Carter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

Filing 54

ORDER. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 11 is granted, and Defendant's Motion for Sanctions 42 is denied. All other motions are denied as moot. All previously set dates are stricken. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated. [For further details see order.] Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 9/5/2018. Notices mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )

Case: 1:18-cv-00186 Document #: 54 Filed: 09/05/18 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:379

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS JOHN CARTER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-CV-186
v.
Judge Jorge L. Alonso
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

ORDER
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [11] is granted, and
Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions [42] is denied. All other motions are denied as moot. All
previously set dates are stricken. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Thomas John Carter is a retired U.S. Army Captain. He alleges that on
November 7, 2017, he went to a Chase bank in Streamwood, Illinois, where he attempted to
access his account. He complains that a bank teller he describes as “Muslim Teller” initially
refused to accept his military ID card as valid identification in processing the transaction, and
that another employee had to advise her it was an acceptable form of identification before the
transaction was completed. [Dkt 26 at 3.] He complains of harm as a result of this exchange.
Mr. Carter initially filed a single-count complaint against JP Morgan Chase Bank
(“Chase”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging a violation of the Illinois Human Rights
Act, 735 ILCS § 5/1-102 (“IHRA”). [Dkt 1-1.] Chase removed the case to federal court, and
then moved to dismiss based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. [Dkt 1, 11.]
In response, Mr. Carter filed an “Amended Complaint for Violation of Constitutional
Rights,” [dkt 25] and an “Amended Complaint for Violation of Constitutional Rights
Memorandum,” adding a number of claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and other statutes prohibiting discrimination in
employment and public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), as well as a claim of
negligence for failing to follow Chase’s internal procedures. [Dkt 26.] He also belatedly filed a
charge of national origin discrimination before the Illinois Department of Human Rights
(“IDHR”) [dkt 30 at 7-8], and then requested it be withdrawn two weeks later. [Id. at 6.]
Accordingly, the IDHR closed Mr. Carter’s charge. [Dkt 38-1.] He filed a second charge of
discrimination, also alleging national origin discrimination, as well as race and age
discrimination. [Id. at 5.] The EEOC dismissed the charge shortly thereafter on the basis that
there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties. [Dkt 26 at 17.]

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Although Mr. Carter proceeds pro se, he is no stranger to federal court litigation, as he
has previously unsuccessfully tried to bring claims against Chase similar to those he forwards
here. Specifically, he has previously filed at least four lawsuits in this District against Chase
stemming from his attempt to use his military ID in conjunction with his 2014 application for a
job. [See N.D. Ill. Case Nos. 15 CV 2256, 16 CV 6818, 16 CV 9732, 17 CV 6216.] Each of
those actions was dismissed, and the two dismissals he appealed were affirmed. [See 7th Cir.
Case Nos. 16-1082 and 17-1801.] In addition, because Mr. Carter ignored the warnings of the
District Court as well as the Court of Appeals against attempting to re-litigate his complaints
regarding the events of that day, he has been sanctioned $3,000 and “enjoined from making any
further attempts in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to litigate
the claims arising from the events of April 24, 2014.” Carter v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
No. 17 CV 6216, 2017 WL 5454455, at * 3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2017).
DISCUSSION
Chase initially moved to dismiss on the basis of Mr. Carter’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. After the deadline to respond to the motion had passed, Mr. Carter
amended his complaint, adding several additional claims which Chase now also seeks to dismiss.
Given that Mr. Carter is pro se, the Court has accepted his amended complaint as the operative
one despite his failure to seek leave to file it.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations of the complaint, drawing all possible inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “enough facts
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ] not accept as true legal
conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.’” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). A pro se complaint is held to less
stringent standards than one drafted by an attorney, and is accordingly construed liberally. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
The Court thus turns to consideration of Mr. Carter’s claims. His IHRA claim fails as a
matter of law. Mr. Carter initially failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, 775 ILCS §
5/7A-102, a failure which would have resulted in dismissal. See, e.g., Baizar v. Moy, No. 15 CV
8292, 2016 WL 772861, at *2 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 29, 2016). Mr. Carter tried to fix this error, by
filing and then withdrawing a charge of discrimination before the IDHR. Chase argues these acts
demonstrate that Mr. Carter has abandoned his IHRA claim or at least that he has “no interest in
complying with the pre-suit requirements for prosecuting a valid claim under the IHRA.” [Dkt
29 at 4.] While this may be so, the Court need not reach that conclusion. Even if Mr. Carter’s

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tardy filing could correct his procedural misstep, his complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim
under the IHRA. To state such a claim, Mr. Carter must plead that he was denied or refused the
full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, or services of a place of public accommodation
on the basis of a protected status. 775 ILCS § 5/5-102(A). Mr. Carter pleads no such denial nor
could he amend to do so given his other allegations. Mr. Carter acknowledges in his amended
complaint that his banking transaction was completed; he alleges only that a Chase teller
“initially” would not accept his military ID as valid identification. [Dkt 26 at 2-3.] He further
alleges that a manager told the teller his ID was acceptable, and later called him to apologize.
[Id. at 3.] The gist of his complaint appears to be that the teller “showed no remorse as she
completed the transition [sic].” Id. This fails to state a claim. Moreover, while Mr. Carter’s
complaint alleges discrimination on the basis of his veteran status, his tardy charge alleges
discrimination on a different basis, national origin. In addition, Mr. Carter’s other filings in this
matter acknowledge that he continues to bank with Chase, and that he accessed one of its
branches to obtain funds after the events of which he complains. [See, e.g., dkt 17 at 1.]
Plaintiff’s additional claims similarly fail as a matter of law. To the extent Mr. Carter
seeks to allege claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, they fail because Mr. Carter
alleges no employment relationship with Chase. Likewise, to the extent Mr. Carter invokes laws
affording hiring preferences for veterans, and other employment rights of veterans and
government employees, none of those laws apply to the facts about which Mr. Carter complains.
Likewise, Mr. Carter’s claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 1985 and 1986 fails because Chase is not a
state actor nor has Mr. Carter alleged anything to suggest a conspiracy or that Chase’s actions
invoked any state authority. See, e.g., London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir.
2010); Davis v. Union Nat’l Bank, 46 F.3d 24, 25 (7th Cir. 1994); Abatangelo v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 719 Fed. App’x. 520, 523 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017) (affirming dismissal of
“obviously frivolous complaint” and noting, “Private banks are normally not state actors”).
Similarly, Mr. Carter’s public accommodations claim fails because Mr. Carter does not
allege a disability or a denial of services or other public accommodation. Finally, to the extent
Mr. Carter complains that the first teller to whom he spoke failed to follow a Chase Bank rule
authorizing certain forms of identification, that complaint does not give rise to any negligence
claim. Because Mr. Carter fails to state any plausible claim against Chase, the complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.
Given Mr. Carter’s history of frivolous filings against Chase, his failure to state any
claim here despite his multiple filings, his reference to events which he has been enjoined from
attempting to re-litigate in this District, and his attempts to obtain information from Chase
employees despite a discovery stay, Chase has requested sanctions be imposed against Mr.
Carter. Specifically, Chase seeks a monetary sanction of $9,000 or its fees and costs incurred in
this matter, an order barring Mr. Carter from filing any further filings in any forum “pertaining to
the subject matter of this lawsuit, including without limitation any allegations that Chase or its
representatives or agents failed to accept Plaintiff’s military ID card and discriminated against
Plaintiff on any occasion on or before the date of the final judgment in this matter,” and an order
requiring Mr. Carter to seek leave of any court or other tribunal before filing any new claim or

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action against Chase. [Dkt 42.] Mr. Carter resists the imposition of sanctions, emphasizing the
IDHR proceedings and the allegations of his amended complaint.
In addition to the powers vested by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the power to
impose sanctions for bad-faith litigation is one of the inherent or implied powers which federal
courts necessarily possess “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (internal
quotations omitted). “A court faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has
the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the
court.” Lysiak v. C.I.R., 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1987). In fashioning such a remedy, the
court must preserve the “sound and orderly administration of justice,” while at the same time
taking care to protect the litigant’s right of access to the court’s processes. Id. (Internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Chase argues that Mr. Carter has engaged in a pattern of frivolous and bad faith litigation,
and that he should be sanctioned for violating the previous bar order. While this Court agrees
that many of Mr. Carter’s filings lack merit, the Court declines to impose sanctions at this
juncture. Mr. Carter’s filings in this action did not violate the prior order which was limited to
“claims arising from the events of April 24, 2014.” Carter, 2017 WL 5454455, at * 3. Although
his amended complaint referenced the 2014 events, it did so only in the introduction section.
While his complaint here is similarly themed as his previous ones, it is not focused on the events
subject to the bar, but rather on a similar exchange that transpired in 2017. Further, given that
Mr. Carter acts without counsel and apparently remains a customer of Chase, the Court does not
conclude that his reported conversation with a Chase employee was an attempt to violate the
discovery stay.
That said, however, it is clear that Mr. Carter has previously been provided specific
rulings on what certain of the laws he invokes here do and do not provide. For example, Mr.
Carter’s first suit against Chase was dismissed among other reasons because USERRA only
imposes liability on employers. [See, e.g., N.D. Ill. Case No. 15-CV-2256 at dkt 36.] Yet Mr.
Carter attempted to bring a USERRA claim here on plainly inapplicable facts. This suggests
more than an ignorance of the law, but an intent to harass Chase. On the other hand, no bad faith
is necessarily ascribed to certain of Mr. Carter’s other claims despite that they also fail on their
merits, and Chase would in any event be called upon to defend them. Weighing all
circumstances presented then, the Court declines to impose sanctions. Mr. Carter is cautioned
that this is not a license to file a complaint that lacks a good faith basis. While the Court does
not doubt Mr. Carter’s frustration with the perceived lack of respect afforded him on account of
his military status, however, he must understand that the causes of action he has repeatedly tried
to bring in this District do not withstand scrutiny. To be clear, despite his protestations to the
contrary, there is no federal law that states, “Thou shall not discriminate against the United
States Military.” [Dkt 26 at 1.]
Given the record in this matter and the previous cases between the parties, the Court has
specifically considered whether a broader litigation bar than the one already imposed is
necessary under the circumstances and declines to impose one. Nevertheless, Mr. Carter is
warned that this order disposes of the facts of which he complains in this case. Any attempt to

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file another action in this District re-litigating the claims brought herein will lead to financial or
other penalties that may include restrictions on Mr. Carter’s access to the court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [11] is granted, and
Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions [42] is denied. All other motions are denied as moot. All
previously set dates are stricken. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Civil case terminated.

Date: 9/5/2018
Jorge L. Alonso
United States District Judge

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