Miller et al v. Southwest Airlines Co.
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's motion to alter the judgment and for leave to file a second amended complaint #46 is denied. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details. Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 10/22/2018. Mailed notice (ags, )
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JENNIFER MILLER, SCOTT POOLE,
and KEVIN ENGLUND,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.,
Defendant.
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18 C 86
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:
Presently before us is Plaintiffs Jennifer Miller, Scott Poole, and Kevin Englund’s motion
to alter judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and for leave to file a second
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). (Mot. (Dkt. No. 46).) On September 13, 2018,
we dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue and entered
judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 44–45.) For the following reasons, we deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
BACKGROUND
The relevant background as set forth in our September 13, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order dismissing the case remains the same and need not be restated here.
(See Dkt. No. 44.) Plaintiffs, ramp agents and operations agents employed by Defendant at
Chicago Midway International Airport, filed this action seeking to recover on behalf of
themselves and a putative class of similarly situated individuals for alleged privacy violations
after Defendant implemented a biometric timekeeping system at Midway. We dismissed
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which asserted class claims for violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq., as well as several common law
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claims. (Id.) In granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), we
determined Plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”),
45 U.S.C. § 181, et seq., requiring submission to the RLA’s arbitral framework and rendering
venue in federal court improper. Specifically, we found that Plaintiffs’ BIPA and common law
claims presented a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA because
resolution of the claims required reference to and interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreements (“CBAs”) governing Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendant. See Brown v. Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs now ask us to reopen the judgment to allow them to amend their complaint to
vindicate “rights and obligations [under BIPA] that exist independent of a [collective bargaining
agreement],” and which are therefore not preempted by the RLA. (Mot. at 1.) Plaintiffs argue
that because we dismissed their amended complaint without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3),
judgment should not have been entered. (Id. at 4–5.) They further argue that leave to amend
under Rule 15(a)(2) should be given here because their proposed second amended complaint,
which includes a single claim under BIPA “for substantive Privacy Injury for Southwest’s failure
to comply with the notice and written consent provisions of BIPA,” does not present a minor
dispute under the RLA and is not preempted. (Id. at 5–6.) The proposed second amended
complaint removes all common law counts and solely asserts a claim for relief under BIPA. (See
Proposed 2d Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 46–2) ¶¶ 71–80.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59(e) permits parties to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment within
twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion to alter or amend
the judgment “will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: ‘(1) that the court
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committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry
of judgment.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A ‘manifest
error’ occurs when the district court commits a ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to
recognize controlling precedent.’” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)). Relief under Rule 59(e)
is ordinarily an “extraordinary” remedy “reserved for the exceptional case.”
Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015). “However, once the requirements
of [Rule 59(e)] have been met, a plaintiff does not lose the ability to amend a complaint under
the liberal standard articulated in Rule 15 simply because the court entered judgment . . . .” Id.
(citing Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 521
(7th Cir. 2015)). “A district court acts within its discretion in denying leave to amend, either by
dismissing a complaint with prejudice or by denying a post-judgment motion, when the plaintiff
fails to demonstrate how the proposed amendment would cure the deficiencies in the prior
complaint.” Gonzalez-Koeneke, 791 F.3d at 808.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argue we erred in entering judgment without granting them leave to file a
second amended complaint, and therefore, relief under Rule 59(e) is warranted. (Mot. at 4.)
They further contend that leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) should be granted as their
proposed amendment would not be futile. (Id. at 4–6.) Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint
asserts a single BIPA claim seeking to recover for alleged privacy injury caused by Defendant’s
failure to comply with the written notice and consent provisions of BIPA. (Id. at 5–6.) Plaintiffs
emphasize that resolution of their amended BIPA claim does not require reference to or
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interpretation of the CBAs and does not present a minor dispute under the RLA rendering venue
improper because: (1) they are no longer asserting any alleged compensation injury in support of
their BIPA claim, nor are they asserting any common law claims; and (2) they are not
challenging Defendant’s implementation or use of a biometric timekeeping system, but rather the
lack of written notice and written consent prior to implementation. (Id. at 3–4.)
Even without the compensation injury allegations and the common law claims, Plaintiffs’
proposed second amended complaint presents a minor dispute under the RLA that must be
submitted to mandatory arbitration. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252–53,
114 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (1994) (explaining “minor” disputes under the RLA “grow out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions” (citation and alteration omitted)). Therefore, the amendment would not
cure the deficiencies in the prior complaint and venue remains improper in this court. Plaintiffs
contend the proposed complaint makes clear their claim centers on whether Defendant provided
the necessary individual written notice and written consent in order to protect employees’ “right
to individually make an informed decision when electing to provide or withhold their most
sensitive information and on what terms.” (Proposed 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) However, as we
previously explained, Plaintiffs are represented by the Transportation Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO Local 555 (“TWU 555”), and the union acts as the “sole and exclusive
bargaining agent” for all of Defendant’s United States-based ramp, operations, provisioning, and
freight agents, including Plaintiffs. (Jordan Decl. (Dkt. No. 28–1) ¶¶ 6, 8.) Thus, it cannot be
determined whether Defendant collected or captured Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers without
informing them or their legally authorized representative in writing that the information was
being collected and stored without first assessing whether TWU 555 had the right or
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responsibility to accept notice and consent on Plaintiffs’ behalf as their “sole and exclusive
bargaining agent.” See Brown, 254 F.3d at 658.
Likewise, TWU 555 broadly granted Defendant the “right to manage and direct the work
force” subject to the specific terms of the CBAs. (CBA, Jordan Decl. Ex. A (Dkt. No. 28–1)
at Art. 2(D).) Determining whether the union acted as Plaintiffs’ “legally authorized
representative” as that term is defined under BIPA and whether Defendant complied with BIPA
in light of the scope of its management rights requires consideration or interpretation of the
CBAs. Defendant has met its low burden of “articulat[ing] an argument that is ‘neither
obviously insubstantial or frivolous, nor made in bad faith,’” showing that resolution of
Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim requires interpretation or application of the governing CBAs. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen (Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region) v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 879 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,
491 U.S. 299, 310, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2484 (1989)). Because the interpretation of these provisions
of the CBAs may bear on Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim, we cannot resolve the parties’ dispute in
federal court. See Grimes v. CSX Transp., Inc., 338 F. App’x 522, 524 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
Railway Labor Act broadly encompasses all disagreements bearing on the labor agreement and
precludes a district court from adjudicating even a dispute ostensibly based on an independent
source of federal or state law if ‘the interpretation of some provision(s)’ of the labor agreement
‘could be dispositive of the plaintiff’s claim.’” (quoting Brown, 254 F.3d at 664)). Plaintiffs’
amended claim cannot be decided without referring to or interpreting the CBAs between
Defendant and TWU 555, and their proposed second amended complaint is therefore preempted
by the RLA. Accordingly, we deny Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because venue in
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this court remains improper. Plaintiffs’ BIPA claim must be submitted to the arbitral framework
established under the RLA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to alter the judgment and for leave to
file a second amended complaint is denied. It is so ordered.
____________________________________
Marvin E. Aspen
United States District Judge
Dated: October 22, 2018
Chicago, Illinois
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