Owens v. Corcoran et al

Filing 222

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Javed in Case No. 18-cv-334. Plaintiff is directed to show cause within 14 days why summary judgment should not also be entered in favor of the remaining Defendants. See attached Memorandum and Opinion for further details. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 9/25/2023. Mailed notice. (cp, )

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BENAHDAM HURT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JAMES CORCORAN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________________)
)
MARK OWENS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JAMES P. CORCORAN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________________)

No. 17-cv-7909
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

No. 18-cv-334
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On June 30, 2017, security officers escorted social worker Christy Lenhardt from the
premises of the Elgin Mental Health Center (“EMHC”), a state-run mental health hospital that
houses and treats patients who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”). Earlier
that day, security officers uncovered evidence that Lenhardt was sexually abusing a patient,
Plaintiff Benahdam Hurt. Lenhardt has since pleaded guilty to a felony count of sexual misconduct
with a person with disabilities for her sexual abuse of Hurt. Unfortunately, Lenhardt’s misconduct
was not isolated to Plaintiff Hurt, and other patients, including Plaintiff Mark Owens, have alleged
that she made sexual advances on them. In these related cases, Plaintiffs Hurt and Owens bring
suit against multiple EMHC staff members whom they believe should have taken steps to protect
them. The Defendants—each state employees sued in their individual capacity—are Dr. Faisa
Kareemi and Dr. Hasina Javed, psychiatrists employed by EMHC; Diana Hogan and Colleen
Delaney, nurses at EMHC; and Andrew Beck, a social worker at EMHC. Plaintiffs allege that the

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Defendants violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment because they knew or suspected that Lenhardt had been abusing them but failed to
report Lenhardt to the authorities, despite their obligations to do so. Both sides now move for
summary judgment.
BACKGROUND 1
A.

Introduction to EMHC and Defendants

Of central importance in this case is what information was available to the individual
defendants. An understanding of EMHC’s physical and administrative structures is therefore
helpful. EMHC is organized in different units, including, as relevant here, the K-Unit and the LUnit, both of which house forensic patients. (Hurt DSOF ¶ 10.) Forensic patients are patients
who have been committed to EMHC either because they have been deemed unfit to stand trial
under 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-16 or have been found NGRI under 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-2-4. (Pls.’ Joint Br. at 6.) The K-Unit and L-Unit are spatially separated by a common
administrative area, but the staff of the two units have access to both units. 2 (Hurt DSOF ¶ 11.)

The facts set forth here come mainly from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements
and related exhibits. Plaintiffs filed a joint statement, and Defendants responded to that statement
jointly. Defendants filed separate statements on the two dockets, and Plaintiffs responded to
them separately. (See Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Joint Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Summ. J.
(“Hurt DSOF”) [Hurt 218]; Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts in Supp of Summ. J.
(“Owens DSOF”) [Owens 202]; Pls.’ L.R. 56.1 Joint Statement of Material Facts in Supp. of Summ.
J. (“PSOF”) [Hurt 222, Owens 204].) The court has also accounted for each party's responsive
statements. (See Hurt’s Resp. to DSOF (“Hurt DSOFR”) [Hurt 234]; Owens’ Resp. to Owens
DSOF (“Owens DSOFR”) [Owens 212]; Defs.’ Joint Resp. to PSOF (“PSOFR”) [Hurt 236, Owens
214].)
The court considers only those facts that are supported by record evidence. Several of
Plaintiffs’ statements of facts are not supported by record evidence and therefore are not
addressed here. For example, in some instances the cited material does not support the
statement asserted. (See, e.g., PSOF ¶¶ 35, 36, 46, 52, 56, 63, 64, 67, 68, 90, 95, 96, 111, 116,
117.) In addition, some of Plaintiffs’ citations reference documents not in the record. (See, e.g.,
PSOF ¶¶ 2, 39, 40, 92, 118.)
1

The court is uncertain whether there is any other distinction between the K-Unit
and the L-Unit or why a patient may be initially assigned to one unit versus the other.
2

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Staff on the K-Unit and L-Unit typically includes nursing staff, psychologists, security therapy aides
(“STAs”), social workers, activity therapists, and two psychiatrists—one for each unit. (Id. ¶ 12.)
EMHC patients ordinarily meet with their social workers individually every one to two
weeks, but these meetings may be more frequent when a patient is first admitted or requires
additional treatment for any reason. (Id. ¶ 13.) Social workers on the L-Unit normally meet
patients in the social workers’ offices, and, under EMHC rules, social workers were expected to
keep their office doors closed but unlocked during these meetings. (Id. ¶ 14.) On their arrival at
EMHC, patients would meet with their treating psychiatrist on a daily or weekly basis, but, after
the patient is settled in, the frequency of those visits is reduced to bi-monthly or monthly. (Id.
¶ 15.) Also on a monthly basis, patients meet with their entire treatment team, including the
assigned social worker and psychiatrist, along with other EMHC staff members. (Id. ¶ 16.) Each
employee at EMHC is required by state law to call the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”)
within four hours if they learn or suspect that any patient has been subject to any sort of neglect
or abuse. (Id. ¶ 19.)
At all relevant times, Defendants in this case were staff members in the K-Unit or L-Unit.
Defendant Dr. Faisa Kareemi worked as a psychiatrist on the K-Unit (id. ¶¶ 3, 25), and Defendant
Dr. Hasina Javed worked as a psychiatrist on the L-Unit. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 23). Psychiatrists at EMHC
work with social workers and nursing staff as part of a treatment team, but the psychiatrists do
not supervise the social workers or nursing staff, nor are psychiatrists responsible for evaluations
or disciplinary action of social work or nursing staff. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.) Drs. Javed and Kareemi
never worked in the social work division at EMHC and have never supervised any social workers
during their employment at EMHC. (Id. ¶ 37.)
Defendant Colleen Delaney was a member of the EMHC nursing staff (Id. ¶ 4); she worked
on the L-Unit as a nurse manager from approximately 2011 to 2015, when she became the
Associate Director of Nursing for the Forensic Treatment Program, overseeing 11 units, including
the K-Unit and L-Unit. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendant Diana Hogan was also a member of the EMHC
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nursing staff (id. ¶ 5); from 2008 to 2015, Hogan served as the Associate Director of Nursing of
the Forensic Treatment Program, and she then became the Director of Nursing at EMHC. (Id.
¶ 32.) Hogan did not work on the K-Unit or the L-Unit on a daily basis and, as Associate Director
of Nursing and then Director of Nursing, Hogan did not supervise social workers. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.)
Defendants Delaney and Hogan never worked for the social work division of EMHC and have
never supervised any social workers during their employment at EMHC. (Id. ¶ 37.)
Defendant Andrew (“Drew”) Beck was an EMHC social worker and worked on the K-Unit
beginning in 2008. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 36.) As a fellow social worker, Beck did not supervise Christy
Lenhardt. (Id. ¶ 38.) For her part, Lenhardt worked as a social worker at EMHC for twenty years,
from approximately 1996 to 2017 (PSOF ¶ 1; Hurt DSOF ¶ 21); she worked on the K-Unit and the
L-Unit, and the details of her transfers between the two units are discussed in more detail below.
B.

Christy Lenhardt’s Prior Abuse

Beyond Christy Lenhardt’s educational qualifications (Lenhardt holds a master’s degree
in social work) and her start date of 1996 as a social worker at EMHC (PSOF ¶ 1; Hurt DSOF
¶ 20), the record includes little information about her early years with EMHC. The first document
of note is an employment review Lenhardt received in 2005, when she was working on the MUnit. At that time, Jeff Pharis, the EMHC Forensic Program Director, documented Lenhardt’s
“perceived overinvolvement with a male patient” and ordered Lenhardt to undertake additional
training on “setting limits, clear boundaries” with patients. (Ex. D to PSOF [Hurt 222-4] at 808.)
The document did not identify the source of this information nor elaborate on the nature of the
specific behavior. (See id.; see also PSOFR [Hurt 236] ¶ 4.) At her deposition, however, Lenhardt
filled in some of the details. She testified that EMHC staff reported to the administration that she
was caught in another EMHC employee’s office with a patient named A.R. 3 (Christy Lenhardt
Dep., Ex. F to PSOF [Hurt 222-9] at 27:4–21 (stating that “people reported it to whoever they
3

The names of other individuals who are potential victims have been redacted.
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reported it to”).) The office in question was that of Rebecca (“Nikolov”) Ogrodny, a clinical staff
member who had worked with Lenhardt on the M Unit. (PSOF ¶¶ 12, 13.) Nikolov, as the parties
refer to her, s a key witness in this case.
Following her August 2005 review, Lenhardt was transferred from the M-Unit to the L-Unit.
(Id. ¶ 9.)

Lenhardt acknowledged that she was transferred due to concerns “about [her]

boundaries with patients” and, specifically, with A.R.—the male patient referred to in her
employment review. (Id. ¶ 9; PSOFR ¶ 9; Lenhardt Dep. at 23:24–29:6.) Rumors spread (to what
extent, it is unclear) among some EMHC workers that Lenhardt was transferred because of
suspicions that she was too close to one or more patients. (See PSOF ¶¶ 32, 33; PSOFR ¶¶ 32,
33.) For example, Audrey Boston—an activity therapist 4 who began working at EMHC in 1988
and, starting in 2012, worked in the L-Unit with Lenhardt and Dr. Javed—testified that in 2005 she
heard rumors that Lenhardt had been transferred “due to some sexual or boundary issues with a
patient on a prior unit.” (Boston Dep., Ex. J to PSOF [222-14] at 8:3–10, 61:24–62:19; PSOF
¶¶ 23, 24.)
Despite this transfer, Lenhardt continued to pursue a relationship with A.R. Then, on or
about February 27, 2006, A.R. escaped from EMHC. (PSOF ¶ 10.) The Illinois State Police
(“ISP”) began investigating the escape (id. ¶ 11), and, on March 1, 2006, they interviewed EMHC
workers, including Lenhardt and Nikolov. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 16.) Lenhardt denied any knowledge of
A.R.’s escape plans and characterized her relationship with A.R. as “strictly professional”;
however, Lenhardt did tell ISP that the EMHC “administration” had accused her of abusing and
neglecting A.R., but she claimed that these allegations were unfounded. (Id. ¶ 14, 17.) For her
part, Nikolov told ISP that she knew nothing about A.R.’s escape plans and did not assist in his
escape. (Id. ¶ 15.) Nikolov further reported that A.R. simply walked past security and signed out,
and that it seemed he acted impulsively. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Ms. Boston testified that activity therapists “provide different modes of therapy
through groups, such as coping skills, physical activity, [and] exercise.” (Boston Dep. at 9:2–7.)
4

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In truth, A.R. fled to Europe after his escape—and Lenhardt planned to meet him there.
(Id. ¶ 37.) Whether Lenhardt told Nikolov of these plans in advance is not clear from the record,
but Nikolov did drive Lenhardt to the airport for her flight and picked her up upon her return. (Id.
¶ 37; see also PSOFR ¶ 36.) Whether anyone else at EMHC ever knew of Lenhardt’s travels to
Europe to meet A.R. is also not clear from the record.
Staff members did know, of course, that a patient had escaped. For example, Defendant
Dr. Javed worked continuously with Lenhardt after Lenhardt’s transfer from the M-Unit to the LUnit in 2005, during the period when A.R. escaped in 2006, and continuing until Lenhardt’s
separation from EMHC on July 5, 2017. (PSOF ¶ 19.) Dr. Javed says she did not know why
Lenhardt was transferred from the M-Unit to the L-Unit. (Javed Dep., Ex. G to PSOF [222-10]
77:10–13 (“She was being transferred to our unit because of some issue on the other unit but I
don’t know any details of that, you know.”).) But Dr. Javed did hear the “big news” about a patient
escaping “right after” it happened; only “[m]uch later” however, did the doctor learn that the patient
was A.R. (Id. at 83:6–23.)
Notwithstanding Lenhardt’s involvement in A.R.’s escape, she continued her job as a
social worker in the L-Unit for more than ten years, ostensibly because EMHC administrators
were unaware of the involvement.

A few years later, in 2009 or 2010, Lenhardt’s relationship

with another patient, Patient M.A.H., generated concern among EMHC staff members. (See Id.
at 100:22–101:18.) In a 2017 interview with ISP after Lenhardt’s abuse of Plaintiff Hurt had come
to light, Dr. Javed reflected on Lenhardt’s earlier relationship with M.A.H., who had been Dr.
Javed’s patient. Dr. Javed told police that she “believed that [M.A.H. had been] spending a lot of
time in [Lenhardt’s] office,” and that Javed “had discussed that with the patient.” (Id. at 97:9–12,
100:22–101:18.) Dr. Javed further explained that she and M.A.H. are both Muslim, and she had
discussed M.A.H.’s feelings for Lenhardt in connection with his religious beliefs. Javed reported
that M.A.H. told her that Prophet Mohammed married a wife much older than he was, so there
would be nothing wrong with his having a relationship with Lenhardt. (Id. at 120:23–121:3.) After
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this conversation with M.A.H., Javed told Lenhart that M.A.H. had “shared with [Javed] that he
had feelings for [Lenhardt] and that it would be advisable if he d[id] not continue to see her
anymore.” (Id. at 107:2–5.) Javed reported that she was “concerned about the patient being
overly fixated on the staff” in his unit, where only women worked, and she decided he should be
transferred to a different unit where he could work with a male therapist. (Id. at 106:2–15.)
Word of M.A.H.’s transfer also got around. Defendant Delaney, who worked in the nursing
division, testified that at some point (Delaney does not recall when), Defendant Beck told Delaney
that M.A.H. had reported to his treatment team that he had developed feelings for Lenhardt.
Delaney recalls that Lenhardt had reportedly admitted she had “feelings for [M.A.H.]” and had
acknowledged “that it would be better if he was moved off the unit.” (Delaney Dep., Ex. N to
PSOF [222-18] 191:7–192:10.) Whether Lenhardt and M.A.H. engaged in a sexual relationship
is not clear, but it appears that there was no further issue between Lenhardt and M.A.H. after he
transferred to a different unit.
C.

Lenhardt and Plaintiff Owens

Plaintiff Mark Owens was admitted to EMHC in 2012 for charges related to the attempted
assault of a police officer. (Owens DSOF ¶ 17; Dep. of Mark Owens, Ex. M to PSOF [Hurt 22217] at 14:11–15, 30:8–16.) Mr. Owens was housed in the L-Unit where Lenhardt was assigned
as social worker. (PSOF ¶ 49; Owens Dep. at 48:11–49:12.) Owens testified that other EMHC
patients—namely, Plaintiff Hurt and M.A.H.—told him about sexual acts Lenhardt performed on
them. (See PSOF ¶ 50; Owens Dep. at 63:19–22.) Lenhardt made Owens feel “uncomfortable.”
(Owens Dep. at 36:2–3.) For example, Owens recalled a meeting with Lenhardt during which
Lenhardt said to him, “you’re not going to get out of here unless you work—unless we get what
we want,” and he interpreted this remark as a sexual advance. (Id. at 34:7–35:24.) On another
occasion, when Owens was seated across from Lenhardt in a chair in her office, she “nudg[ed]
[him] to come closer.” (Id. at 49:20–23.) Owens testified that Lenhardt “took [him] by the seat [of
his chair] and tried to move it.” (Id. at 56:12–14.) Owens further testified that on one occasion
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when Lenhardt came to her office at EMHC over the weekend, he listened while Lenhardt
described her personal problems to him, in tears; Lenhardt did not make any advances that
Owens considered sexual during this encounter, however. (Owens DSOF ¶ 24.)
At his deposition, Owens also described an incident that occurred around June of 2014
when he and Lenhardt were meeting outside of Lenhardt’s office. (PSOF ¶ 51; Owens Dep. at
38:4–39:13.) According to Owens, Dr. Javed walked by and, when she observed them, asked
why Owens and Lenhardt were meeting outside of Lenhardt’s office, and Owens told Javed that
he “was not comfortable being in the office with [Lenhardt].” (Owens Dep. at 38:12–14.) Owens
testified that Dr. Javed asked, “is it because of the Islam?” and he confirmed this, saying, “You
can consider it’s because of the Islam.” (Id. at 38:18–19.) As Owens and Javed are both Muslim,
Owens interpreted Javed’s question as “insinuating” that the reason he was not comfortable being
in the room with Lenhardt was because of his religious beliefs. (Id. at 38:20–23; 45:6–10.) After
Dr. Javed confronted Owens about his meeting with Lenhardt outside her office, Owens says
(without further explanation) that he went into Lenhardt’s office hoping she “would be cool” but
that “it kind of got real hot” and “awkward.” (Id. at 39:2–13.)
Dr. Javed also recalled this episode. She testified in her deposition that when she
questioned Owens, he said only that he “d[idn’t] want to meet in offices,” and “want[ed] to be seen
in open spaces.” (Javed Dep. at 166:8–18.) Dr. Javed did not understand that these concerns
were directed toward Lenhardt specifically; rather, Owens “mention[ed] that he [wa]s not
comfortable meeting with any staff in offices.” (Id. at 166:19–167:1.) Dr. Javed did not believe
that Owens’ statements were meant to alert her to any inappropriate behavior by Lenhardt
towards Owens. (Owens DSOF ¶ 45.)
Owens reports, however, that the next time he spoke with Dr. Javed after this incident, he
told her that he “was uncomfortable working with Christy from that time forward.” (Owens Dep.
at 48:1–2.) Owens acknowledges that during this conversation, he did not tell Javed why he was
uncomfortable working with Lenhardt, and Javed did not inquire. (Id. at 48:3–7.) It is not clear
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from the deposition testimony whether Owens ever specifically asked Javed to be assigned do a
different social worker, but Owens was in fact switched to another social worker after this
conversation. (Id. at 48:8–14.)
The record also shows that on January 15, 2014, Mr. Owens had a physical altercation
with another patient. (See Ex. R to PSOF [Hurt 222-22] at Bates 8726–27.) The next day, an
unidentified social worker documented a call from Mr. Owens’ parents in which they raised
concerns about the January 15 incident. Page(s) are missing from Owen’s medical chart on this
date, however (Dr. Javed does not know why), so the full scope of the phone conversation is
unknown. (See id.; see also Javed Dep. at 134:24–135:4.)
Even though Owens had been assigned to another social worker, Lenhardt completed a
social work note in his medical chart several months later, on January 5, 2015. (See Medical
Chart Social Work Note January 5, 2015, Ex. G to Owens DSOFR [Owens 212-8].) After that
date, there are no notes labeled as social work progress notes in Owens’ file. (See PSOF ¶ 65;
PSOFR ¶ 65; see also generally Ex. U to PSOF [Hurt 222-26]; PSOF ¶ 67; PSOFR ¶ 67.) On
August 12, 2017, Owens was transferred from EMHC to Chicago Read Medical Hospital, ending
his five-and-a-half-year term at EMHC. (Owens DSOF ¶ 18; PSOF ¶ 115.) Although Mr. Owens
believed that Lenhardt was “affectionate” toward him, it is undisputed that the two never engaged
in sexual behavior with one another. (See PSOF ¶ 59; PSOFR ¶ 59; Owens DSOF ¶ 26–32, 34;
Owens DSOFR ¶ 26–32, 34.)
D.

Lenhardt and Plaintiff Hurt

On August 14, 2014, Plaintiff Ben Hurt was admitted to EMHC as NGRI for aggravated
battery of a peace officer. (Hurt DSOF ¶ 39.) When first admitted to EMHC, Hurt was housed on
the L-Unit where Lenhardt was his social worker and Dr. Javed was his treating psychiatrist. (Id.
¶ 40.) Soon after Hurt arrived at EMHC, Lenhardt pursued him. Hurt and Lenhardt first kissed in
late 2014. (PSOF ¶ 62.) Hurt’s own behavior drew attention: in late November 2014, a nurse’s

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note in Hurt’s chart described instances of Hurt’s acting in sexually inappropriate ways around
other patients. (Id. ¶ 61; Ex. T to PSOF [Hurt 222-25] at Bates Hurt 13989–91.)
Around December 14, 2014, Hurt was temporarily transferred to the K-Unit for his safety
after a physical altercation with another patient. (Hurt DSOF ¶ 41.) Hurt returned to the L-Unit
by January 4, 2015. (Id.) Around that same time, in late 2014 or early 2015, Lenhardt and Hurt
started a sexual relationship and began engaging in sexual activity, including Lenhardt’s
performing oral sex on Hurt in her office. (Id. ¶ 43.) During these interactions in Lenhardt’s office,
Hurt would usually stand in front of Lenhardt with his back facing the door, but looking over his
shoulder through a window in the door to see if anyone was approaching. (Id. ¶ 44.) Hurt knew
that Lenhardt’s behavior was placing her job at risk if other EMHC staff members learned of it.
(Id. ¶ 45.) Specifically, Hurt believed that if EMHC staff discovered their relationship, Lenhardt
would go to jail, and he would be transferred to a different mental health facility. (Id. ¶ 46.)
Lenhardt, too, knew that discovery of the sexual relationship would have serious consequences,
including the loss of her job and her social work license and damage to her relationship with her
family. (Id. ¶ 47.) Accordingly, Hurt and Lenhardt both actively took steps to conceal their sexual
relationship from other EMHS patients or staff, and neither said anything about it to other patients
or staff, including any of the Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 49, 50.)
All Defendants in fact deny having any knowledge of Lenhardt’s sexual relationship with
Hurt, but both Hurt and Lenhardt have described circumstances suggesting Defendants could
have had a basis for suspicion. Hurt testified that Dr. Javed noticed that he had spent a lot of
time with Lenhardt and asked what they were doing together, to which Hurt offered an innocuous
response. (Id. ¶ 51.) According to Hurt, on one occasion, Dr. Javed came to Lenhardt’s office
door when Lenhardt was performing oral sex; Hurt concedes he does not know whether Dr. Javed
could see what was going on. (Id. ¶ 52.) On another occasion, Hurt testified, Lenhardt vomited
after performing oral sex on him in a bathroom. (PSOF ¶ 75.) After cleaning himself up, Hurt
“walk[ed] out of the bathroom, and Dr. Javed was there.” (Hurt Dep. at 80:9–81:3.) According to
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Hurt, Javed asked him “What’s going on with you and [Lenhardt]?” because “[s]omething seems
like it’s up.” (Id. at 80:20–22.) Hurt recalls that he “pass[ed] it off,” telling Javed that nothing was
going on. (Id. at 80:22–81:3.)
As for Defendant Delaney, the Director of Nursing, Hurt testified that Delaney noticed that
he was “with Christy Lenhardt in the office a lot” and asked “[w]hat are you guys doing?” (Hurt
DSOF ¶ 53.) Hurt did not tell Delaney that he was having a physical relationship with Lenhardt,
but instead explained that they were engaged in “paperwork.” (Id. ¶ 53.) Delaney, too, walked
by Lenhardt’s office on one occasion while Lenhardt was performing oral sex but, as with the
incident involving Javed, Hurt does not know that Delaney was aware of what was happening.
(Id. ¶ 54.)

According to Audrey Boston (the activity therapist), Defendant Delaney did call

Lenhardt out for “boundary issues” during nursing meetings where, among others, Defendants
Dr. Javed, Dr. Kareemi, and Beck were present. (Boston Dep. at 41:5–16.) Boston estimated
that Delaney admonished Lenhardt for her behavior several times between 2012 and 2017. (Id.
at 41:20–44:24.) Lenhardt herself testified that Delaney would “attack” her in morning meetings,
though she did not specify the reason for these verbal “attacks.” (Lenhardt Dep. at 44:5–50:22.)
Hurt and Lenhardt testified that Defendant Beck, too, had his suspicions. Hurt testified
that Beck commented on the amount of time that he spent with Lenhardt. (Hurt DSOF ¶ 55.)
And, like Javed and Delaney, Beck came to Lenhardt’s office on one occasion when Lenhardt
was performing oral sex. (Id. ¶ 56.) Again, however, Hurt does not know whether Beck saw what
Lenhardt was doing, and Beck never said anything to Hurt about Lenhardt’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 56.)
Hurt described one incident when he and Lenhardt were interrupted by a knock on the
door during an episode of oral sex. (Hurt Dep. at 102:22–103:2.) Hurt alerted Lenhardt that
someone was at the door, and when Lenhardt opened it, Beck was there; Beck said, “Christy, I’d
like to speak with you,” to which Lenhardt replied, “okay.” (Id. at 102:22–103:15.) According to
Hurt, he stepped outside the office at Lenhardt’s request. Lenhardt and Beck initially engaged in
a conversation outside the office in Hurt’s presence, but then went into Lenhardt’s office, while
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Hurt remained outside. (Id. at 103:14–24.) Hurt heard Beck and Lenhardt arguing for about ten
minutes in the office, after which Beck left and Hurt reentered the room and finished his session
with Lenhardt. (Id. at 103:20–104:6.)
According to Hurt, Lenhardt told him about her exchange with Beck and reported that Beck
had asked her, “What’s with you and black guys?” (Id. at 103:14–104:6.) In her own testimony,
Lenhardt confirmed that Beck made this comment about “black guys” to her. (Lenhardt Dep. at
108:1–3.) Lenhardt also testified that Beck had warned her that “administration was watching
[her] and [Hurt].” (Id. at 107:13–14.) Beck himself disputes having posed such a question to
Lenhardt and denies telling her that the administration was suspicious of her behavior. (Andrew
Beck Decl., Ex. 1 to PSOFR [Owens 214-1] ¶¶ 9–10.) Beck asserts that he “first learned of any
impropriety” regarding Lenhardt and any EMHC patients during the ISP investigation in the fall of
2017. (Beck Decl. ¶ 4.)
Lenhardt continued to engage in behavior which, according to Plaintiffs, could have
exposed Lenhardt’s misconduct. Between September and December 2016, Lenhardt and Hurt
exchanged numerous amorous emails, including naked pictures of Lenhardt. (PSOF ¶ 74.)
Lenhardt used her mobile phone to communicate with an email account that she set up for Hurt.
(Id. ¶ 74.)
On December 18, 2016, Hurt was transferred from the L-Unit to the K-Unit due to the
aggressive behavior of another patient. (Id. ¶ 79; PSOFR ¶ 79.) Hurt’s transfer to the K-Unit in
2016 resulted in his treatment team being changed. (See PSOF ¶ 80.) The treatment teams in
both the K-Unit and L-Unit agreed that Hurt would complete the Mental Health Substance Abuse
(“MISA”) program in the K-Unit. (Id. ¶ 80; PSOFR ¶ 80.) That program typically takes patients
six to nine months to complete, and Hurt was scheduled to leave EMHC in the summer of 2017,
so the plan for his completion of this MISA program would have kept him housed in the K-Unit for
the remainder of his time at the facility. (See PSOF ¶¶ 80, 112; PSOFR ¶ 80.)

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Hurt’s new social worker in the K-Unit was Robert (“Bob”) Hamlin. 5 (See Bob Hamlin Dep.,
Ex. GG to PSOF [Hurt 222-36] at 19:17–20:11.) As a result of Hurt’s transfer to the K-Unit, one
of Hamlin’s patients was transferred to Lenhardt in the L-Unit. (Lenhardt Dep. at 92:6–93:4.)
Despite this rearrangement, Lenhardt had a reason to enter the K-Unit where Hurt was housed:
Lenhardt explained that Hamlin gave his patients snacks as an incentive for good behavior, and
Lenhardt continued this program for Hamlin’s former patient, now assigned to the L-Unit.
Lenhardt frequently visited Hamlin’s office in the K-Unit to retrieve snacks. (Id.) In a statement
he later gave to the ISP, Hamlin confirmed that he left food for patients in his office. (Ex. B to
PSOF [Hurt 222-2] at 000137–38.)
Lenhardt’s frequent presence on the K-Unit nevertheless drew suspicion.

Activity

Therapist Boston testified “on more than several occasions,” she observed that Lenhardt had
secluded herself in an office with Hurt and was giving him food. (Boston Dep. at 32:9–14; 34-1.)
Boston testified that on one occasion she warned Lenhardt that “it looked very odd to have
somebody secluded in your office . . . with food,” and that “the other patients are talking about it.”
(Id. at 33:13–16.)

Boston recalled that when confronted about “boundary issues” during staff

meetings, Lenhardt “always made excuses to other people . . .; she would have excuses.” (Id. at
32:23–24; 41:5-7.) In late December 2016 or early 2017, Lenhardt became emotional, openly in
tears for several days during the morning staff meetings about the fact that Hurt was no longer on
the L-Unit, and, according to Boston, asking with “over-excessive” tears why he wasn’t being
transferred back. (Id. at 133:8-134:12; PSOF ¶ 83.)
Defendant Dr. Faiza Kareemi took over as Hurt’s treating psychiatrist in the K-Unit. (Id. ¶
80; PSOFR ¶ 80.) Hurt testified that Dr. Kareemi made inquiries about his relationship with
Lenhardt, asking him, “How are you two getting along?”, “What are you two working on more
than—more than work?”, “What was going on in the office, why [Hurt] was there so much . . . .”
Defendant Drew Beck was also Hurt’s social worker on the K-Unit for a brief period
between April 2017 and May 2017. (PSOF ¶ 86.)
5

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(Hurt Dep. at 54:18–24.) He also recalled Dr. Kareemi commenting that “Christy Lenhardt is really
busy. You go to her office a lot. Why?” (Id. at 55:5–7.) Hurts responded by telling Dr. Kareemi
that he visited Lenhardt’s office to “[g]et services for my treatment plan.” (Id. at 55:7–8.)
On at least one occasion, Hurt and Lenhardt engaged in sex acts in Hamlin’s office. The
lock on Hamlin’s office was faulty; this defect had at some point previously been reported to
security staff. (DSOF ¶ 69.) On May 31, 2017, while Lenhardt and Hurt were in the office, they
were accidentally locked in and Lenhardt had to call security to open the door. (PSOF ¶ 91.) A
security officer documented this event in a security incident report, noting that Lenhardt told him
that she had asked Hurt into the office to try to fix the broken lock. (Ex. GG to PSOF [Hurt 22236].) On June 1, 2017, Chief of Security William Epperson forwarded the report to several
individuals, including Defendants Delaney and Hogan, and stated in his email that he was “[v]ery
concerned that a [social worker] would ask for assistance from a patient, for an office not on her
unit.” (Id.) The following day, Medical Administrator James Corcoran attended an administrative
meeting where the attendees discussed the fact that “Mr. Hurt, and a social worker, had been
locked in an office inadvertently and security was called to somehow open the door.” (James
Corcoran Dep., Ex. HH to PSOF [222-37] at 24:14–25:20.) At that meeting, “[t]he first thing that
came to [Corcoran’s] mind” was “Is this reportable to the Office of the Inspector General?” (Id. at
29:10–17.)
Corcoran was not the only worker concerned about the incident. When later talking to ISP
officers, Defendant Beck also said it was unusual for a patient to be locked in a room with a social
worker, especially a social worker who was not assigned to work with that patient. (See PSOF
¶ 98; Beck Dep. at 106:3–107:10.) Nikolov, the woman who drove Lenhardt to the airport to visit
A.R., testified that after the incident in Hamlin’s office she “maybe” told Dr. Javed and Dr. Kareemi
that Lenhardt had feelings for a patient in the past. (Nikolov Dep. at 59:2–16.) For their parts,
however, neither Javed nor Kareemi has any memory of ever having a conversation with Nikolov
about Lenhardt and Hurt or Patient A.R. (Javed Dep. at 251:12–20; Kareemi Dep. at 108:6–8.)
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In early June, Richard Malis, the Acting Medical Director of EMHC, heard about the locked
office incident. (PSOF ¶ 100.) Sometime in early June, he saw Hurt standing in the doorway of
Bob Hamlin’s office talking to Lenhardt, and he reported this to Hamlin, who then became angry
with Lenhardt. (Id. ¶ 100; Hurt PSOFR ¶ 100.) Whether Malis or Hamlin took any further action
at this point is uncertain.
Then on June 30, 2017, at around 7:30 a.m., Chief Epperson received a report that Hurt
had posted on social media a photo of himself, taken within EMHC. (PSOF ¶ 101.) From the
appearance of this photograph—which included a picture that could be seen in the background—
Epperson and other security officers determined that the photo of Hurt had been taken in
Lenhardt’s office. (Id. ¶ 101; PSOFR ¶ 102.) Security officers proceeded to conduct a search of
Hurt’s room while Epperson himself was attending the morning meeting. (William Epperson Dep.,
Ex. JJ to PSOF [Hurt 222-39] at 23:15–18.) In their search, the security staff discovered evidence
that included a journal and four USB drives containing audio recordings.

In one of these

recordings, Lenhardt and Hurt can be heard engaged in or discussing sexual activity; in another,
Lenhardt can be heard telling Hurt she had assisted in the escape of A.R. and had visited A.R. in
Germany months later. (Id. at 16:14-17:19; 35:1–7.) Immediately after the search, security officer
Jeremy Jackson knocked on the meeting door and asked Epperson to step outside, where
Jackson showed Epperson a passage from the journal he had retrieved from Hurt’s room, which
made reference to Lenhardt’s efforts to assist A.R.’s escape. (Id. at 28:2–31.) Epperson returned
to the meeting, but did not immediately share what he had learned with others in attendance at
the meeting. (Id. at 28:16–23.) Epperson did tell the hospital administrator, Brian Dawson, about
his team’s discovery, and advised Dawson that he intended to report the matter to the Division of
Internal Investigations. (Id. at 28:24–30:9.)
The room search and meeting had occurred before Lenhardt arrived at work. (PSOF
¶ 105.) Epperson conferred with HR Director Derek Williams and, when Lenhardt arrived, HR
personnel intercepted her and took her to the administration area. (Hurt PSOFR ¶¶ 105, 106;
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Epperson Dep. at 31:13–18.) By 11:00 a.m., Epperson had listened to the recordings of two
conversations between Hurt and Lenhardt, and wrote a detailed report that included an allegation
of custodial sexual abuse against Lenhardt. (PSOF ¶ 108.) After the recording and journal were
found in Hurt’s room, Lenhardt was escorted out of EMHC, never to return. 6 (Id.) At 1:00 p.m.,
Epperson called the ISP Division of Internal Investigation and informed them of the allegation of
custodial sexual abuse. (PSOF ¶ 109.)
Dr. Javed testified that she does not recall being present at EMHC the day that Hurt’s
room was searched and Lenhardt was removed from the premises. (Javed Dep. at 258:15–
265:20.) She does recall being present soon afterwards, however, and also recalls receiving a
call from Lenhardt’s husband, who told Dr. Javed that Lenhardt was very upset. (Id. at 256:19–
258:11; See also PSOF ¶ 119.) In response to a question from Lenhardt’s husband about what
had happened, Dr. Javed told him, “I know she was walked out relating to some patient issue but
that’s all I know.” (Javed Dep. at 257:4–17.)
Also on June 30, 2017, Chief Epperson or a member of the EMHC nursing staff imposed
a restriction of rights (“ROR”) on Hurt, restricting his movement off the unit and his telephone
privileges. (PSOFR ¶ 107.) On July 3, 2017, EMHC staff extended the ROR until July 22, 2017,
effectively prohibiting Hurt from contacting anyone other than his mother. On July 22, 2017, Hurt’s
NGRI commitment expired, and he was released from EMHC. (PSOF ¶ 110, 112.)
After the imposition of the ROR and before his release, Hurt had psychiatric sessions with
Dr. Kareemi. Dr. Kareemi testified that she did not ask Hurt about the investigation during those
sessions because the administration had not told her anything about it, and she did not feel it “it
was appropriate or my place to go and ask administration why they were hiding it, why they were
not telling me.” (See Kareemi Dep. at 206:11–211:17.)

The record is not clear as to how long Lenhardt was in the administration area
before she was escorted from the facility.
6

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On August 3, 2017, ISP received Chief Epperson’s security report. (Ex. B to PSOF at
Bates 112.) As noted, Christy Lenhardt has pleaded guilty to a felony count of sexual misconduct
with a person with disabilities. (See Lenhardt Dep. at 80:10–16.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hurt, through counsel, filed this suit on November 2, 2017. He has since filed several
amended complaints [Hurt 23, 39, 56] and raises a host of constitutional claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (See Third Amended Complaint [Hurt 56] ¶ 17.) Owens filed his suit on January
1, 2018. His claims in large part mirror Hurt’s. The court has dismissed some of those claims on
Defendants’ motion. See Hurt v. Corcoran, No. 17 C 7909, 2019 WL 3842819, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 15, 2019). What remains are both Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims against Dr.
Javed; and Hurt’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Kareemi, Beck, Delaney, and Hogan.
Both sides now seek summary judgment [Hurt 216, 220; Owens 200, 203]. In Hurt’s case,
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all counts on the following bases:
(1) Hurt’s failure to intervene claim fails because Hurt cannot prove that any Defendant had actual
knowledge of the sexual relationship between himself and Lenhardt; (2) Hurt’s claims under a
theory of supervisory liability fail because none of the Defendants ever supervised Lenhardt in
any capacity; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no evidence
that any Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (See generally Defs’ Joint Mem. in
Supp. of Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Hurt Br.”) [Hurt 217].) In support of his own motion for summary
judgment [220], Hurt argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on both his substantive and
procedural due process claims because the record demonstrates that Defendants knew of or
suspected Lenhardt’s abuse but failed to report it. (See generally Pl.’s Joint Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Pls.’ Joint Br.”) [Hurt 220].)
In Owens’ case, Defendant Javed makes the following arguments in support of her motion
for summary judgment [Owens 200]: (1) Owens’ failure to intervene claim fails because Lenhardt
never violated his constitutional rights, and there is no evidence that Dr. Javed had actual
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knowledge of any behavior by Lenhardt that Owens perceived as inappropriate; (2) Owens’
supervisory liability theory fails because Dr. Javed never supervised Lenhardt; and (3) Dr. Javed
is entitled to qualified immunity. (See generally Def. Javed’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. (“Def.’s
Owens Br.”) [Owens 201].) Plaintiffs have submitted joint opening briefs; Owens’ arguments in
support of his motion [Hurt 203] are identical to Hurt’s. Owens argues that he is entitled to
summary judgment because the record demonstrates that Defendant Javed knew of or suspected
Lenhardt’s abuse but failed to report it. (See generally Pls.’ Joint Br. [Owens 203].)
DISCUSSION
The court will grant a motion for summary judgment only if the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The court views the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Garofalo v. Vill. of
Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Laskin v. Siegel, 728 F.3d 731, 734 (7th
Cir. 2013)). Put differently, in order to succeed at the summary judgment stage, the record must
show that “no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka,
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994). When the court considers cross-motions
for summary judgment, as is the case here, it must interpret any disputed facts in favor of each
nonmovant. Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs bring their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law.”
J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). It is
undisputed that the Defendants were acting under color of state law, so the second requirement
is not at issue in this case.
As for the first requirement, § 1983 does not in and of itself provide substantive rights;
rather, it “merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham
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v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally,
a defendant can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she is “personally responsible for the
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Green v. Beth, 770 F. App'x 273, 275 (7th Cir.
2019) (citing Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018)). Section 1983 “creates a cause
of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault.” Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep't of
Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, defendants are not liable
under § 1983 “merely for their supervision of others,” and instead the plaintiff must show that the
constitutional violation occurred “at the defendant’s direction or with his knowledge or consent.”
Id. Here, Plaintiffs point to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to articulate two
theories of constitutional violations by the Defendants: a failure to intervene claim and a
procedural due process claim. 7 The court addresses these two theories separately.
I.

Failure to Intervene Claim
Plaintiffs’ primary § 1983 claim is that Defendants violated their due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene and protect Plaintiffs from Lenhardt’s sexual
misconduct. An antecedent component of this claim is that there was a constitutional violation of
Plaintiffs’ liberty interest in bodily integrity; the second component is that the Defendants were
aware of the constitutional violation and failed to intervene.
Ordinarily, the state does not have a constitutional obligation “to protect private citizens
from doing harm to each other.” J.H. ex rel. Higgin, 346 F.3d at 791–92 (citing DeShaney v.

Defendants have also moved for summary judgment as to any claim predicated on
a theory of supervisory liability. (Defs.’ Hurt Br. at 9; Def.’s Owens Br. at 7.) Plaintiffs have not
asserted such a claim in their complaints and do not raise such a theory in their motion for
summary judgment. In fact, the parties agree that none of the Defendants ever supervised
Lenhardt. (Hurt DSOF ¶¶ 37, 38; Hurt DSOFR ¶¶ 37, 38.) Defendants’ request for summary
judgment with respect to any supervisory liability claim under § 1983 is moot.
7

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Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)). Courts have recognized,
however, that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty on a state
where it “creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger or renders citizens more
vulnerable to a danger than they otherwise would have been.” Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,
1126 (7th Cir. 1993). The paradigmatic failure-to-intervene case is one brought against a law
enforcement officer who stands by and watches as his or her partner uses excessive force on an
individual. Indeed, Defendants rely on the case law in this area and cite to Yang v. Hardin, 37
F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) to assert that a failure to intervene claim requires a plaintiff to show
that the defendant had actual knowledge of a constitutional violation and failed to intervene. Yang
involved a § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim brought against a police officer who stood by and
silently watched as his partner physically assaulted a store owner who was attempting to stop the
abusive officer from stealing from his business. Id. at 283–84. The district court concluded that
the police officer who observed the assault was not liable as a matter of law, but the Seventh
Circuit reversed. In finding the bystander-officer liable under § 1983, the court articulated the
standard for failure-to-intervene cases involving excessive force by law enforcement:
An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement
officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under § 1983 if
that officer had reason to know . . . that any constitutional violation has been
committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity
to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.
Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs contend that the standard for a failure-to-intervene claim is satisfied if the
Defendants knew or suspected that the Plaintiffs were being abused. To support this assertion,
the Plaintiffs cite to a district court ruling in Doe v. Board of Educ. of Consol. Sch. Dist. 230 Cook
Cnty., 18 F. Supp. 2d 954, 958 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Doe involved a § 1983 claim against the principal
of a high school who failed to protect minor students from engaging in sexual relations with a
school staff member. Id. at 956–57. The court in Doe denied summary judgment for the principal
and stated “[a]lthough there is no direct evidence establishing that any of the individual defendants
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had actual knowledge of Vasquez's relationships with plaintiffs . . . a reasonable jury [could]
conclude that some or all of the individual defendants had enough knowledge to suspect some
improper activity and did nothing about it.” Id. at 958. The court did clarify, however, that
“personal involvement is a prerequisite for individual liability in a § 1983 action” and that a
supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for “simply [being] negligent in failing to detect and
prevent subordinate misconduct.” Id. at 957 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gossmeyer
v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 491 (7th Cir.1997)). Instead, the court stated, a supervisor can be
held liable under § 1983 only if they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone
it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see” and added that they must “act either
knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Id. 957–58. Notably, however, plaintiffs’
claims in Doe were brought under a theory of supervisory liability, not one of failure to intervene.
Id. at 957.
In the court’s view, neither side in this case has cited directly-controlling case law, but
Plaintiffs have stated the more applicable standard. Closest support for this conclusion can be
found in § 1983 failure-to-intervene cases brought by victims of sexual abuse in the foster care
setting. In this context, the Seventh Circuit has applied a “modified deliberate indifference
standard . . . requiring actual knowledge or suspicion of the alleged risk.” J.H. ex rel. Higgin, 346
F.3d at 791 (emphasis in original); see also K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that children in state custody have a right not to be placed in the custody
of an individual “whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser”); Lewis v. Anderson, 308
F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the “knows or suspects” standard in a failure-to-intervene
case involving an abusive foster care setting).
J.H. ex rel. Higgin, a case that neither side here has cited, is illustrative. J.H. ex rel. Higgin
was a § 1983 suit brought by two minor siblings who were sexually abused by their respective
foster fathers, both of whom were convicted of aggravated sexual assault. Id. at 789. The action
was brought against multiple employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family
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Services (“DCFS”), who oversaw placing the minors in the two homes where they were abused.
Id. There was evidence that the defendants knew or suspected that there was a significant risk
of abuse: one of the foster fathers had two previous allegations of abuse on his record. Id. at 794.
The plaintiffs also presented evidence of dangerous/unsanitary conditions in the homes of the
two foster parents. Id. at 793.
Defendants in J.H. ex rel. Higgins prevailed on summary judgment; the court observed
that even the more relaxed standard requires that the plaintiffs “show a connection between any
knowledge or suspicion of risk that the defendants may have had and the injury that the children
actually suffered.” Id. at 793. Evidence of the unsanitary conditions of the homes would not have
suggested to the defendants that the plaintiffs were likely to be abused, nor was the court moved
by the evidence showing a record of abuse by one of the foster fathers. Id. More meaningful was
evidence showing that the prior allegations of abuse were investigated by DCFS and determined
to be unfounded, and perhaps more importantly, that the named defendants were not involved in
those investigations. Id. at 794. The court noted that while “the underlying facts of cases like this
portray a sad course of events, we nevertheless continue to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the individual defendants had specific knowledge or suspicion of the risk of sexual abuse” in order
to hold defendants liable under § 1983. Id. at 792.
In this court’s view, the facts and law of J.H. ex rel. Higgins are more closely analogous to
the case at hand than the law enforcement failure-to-intervene cases relied on by Defendants. In
both the foster care cases discussed above and the one before this court, the plaintiffs are
individuals with limited capacity—children and individuals adjudged criminally insane,
respectively. Additionally, in both the foster care cases and the present case, the plaintiffs were
in the long-term custody of the state when they were allegedly subjected to abuse. Cf. Lewis,
308 F.3d at 773 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (noting that an official’s duty to
intervene “may arise from the creation of a special relationship between the state and the
individual”).
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In its analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, then, the court will apply the standard used
in J.H. ex rel. Higgins. 8 Under that standard, for Plaintiffs to succeed on their § 1983 failure-tointervene claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an underlying constitutional injury, and (2)
that the defendants “knew of or suspected the specific risk facing plaintiffs and consciously
ignored it or failed to stop the abuse.” J.H. ex rel. Higgin, 346 F.3d at 792 (citing Lewis, 308 F.3d
at 773). Because the two Plaintiffs’ failure-to-intervene claims are distinct from each other, the
court applies this standard to each one separately.
A.

Plaintiff Owens

Plaintiff Owens and Defendant Dr. Javed filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim. As noted above, Dr. Javed was Owens’ psychiatrist at EMHC
while Lenhardt was Owens’ social worker. Owens claims that Dr. Javed knew or suspected that
Lenhardt was abusing him, and that Dr. Javed failed to intervene. Owens’ claim fails, however,
because there is no evidence that Lenhardt ever abused him.
Owens and Lenhardt both testified that the two never engaged in any sexual activity; they
never kissed, fondled each other, or engaged in any sexual activity. (Owens DSOF ¶¶ 26–32.)
The nearest allegation to physical contact between Owens and Lenhardt is Owens’ claim that
during one of his sessions with Lenhardt, she “took [him] by the seat and tried to move it” in an
attempt to nudge him closer to her. (Owens Dep. at 56:12–14.) Owens does describe other
nonphysical interactions he had with Lenhardt that made him feel uncomfortable and which he
interpreted as seductive behavior. For example, Owens described an incident when Lenhardt
came to the EMHC on a weekend and met with him, crying about personal problems she was
experiencing. (Id. at 53:24–55:6.) In another instance, during a social work session, Lenhardt
allegedly told Owens, “You’re not going to get out of here unless you work—unless we get what

As neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants cited to J.H. ex rel. Higgins or the other foster
care cases discussed in this opinion, the court will consider additional briefing on the topic should
the parties request it.
8

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we want.” (Id. at 34:7–35:24.) In essence, Owens’ claim is that his perception that Lenhardt was
attempting to seduce him amounted to a constitutional violation.
Given the knowledge now of record concerning Lenhardt’s unlawful conduct at EMHC for
more than a decade, the court recognizes that Lenhardt may indeed have had lewd intentions.
Nevertheless, the record does not support the claim that Owens suffered a constitutional harm at
her hands. Owens’ claim here is based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which “does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.”
Lewis, 308 F.3d at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202
(1988)). Existing caselaw does not precisely define what actions constitute an infringement of
one’s liberty interest in bodily integrity, but Owens fails to cite even one case supporting the claim
that his interactions with Lenhardt amounted to a constitutional violation. Given the lack of any
concrete allegation of physical or verbal harassment, the court concludes that Owens did not
suffer a due process harm. Because Lenhardt never violated Owen’s constitutional rights, his
failure-to-intervene case must necessarily fail. See Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th
Cir. 2005) (citing Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “[i]n order
for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that there must exist an underlying
constitutional violation”)).

Accordingly, the court grants Defendant Dr. Javed’s motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiff Owens’ failure-to-intervene claim.
B.

Plaintiff Hurt

Plaintiff Hurt and Defendants Dr. Javed, Dr. Kareemi, Beck, Delaney, and Hogan have
filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim. At the outset,
the court notes that it is undisputed that Hurt suffered an underlying constitutional harm at the
hands of Lenhardt, specifically that she sexually abused Hurt. (See Hurt DSOF ¶ 42, 43.) Instead,
the Defendants each argue that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because they did not actually know about
Lenhardt’s sexual misconduct involving Hurt, whereas Hurt claims that each Defendant knew of
or suspected the abuse. In their efforts to peek into the minds of each Defendant and discern
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what each knew or suspected, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, including over two
dozen depositions and a review of some 30,000 documents. As explained below, the weight of
the evidence against each Defendant is varied. Ultimately, however, the court concludes there
remain significant issues of material fact as to what each Defendant knew or suspected and
therefore denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Hurt’s failure-to-intervene claim.
Some of the most forceful evidence that Plaintiffs present connecting Lenhardt’s sexual
abuse to Defendants is her roughly twelve-year history of abuse at EMHC and the rumors that
swirled around the facility. The record shows evidence that Lenhardt had sexual relations with at
least three patients at EMHC; that she engaged in sexual activities with patients at EMHC during
normal business hours, in her office and other staff member’s offices; and that on multiple
occasions she was nearly caught in the act as staff walked by the office or knocked on the door
while she was engaging in her misconduct. The record also shows evidence that Lenhardt’s
misconduct generated rumors among EMHC staff. Audrey Boston, an activity therapist who
worked on the L-Unit with Dr. Javed, testified that “prior to my arriving to the L-Unit [in 2012], there
already was . . . a reputation in the hospital” that Lenhardt was moved to the L-Unit “due to some
sexual or boundary issues with a patient on a prior unit.” (Boston Dep. at 62:3–12.) Others
testified as to Lenhardt’s shadowy reputation, including witnesses Nikolov, Desai, Boston, and
Ingram. (PSOF ¶ 26, 31–33.) Lenhardt herself testified that hospital “administration” had accused
her of abusing a patient. (Id. ¶ 17.) After Lenhardt and Hurt were caught locked in Hamlin’s office,
EMHC Security Chief Epperson emailed staff (including defendants Delaney and Hogan)
expressing that he was “[v]ery concerned” that a [social worker] would ask for assistance from a
patient, for an office not on her unit”—highlighting that even staff outside of Hurt’s treatment team
were on notice. (Ex. GG to PSOF.)
Plainly, the evidence that Lenhardt was abusive is voluminous and, at times, seemingly
right in front of Defendants. Still, in order to succeed on a failure-to-intervene claim, Plaintiff Hurt
must show that the Defendants in fact knew or suspected the existence of abuse, not merely that
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they “should have known.” Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citation
omitted) (“what state officials ‘should have known’ is an insufficient basis of constitutional
liability”). To attribute knowledge or suspicion to the Defendants from this record, Plaintiff Hurt
points to statements allegedly made by each of the Defendants to either Hurt or Lenhardt. For
example, Plaintiff Hurt claimed that Dr. Javed once asked him, “What’s going on with you and
[Lenhardt]?” because “[s]omething seems like it’s up” immediately after he walked out of a room
where Lenhardt vomited after performing oral sex on him. (Hurt Dep. at 80:20–22.) Hurt testified
about similar interactions with Dr. Kareemi in which she asked, “What are you [and Lenhardt]
working on more than—more than work?” and “Christy Lenhardt is really busy. You go to her
office a lot. Why?” (Id. at 55:5–7.) Similarly, Hurt says that Defendant Delaney observed at least
once that he was with “Lenhardt in the office a lot” and asked “[w]hat are you guys doing?” (Id.
at 76:5–7.) Plaintiff also points to testimony from Boston claiming that she witnessed Defendant
Delaney publicly accuse Lenhardt of having boundary issues in morning meetings where Dr.
Javed, Defendant Dr. Kareemi, Defendant Beck were allegedly present. (Boston Dep. at 41:5–
16.) Boston recalled Lenhardt’s “over-excessive” tears during these meetings, in reaction to
Hurt’s having been moved off Lenhardt’s unit. (Id. at 133:8-134:12.) Plaintiff and Lenhardt both
testified that Defendant Beck had asked Lenhardt “What’s with you and black guys?” (Id. at
103:14–104:6; Lenhardt Dep. at 108:1–3.) And Lenhardt testified that Beck had warned her that
“administration was watching [her] and [Hurt].” (Lenhardt Dep. at 107:13–14.)
For their parts, Defendants have each vehemently denied these inferences supplied by
Plaintiff and maintain that they had no knowledge or suspicion of a sexual relationship between
Lenhardt and Hurt. But as the Seventh Circuit has noted, failure-to-intervene cases generally
present “an issue for the trier of fact unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could
not possibly conclude otherwise.” Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir.
1997) (citing Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994)). In this case, there is evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that each Defendant knew of or suspected that Lenhardt
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was sexually abusing Hurt for nearly three years and that, instead of intervening, each chose to
bury their heads in the sand. Similarly, a reasonable jury could conclude that each Defendant
was indeed ignorant of Lenhardt’s abuse, in part because of Lenhardt and Hurt’s efforts to conceal
their relationship and in part because of the sheer unlikelihood of the scenario. For this reason,
the court denies both Plaintiff Hurt’s and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Hurt’s
failure-to-intervene claim.
Briefly, the court acknowledges that Defendants have also raised qualified immunity as a
defense to Plaintiff’s claim. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). Determining if an official is entitled to qualified immunity involves two inquiries.
T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). First, the court must decide
whether the facts demonstrate that the official conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. Second,
if there was a constitutional violation, the court must determine whether the violated right was
“clearly established.” Id. Defendants here address only the first prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry. Specifically, they claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not
have “actual knowledge” of the sexual abuse by Lenhardt and thus, according to Defendants,
there was no constitutional violation. (Defs.’ Hurt Br. at 12.) As discussed above, however,
whether Plaintiff Hurt can establish a constitutional violation by the Defendants is, for now, a
matter of factual dispute. Because the underlying factual allegations are disputed, the court
denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
II.

Procedural Due Process Claim
Finally, Plaintiffs Owens and Hurt also assert a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process claim. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ alleged violation of the Illinois Department of
Human Services Act, 20 ILC 1305/1-17 et. seq. (“IDHS Act”)—which creates reporting obligations
for state employees on the discovery of abuse—amounts to a constitutional violation. (Pls.’ Joint
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Br. at 50.) The court finds this claim meritless. A violation of state law, assuming one occurred
here, “does not per se make a state actor liable under § 1983.” J.H. ex rel. Higgin, 346 F.3d at
793. That is because state law violations “do not form the basis for imposing § 1983 liability.” Id.
(citing Windle v. City of Marion, Ind., 321 F.3d 658, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also White v.
Olig, 56 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is therefore a truism, reiterated many times by this court,
that mere allegations of state law infraction are insufficient to support a Section 1983 claim.”).
In support of their claim, Plaintiffs cite two cases: Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466
(1983) and Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1990), but those cases do not alter
this court’s conclusion. Those cases address a different context; they specifically deal with
situations when state statutes regulating prison conditions create a liberty interest for prisoners.
More importantly, the Supreme Court has overruled the proposition for which Plaintiffs rely on the
two cases. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) (overruling Hewitt and holding that
“the search for a negative implication from mandatory language in [state] prisoner regulations has
strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”).
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have an actionable liberty interest created by the IDHS
Act’s reporting requirements. Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment ([220] in No. 17cv-7909; [203] in No. 18-cv-334) are denied in full. Defendants' motions for summary judgment
([216] in No. 17-cv-7909; [200] in No. 18-cv-334) are denied as to Plaintiff Hurt’s failure-tointervene claim and Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity and granted as to Plaintiffs’
supervisory liability claims and procedural due process claims. Defendant Javed’s motion for
summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff Owens’ failure-to-intervene claim ([200] in No. 18-cv334). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant in Case No. 18-cv-334. The
parties are directed to show cause within 14 days why the seal should not be lifted on their
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summary judgment submissions or, in the alternative, propose redactions that would permit
otherwise sealed documents to be in the public record.
ENTER:

Dated: September 25, 2023

______________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

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