Brown v. Berryhill
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 4/11/2019: Mailed notice (lp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREW B.,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 17 C 9167
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to review
the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
denying Plaintiff Andrew B.’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The parties have filed competing motions for summary judgment. For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the
Commissioner’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI, alleging
disability since September 15, 2012 due to carpal tunnel syndrome, torn ligaments
in his hands, arthritis in his wrists and hands, and muscle spasms. (R. 78–80, 86,
124, 128, 242.) His applications were denied initially and again upon
reconsideration. (R. 78, 86, 94–95, 109–13, 121–28.) Plaintiff thereafter requested a
hearing before an ALJ, which was held on August 31, 2016. (R. 46, 129–30.)
Plaintiff, represented by an attorney, appeared and testified at the hearing, as did a
vocational expert (“VE”). (R. 46–76.)
On November 22, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims for DIB and SSI,
finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 25–45.) The Appeals
Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review on October 27, 2017. (R. 1–5.)
II.
ALJ DECISION
In determining that Plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s
claims according to the five-step sequential evaluation process established under
the Social Security Act. (R. 29–30.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 15, 2012, his
alleged disability onset date. (R. 30.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: history of left hand/wrist injury and right
hand/wrist disorder. (R. 31.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, App’x 1. (R. 32.)
The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the following restrictions: Plaintiff should
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never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding; he should no more than occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, bend, and twist; he should
avoid concentrated exposure to work hazards such as unprotected heights and
dangerous moving machinery; and he should use his hands no more than frequently
to handle, finger, and feel. (R. 32–33.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was unable to perform his past relevant work as a bus driver. (R. 36.) At step five,
the ALJ determined that, based on the VE’s testimony, Plaintiff could perform other
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as hand
packager, cashier, and housekeeper. (R. 36–37, 39.) Because of this determination,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged disability onset date
through the date of the decision. (R. 39.)
DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine disability, the ALJ considers five
questions in the following order: (1) Is the plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does
the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically
equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the
plaintiff unable to perform his former occupation (i.e., past work)? and (5) Is the
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plaintiff unable to perform any other work? See Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding of
disability. Young, 957 F.2d at 389. A negative answer at any step, other than at step
three, precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at
steps one through four. Id. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy. See Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d
565, 569 (7th Cir. 2011).
II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision became the
final decision of the Commissioner, which is reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, judicial review
of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227
F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). “Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, or
decide questions of credibility. Id.; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th
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Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed even if “reasonable
minds could differ” so long as “the decision is adequately supported”) (internal
citation and quotations omitted).
Although the ALJ need not “address every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind
her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
This requires the building of “an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
[the ALJ’s] conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must explain the
“analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful
appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir.
2005); see also Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a
duty to fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions and must
adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning.”) (internal
citations omitted).
The Court plays an “extremely limited” role in reviewing the ALJ’s decision.
Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to
differ, the responsibility for determining disability falls upon the ALJ, not the
Court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990). Even so, an ALJ
must consider all relevant evidence, and it cannot “select and discuss only that
evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion.” Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333
(7th Cir. 1994).
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III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous and requires
remand for a number of reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC
assessment limits him to less than the full range of “light work” and, as such, it
contradicts the ALJ’s subsequent findings that Plaintiff can perform light work.
Relatedly, Plaintiff contends that remand is required so that the ALJ can identify
the exertional functions required by light work that he cannot perform. Second,
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff could “frequently” use
both his hands for handling objects over the course of an eight-hour workday; he
seeks remand so that the ALJ can properly determine Plaintiff’s ability to use, on a
sustained basis, his hands and wrists to handle objects. Third, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ’s hypothetical questions to the VE were flawed in several respects and,
accordingly, cannot support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was disabled at step five
of the sequential evaluation process. After careful consideration of the record and
the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred in finding that
Plaintiff could frequently use both his hands to handle objects for the entire period
of alleged disability, warranting remand for further administrative proceedings.
The Court begins with the factual background relevant to its analysis.
Plaintiff worked for twenty-five years as a bus driver. (R. 243.) In July 2012, his bus
was rear-ended by another vehicle, injuring the thumb on his non-dominant left
hand when it was jammed into the steering wheel. (R. 401; see R. 49–50, 60.) The
following month, orthopedic surgeon John Fernandez, M.D. diagnosed Plaintiff with
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a collateral ligament tear in his left thumb and performed surgery to repair it. (R.
370, 419–21, 425–27.) Plaintiff’s left thumb pain seemed to improve by the end of
the year, but he then began complaining of left wrist pain. (R. 375, 377–80, 382,
386, 388, 392.) Dr. Fernandez diagnosed Plaintiff with de Quervain’s tenosynovitis 1
in his left wrist and administered a cortisone injection in January 2013. (R. 370–
76.) Although Plaintiff continued to complain of pain in his left wrist and thumb,
Dr. Fernandez opined in February 2013 that Plaintiff was “technically at maximum
medical improvement” and that there was nothing further in terms of treatment
that he could recommend. (R. 364–65.)
Even so, Dr. Fernandez recommended that Plaintiff undergo a Functional
Capacity Evaluation (“FCE”), which was performed by Elizabeth Williamson, DPT
in May 2013. (R. 360, 429–40.) Williamson opined that Plaintiff had the ability to
function within the medium physical demand category, but she also noted that
Plaintiff demonstrated self-limiting behavior when tested for his ability to lift
materials, indicating that additional abilities could be possible. (R. 429.) Williamson
further found that Plaintiff exhibited full strength and normal range of motion in
both wrists and all fingers of both hands and that he could use his right hand to
frequently handle, finger, grasp, and manipulate objects with no observed deficits.
(R. 429–30, 434, 437–38.) Plaintiff, however, could only use his left hand
De Quervain’s tenosynovitis “is a painful condition affecting the tendons on the thumb
side of [one’s] wrist.” Symptoms include pain and swelling near the base of the thumb and
difficulty moving the thumb and wrist when doing something that involves grasping or
pinching. Mayo Clinic, De Quervain’s tenosynovitis – Symptoms and causes,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/de-quervains-tenosynovitis/symptomscauses/syc-20371332 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
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occasionally to finger, grasp, and manipulate objects, and Williamson noted deficits
in Plaintiff’s left-hand repetitive gripping of objects and motor skills. (R. 429–30,
434.) Williamson’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to handle objects with his
left hand, though, was less than clear: her summary indicates that Plaintiff could
only occasionally perform this activity, but her findings during the evaluation twice
note that Plaintiff could frequently handle objects using his left hand with no
deficits observed. (Compare R. 429, with R. 430, 434.)
In a July 2013 work status form, Dr. Fernandez stated that Plaintiff could
return to work in medium duty capacity, lifting less than thirty pounds, and he
appeared to concur with the restrictions from the May 2013 FCE. (R. 359.)
Subsequent doctor visits in 2013 and 2014 noted wrist joint pain, and at a
November 2014 visit with Lettricia Gunaratnam, M.D., Plaintiff complained of pain
in both wrists. (R. 463–67.) At this visit, Dr. Gunaratnam noted tenderness with
range of motion in Plaintiff’s right wrist, as well as a ganglion cyst. (R. 34, 467.)
Early the next year, Kristopher Carpenter, M.D. opined that Plaintiff had
significant, chronic bilateral wrist pain. (R. 470.) Dr. Carpenter further noted that
Plaintiff’s status after his left thumb surgery was “complicated by persistent pain”
and that although Plaintiff’s ganglion cyst had been removed, he still experienced
“residual pain and wrist deformity.” (Id.) Through the remainder of 2015, Plaintiff
continued to complain of right wrist pain. (R. 500–01, 505, 563, 567–71.)
In December 2015, Plaintiff presented to orthopedic surgeon Tariq B.
Iftikhar, M.D., complaining of pain and swelling on the radial aspect of his right
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wrist. (R. 500–01.) Dr. Iftikhar believed that Plaintiff had de Quervain’s
tenosynovitis and arthritis in his right wrist and thumb. (Id.) In January 2016, Dr.
Iftikhar operated on Plaintiff’s right wrist to release his de Quervain’s
tenosynovitis. (R. 492, 494.) Post-surgery, Plaintiff reported “doing very well” and
he did not complain of any particular problem; indeed, he reported that “the pain
[was] gone completely.” (R. 492.) Dr. Iftikhar subsequently opined that by the end of
February 2016, Plaintiff could return to work without any accommodations. (R.
496.) Nonetheless, when Plaintiff later presented to another doctor complaining of a
cough in June 2016, the doctor noted tenderness and limited range of motion in
Plaintiff’s wrists. (R. 552–54.)
State agency consultants also reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and opined
about his functional capabilities. (R. 79–85, 87–93, 96–106.) In July 2014, at the
initial level of review, Vidya Madala, M.D. opined that Plaintiff had no
manipulative limitations, which would include any handling limitations. (R. 83, 91);
see Herrmann v. Colvin, 772 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 2014) (characterizing
handling as a manipulative activity). But in March 2015, at the reconsideration
level of review, Richard Bilinsky, M.D. opined that Plaintiff’s bilateral wrist pain
limited him to “occasional” handling in both hands. (R. 102–03.)
With this background set forth, the Court turns to the parties’ arguments,
beginning with those that relate to the ALJ’s RFC assessment. The RFC is an
administrative assessment of what work-related activities a claimant can perform
despite his physical and mental limitations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000
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(7th Cir. 2004); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ makes
this assessment “based upon the medical evidence in the record and other evidence,
such as testimony by the claimant or his friends and family.” Craft v. Astrue, 539
F.3d 668, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2008). In her decision, the ALJ must describe “how the
evidence, both objective and subjective, supports each conclusion” contained in the
RFC assessment. Zblewski v. Astrue, 302 F. App’x 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished decision); see also Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“The ALJ needed to explain how she reached her conclusions about [the claimant’s]
physical capabilities[.]”). The Court’s tasks on appeal are to “determine whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC conclusion” and whether the ALJ built
an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence” to this conclusion. See Pepper v.
Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 2013); Young, 362 F.3d at 1002 (internal
quotations omitted).
Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the RFC to “perform less
than the full range of light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b). (R. 32.) The ALJ then went on to list several restrictions addressing
Plaintiff’s postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations, including a
restriction permitting Plaintiff to “use his hands no more than frequently to handle,
finger, and feel.” (R. 32–33.)
The Court first addresses the ALJ’s finding that from the alleged disability
onset date (in September 2012) through the date of the decision (in November
2016), Plaintiff retained the RFC to “use his hands . . . frequently to handle[.]” (R.
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32–33, 39.) How often Plaintiff can use his hands for handling is a key issue: based
on the VE’s testimony, an individual who could perform bilateral handling
“frequently” was employable, but an individual who could do so only “occasionally”
(i.e., less than frequently) was not. 2 (R. 72–75.) As the VE explained, occupations at
the light exertional level and above generally require frequent use of the dominant
upper extremity for handling (although only occasional use of the non-dominant
upper extremity for handling), and occupations at the sedentary exertional level
require the ability to frequently use both upper extremities for handling. (R. 74–75.)
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could use
both hands frequently to handle objects throughout the four-plus year period at
issue is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the ALJ failed to
support her conclusion that Plaintiff could frequently handle objects with his right
hand for the entire time period between September 2012 and November 2016.
As the ALJ recognized, Plaintiff’s alleged right-hand symptoms and
limitations arose well after the September 2012 alleged onset disability date. (R.
34.) Indeed, the first documented problems with Plaintiff’s right hand or wrist do
not appear in the record until November 2014, more than two years later. (R. 467);
(Pl.’s Mem. at 9) (“[P]laintiff experienced significant right wrist impairments and
Handling involves “seizing, holding, grasping, turning or otherwise working primarily
with the whole hand or hands,” including the ability “to seize, hold, grasp, or turn an
object.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *2, *7 (Jan. 1, 1985). Occasional handling would be
performed very little to, at most, one-third of the workday, whereas frequent handling
would be performed between one-third and two-thirds of the workday. SSR 83-10, 1983 WL
31251, at *5–6 (Jan. 1, 1983).
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limitations that are well documented from November, 2014 to June 2016.”). 3
Apparently, the delay between Plaintiff’s alleged onset date and the appearance of
his right hand and wrist problems affected the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
subjective symptom allegations. (R. 34.) But whatever impact this delay may have
had on the ALJ’s subjective symptom assessment, which is not challenged on
appeal, the fact remains that Plaintiff did not appear to have any right hand or
wrist problems until November 2014. There is also evidence that Plaintiff’s right
hand and wrist problems were significantly alleviated by February 2016, after he
underwent right wrist surgery on January 21, 2016. (See R. 492, 494.) In fact, Dr.
Iftikhar opined that after the surgery, Plaintiff could return to work by the end of
February 2016 without any accommodations. (R. 496.)
Thus, from September 2012 to November 2014 and from February 2016 to at
least June 2016, 4 there is evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision to restrict Plaintiff
to frequent handling with his right hand is supported for these time frames. See
Falls v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 2805, 2018 WL 5839955, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2018)
(finding that a more restrictive RFC is supported by evidence indicating fewer or no
restrictions).
The Court notes Plaintiff’s attempt to change his earlier claim about when his right hand
and wrist symptoms and limitations were first documented. (Pl.’s Reply at 6–8) (identifying
November 2013 as the date when his right hand and wrist impairments were first
documented). The newly-cited documents, however, do not clearly show right hand and
wrist problems prior to November 2014. (See R. 463–66.)
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The June 2016 treatment note indicating tenderness and limited range of motion in
Plaintiff’s wrists could arguably indicate that Plaintiff’s right hand and wrist problems had
returned by this time. (See R. 552–54.) On remand, the ALJ should consider if and how this
treatment note affects Plaintiff’s RFC.
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But the alleged period of disability also includes the time period from the
onset of Plaintiff’s right hand and wrist pain and issues to his right wrist surgery,
i.e., from approximately November 2014 to January 2016. And the only medical
assessment of Plaintiff’s right-hand handling capabilities during this time frame
came from Dr. Bilinsky, who opined in March 2015 that Plaintiff could only
occasionally handle objects with both hands. (R. 102–03.) Despite acknowledging
this proposed limitation, the ALJ found that a frequent bilateral handling
limitation was more appropriate. (R. 35–36.)
The ALJ was under no obligation to accept Dr. Bilinsky’s occasional handling
restriction. See Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
the ALJ “was not required to afford any particular weight to” the opinions of two
non-treating physicians). Nevertheless, the ALJ was not permitted to “substitute
[her] own judgment for [Dr. Bilinsky’s] opinion without relying on other medical
evidence or authority in the record.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. Once the ALJ
rejected Dr. Bilinsky’s “occasional” handling restriction, she was required to identify
other medical evidence that supported her conclusion that a frequent handling
limitation was more appropriate. See Norris v. Astrue, 776 F. Supp. 2d 616, 637–38
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (explaining that after the ALJ discredited the medical opinions in
the record regarding the claimant’s RFC, “she was then required to call a medical
expert or, alternatively, explain what other medical basis she relied on in”
determining the RFC).
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The ALJ, however, did not identify any medical evidence demonstrating that
Plaintiff could frequently handle objects with his right hand from approximately
November 2014 to January 2016. The ALJ discussed the May 2013 FCE, which
found that Plaintiff could use his right hand to frequently handle objects, but this
assessment was made more than a year before Plaintiff presented with a right wrist
ganglion cyst and tenderness in November 2014. Thus, the May 2013 FCE is not
relevant to Plaintiff’s right-hand handling capabilities after the problems with his
right hand and wrist began in November 2014. See Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046,
1051 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a medical assessment made a year before the
claimant suffered the allegedly disabling injury told the court “little if anything
about the credibility of her later complaints of disabling pain”). 5
The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s frequent handling restriction is
supported by substantial evidence because it “struck a middle position” between two
sets of medical opinions: Dr. Bilinsky’s March 2015 “occasional” bilateral handling
opinion (R. 102–03) on the one hand, and Dr. Fernandez’s February 2013 work
status report (R. 521) and Dr. Iftikhar’s February 2016 opinion (R. 496), which
The Court acknowledges Dr. Madala’s July 2014 opinion that Plaintiff had no
manipulative, i.e., handling, limitations. (R. 83, 91.) But there is no indication that the ALJ
relied upon this opinion to impose her “frequent handling” determination; in fact, the ALJ
did not discuss the opinion, other than to simply state that she gave it “some weight.” (R.
35); see Scott, 647 F.3d at 739 (explaining that the court’s review is confined “to the
rationale offered by the ALJ”). The July 2014 opinion, like the May 2013 FCE, was also
given before Plaintiff’s documented right hand and wrist issues began. Lastly, the
Commissioner does not argue that Dr. Madala’s July 2014 opinion provides support for the
ALJ’s RFC assessment, thereby waiving any defense of the ALJ’s decision on this basis. See
Kelly v. Colvin, No. 14 C 1086, 2015 WL 4730119, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2015).
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indicate no limitations in handling, on the other. (See Def.’s Mem. at 6–7, 9–10.) The
Commissioner’s argument is not persuasive.
First, there is no reason to believe that Dr. Fernandez assessed Plaintiff’s
right hand and wrist capabilities in February 2013. At this time, Dr. Fernandez’s
treatment was limited to Plaintiff’s left hand and thumb problems, and his work
status report only refers to left hand and arm restrictions. (See, e.g., R. 364–65, 370,
521.) Indeed, the Commissioner seemingly admits that Dr. Fernandez’s February
2013 work status report only supports the ALJ’s decision as to the amount of
handling Plaintiff could perform with his “left arm or hand.” (Def.’s Mem. at 7)
(emphasis added). Thus, Dr. Fernandez’s February 2013 opinion does not shed any
light on Plaintiff’s right hand and wrist capabilities. Second, while Dr. Iftikhar’s
February 2016 opinion did address Plaintiff’s ability to use his right hand, this
opinion was offered after Plaintiff underwent right wrist surgery on January 21,
2016. (See R. 494, 496.) As such, it—along with Plaintiff’s post-surgery reports that
he was doing very well and that the pain in his right wrist was “gone completely”
(see R. 492)—say nothing about Plaintiff’s right-hand handling capabilities before
the surgery, i.e., during the relevant November 2014–January 2016 time period.
The Commissioner also argues that Plaintiff’s right hand and wrist problems
occurred largely between May 2015 and January 2016 and, thus, they did not meet
the 12-month durational requirement required for disability. (Def.’s Mem. at 11–
12.) This argument is likewise flawed. First, although the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s
report of right wrist pain in May 2015 and his subsequent surgery in January 2016
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(R. 34), she never used the intervening time period (or the fact that it was less than
12 months) to justify her “frequent handling” restriction. (See R. 33–36.) Thus, the
Commissioner cannot use it to defend the ALJ’s restriction on appeal. Arnett v.
Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Commissioner’s
“attorneys may not advance an explanation the [ALJ] never made”); Scott, 647 F.3d
at 739. Second, Dr. Gunaratnam noted tenderness, complaints of pain, and a
ganglion cyst in Plaintiff’s right wrist in November 2014, six months before the
Commissioner’s May 2015 starting point. (R. 467.) Even if Plaintiff’s purported
failure to seek treatment for many months afterwards “undercuts his argument for
occasional handling,” as the Commissioner claims, (Def.’s Mem. at 12), Dr.
Gunaratnam’s treatment note still shows that Plaintiff’s right wrist problems began
well before May 2015. Similarly, Dr. Carpenter’s February 2015 letter states that
Plaintiff suffered significant, chronic bilateral wrist pain with residual pain and
wrist deformity in his right wrist. 6 (R. 470.)
By concluding that Plaintiff could use his right hand to frequently handle
objects from September 2012 through November 2016, the ALJ necessarily found
that he had this capability from November 2014 through January 2016. Yet there is
no medical evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s right-hand handling
restriction for this latter time frame. Specifically, the May 2013 FCE and Dr.
Iftikhar’s February 2016 opinion do not support such a finding, as they merely
Whether the ALJ properly gave “no weight” to Dr. Carpenter’s conclusion that Plaintiff
“had not been able to work,” as the Commissioner contends, is beside the point. (Def.’s
Mem. at 12.) Regardless of this conclusion, the letter provides evidence of right hand or
wrist pain predating the Commissioner’s chosen May 2015 date.
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establish Plaintiff’s right-hand capabilities at the “bookends” of the May 2013–
February 2016 period without accounting for intervening events that bear on these
capabilities, such as the onset of Plaintiff’s right-hand problems in November 2014
and Plaintiff’s right wrist surgery in January 2016. See Walker v. Berryhill, 900
F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The ALJ’s error stemmed from considering evidence
from particular points between 2008 and 2014 to support a conclusion covering the
entire period. By trying to fit the evidence to support a conclusion covering such a
broad period of time, the ALJ failed to remain watchful for the intermediate
possibility of Walker becoming disabled sometime between the bookends of January
2008 and December 2014.”).
The matter therefore must be remanded for further consideration of
Plaintiff’s right hand limitations during the relevant time frame. See Scott, 647 F.3d
at 740 (requiring remand where “the ALJ did not identify any medical evidence to
substantiate her belief that” the claimant was capable of meeting the assessed RFC
physical requirements); Suess v. Colvin, 945 F. Supp. 2d 920, 934–35 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (remanding where the ALJ failed to identify medical evidence to support her
physical RFC restrictions). On remand, the ALJ may wish to craft an RFC that
addresses Plaintiff’s left-hand and right-hand manipulative capabilities separately.
Whatever form her RFC assessment takes, however, the ALJ should ensure that
she explains why she imposed the restrictions she does by building an “accurate and
logical bridge” between the evidence and her RFC restrictions. See Scott, 647 F.3d
at 740 (“The ALJ needed to explain how she reached her conclusions about [the
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claimant’s] physical capabilities.”); Young, 362 F.3d at 1002 (finding that the ALJ
failed to build the requisite bridge from the evidence of the claimant’s impairments
to his RFC finding).
Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the
Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The
Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were
omitted from the opinion because no error was found.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment is denied. The Court finds that this matter should be remanded to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
April 11, 2019
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