 1 (Dkt. 97 at ¶
1). The events giving rise to this suit occurred at Sheridan while Robinson was an
inmate. (Id. at ¶ 5). On December 7, 2016, Robinson injured the fifth finger of his left
Robinson voluntarily dismissed his claim for deliberate indifference based on the failure to provide
him medications prior to being released from Sheridan. (Dkt. 97 at ¶ 7).
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hand while playing basketball. (Id. at ¶8). A few hours later, Robinson was taken to
the Valley West Hospital emergency room where he received an x-ray and finger cast.
(Dkt. 100 at ¶ 34). 2 The emergency room physician, Dr. John Massimilian, opined
that Robinson had dislocated his finger and “referred [him] for close orthopedic follow
up.” (Id. at ¶ 36); (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit H). Upon his return to Sheridan, Robinson,
received follow up care at the Sheridan Health Care Unit. (Dkt. 100 at ¶ 37). Over
four months later, on April 24, 2017, Robinson saw an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Ryan
Kenny at Midwest Orthopedic Institute. (Id. at ¶ 40); (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit I). According
to Robinson, Dr. Kenny informed him that the only options available for his finger
were amputation or pin insertion. (Dkt. 100 at ¶ 41). Robinson opted for the latter.
(Id. at ¶ 42). Shortly thereafter, on May 30, 2017, Dr. Kenny performed a surgical
procedure to insert pins into Robinson’s injured finger. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44); (Dkt. 100 at
Exhibit J). After the surgery, Robinson claims Dr. Kenny advised him that he needed
physical therapy. (Dkt. 100 at ¶ 44).
On May 31, 2017, the day after his surgery, Robinson submitted a formal
grievance requesting the opinion of a second specialist regarding his finger. (Id. at ¶
57); (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit E). Robinson stated that a week after returning from the
emergency room for his injury, he saw a Dr. Roz at Sheridan who prescribed a
therapeutic exercise involving squeezing a ball for six weeks. (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit E).
After trying the exercise for a short time, Robinson complained to Dr. Roz that “it was

Defendant disputes the relevance of several statements of fact regarding the medical care Robinson
received for his finger. (See Dkt. 100 at ¶¶ 34-38; 41-45). The Court finds these statements pertinent
to understanding the basis for Robinson’s § 1983 claim.
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extremely painful” and that his “finger wasn’t working.” (Id.) Subsequently, Dr. Roz
treated Robinson’s finger with Novocain and “rubbed [the] finger trying to reset it.”
(Id.) Robinson further stated, “I believe that my injury was misdiagnosed, and
because of the lapse of time and severeness of it, that malpractice and gross
negligence may be applicable.” (Id.)
Defendant Robin Rose is a nurse by profession and was the Health Care Unit
Administrator at Sheridan from December 2015 through January 2018. (Dkt. 97 at
¶¶ 3; 32). In her capacity as Health Care Unit Administrator, Rose reviewed and
investigated inmate grievances regarding medical care and made recommendations
as to the merits of the grievance. (Dkt. 100 at ¶¶ 49; 55). Rose testified that if
applicable she would raise her concerns regarding an inmate’s treatment or care to
the medical personnel involved. (Dkt. 90 at 63-64).
Rose reviewed Robinson’s May 31, 2017 grievance and advised that the
grievance had no merit:
The medical record has been reviewed and it was noted that Mr. Robinson has
been followed by UIC. Mr. Robinson has a follow-up appointment next week
with orthopedics. Mr. Robinson was seen by the nurse practitioner on
7/17/2017 for a pain medication refill.
Recommendation: No Merit
(Dkt. 97 at Exhibit E). Relying on this recommendation, the grievance officer and
warden deemed Robinson’s grievance moot and denied his request for a second
opinion. (Id.)
On July 17, 2017, Robinson had a follow up appointment with Dr. Kenny, who
removed the stitches from Robinson’s finger. (Dkt. 88 Exhibit 1 at 72).
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On October 11, 2017, Robinson saw Rose in the Health Care Unit. (Dkt. 100 at
¶ 62). During this visit, Rose advised Robinson “to continue range of motion and limit
heavy lifting” and “[a]ssured [him] there would be a follow up with NP [nurse
practitioner].” (Id. at ¶ 63).
On October 16, 2017, Robinson filed a second grievance requesting an offsite
orthopedic therapy appointment because his previous appointment for offsite therapy
in September was cancelled and never re-scheduled. (Id. at ¶ 58); (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit
F). Rose reviewed this grievance, conducted an investigation, and determined the
grievance had no merit. (Dkt. 100 at ¶ 59-60). Rose explained:
The medical file has been reviewed and it is noted that on 10.05.2017 the nurse
practitioner noted there was a 6 week follow up after completing PROM and
ROM and massage for the 5th left finger. After completing these instructions
for 6 weeks the Nurse practitioner noted that she was resubmitting the
collegial request. On 10/13/2017 the nurse practitioner noted that the collegial
had been denied and to continued [sic] previous treatment plan.
(Dkt. 97 at Exhibit F). Collegial review is a process through which inmates’ requests
for offsite care are approved or denied. 3 (Dkt. 90 at 64). Relying on Rose’s
recommendation, the grievance officer and warden denied Robinson’s grievance.
(Dkt. 97 at Exhibit F).
At some point after injuring his finger, Robinson also claims he submitted sick
call slips directed to Rose requesting “to meet with her and complain about whatever
was going on,” but that Rose never responded. (Dkt. 88 Exhibit 1 at 131); (Dkt. 100
at ¶ 48). Sick call slips are requests to see medical staff for medical issues an inmate

Rose attended collegial review sessions, but testified that her role was to be informed, and not to
make a decision regarding whether to approve offsite care. (Id. at 72-73).
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may have. (Dkt. 88 Exhibit 1 at 21-22). Robinson does not know whether Rose
received the sick call slips or when he sent them. (Id. at 133). Rose was not asked at
her deposition about receiving sick call slips from Robinson. (Dkt. 90).
On November 27, 2017, Robinson filed the present action against Rose and
other prison medical providers claiming they were deliberately indifferent to his
finger injury by perpetuating ineffective treatment and delays in offsite care.
Robinson also brings state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Rose moves for summary judgment on the claims against her. The remaining
Defendants have since been dismissed from the case (Dkt. 95) or are unidentified.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts
are material. Id. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of
establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323 (1986).
After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted). Construing the evidence and

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facts supported by the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court gives the
non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not
speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir.
2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable
trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in
support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation
omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

Deliberate Indifference
To successfully challenge medical care under the Eighth Amendment, an

inmate must demonstrate that the defendant prison official was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000). The deliberate indifference
standard requires the plaintiff to establish “that (1) the medical condition was
objectively serious, and (2) the state official[ ] acted with deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, which is a subjective standard.” Sherrod, 223 F.3d at 610. The
subjective prong is met if an official ‘“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health and safety.”’ Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The parties do not dispute
that Robinson’s finger injury constitutes an objectively serious medical condition.
Rather, Rose moves for summary judgment arguing that the evidence does not
establish that she acted with deliberate indifference.

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Robinson argues that Rose, through her review of his sick call slips, grievances
and her medical visit with him on October 11, 2017, was subjectively aware of the
deficient medical care he was receiving for his finger and that her failure to take
appropriate remedial action constituted deliberate indifference. The evidence
presented to the Court, however, fails to establish that Robinson’s complaints or
medical visit were sufficient to place Rose on notice of an excessive risk to his health
or safety. While “a prison official’s knowledge of prison [medical] conditions learned
from an inmate’s communication can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient
knowledge of the conditions to” establish deliberate indifference, “[t]he plaintiff still
has the burden of demonstrating that the communication in its content and manner
of transmission gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993-94 (7th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Beginning with the sick call slips, even if Robinson had established that Rose
received these slips, which he has not, he fails to present any evidence of the content
of the submissions other than that they contained “complain[ts] about whatever was
going on.” (Dkt. 88 Exhibit A at 131); (Dkt. 100 at ¶ 48) (“Plaintiff wrote sick call slips
specifically addressed to Defendant Rose, requesting to meet with her and complain
about various issues ….”). Without such evidence, there is not a genuine issue of
triable fact regarding whether the sick call slips placed Rose on notice of an excessive
risk to Robinson’s health.

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Similarly, Robinson does not present evidence regarding the medical visit with
Rose on October 11, 2017 suggesting that Rose should have been alerted to a risk to
Robinson’s health. The only evidence concerning the visit is a note by Rose
documenting the visit that reads: “Met with patient and explained to continue range
of motion and limit heavy lifting. Assured patient there would be follow up with NP.”
(Dkt. 100 at ¶ 63). Robinson argues that at the visit Rose “made the decision to
continue his current improper course of treatment,” but fails to present evidence
showing that Rose would have known that his current treatment was improper. (Dkt.
96 at 7). The note does not indicate, and Robinson does not claim, that he complained
to Rose during the visit about the medical care he had received for his finger or that
he requested offsite care.
Finally, the evidence does not allow a rational jury to find that Rose was aware
of an excessive risk of harm to Robinson from her review and investigation of
Robinson’s grievances. In the first grievance filed on May 31, 2017, Robinson
complained about the ineffective medical care he received from Dr. Roz at Sheridan
prior to his surgery and requested to see a second orthopedic specialist. (Dkt. 97 at
Exhibit E). The grievance itself indicates that when Robinson complained that the
prescribed ball exercises were too painful, Dr. Roz modified his course of care by
opting for Novocain treatment and attempting to re-set Robinson’s finger. (Dkt. 97 at
Exhibit E). Thus, the grievance establishes that Robinson disagreed with the course
of treatment he received, which is insufficient in itself to establish deliberate
indifference, Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Disagreement

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between a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two medical professionals, about
the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation.”). But in any event, the grievance informed Rose that
Dr. Roz had modified the treatment to address Robinson’s concerns. (Dkt. 97 at
Exhibit E).
Regarding Robinson’s request to see a second orthopedic specialist, because
inmates do not have a constitutional right to the opinion of a specialist, the “refusal
to refer [an inmate to a specialist] supports a claim of deliberate indifference only if
that choice is blatantly inappropriate.” Id. at 411 (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, prior to submitting his grievance, Robinson had seen an offsite
orthopedic specialist, Dr. Kenny, and received surgical intervention. Rose further
observed that Robinson had also been seen by an offsite provider at UIC and had a
follow up appointment the following week with Dr. Kenny. (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit E).
Under these facts, it would not have been clear to Rose that Robinson needed to see
a specialist. No rational jury could find deliberate indifference on Rose’s part on this
record.
In his second grievance, filed on October 16, 2017, Robinson complained that
his offsite physical therapy appointment had been cancelled and requested that it be
rescheduled. (Dkt. 97 at Exhibit F). As Rose noted in her response memorandum,
however, Robinson’s appointment had been cancelled because his request for offsite
physical therapy was denied through the collegial review process. (Id.) The
recommendation of the collegial review team was to continue the onsite physical

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therapy routine consisting of PROM (passive range of motion) and ROM (range of
motion) exercises and massage. (Id.) Robinson argues that Rose’s denial of this
grievance was “particularly troubling” because she “continued to ignore Plaintiff’s
complaints about the ineffectiveness of such [onsite] physical therapy and
perpetuated the medical decision to continue the same ineffective exercises, which
led to the loss of Plaintiff’s use of his finger.” (Dkt. 96 at 8-9). But Robinson fails to
raise a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether Rose knew that the physical therapy
Robinson was receiving at Sheridan was ineffective. First, the grievance itself did not
contain any complaints regarding the quality or effectiveness of the physical therapy
Robinson was receiving at Sheridan. While Robinson’s first grievance complained
about therapeutic ball exercises, it is unclear whether the ball exercises were the
same as the PROM and ROM exercises recommended by the collegial team. Second,
Robinson argues that Rose must have been aware that the treatment was ineffective
from her review of his medical records but fails to point to any fact in the limited
medical record he provides that would have revealed this. Finally, Robinson suggests
that Rose should have known the physical therapy was ineffective because after six
weeks of PROM and ROM exercises and massage a nurse practitioner submitted a
collegial request for offsite physical therapy on Robinson’s behalf. The collegial team
consisting of doctors, however, disagreed that offsite physical therapy was necessary.
As noted above, a “[d]isagreement between … two medical professionals, about the
proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. Robinson argues at length that as a

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nurse, Rose could not blindly defer to the medical judgment of physicians, but the
evidence fails to show that Rose was aware of an excessive risk to Robinson’s health
or safety to necessitate her interference.
On the facts presented to the Court, no rational trier of fact could find that
Rose was deliberately indifferent to Robinson’s finger injury. 4 Rose’s motion for
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim is granted.
II.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Illinois law, to succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress (“IIED”) a plaintiff must shows“(1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous, (2) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew
that there was at least a high probability that his conduct would inflict severe
emotional distress, and (3) the defendant's conduct did cause severe emotional
distress.” Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997). Because
Robinson has failed to supply an adequate factual basis to support a finding of
deliberate indifference against Rose, however, Robinson’s IIED claim must also fail.
See e.g, Harrison v. Cty. of Cook, No. 08 C 3202, 2011 WL 4036115, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 12, 2011) (“[Plaintiff] has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of fact
regarding whether [Defendants] were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. … Accordingly, [Defendants] are entitled to summary judgment on [Plaintiff]'s
IIED claims against them.”); Hardy v. Hardy, No. 10 C 5921, 2013 WL 5325077, at

Having concluded that Rose was not deliberately indifference to Robinson’s serious medical condition,
the Court declines to consider her arguments that she (1) lacked personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation or (2) is entitled to qualified immunity.

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*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2013) (“[B]ecause [Defendant] was entitled to summary
judgment on [Plaintiff]'s deliberately indifference claim, it necessarily follows that
[Plaintiff]’s direct IIED claim against [Defendant] fails as well.); Wells v. Bureau Cty.,
723 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1089 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (“Plaintiffs' failure to establish an
adequate factual basis to support a finding of deliberate indifference or willful and
wanton conduct on their § 1983 claim necessarily precludes them from making an
adequate showing of extreme and outrageous conduct or that any individual
defendant intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress as a matter of
law.”). There is no evidence that Rose intentionally ignored Robinson’s complaints of
a known risk to his health. Rose is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the
IIED claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
granted.
E N T E R:
Dated: August 31, 2020
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge

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