Baker et al v. BRG Sports, Inc. et al

Filing 241

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/17/2021: For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the bellwether plaintiffs ' design defect claims but denies defendants' summary judgment motions on those plaintiffs' failure to warn claims [Case No. 17 C 8972, dkt. no. 366]. Riddell's other motions [Case No. 17 C 8972, dkt. nos. 362, 364, 374, 376] are terminated without prejudice as moot. The parties are directed to file a joint status report with a joint proposal for further proceedings (or, if they cannot agree, separate proposals) by April 27, 2021. (mk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARK ADAMS, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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BRG SPORTS, INC., et al.,
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Defendants.
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FREDDIE ADAMS, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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BRG SPORTS, INC., et al.,
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Defendants.
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QUINCY BAKER, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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BRG SPORTS, INC., et al.,
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Defendants.
)
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Case No. 17 C 8544

Case No. 17 C 8972

Case No. 18 C 129

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
The plaintiffs in these cases, all of whom played high school football, sued BRG
Sports, Inc. and Riddell, Inc., which design, manufacture, and sell football helmets.
These cases were transferred here from the Northern District of California, where the

plaintiffs originally filed the lawsuits. Following transfer, the Court essentially treated the
cases as if they had been consolidated here as a mass-tort multidistrict litigation (MDL)
proceeding.
In a first amended "master complaint" containing allegations common to all
plaintiffs and in individual "short-form complaints" with allegations specific to each
individual plaintiff, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' negligence (design defect
and failure to warn) caused them to suffer brain and neurocognitive injuries. The Court,
with the assistance of the parties, then selected a number of "bellwether" cases, in
which full discovery, including expert discovery, would be taken. That process has been
completed through the deadline for the plaintiffs to designate experts.
The defendants have filed several motions, including three motions to
strike/exclude the report and testimony of the plaintiffs' only expert, Dr. Randall Benson,
on various grounds and two motions for summary judgment on all of the bellwether
plaintiffs' claims. In support of their motions, the defendants argue that the Court should
strike and/or exclude Dr. Benson's expert testimony—which they describe as vague and
conclusory—based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The defendants further contend that with or without Dr. Benson's expert testimony, the
plaintiffs cannot prove the causation element of their claims, which has two aspects:
general causation and specific causation. The defendants also argue that without this,
no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiffs on any of their claims.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on the plaintiffs' design defect claims but denies the motion on the

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plaintiffs' failure to warn claims.
Background
The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted. The plaintiffs
are all former high school football players; some played college football, too. Many of
them played in Texas and Iowa. There are eight bellwether plaintiffs: Todd Bradford,
Simson Green, Jaquaries Johnson, Gregory Page, Michael Sterns, Ashton Whitby,
Walker Whitehorn, and Jeffrey Wodka. Either Texas or Iowa substantive law applies to
each of these plaintiff's claims. The defendants are two related business entities: BRG
Sports, Inc. (BRG), formerly known as Riddell Sports Group, Inc., and Riddell, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of BRG. Both companies are involved in the manufacturing,
distribution, and sale of Riddell football helmets. For simplicity's sake, the Court will
refer to the defendants collectively as Riddell.
Each plaintiff wore a Riddell helmet during the time period relevant to these
lawsuits; some as early as 1975 and others as late as 2002 or even later. The purpose
of a football helmet is to mitigate the risk of head injuries and ensure safety during game
play. The National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment
(NOCSAE), formed in 1969, implemented football helmet safety standards in 1973; its
standards cover Riddell helmets. The plaintiffs contend that as football players, they
sustained various head injuries during game play—namely from blows to the head.
A.

Riddell adds warning labels
Beginning in 1983 and until the late 1990s, Riddell affixed warning labels onto

the back of their football helmets. The warning stated: "Do not use this helmet to strike
an opponent. Such an action is against football rules and may cause severe brain or

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neck injury. Playing the game of football in itself can cause injury, and no helmet can
prevent all such injuries." Am. Master Compl. ¶ 12 (dkt. no. 184). The plaintiffs contend
that Riddell's warnings were insufficient and that a better warning would have prompted
them to avoid playing football altogether, choose a safer helmet, or play football
differently. Riddell disputes these contentions and says that without evidence of a
causal link between the plaintiffs' alleged injuries and Riddell helmets, the adequacy of
warnings do not matter.
B.

Riddell introduces new Revolution helmet
In 2002, Riddell introduced a new product—the "Riddell Revolution Helmet"—

which it claimed to be 31% safer than other helmets on the market. Am. Master Compl.
¶ 16. The plaintiffs contend that they suffered brain injuries caused by Riddell's football
helmets—older Riddell products and the Revolution line of helmets—because these
helmets did not adequately protect them against injuries from concussive and subconcussive blows to the head. The design defects alleged by the plaintiffs include (1)
padding liner systems that lacked newer, safer, and better energy absorbing materials;
(2) substandard foams that did not reduce force to the forehead; (3) insufficiently thick
padding; and (4) the lack of safer and better energy absorbing systems, such as airfilled chamber-based systems. Id. ¶ 17. The plaintiffs say that Riddell marketed all of
their helmets as safe equipment that would protect football players—especially from
concussions. Id. ¶ 18.
C.

The plaintiffs' brain and neurocognitive injuries
Each of the plaintiffs claim to suffer from brain and neurocognitive injuries—

namely mild traumatic brain injuries (MTBIs). MTBIs include concussions.

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A concussion can cause temporary or permanent loss of normal brain function.
The effects of a concussion may be mild, including headaches, lack of concentration,
memory and judgment problems, coordination issues, and difficulty with balance.
Significant effects of concussions include post-concussion syndrome (PCS), chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), and second impact syndrome (SIS). PCS symptoms
include chronic headaches, fatigue, memory problems, fogginess, depression, impulse
issues, and other physical, cognitive, and behavioral problems. CTE is a
neurodegenerative disease caused by repetitive trauma to the brain; it eventually leads
to dementia and other neurological disorders and can have other cognitive and
behavioral effects. SIS occurs when an athlete who has sustained a concussion
experiences another brain injury before recovering from the first concussion; it can
cause serious head trauma or death.
During their depositions, each bellwether plaintiff testified about concussions they
believe they sustained during game play as well as concussion diagnoses from medical
professionals. Some bellwether plaintiffs relied on other evidence to indicate that they
suffered concussions, such as deposition testimony from Green's mother and Johnson's
mother; both of whom believe that their sons sustained concussions. Riddell contends
that the mothers' deposition testimony is neither admissible nor sufficient to prove that
they suffered concussions.
For some bellwether plaintiffs, the scope and existence of their long-term brain
and neurocognitive injuries were only recently discovered. These plaintiffs experienced
the neurocognitive effects of injuries only as recently as 2017. The plaintiffs contend
that a better designed helmet would have prevented or lessened the severity of their

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injuries. Riddell does not dispute that the bellwether plaintiffs each wore a Riddell
helmet at some point during their football careers, but it contends that the helmets did
not cause the plaintiffs' injuries.
D.

The plaintiffs' design defect theory
In an October 5, 2018 order on Riddell's motion to dismiss, the Court addressed

the plaintiffs' burden of proof regarding their causation theory of liability. The Court
explained that there are two aspects of causation. "The first is general causation, that
is, whether the product or exposure has the capacity to cause the injury the plaintiff
alleges. The second is specific causation, that is, whether the product or exposure in
fact caused the plaintiff's injury. Both must be alleged." Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 6
(dkt. no. 182). In this order, the Court dismissed, with leave to amend, short-form
complaints filed by the plaintiffs because they did not include any allegations regarding
causation. The plaintiffs filed their first amended master complaint and second
amended short-form complaints on November 2, 2018.
On May 27, 2019, the Court—with the parties' input—selected eight bellwether
plaintiffs. The bellwether plaintiffs contend that they suffer from various medical
problems resulting from head trauma they experienced playing football while wearing
Riddell helmets, including memory loss, headaches, depression, irritability, aggression,
attention and concentration issues, anxiety, and impulsiveness. They attribute this to
the defective design of Riddell helmets and the lack of adequate warnings.
In August 2020, the plaintiffs designated Dr. Randall Benson as their lone expert
on both general causation and specific causation. (Plaintiffs have a separate warnings
expert.) Dr. Benson authored an expert report totaling ten pages. In relevant part, Dr.

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Benson opines:
It is my opinion that concussive and sub-concussive blows to the head
suffered while playing tackle football can and do cause mTBI and other
brain injuries cited by Plaintiff in this case. It is further my opinion that
playing football and suffering these blows to the head while wearing a
properly designed and engineered football helmet can reduce the
incidence and injuries complained of if the helmet is worn properly and
well designed.
Def.'s Ex. B, Dr. Benson Expert Rep. (General Causation), at 10 (dkt. no. 367-2). The
deadline for deposing general causation experts—which, in the plaintiffs' case, includes
only Dr. Benson—was November 9, 2020. Dr. Benson was not deposed.
As indicated earlier, the plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against Riddell for
defective design and inadequate warnings (count 1) and strict liability claims based on
design defect (count 2), and failure to warn (count 3).
Discussion
On November 19, 2020, Riddell moved to strike Dr. Benson's report on general
causation and exclude his testimony on that topic, citing inadequate disclosures that
failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), as well as
failure to meet the standards for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Soon after, the
plaintiffs designated Dr. Benson as their sole expert on specific causation; he authored
eight specific causation reports regarding each bellwether plaintiffs. The eight reports
each include identical content; they do not reference the individual plaintiffs other than
on the title page of each report, nor do they reference Riddell. Riddell then moved to
strike Dr. Benson's specific causation reports and testimony on the grounds similar to
those it had cited for exclusion of his general causation report and testimony.

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Riddell has also moved for summary judgment, arguing the insufficiency of the
plaintiffs' evidence with or without Dr. Benson's testimony.
A.

Riddell's motion for summary judgment
on general causation
To obtain summary judgment, Riddell must demonstrate that "there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine issue of material fact arises only if sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists to permit a jury to return a verdict for that
party." Egonmwan v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks omitted). The Court views the evidence and draws all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. See Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp., 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th
Cir. 2019). The plaintiffs must identify "specific, admissible evidence showing that there
is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial." Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562,
568 (7th Cir. 2017). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an
element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial,
summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Cervantes, 914 F.3d at 564.
To support its motion, Riddell argues that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the
existence of a triable issue regarding general causation. Accordingly, Riddell also
contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims.
1.

Design defect claims

Under both Texas and Iowa law, which collectively govern all of the bellwether
plaintiffs' claims, a plaintiff alleging design defect—based on theories of negligence and
strict liability—must provide evidence of causation. In Texas, "[t]o recover for a
products liability claim alleging a design defect, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
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product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer
alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery." Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311
(Tex. 2009). Negligent design defect claims similarly require evidence that the
negligent design caused the plaintiff's injuries. See Oasis Oil Corp. v. Koch Refin. Co.
L.P., 60 S.W.3d 248, 253 (Tex. App. 2001) ("When a products liability action is
submitted to the jury on a theory of negligent manufacture or negligent design, the
defendant is held liable based on proof that its negligent conduct proximately caused
the claimant's damages.").
Iowa law likewise imposes these requirements on plaintiffs asserting such claims,
although the Iowa Supreme Court has explained that it "prefer[s] to label a claim based
on a defective product design as a design defect claim without reference to strict liability
or negligence." See Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002);
see also Des Moines Flying Serv., Inc. v. Aerial Servs. Inc., 880 N.W.2d 212, 218 (Iowa
2016) (explaining that products liability law in Iowa "imposes tort liability on sellers or
distributors of defective products 'for harm to persons or property caused by the
defect'") (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 1, at 5 (1998)).
As a general matter, the causation inquiry for the plaintiffs' design defect claims involves
both "general" and "specific" causation. As the Court has previously explained, the
general causation inquiry regarding a design defect claim concerns "whether the
product or exposure has the capacity to cause the injury the plaintiff alleges." Order on
Mot. to Dismiss at 6. This is consistent with both Texas and Iowa law. See Merck &
Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tex. 2011) (explaining that in products liability

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actions, "causation . . . has two components: general and specific"). "General
causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in
the general population." Id. (quotations omitted); see also Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc.,
778 N.W.2d 677, 687-90 (Iowa 2010) (discussing general and specific causation
requirement in the "toxic tort" context).
In count 1 of the first amended master complaint, the plaintiffs assert a negligent
design defect claim and contend that Riddell was "negligent in the design, testing,
marketing, and engineering of the helmets warn [sic] by Plaintiffs." Am. Master Compl.
¶ 199. Further, they allege that "[a]s a result of Riddell's breach of duty to the Plaintiffs,
they suffered long-term brain injuries." Id. ¶ 205. In count 2, the plaintiffs assert a
design defect claim sounding in strict liability; they allege that the Riddell helmets worn
by the plaintiffs were "defective in design, unreasonably dangerous, unsafe for their
intended purpose, and failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect . . . because the helmets did not provide adequate protection against the
foreseeable risk of concussive brain injury." Id. ¶ 207. They further allege that "[t]he
design defects created an unavoidable and unreasonable risk of long-term health
consequences arising from repeated concussive and sub-concussive blows to the head
during football play and practice." Id. ¶ 208. "These risks," the plaintiffs allege, "could
have been significantly reduced through the implementation of reasonable, relatively
affordable, and technologically and scientifically feasible alternative designs." Id. The
plaintiffs identify three distinct defects in Count 2:
a.

Helmet frontal pads with materials incapable of adequately
distributing force;

b.

Helmet liner systems that lacked a safe means of attenuating and
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absorbing the foreseeable forces of impact in order to minimize
and/or reduce the forces and energy directed to the player’s head,
both due to the use of inadequate materials and inadequate overall
systems (as compared to superior systems such as an air
chamber-based system); and
c.

Helmet liner systems comprised of pads too thin to adequately
protect players’ heads.

Id. ¶ 209. The plaintiffs contend that they suffered long-term brain injuries caused by
Riddell's defective helmets and that an alternative design—such as one with superior
padding—could have reduced their risk of injury. Id. ¶ 212.
Riddell argues that the plaintiffs' design defect theory "depends on [an] . . .
attenuated causal chain" encompassing "complex issues involving medicine,
epidemiology, neuroscience and brain injury mechanism, and football helmet design
and engineering." Def.'s Opening Mem. at 1. Riddell contends that the plaintiffs' theory
of causation needs to be supported by sufficient expert testimony but that "nothing in
[Dr. Benson's report] comes close to the level the plaintiffs need to set forth a triable
issue on general causation." Id.
Riddell asserts several specific issues regarding Dr. Benson's report. First,
Riddell says that his report is vague and conclusory—"[h]e doesn't explain, for example,
how he reached or on what methodology he supports his conclusion that 'concussive
and sub-concussive blows to the head suffered while playing tackle football can and do
cause mTBI and other brain injuries . . . .'" Def.'s Opening Mem. at 7-8 (quoting Dr.
Benson's expert report). Next, Riddell contends that Dr. Benson did not consider
alternative causes for the plaintiffs' injuries and unnecessarily discusses irrelevant
conditions that no plaintiff claims to suffer from—such as Alzheimer's disease. Id. at 8.
Riddell also argues that Dr. Benson's report does not provide support for the plaintiffs'
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"contention that Riddell helmets were not properly designed or engineered." Id. Riddell
also points out that the report's contents are nearly identical to the allegations in the
plaintiffs' amended master complaint., suggesting the report is deficient for that reason
as well. See Def.'s Stat. of Facts ¶ 10 (dkt. no. 368). For these reasons, Riddell
contends that the plaintiffs cannot meet their burden with respect to general causation.
In response, the plaintiffs cite, in addition to Dr. Benson's report, a number of
scientific studies in support of their claims that football participation and helmet design
are causally linked to MTBIs. But none of these scientific studies concern Riddell
helmets; many do not even address football helmets at all. They contend that the
evidence they have provided is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact regarding
general causation. For instance, they argue that the scientific research on helmet
design and MTBIs put Riddell on notice of the causal connection between its helmets
and brain injuries, yet it failed to warn consumers of its products' risks with respect to
concussions and other MTBIs. Id. at 7-22. The plaintiffs also point to the bellwether
plaintiffs' deposition testimony regarding their brain injuries and neurocognitive
problems—such as memory issues, amnesia, and lightheadedness—as evidence of
general causation. Id. at 1-2.
The plaintiffs' design defect claim concern various MTBIs, including injuries that
can have unknown or multiple origins. In Dr. Benson's expert report, he opines that
"[t]he mechanisms underlying these concussions, as well as methods of prevention
have been investigated both in the laboratory and in the field." Dr. Benson Expert Rep.
(General Causation) ¶ 30. Dr. Benson's report itself thus suggests that to understand
MTBIs, one must rely on scientific research and perhaps medical knowledge. See id.

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The Court agrees with Riddell that the origin of the plaintiffs' injuries is not the sort of
matter that would be obvious to a layperson.
"When an injury is of this nature, determining what caused it is not usually
obvious to a layman and thus requires expert testimony." Myers v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 629 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Nat'l Football League Players'
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 388 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("[t]he case implicates
complex scientific and medical issues . . . [and] the association between repeated
concussive trauma and long-term neurocognitive impairment remains unclear"). The
Court concludes that to prevail on their design defect claims, the plaintiffs need expert
testimony on general causation.
In Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009), the plaintiffs
similarly "sought to establish causation for . . . their claims through the use of expert
testimony." Id. at 704. The defendant in that case "contested [the expert]'s conclusions
regarding both general and specific causation" and "pointed to several notable gaps
within [his] cause-and-effect conclusions, which [the defendant] argued were based on
mere speculation and therefore inadmissible." Id. at 706. The district court in Lewis
agreed with the defendant and concluded "that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their
burden to establish the admissibility of their evidence"; the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision granting summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
The Court concludes that Dr. Benson's expert report falls short of providing
evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the required connection between
Riddell's helmet designs and the plaintiffs' injuries. Dr. Benson's report is sufficient to
permit a reasonable finding that a person may suffer brain and/or neurocognitive injuries

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from playing football. But his report does nothing to connect the plaintiffs' injuries with
Riddell's designs. Indeed, the most that Dr. Benson has said regarding design is, in
essence, that good helmet design can mitigate the risk of head injuries. See Dr.
Benson Expert Rep. ¶¶ 30-34. That's all well and good, but it does not advance the ball
in establishing that Riddell's designs were deficient, let alone how they were deficient.
Without such evidence, the plaintiffs cannot meet their evidentiary burden on general
causation regarding their design defect claims. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Baytown,
467 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. App. 2015) (noting that the plaintiffs' "expert could not
connect his general causation theory . . . to any specific fact . . . in this case"). For this
reason, Riddell is entitled to summary judgment on the bellwether plaintiffs' design
defect claims.
2.

Failure to warn claims

Riddell argues that what it contends is the absence of adequate general
causation evidence entitles it to summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims,
including their failure to warn claims. But the discussion in its briefs is focused
exclusively, or nearly so, on design defect claims. Riddell makes no effort to explain
what exactly it thinks is required to show causation in a failure to warn case. It seems to
take the position that because the plaintiffs have offered nothing regarding how the
design of Riddell's helmets caused or contributed to their injuries, that also eliminates
the possibility of causation from Riddell's warnings. This does not make much sense to
the Court, at least without some explanation, which Riddell has not meaningfully
provided.
"To succeed on a marketing defect claim," under Texas law, "a plaintiff must

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prove that the defendant knew or should have known of a potential risk of harm
presented by the product, but marketed it without adequately warning of the danger or
providing instructions for its safe use." Ramsey v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 12 16 00155,
2017 WL 1426793, at *2 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining that "the failure to warn
or instruct constituted a causative nexus in the product user's injury") (citing DeGrate v.
Exec. Imprints, Inc., 261 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex. App. 2008)). Under Iowa law, "[i]n the
context of a failure to warn claim, proximate cause can be established by showing a
warning would have altered the plaintiff's conduct so as to avoid injury." Mercer v.
Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 624 (Iowa 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Riddell
does not address the causation inquiry in the failure to warn context at all.
The plaintiffs have not done a particularly good job on this point either, but it is
Riddell that has to tee up the issue by showing that there are no genuine factual
disputes and that it is entitled to judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") (emphasis
added), and it has not done so. See Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th
Cir. 2013) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 imposes an initial burden of production
on the party moving for summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not
necessary."). Riddell is not entitled to summary judgment on the bellwether plaintiffs'
failure to warn claims, though the Court expresses no view on the ultimate merits of
those claims.
B.

Riddell's other motions
Given the Court's ruling that Riddell is entitled to summary judgment on the

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plaintiffs' design defect claims even if Dr. Benson's testimony is admitted and that
Riddell's motion falls short on the failure to warn claims, the Court need not address
Riddell's other motions. These include Riddell's second motion for summary judgment
with respect to specific causation and its motions to strike/exclude Dr. Benson's report
and testimony. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on Specific Causation (dkt. no. 376);
Def.'s Mot. to Strike Pls.' General Causation Expert (dkt. no. 362); Def.'s Mot. to Strike
Pursuant to Daubert & Fed. R. Evid. 702 Pls.' General Causation Expert (dkt. no. 364);
Def.'s Mot. to Strike Pls.' Specific Causation Expert (dkt. no. 374); Gonzalez v. Madigan,
403 F. Supp. 3d 670, 680 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (Kennelly, J.) ("because the Court concludes
that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment . . . the plaintiff's outstanding
motions to strike . . . are moot"); see also Vargas-Harrison v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist.,
272 F.3d 964, 974 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's decision "to dismiss as moot
a motion . . . in light of the grant of summary judgment for the defendant").
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the bellwether plaintiffs' design defect claims but denies defendants'
summary judgment motions on those plaintiffs' failure to warn claims [dkt. no. 366].
Riddell's other motions [dkt. nos. 362, 364, 374, 376] are terminated without prejudice
as moot. The parties are directed to file a joint status report with a joint proposal for
further proceedings (or, if they cannot agree, separate proposals) by April 27, 2021.

________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

Date: April 17, 2021
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