Whitfield v. Lashbrook
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Petitioner's habeas corpus petition (Dkt. 1 .) is denied on the merits. Any pending motions are denied as moot. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk is instructed to: (1) correct the spelling of Respondents name on the docket as Jacqueline Lashbrook, and, (2) enter a judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. Civil Case Terminated. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 9/12/2018. Mailed notice (ags, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HEZEKIAH WHITFIELD, (B14293),
Petitioner,
v.
JACQUELYN LASHBROOK,
Respondent.
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No. 17 C 8760
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Marvin E. Aspen, District Judge:
Petitioner Hezekiah Whitfield, a prisoner incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center,
brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging
his 2014 murder conviction from the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Illinois.
(Dkt. 1.) He argues that the state court erred in: (1) its application of the harmless error standard
regarding the failure to videotape his confession made to the police; and, (2) its preclusion of
certain evidence that he wished to present at trial regarding James Edwards.
For the reasons set
forth below, the Court denies Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the merits, and declines to
issue a certificate of appealability.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following factual history from the state court record. (Dkt. 9.) State
court factual findings have a presumption of correctness, and Petitioner has the burden of
rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269,
2282 n.8 (2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1)). Petitioner has not made such a showing.
Petitioner was convicted of the 1994 murder of Fred Reckling. Illinois v. Whitfield, 78
N.E.3d 1015, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). The prosecution’s evidence at trial showed that on
December 9, 1994, Reckling’s body was discovered at the Grand Appliance store that he owned
in Waukegan, Illinois. Id. at 1018, 1026. His head had been beaten in. Id. at 1018. The murder
appeared to have occurred during the course of a robbery.
Reckling was last seen at his church the night before around 8:30 p.m. Id. at 1026. He
left the church driving his black Lincoln Town Car. Id. Reckling’s practice was to work on
paperwork in the store during the evenings. Id. at 1026-27. He would also drop the day’s
deposits off at the bank on the way home. Id. at 1027. Additionally, one of Reckling’s
employees, who had borrowed $20 dollars from Reckling the day before his murder, saw that
Reckling’s wallet was full of cash, estimating it to be several hundred dollars. Id. at 1027.
On the day that Reckling’s body was discovered, a customer and employee arrived
around 8:15 a.m. Id. at 1026. They observed signs of a disturbance by the store’s front door
(glass from a shattered fluorescent light bulb and a ladder lying on the floor), and that Reckling’s
Lincoln Town Car was not in his normal parking spot. Id. at 1027. Reckling routinely arrived to
work by 8:00 a.m. Id. at 1026. Reckling’s car was also not at his home. Id. at 1027. It had
snowed the night before, and there were no tire tracks in either Reckling’s home driveway, or in
his store parking spot. Id.
The store’s front door was unlocked, and there was a faint alarm. Id. at 1026. The store
had a security alarm, but it was not connected to the police department due to technical glitch.
Id. at 1027. The alarm would sound loudly for fifteen minutes, and then switch to a quieter
sound. Id. Upon entering the store, the employee and customer found a number of papers on the
floor including customers’ checks, credit card slips, and deposit slips.
Id. The deposit slips
indicated a cash deposit of $1700, but no cash was found in the store, and the bank deposit bag
was missing. Id.
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Reckling’s body was discovered lying motionless near the refrigerators with blood
pooled under his head. Id. He was wearing his clothes from the night before including his jacket
as if he had been preparing to leave the store. Id. Reckling suffered scalp and head wounds. Id.
There were blood splatters on a nearby refrigerator door along with gouges on the door. Id. at
1028. A forensic expert testified that the evidence suggested that Reckling was bludgeoned to
death with a metal object. Id. Four blood “droplet-type” stains were recovered from the carpet
by the store’s front door. Id.
Reckling’s Lincoln Town Car was spotted the next day parked on a residential side street
on Chicago’s northside. Id. A local resident would eventually call the police reporting the
vehicle abandoned. Id. The police found that the spare tire was on the car, and there were
grocery bags in the back of the car. Id. at 1029. The grocery bags were from Franklin Food in
Waukegan, a store at which Reckling often shopped. Id. Blood stains were also discovered on
the car’s steering wheel, on the driver’s seat, and the floor between the driver’s side door and
seat. Id. at 1030.
Two days after the car was recovered by police, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority
workers found Reckling’s wallet on Interstate 94 near an onramp at Route 60. 1 Id. at 1029. The
wallet contained Reckling’s driver’s license. Id. Previously, on the day that Reckling’s body
was discovered at his store, a second tollway worker found jumper cables from Reckling’s car at
the southbound entrance ramp to Interstate 94 at Route 60. Id. A tire, rim, and car jack stand
were also discovered at the intersection. Id.
The jack was missing from Reckling’s car when
the police recovered his car in Chicago. Id. at 1030.
1
The intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 is south of Waukegan on the way towards
Chicago.
3
The police passed out flyers at the intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 in an attempt
to locate eyewitnesses. Id. at 1029. The police located three eyewitnesses. The first, Jason
Howell, worked at a local mall on the evening of Reckling’s murder. Id. He drove past the
intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 around 11:30 p.m. or midnight that evening. Id. He
witnessed two cars on the side of the road, one in front of the either. Id. A red compact car was
in front, and the black Lincoln was in the rear. Id. A person wearing black clothes and a white
hat was bending over the rear of the Lincoln, but Howell could not make out the person’s
features. Id. Howell saw a second man, who was white and in his 30s, getting out of the red
compact car. Id. Petitioner is African American. Id. at 1035. (The other two witnesses,
Michael and Holly Wales, were presented in the defense case discussed below).
Regarding the recovered blood evidence from the store and victim’s car, the crime
laboratory during that period could only perform tests identifying blood type and certain genetic
markers for blood enzymes. Id. at 1030. The lab did not perform DNA testing at that time. Id.
Beyond the blood evidence, the police also recovered various fingerprints from the store, car,
and items recovered on the highway. Id. at 1033.
A little more than a year after Reckling’s murder, James Edwards was arrested for a
series of robberies in the Waukegan area. Id. at 1018. He also confessed to murdering Reckling.
Id. Edwards was convicted with the confession being the sole source of evidence against him.
Illinois v. Edwards, 704 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). In 2011, Edwards was cleared of
the crime after it was shown that neither his fingerprints, nor his DNA matched the recovered
fingerprint and blood evidence. Whitfield, 78 N.E.2d at 1018, 1031, 1033.
Following the dropping of the charges against Edwards, the blood evidence was
compared to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database, which revealed a
probable match to Petitioner. Id. at 1018. The Waukegan police procured a warrant to obtain a
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DNA sample from Petitioner. Id. at 1030. In June 2011, the Waukegan police stopped Petitioner
while he was driving, and took him to the hospital to obtain the sample. Id. at 1030-31.
Testing later revealed that all fifteen loci from the car DNA matched Petitioner, and that
the odds of this match occurring randomly would be one in 22.3 sextillion African Americans.
Id. at 1031. The DNA from the store’s carpet only had fourteen loci, however, and although the
store carpet DNA was consistent with Whitfield’s DNA, the expert only used the term “match”
when all fifteen loci could be compared. Id. (the expert nonetheless noted the chance of this
match occurring randomly as “astronomical”). There was no innocent explanation as to how
Petitioner’s blood could end up in the store and car as he did not live or work near the store, and
had never been a customer or employee of the store. Id. at 1039.
Shamiya Mathis, a woman Petitioner had begun dating a few months earlier, was riding
with Petitioner when he was stopped by the police for the collection of the DNA sample. Id. at
1018. The police returned Petitioner to his vehicle after securing the sample, and he and Mathis
drove away. Id. at 1032. Mathis testified that Petitioner was shaking, smoking cigarettes, and
crying when he returned following the police taking his DNA sample. Id. at 1031. She asked
him what was wrong, and he confessed to Reckling’s murder. Id. Petitioner related that he was
on heroin at the time, and was looking for someone to rob. Id. He hit Reckling over the head
three times with a gun, and then took his wallet, car, and some money from the register. Id.
Petitioner explained the he got a flat tire as he drove towards to Chicago, and flagged down
someone to help him change the tire. Id.
A few days after the police took Petitioner’s DNA sample, he called Mathis asking that
she search the Internet to see if he was wanted for murder. Id. She told him no. Id. Petitioner
contacted Mathis a few weeks later to repeat the Internet search, and again she said there was no
indication he was wanted. Id.
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In July 2011, Petitioner called Mathis and told her he was in Indonesia. Id. She then
went to the Waukegan police telling them what Petitioner had told her. Id. She learned about
the crime on the Internet during this period. Id. It also appears that Mathis’s relationship with
Petitioner soured after she learned that Petitioner married a woman while in Indonesia. Id. at
1033.
Despite this, Petitioner and Mathis saw each other again in Chicago in April 2012. Id. at
1032. Mathis claims she attacked Petitioner with a pipe in self-defense during the April 2012
incident because Petitioner had tried to cut her. Id. The Chicago police took both Mathis and
Petitioner to the police station. Id. at 1031. Petitioner was taken to the station after declining
medical care at the hospital. Id. at 1018.
Mathis was transported to a police station by Chicago police officer Jacquelyn
Spaargaren. Id. at 1018. On the way to the station, Mathis told Spaargaren that Petitioner was
wanted for murder in Waukegan. Id. at 1031. At the station, Spaargaren Mirandized Petitioner
and questioned him about the Waukegan case. Id. Spaargaren testified at trial that Petitioner
told her, “they DNA tested me for murder in Waukegan, and then I found out they knew that I
did it, I left out to Indonesia.” Id. He then told her he did not want to talk anymore, and she
stopped the questioning.
Id.
Spaargaren conceded that she did not videotape Petitioner’s
statement as required by Illinois law, but claimed she was not covered by the Illinois requirement
because she was a patrol office, as opposed to a detective. Id.
In sum, the prosecution’s strongest evidence against Petitioner was Petitioner’s DNA
matching the blood found in the store and Reckling’s car. Additionally, there was Petitioner’s
confessions to Mathis and Spaargaren.
The defense presented testimony from Michael and Holly Wales. The Wales were the
two other eyewitnesses who drove through the intersection of Interstate 94 and Route 60 on the
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night of the murder. They passed through intersection around 10:30 p.m. that evening. Id. at
1033. They worked together and were each driving their respective cars home with Holly
following directly behind Michael. Id. They both only saw one car at the intersection. Id.
Michael Wales said it was a black car, while Holly Wales identified it as a “dark nice car, a
larger style.” Id.
By a matter of apparent coincidence, Michael Wales and Petitioner had been in culinary
school together in 1993 in Evanston, but Wales said he had not seen or heard from Petitioner in
the intervening two decades. Id. Michael Wales explained that he recognized Petitioner’s name
when he received his trial subpoena for Petitioner’s 2014 murder trial. Id. He said he was
positive that he saw a white man in a hoodie standing by the car, and that it was not Petitioner.
Id.
The defense also presented James Edwards’ confession to the Reckling murder, as well as
evidence that a white man appeared to be casing a neighboring business on the night of the
murder. Id. at 1034.
In closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized the DNA evidence arguing that there
was no innocent explanation for why Petitioner’s blood was both in the store and in Petitioner’s
car. Id. The prosecution also pointed to Petitioner’s two confessions to Mathis and Spaargaren,
and Petitioner’s flight to Indonesia. Id.
The defense countered in closing that there were multiple witnesses who said they saw a
white man, not an African American, changing the Town Car tire. Id. As to the DNA evidence,
the defense argued there was no evidence as to how old the blood evidence was, or how it was
deposited in the store or car. Id. Additionally, the defense pointed out there no blood or
fingerprint evidence on the items the murderer would have handled that evening such as the
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spare tire and tire jack. Id. The defense also argued that Edwards confessed to the crime, and
that Mathis and Spaargaren were not believable. Id.
The jury sent out a note during its deliberation asking to see Spaargaron’s report
regarding Petitioner’s confession to her. Id. The trial court refused the request and told the jurors
to keep deliberating. The jury found Petitioner guilty, and his conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal. He now brings the present habeas corpus petition.
ANALYSIS
1.
Claim One: Challenge to the Harmless Error Standard applied by the
Appellate Court of Illinois
Claim One arises out of Petitioner’s pretrial motion in limine to bar the state from
introducing his confession to Chicago police officer Spaargaren. Id. at 1019. The motion in
limine invokes 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1. Id. This statute prohibits the use of a statement made
during custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention in a murder trial
unless the statement was electronically recorded. 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b-5). However, “the
presumption of inadmissibility” “may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.” 725
ILCS 5/103-2.1(f).
The state trial court held a multi-day hearing on the motion receiving testimony from
three police officers (including Spaargaren), and also from Petitioner. In sum, the officers
testified that they found Petitioner walking in an alley with a laceration on his head and blood on
his shirt when responding to the domestic violence call. Id. at 1020. The officers saw no sign
that Petitioner was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and was calm other than the agitation
caused by the assault. Id. (Petitioner said he had a small amount of alcohol prior to the incident
with Mathis. Id. at 1023.) He also did not complaint about being in any pain. Id. at 1020.
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Petitioner was 42 years old and had finished three years of college at the time of the incident. Id.
at 1022.
Petitioner initially refused to be taken to the hospital, but the police transported him per
protocol. Id. at 1021. He was observed by a doctor who signed off on Petitioner’s refusal to
accept treatment. Id.
Petitioner was then brought to the police station where he was handcuffed to a bench in a
processing room. Id. The room is 15 by 20 feet with four computers and two benches. Id.
Petitioner was conscious, did not complain of pain, or request water, food, or to use the
bathroom. Id. Petitioner remained in the processing room for the next ten to fifteen minutes
while two of the officers worked on typing up a report. It was during this time that Spaargaren
spoke to Petitioner. Id.
Spaargaren, having received Mathis’s statement in the squad car that Petitioner was
involved in the Waukegan murder, spoke to Petitioner while he was handcuffed to the bench in
the processing room. Id. She explained that she Mirandized Petitioner “off the top of her head.”
Id. She then raised his alleged involvement with the Waukegan murder to which Petitioner
mentioned that he had his DNA tested, and that he had fled to Indonesia. Id. Petitioner then said
he did not want to talk anymore, and Spaargaren terminated her questioning. Id. Spaargaren
conceded that she did not obtain a written statement from Petitioner regarding his Miranda
rights. It was somewhat loud in the processing room, and the two other officers said they did not
hear the substance of Spaargaren’s conversation with Petitioner. Id. at 1021-22.
Petitioner refuted Spaargaren’s testimony stating that he did not confess to her. Id. at
1022. He also said that he did not recall Spaargaren or anyone else explained to him his
Miranda rights. Id. at 1023. He did agree that none of the officers used physical force or
threatened him in any way. Id. Petitioner stated that the questioning by Spaargaren lasted five
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minutes, and he refused to answer her questions. Id. at 1022. Petitioner was held at the station
until the next morning. Id. at 1023. He went to the hospital and received five stiches following
his release. Id.
The trial court denied the motion in limine holding that although Spaargaren failed to
record Petitioner’s statement as required by Illinois law, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(b-5), the
presumption that the statement was inadmissible was overcome by the prosecution’s showing
that Petitioner’s statement was voluntarily given and reliable, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1(f). Whitfield,
78 N.E.3d at 1025
In finding the statement was voluntary, the trial court said that it saw no evidence that
Petitioner was intoxicated, suffering from a physical disability, or was subject to undue coercion
of any type of lengthy custodial interrogation that would make his statements involuntary. Id.
The trial court also found that Petitioner was Mirandized at the time he gave the statement. Id.
On appeal, the appellate court explained that the trial court’s analysis was incomplete.
Id. at 1038. According to the appellate court, the trial court focused predominately on the
voluntariness question without giving sufficient attention to the question of whether the
statement was also reliable. Id. The reliability question was also in dispute because Petitioner
disputed Spaargaren’s testimony that she had Mirandized him, and that he had confessed as she
claimed. Id. This dispute was heightened by the fact that the two other police officers said they
had not heard the conversation between Petitioner and Spaargaren. Id.
Despite the concerns over the trial court’s failure to perform a full reliability analysis, the
state appellate court held that it need not go further because any error was harmless. Id. The
state appellate court, the last court to rule on the issue, applied a harmless error standard of:
An evidentiary error is harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained, or when no reasonable
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probability exists that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the
error.
Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In finding any error harmless, the appellate court concluded that “[b]y far, the most
damning evidence against the defendant was the DNA evidence . . . .” Id. That court explained
that the blood evidence in both the store and the victim’s car resulted in a “match that was
astronomically unlikely to occur randomly.”
Id.
This is “overwhelming evidence.” Id.
Additionally, the state court noted Petitioner’s confession to Mathis. The state appellate court
concluded that, “there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the
defendant even if the motion in limine had been granted.” Id. at 1040.
Petitioner argues in Claim One that the appellate court applied the wrong harmless error
standard. (Dkt. 1, pgs. 17-21.) The problem that Petitioner faces is that the appellate court was
considering whether a trial court error in the application of a state statute was harmless. As a
general principle, state law errors are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
Illinois’s Recording Law, 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1, mandating that confessions resulting from
custodial interrogations are presumptively inadmissible unless they are recorded is not required
by the United States Constitution. United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 366 (7th Cir. 2018),
petition for cert. filed, No. 18-5528 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2018); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d
1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that although some states, including Illinois, now require the
recording of custodial interrogations, this requirement is not required by the United States
Constitution, and “we see no hint that the Supreme Court is ready to take such as major step.”).
Thus, the question of whether 725 ILCS 5/103-2.1 was violated with the introduction of his
confession is a non cognizable issue for a federal habeas corpus petition because Illinois’s
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prophylactic measure is not required by the Constitution. Nor does the state appellate court’s
application of the state’s harmless error standard implicate a constitutional concern because a
state court ruling as to whether a ruling of state law is harmless implicates only state law.
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 89 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that
states apply their own harmless error law when evaluating state law errors and that is an issue of
state law separate and distinct from the harmless error standard used for review of federal
constitutional errors); Atterberry v. Korte, No. 16 C 3063, 2017 WL 55263251, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 9, 2017) (same). In sum, Claim One is fails because it raises a non cognizable issue of state
law.
For completeness purposes, the Court notes that the Petitioner would be unsuccessful if
the Court’s foregoing analysis --- that the state appellate court’s decision did not implicate a
federal constitutional right --- is incorrect. Even if the state appellate court misapplied the
federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), as
Petitioner alleges, he would still be unable to meet the standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619 (1993). “[I]f the state court never conducted the harmless error analysis or otherwise
applied Chapman unreasonably, the federal court must make an independent decision as if the
state court never addressed the subject at all. Hence, here, the Brecht standard is appropriate in
determining if the error was harmless.” Brown v. Rednour, 637 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Johnson v. Acevedo, 572 F.3d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also, Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.
Ct. 2187, 2198-99 (2015).
Brecht establishes the harmless error standard applied in habeas corpus cases of an error is
harmless unless it had a substantial and injurious effort or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631). As the state
appellate court explained, the DNA was “the most damning evidence” against Petitioner, and
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found the evidence “overwhelming” considering Petitioner neither lived nor worked near
Reckling’s store. Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039. We agree with the Illinois Appellate Court that
the strength of the other physical evidence in this case, including DNA evidence from the scene
of the crime and the victim’s vehicle, meant that there is no reasonable doubt the jury would
have acquitted Petitioner absent the admission of his challenged confession. Whitman v. Bartow,
434 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]rial errors are often found harmless where the record is
replete with overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.”).
Furthermore, even if Mathis was partially impeached, her testimony recounted Petitioner’s
confession to the same crime.
Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1039–40.
Mathis’ testimony also
provided much more detailed evidence about Petitioner: while Spaargaren testified Petitioner
said the police knew he committed “a murder in Waukegan,” Mathis testified that Petitioner
admitted detail about the time, location, injury to the victim, age of the victim, and that he took
the victim’s car but later got a flat tire. Id. at 1032. Given Mathis’ testimony, Petitioner’s
confession to Spaargaren is cumulative. Brown v. Rednour, 637 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011).
Petitioner specifically argues that the note from the jury asking for Spaargaren’s police
reports means the jury necessarily considered Petitioner’s confession in rendering their verdict.
(Reply at 17–18.) We agree that the jury undoubtedly contemplated or discussed Spaargaren’s
testimony when deliberating.
However, merely proving the jury considered inadmissible
evidence does not mean harmless error occurred. See Brown, 637 F.3d at 767 (finding harmless
error under Chapman after the jury accidentally was given an inadmissible police report that a
sheriff witnessed a juror reading , and after it was removed from the juror room, the jury later
sent a note to the judge requesting the report). Considering the strength of the other evidence in
the case and the cumulative nature of the substance of Spaargaren’s account, any alleged error
did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.
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In sum, Claim One raises a non cognizable issue of state law. But even if Petitioner did
raise a cognizable issue, any error by the state court was harmless under the Brecht standard.
The evidence of Petitioner’s guilty is overwhelming. Claim One is denied. 2
2
Respondent’s answer frames Claim One as asserting that Petitioner’s confession to
Spaargaren was given involuntarily resulting in a due process violation from its introduction at
trial. (Dkt. 8, pg. 5.) However, as discussed above, Petitioner’s claim was that the state court
erred its application of harmless error when allowing the introduction of his confession under
Illinois’s Recording Law. (Dkt. 1, pgs. 17-21.)
Respondent’s improper framing of the claim resulted in a red herring in the parties’
briefing. Respondent argued that Petitioner failed to exhaust a federal involuntary confession
claim before the state courts because Petitioner had only raised the Illinois Recording Law issue
in the state courts. (Dkt. 8, pgs. 5-6.) Petitioner countered that his claim was properly
exhausted because Miranda caselaw was cited through the parties’ briefing before the state
appellate court, and in the state appellate court decision. (Dkt. 11, pg. 6.)
The problem with the Petitioner’s argument is that the Illinois Recording Law draws
upon Miranda case law for determining whether a statement is giving voluntarily and reliable so
as to be admissible even when the statement is not videotaped. Illinois v. Harris, 977 N.E.2d
811, 821-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Illinois has chosen to use Miranda case law in the
implementation of an Illinois statute; it is not using Miranda case law to carry out a federal
constitutional requirement because, as explained above, there is no federal requirement that
confessions be recorded. In fact, Illinois courts recognize this fact by “[emphasiz[ing] that
Miranda case law serves only as a guidance; it is not determinative.” Harris, 977 N.E.2d at 82122 (emphasis in original).
Finally, for completeness purposes, the Court notes that even if it misunderstands the
claim, and Petitioner is actually trying to raise a federal involuntary confession claim, this claim
would be baseless. There is nothing in the record to suggest, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that there was any type of coercion resulting in Petitioner’s statement to
Spaargaren. See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 303-304 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). There is
no allegation that Petitioner was physically or mentally coerced into confessing to the police. He
was offered medical care for his injury (that he declined), and was in police custody for less than
24 hours. There is also nothing in the record to refute the state court’s ruling that Petitioner
received Miranda warnings before being questioned by Spaargaren.
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2.
Claim Two: State Court’s Exclusion of Evidence Regarding James Edwards
Petitioner’s remaining claim involves his attempt to introduce evidence regarding the
police’s questioning of James Edwards. As discussed above, Edwards was originally convicted
of Reckling’s murder, but he was later cleared after it was found that his DNA did not match the
blood evidence at the crime scene and the victim’s car. The defense at Petitioner’s trial called
the police detectives who questioned Edwards in order to present Edwards’ confession to the jury
in an attempt to establish reasonable doubt. Whitfield, 78 N.E.3d at 1034. Thus, the traditional
positions taken by a prosecutor and defense counsel were effectively flipped in this case. It was
the defense attorney attempting to enter a confession into evidence through a police officer’s
testimony, while the prosecutor was trying to limit the impact of the confession before the jury.
The prosecutor took multiple steps to limit Edwards’ confession. He argued the confession
was not supported by the DNA evidence. Id. at 1041. The prosecution also attempted to
emphasize on cross-examination the inconsistencies between Edwards’ confession and the
evidence at the crime scene.
Id. at 1034.
Finally, the prosecution moved to preclude a
discussion of Edwards’ other crimes before the jury. Id. at 1040. The limitation on other crime
evidence is what is at issue in this claim.
As to the other crime evidence, the prosecution moved to bar both testimony regarding the
fact that Edwards committed a series of robberies prior to his arrest, and questioning about the
robberies that resulted in his confession to the police. Id. The prosecution believed the evidence
was irrelevant because the circumstances of Edwards’ other robberies were too dissimilar to the
robbery in this case. Id.
The defense responded that exclusion of the robbery cases would create a false impression
before the jury. Id. The police questioned Edwards first about the robberies, and the murder
confession did not occur until more than 24 hours after his arrest. Id.
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The trial court ruled that Edwards’ other crime evidence was not relevant to Petitioner’s
trial because those crimes were too dissimilar, and there was no indication that Edwards’
robberies were intertwined with Reckling’s murder. Id. The trial court, however, instructed the
prosecution to not give the false impression that the officers had only been questioning Edwards
about the murder. Id. The officers would testify that they questioned Edwards about “other
matters” before questioning his about the murder. Id.
On appeal before the state appellate court, the last court to consider Petitioner’s claim on
the merits, Petitioner raised what one could characterize as a “what’s good for the goose is good
for the gander” type argument. 3 Petitioner pointed out that the prosecution explicitly used the
evidence of Edwards’ robberies in Edwards’ case while taking the opposing position in his case.
Id. at 1041. Edwards had accused the police of fabricating his confession, and the prosecution
used the robbery other crime evidence in an attempt to bolster authenticity of the confession
before the jury in his case. Id. Petitioner argued that he should be able to take the same
approach of using Edwards’ robberies in an attempt to bolster the credibility of Edwards’
confession in an attempt to establish reasonable doubt at his trial. Id.
In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court held that pursuant to Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), Petitioner had a due process right to introduce evidence
that someone other than him --- Edwards --- confessed to murdering Reckling. Whitfield, 78
N.E.2d at 1040. The state appellate court, however, rejected Petitioner’s argument that the fact
that other crime evidence was admissible in Edwards’ case as it related to his confession should
also mandate the admissibility of this same evidence in Petitioner’s case. Id. at 1041. In sum,
3
Neither the parties nor the state court used the “good for the goose, good for the gander” phrase
the Court now uses. It is doing so now simply for illustrative purposes.
16
the state court concluded that Petitioner’s right was limited to the introduction of only Edwards’
confession. Id. at 1042.
Petitioner now renews this argument in Claim Two before this Court that he should have
been allowed to introduce the other crime evidence regarding Edwards’ robberies for the
purposes of bolstering Edwards’ confession before the jury. As this claim was adjudicated by
the state appellate court, the Court’s review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Petitioner cannot obtain relief unless he can show that the
“state court decision is ‘contrary to’ or ‘an unreasonable application of’ clearly established
federal law.”
Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1)). Under the AEDPA, a state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent
when it applied a rule different from controlling law set forth in Supreme Court precedent, or if it
reaches a different decision than the Supreme Court has already reached on “materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000); see also Burr, 546
F.3d at 831. “A state court unreasonably applies clearly established law if it ‘identifies the
correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.’” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). For a state court’s application to be
“unreasonable,” it must have “been more than incorrect or erroneous,” and must be “objectively
unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Under either prong, the prisoner
bears the burden of establishing he is entitled to habeas relief.
See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Habeas review is deferential to state courts; we must “attend closely”
to state court decisions and “give them full effect when their findings and judgments are
consistent with federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 383. Accordingly, because we must defer to
state court decisions “to a great extent,” habeas relief of a state criminal conviction is “not easy
to come by.” Thompkins v. Pfister, 698 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2012).
17
The Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to present a complete defense, but this
is not an unfettered right as the states have board latitude in establishing evidentiary rules
governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. Caffey v. Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 895 (7th Cir.
2015) (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986)). Chambers, along with a line of Supreme Court cases building upon it, are
understood as guaranteeing a defendant’s right to introduce evidence and testimony on his own
behalf as long as that evidence is “essential to the defendant’s ability to present a defense.”
Kubsch v. Neal, 838 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The evidence that defendant
wishes to present must be reliable and trustworthy. Id. However, state evidentiary rules still
apply to preclude a defendant’s introduction of evidence that is “cumulative, impeaching,
unfairly prejudicial, or potentially misleading.” Id. Finally, and most noteworthy to this case,
the state court’s exclusion of evidence “cannot operate in an arbitrary manner. . . . Arbitrariness
might be shown by a lack of parity between the prosecution and the defense; the state cannot
regard evidence as reliable enough for the prosecution, but not for the defense.” Id.
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the state appellate court ruling. The
state decision is not contrary to the relevant constitutional standard. The state court recognized
that the issue is one involving Petitioner’s ability to present a defense while balancing the state’s
court’s right to regulate the introduction of evidence. The state court also cited to, and discussed,
the relevant Supreme Court standard. Petitioner cannot demonstrate the state court ruling was
contrary to clearly established federal law.
The unreasonable application prong of the analysis is a much closer call. The reason is that
there are two competing principles at issue in this case. On one hand, the state court decision is
consistent with Supreme Court principles in that the state court is allowing the prosecutor to
18
exclude potentially misleading information. However, the fact that the prosecutor argued for the
introduction of this same material in Edwards’ case while taking the opposite position in
Petitioner’s case suggests an impermissible arbitrariness as demonstrated by a lack of parity
between the state court’s treatment of the prosecutor and defendant.
However, the Court’s resolution of this case is governed by the AEDPA’s demanding
standard.
The AEDPA requires the state court’s resolution of the issue to be objectively
unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 383. In light of the closeness of the issue, the Court cannot
say that Petitioner has met the AEDPA’s rigorous standard.
Finally, even if the Court could meet the AEDPA standard, he would still be unsuccessful
as a Chambers claim is subject to review under Brecht. Fry, 551 U.S. at 115, 120. As discussed
in Claim One, Petitioner cannot meet the substantial and injurious effort or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict Brecht standard. Although the jury did not hear about the other
crimes evidence involving Edwards, they did hear that he confessed to the murder. Additionally,
as discussed above, the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. Claims Two is denied.
The habeas corpus petition is denied on the merits.
3.
Certificate of Appealability and Notice of Appeal Rights
The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner cannot make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, or that reasonable jurists would debate,
much less disagree, with this Court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claims. Arredondo v. Huibregtse,
542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)).
Petitioner is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If Petitioner
wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Petitioner need not bring a motion to reconsider this
19
Court’s ruling to preserve his appellate rights. However, if Petitioner wishes the Court to
reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or
60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of this judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal
until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b)
motion must be filed within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or
(3), must be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A
Rule 60(b) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled
upon only if the motion is filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition (Dkt. 1.) is denied on the merits.
Any pending
motions are denied as moot. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk
is instructed to: (1) correct the spelling of Respondent’s name on the docket as Jacqueline
Lashbrook, and, (2) enter a judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. Civil Case
Terminated.
ENTERED:
____________________________________
Marvin E. Aspen
United States District Judge
Dated: September 12, 2018
Chicago, Illinois
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