Matherly v. DeKalb County Jail et al

Filing 7

ORDER : Plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 3 is granted. The court authorizes and orders the trust fund officer at plaintiff's place of incarceration to deduct $6.80 from plaintiff's account for pay ment to the Clerk of Court as an initial partial payment of the filing fee, and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. However, the court summarily dismisses the complaint on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 915A for failure to state a colorable federal claim. The case is terminated. The court directs the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. This dismissal counts as one of plaintiff's three allotted dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dismissal is without prejudice to pursuing any avenue of relief that may be available in the state court system. [See STATEMENT] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 1/24/2018. Mailed notice (jp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Jason Matherly (278343),
Plaintiff,
v.
DeKalb County Jail, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18 CV 00369

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] is granted. The court
authorizes and orders the trust fund officer at plaintiff’s place of incarceration to deduct $6.80
from plaintiff’s account for payment to the Clerk of Court as an initial partial payment of the
filing fee, and to continue making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. However,
the court summarily dismisses the complaint on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for
failure to state a colorable federal claim. The case is terminated. The court directs the Clerk of
Court to enter final judgment. This dismissal counts as one of plaintiff’s three allotted dismissals
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dismissal is without prejudice to pursuing any avenue of relief that
may be available in the state court system.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Jason Matherly, currently an inmate at the Kendall County Jail, brings this pro
se civil rights action purportedly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that he stumbled,
fell, and injured himself while exiting from a DeKalb County Jail transport vehicle. Plaintiff
faults the deputy who was escorting him, alleging that the officer failed to raise the car seat for
him. For the reasons set forth in this order, the court grants plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, but summarily dismisses the complaint on initial review for failure to
state an actionable federal claim.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is unable to prepay the statutory filing fee. The court
therefore grants his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(b)(1) and (2), the court orders: (1) plaintiff to immediately pay (and the facility having
custody of him to automatically remit) $6.80 to the Clerk of Court for payment of the initial
partial filing fee and (2) plaintiff to pay (and the facility having custody of him to automatically
remit) to the Clerk of Court twenty percent of the money he receives for each calendar month
during which he receives $10.00 or more, until the $350 filing fee is paid in full. The court
directs the Clerk of Court to ensure that a copy of this order is mailed to each facility where
plaintiff is housed until the filing fee has been paid in full. All payments shall be sent to the
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Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604,
attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify plaintiff’s name and the case number
assigned to this case.
However, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the court is required to screen
pro se prisoners’ complaints and dismiss the complaint, or any claims therein, if the court
determines that the complaint or claim is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th
Cir. 2013).
Courts screen prisoner litigation claims in the same manner as ordinary motions to
dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See Hallinan v.
Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule
8(a)(2) must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).
Under federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put
differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility
standard, [courts] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.” Alam v. Miller
Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). Courts also construe pro se complaints
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
A plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat
affirmative defenses. Independent Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Serv. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935
(7th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff can plead himself or herself out of court by pleading facts that
undermine the allegations set forth in the complaint. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406,
412 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (“A judicial admission trumps evidence. This is the basis
of the principle that a plaintiff can plead himself out of court.”).
Facts
Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim reads in its entirety as follows:
In the month of March 2017 I was returning from court in the custody of
Deputy Schults and two other inmates whos[e] name[s] I do not know.
When the other two inmates got out of the mini-van, I was instructed by
Deputy Schults to climb through the seats instead of raising the seat like the
deputy was supposed to do. He left it down. So as I climbed out, my
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shackle was caught by the seat, causing me to fall and smack my head and
shoulder on the ground, causing me to be in great pain.
I feel that I should be fin[an]cially compensated for the negligen[ce] of the
officer and that any doctor bills related to this incident be paid for.
[1], p. 4.
Analysis
Even accepting plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the court finds that the complaint
fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is most regrettable that
plaintiff fell and injured himself. However, the matter implicates no constitutional right, and the
court is satisfied that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.
Plaintiff does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of the facts
alleged. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs conditions of confinement
claims brought by pretrial detainees. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). The
Eighth Amendment standard applies to Fourteenth Amendment claims, as “detainees are entitled
to no less protection than prisoners whose treatment must meet the standards of the Eighth
Amendment.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Phillips v. Sheriff
of Cook Cnty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n. 31 (7th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment
standard governs claims by pretrial detainees notwithstanding Kingsley v. Hendrickson, --- U.S. --, 35 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015), which holds that the due process standard for pretrial detainee
excessive force claims is less demanding than the Eighth Amendment standard for prisoners).
A federal claim arises regarding an inmate’s treatment where the plaintiff can
demonstrate that jail officials “kn[e]w of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976)). Negligence—even gross negligence—is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. King, 680 F.3d at 1018; see also Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012)
(collecting cases); Miller v. Kienlen, No. 14 CV 0031, 2017 WL 951342, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
10, 2017) (Gottschall, J.) (negligence is not actionable as a deliberate indifference claim)
(citation omitted). “[N]ot every injury suffered by a detainee violates his civil rights.” Fisher v.
Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2005). Rather, to establish a claim of constitutionally
deliberate indifference, as opposed to mere negligence, an inmate must provide facts allowing
the inferences that (1) he faced circumstances perilous enough to constitute “an unreasonable
risk of serious damage to his future health,” and (2) jail personnel acted with deliberate
indifference to that danger. Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted).
Here, plaintiff has not provided facts arguably demonstrating a constitutionally serious
safety threat. The courts have repeatedly held that slippery floors and similar hazards generally
do not present a risk serious enough to inmate safety to implicate constitutional concerns. See,
e.g., Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2014) (agreeing that the “hazard” presented
by stairs rendered slippery by inmates’ wet shower shoes, without more, “is not sufficiently
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serious to invoke the Eighth Amendment”); see also Scott v. Scott, No. 14 CV 3229, 2014 WL
6704583, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2014) (holding that directing detainee to exit transport van
onto light-weight stepping stool while shackled stated, at best, state-law negligence claim
properly brought in state forum where detainee fell and injured himself in the process); Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994) (reiterating that “deliberate indifference entails
something more than mere negligence.”).
In the instant case, plaintiff asserts only that he had to wriggle through a narrow space to
exit the transport vehicle because defendant failed to raise the seat up for him. Plaintiff indicates
that he was shackled, and the court additionally assumes for purposes of threshold review that
plaintiff received no assistance getting out of the van. Nevertheless, the complaint does not
support an inference that plaintiff faced an unreasonable risk of serious harm—after all, inmates
in restraints are transported to court appearances and other destinations nearly every day. Nor
does he plausibly allege deliberate indifference. There is no indication that defendant was aware
of a dangerous obstacle, or that that he ignored a complaint or a request for help. To the
contrary, plaintiff specifically asserts that defendant was merely negligent. But again, in order to
state a claim in federal court, plaintiff would have had to show indifference—which is akin to
criminal recklessness, see Fisher, 414 F.3d at 662—and not just negligence on the part of jail
officials. A negligence claim belongs in the state court system.
In sum, under the circumstances of this case, the court cannot find that plaintiff has a
potential federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal statute.
Furthermore, the court concludes that allowing plaintiff to submit an amended complaint
elaborating on his claim would be a fruitless exercise. Although leave to amend should be
“freely given when justice so requires,” see Rule 15(a)(2), district courts have broad discretion to
deny leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to defendants, or where amendment would be futile. Arreola
v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). The court concludes that no reasonable person
could infer deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm on the basis of these facts.
This case presents an unremarkable mishap where defendant could be accused, at worst, of
negligence. Accordingly, the court summarily dismisses the complaint on preliminary review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a colorable federal claim.
For the foregoing reasons, this suit is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The court directs the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. Dismissal is
without prejudice to pursuing any avenue of relief that may be available in the state court system.
The court assesses plaintiff a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If plaintiff wishes
to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this court within thirty days of the entry of
judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). If plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $505.00
appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. See Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d
810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). If the Court of Appeals should find the appeal to be non-meritorious,
plaintiff could be assessed a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If a prisoner accumulates three
“strikes” because three federal cases or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or
for failure to state a claim, the prisoner may not file suit in federal court without pre-paying the
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filing fee unless he or she is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Id. If plaintiff seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, he must file a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in this court. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1).
Plaintiff need not file a motion to reconsider this court’s ruling to preserve his appellate
rights. However, if plaintiff wishes the court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed
within 28 days of the entry of this judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion
pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e)
motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be filed within a reasonable time
and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no more than one year after
entry of the judgment or order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule 60(b)
motion cannot be extended. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the
deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed
within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
Date: 1/24/2018

ENTER:

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United States District Court Judge

Docketing to Mail Notices. (LC)

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