Dillon et al v. Warren et al
Filing
41
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 6/12/2018: For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion, the plaintiffs' motion to remand 20 is granted. This case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County. All future dates and deadlines are stricken; all pending motions are denied as moot. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(air, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFF DILLON and DILLON
TRANSPORT, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NAMAN, HOWELL, SMITH & LEE,
PLLC; LARRY D. WARREN;
MICHAEL TANNEN; and TANNEN
LAW GROUP, P.C.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 18-CV-00470
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After Dillon Transport, Inc. was found liable for a $32 million verdict in a personal injury
lawsuit in Texas, the trucking company and its principal, Jeff Dillon, sued the lawyers and law
firms that provided the company legal advice in connection with the lawsuit. Dillon and the
company filed their case in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging that due to the
defendants’ professional negligence Dillon and Dillon Transport had to pay $2.5 million beyond
their insurance coverage as part of a post-verdict settlement. Defendant attorney Larry Warren
removed the case to federal court, claiming that two other defendants, Michael Tannen and
Tannen Law Group, P.C. (“TLG”), had been fraudulently joined to destroy diversity. After
removal, the plaintiffs moved to remand the case to the state court, arguing that the defendants
have not established fraudulent joinder. The Court agrees. Because the defendants have failed to
show that Tannen and TLG were fraudulently joined, complete diversity among the parties does
not exist and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the Court
grants the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
BACKGROUND1
Jeff Dillon and the trucking company Dillon Transport are citizens of Illinois. Michael
Tannen is a lawyer and the owner of the Chicago law firm Tannen Law Group, P.C. (“TLG”).
Tannen and TLG are also Illinois citizens. Larry Warren is a lawyer for Naman, Howell, Smith
& Lee PLLC (“NHSL”), a law firm located in San Antonio, Texas. Warren and NHSL are
citizens of Texas. At various times, Tannen and TLG (collectively, the “Tannen defendants”) and
Warren and NHSL (collectively, the “Warren defendants”) provided legal counsel to Dillon
Transport.
In 2015, Dillon Transport was sued in Nueces County, Texas (the “Texas lawsuit”) for its
role in an accident that caused permanent injuries to two individuals (the “Texas plaintiffs”) who
were riding a motorcycle that collided with a Dillon Transport truck. The Texas lawsuit alleged
that Dillon Transport was liable for its own negligence and vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of its employee who operated the truck. Dillon Transport hired the Warren defendants to
represent it in the case, up to the extent of the trucking company’s $5 million liability insurance
coverage. In September 2015, Warren authored a pre-trial and pre-mediation evaluation report on
1
The facts are taken from the plaintiffs’ complaint and the declarations and affidavits
submitted by the Warren and the Tannen defendants. On a motion to remand, the Court may
consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and “summary judgment-type evidence,”
such as affidavits and deposition testimony, so long as the evidence relates to jurisdictional facts
rather than substantive facts going to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. See Peters v. AMR
Corp., No. 95 C 588, 1995 WL 358843, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1995); Momans v. St. John’s
Nw. Military Acad., Inc., No. 99 C 8510, 2000 WL 33976543, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2000);
CC Indus., Inc. v. ING/Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 813, 815-16, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
For the purposes of resolving the motion to remand, the Court accepts as true the factual
allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in
favor of the plaintiffs. Denton v. Universal Am-Can, Ltd., 12 C 3150, 2012 WL 3779315, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2012); Blockinger v. Reach Med. Holdings, Inc., No. 09-cv-1805, 2009 WL
3617530, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2009).
Because the plaintiffs’ complaint provides only the residence of each party, the
citizenship of each party is taken from Warren’s notice of removal. None of the parties contested
the citizenship allegations included in Warren’s notice of removal.
2
the lawsuit, stating that it was defensible at trial and that the evidence indicated that the plaintiff
was the sole cause of the accident. In October 2015, a mediation was held, but Warren made no
serious offers of settlement to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the Texas plaintiffs amended their
complaint to add claims of gross negligence and institutional negligence against Dillon
Transport. The plaintiffs also succeeded in barring the trial testimony of a critical defense
witness.
On December 2, 2015, the Texas lawsuit went to trial, during which Dillon Transport
suffered several setbacks. Closing arguments concluded on December 16, 2015, and the jury
began its deliberations on that day. After deliberations commenced, the jury raised questions that
indicated they were leaning toward a significant verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Early the next
morning, December 17, 2015, Warren contacted Dillon Transport and its insurance carriers to
discuss a potential settlement offer to the Texas plaintiffs. Decl. of Larry Warren (“Warren
Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 1-6. Later that day, in the evening, Dillon Transport executives contacted
Tannen and requested his legal advice regarding the trial and the expected verdict. Aff. of TLG
and Tannen in Supp. of Pet. for Removal (“Tannen Aff. I”) ¶¶ 22-32, ECF No. 23-2. Tannen
began working on the case that night. Id. Dillon Transport retained Tannen and TLG to review
the case, to advise it of its exposure and risk above the $5 million liability insurance policy limit,
3
and to take action to protect it against an adverse verdict.2 Comp. Counts I-IV ¶ 15, ECF No. 11.3
While the jury continued to deliberate, Dillon Transport attempted to settle the case
within its insurance policy limit, but the Texas plaintiffs rejected the company’s settlement
offer.4 On December 18, 2015, the jury returned a $32 million verdict against Dillon Transport.
Dillon Transport submitted post-trial briefs and appeals, and engaged in post-trial mediation and
settlement negotiations. See Aff. of TLG and Tannen in Resp. to Mot. for Remand (“Tannen Aff.
II”) n.3-5, Exs. F-J, ECF No. 24-1. Tannen was involved in these efforts, which continued
throughout 2016. See id. The company also issued a 50,000-page financial disclosure regarding
its corporate assets. On December 19, 2016, about a year after the verdict, the parties reached a
settlement that required Dillon and Dillon Transport to pay $2.5 million above the limits of
Dillon Transport’s insurance coverage.
In December 2017, Dillon and Dillon Transport filed a complaint against the Tannen
defendants and the Warren defendants in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging professional
negligence related to the Texas lawsuit. On January 22, 2018, Warren filed a timely notice of
2
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that both Dillon Transport and Dillon
Tannen and TLG to provide these legal services. Tannen and TLG, however, state
affidavit that they did not provide legal services to Dillon in relation to the Texas
Tannen Aff. I ¶¶ 16-18, ECF No. 23-2. Dillon does not present any sworn statements
evidence to dispute this assertion.
retained
in their
lawsuit.
or other
3
The plaintiffs’ complaint includes paragraphs numbered 1 through 29 under “Counts I,
II, III & IV” and paragraphs numbered 1 through 38 under “Counts V, VI, VII & VIII.” Citations
to the plaintiffs’ complaint, therefore, identify the counts and the paragraph number.
4
The complaint allegations, Warren’s declaration, and Tannen’s affidavits offer varying
accounts of exactly when and how the settlement offer was extended. See Compl. Counts V-VIII
¶ 29, ECF No. 1-1; Warren Decl. ¶¶ 8-10, ECF No. 1-6; Tannen Aff. I ¶¶ 35-42, ECF No. 23-2.
4
removal in this Court.5 The Tannen defendants sought leave to file a submission in support of the
removal, which the Court granted. Dillon and Dillon Transport moved to remand the case to the
Circuit Court of Cook County, and the defendants submitted briefs in opposition to remand.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs argue that their case must be remanded to the Circuit Court because this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Warren removed this case to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), which provides that any civil action filed in a state court may be removed by
the defendant to the district court if the district court has original jurisdiction over the
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Warren and Tannen defendants assert that original
jurisdiction of the federal court exists based on the diversity jurisdiction provided for under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (“Section 1332”). They claim that the Tannen defendants, who are Illinois citizens
and are therefore not diverse from the plaintiffs, were fraudulently joined and therefore should be
disregarded when determining whether there is complete diversity among the parties, as is
required under Section 1332. In their motion to remand, Dillon and Dillon Transport argue that
the defendants have not met their burden to establish that the Tannen defendants were
fraudulently joined.
The Seventh Circuit directs federal courts to interpret the removal statute narrowly,
resolving any doubts in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum in the state court. Schur v. L.A.
Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009). Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine,
a court considering removal may “disregard, for jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of certain
5
Warren’s removal period ended on Monday, January 22, because the last day of the 30day period allotted by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) was on Sunday, January 21. When the last day of a
period falls on a weekend, the period is extended to the next business day. Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(C). Rule 6 applies to “any statute,” like § 1446(b), “that does not specify a method of
computing time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ assertion that Warren’s notice
of removal “may” have been untimely is unfounded.
5
non-diverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case, dismiss the non-diverse defendants, and
thereby retain jurisdiction.” Id. at 763 (quoting Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir.
1999)). Fraudulent joinder exists if the plaintiff has made false allegations of jurisdictional fact,
or if a claim against a non-diverse defendant has no chance of success. Poulos v. Naas Foods,
Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ claims
against Tannen and TLG have no chance of success.
Defendants seeking to remove a case from state court to federal court based on fraudulent
joinder of a non-diverse defendant bear “a heavy burden.” Id. The test for fraudulent joinder is
even more favorable to the plaintiff than the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Livingston v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., No. 09 C
2611, 2009 WL 2448804, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2009). Warren must show that, after resolving
all issues of fact and law in favor of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs cannot establish a cause of action
against Tannen or TLG. Poulos, 959 F.2d at 73. The Court must determine whether there is “any
reasonable possibility” that a state court would rule against Tannen or TLG. Id. Warren,
however, need not negate “any possible theory” that the plaintiffs might allege in the future;
“only [the] present allegations count.” Id. at 74.
There is no dispute that Dillon Transport retained the Tannen defendants on December
17, 2015; thereafter, the Tannen defendants owed a duty to provide legal counsel and
representation that was free of negligence. Dillon Transport hired the Tannen defendants to
review the Texas lawsuit, to provide legal advice on its personal exposure and risk in excess of
its insurance policy limits, and to take action to protect the company against an adverse verdict.
The plaintiffs allege that Tannen and TLG negligently failed to issue timely pre-verdict
settlement demand letters, negligently failed to initiate timely pre-verdict settlement negotiations,
6
and negligently failed to timely advise Dillon Transport of the likelihood of an adverse verdict
and the steps necessary to protect itself against an adverse verdict. The complaint alleges that
these negligent acts caused Dillon and Dillon Transport to pay $2.5 million in “personal” assets
(i.e., assets other than payments by their insurer) in the post-verdict settlement with the Texas
plaintiffs. Compl. Counts I-IV ¶ 24, ECF No. 1-1.
The Warren and Tannen defendants argue there is no reasonable possibility that these
allegations suffice to state a cause of action for professional negligence against the Tannen
defendants in an Illinois state court. In Illinois courts, whether a claim states a valid cause of
action is analyzed in the context of a motion to dismiss. Gen. Elec. Railcar Servs. Corp. v. Nat’l
Steel Car Ltd., No. 04 C 3043, 2004 WL 2392104, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2004) (citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-615). On a motion to dismiss, Illinois courts accept all well-pleaded facts as
true and consider them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hartmann Realtors v. Biffar,
13 N.E.3d 350, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “The complaint must be construed liberally and should
only be dismissed when it appears that the plaintiff cannot recover under any set of facts.” Id.
Under Illinois law, a cause of action based on professional negligence requires the following
elements: “(1) the existence of a professional relationship, (2) a breach of duty arising from that
relationship, (3) causation, and (4) damages.” SK Partners I, LP v. Metro Consultants, Inc., 944
N.E.2d 414, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have no reasonable possibility of recovering on
their professional negligence claims against Tannen and TLG because the defendants’ affidavits
and declaration establish that Tannen and TLG did not act negligently. See Tannen Submission
in Supp. of Removal 9-10, ECF No. 23; Tannen Aff. I ¶¶ 50-54, ECF No. 23-2; Warren Resp. to
Mot. to Remand 10, ECF No. 25; Tannen Resp. to Mot. to Remand 3, ECF No. 24. Tannen’s
7
affidavit states that from the evening of December 17, when he was first asked to provide Dillon
Transport with legal advice regarding the Texas lawsuit, until mid-morning on December 18,
when the jury returned its verdict, he did “everything” that the complaint alleges that he failed to
do. Tannen Aff. I ¶ 54, ECF No. 23-2. He states that he “timely and repeatedly,” “until the very
last minute,” demanded that the case settle within the policy limits, but his requests were refused
by the insurers’ representatives. Id. ¶¶ 51, 52. He also states that he advised Dillon Transport on
several steps to take to protect itself from an adverse verdict. Id. ¶ 53.
This argument, however, goes beyond the jurisdictional inquiry that the Court is limited
to on a motion to remand and goes directly to the merits of the case. See Momans, 2000 WL
33976543, at *4 (when considering defendants’ fraudulent joinder argument on a motion to
remand, defendants’ substantive denials of the complaint allegations go to the merits of the case
and should be disregarded). “The purpose of the fraudulent joinder doctrine and a motion to
remand is to place the case in the proper forum, not to rule substantively on [p]laintiffs’ claims.”
Torrez v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., No. 13 C 825, 2013 WL 5325454, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18,
2013). The Court, therefore, can consider evidence regarding jurisdictional facts establishing the
propriety of summarily dismissing a defendant, such as an uncontradicted affidavit establishing
that the defendant had “absolutely nothing to do with” the allegations in the complaint. See
Momans, 2000 WL 33976543, at *3-4; Faucett v. Ingersoll-Rand Mining & Mach. Co., 960 F.2d
653, 655 (7th Cir. 1992); Blockinger, 2009 WL 3617530, at *3-4. But the Court should disregard
evidence that goes to the ultimate issue of fact in the case, even when the plaintiff has failed to
submit any contradicting evidence. See Momans, 2000 WL 33976543, at *4 (disregarding
uncontradicted affidavits that presented substantive rather than jurisdictional facts because the
court should not pre-try the case when determining the propriety of removal); Peters, 1995 WL
8
358843, at *4 (holding that plaintiffs were not required to respond to defendant affidavits going
to substantive rather than jurisdictional facts). Consideration of a defendant’s affidavit denying
the plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise addressing the merits of the case would require the court
to make credibility determinations and findings on the ultimate issues of fact, before it is clear
whether the court has jurisdiction over the case. See Momans, 2000 WL 33976543, at *4; Peters,
1995 WL 358843, at *4. See also Torrez, 2013 WL 5325454, at *3 (holding that it would be
“illogical” for the court to consider evidence on a motion to remand in the same manner as it
would on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56) (citing CC Indus., Inc., 266 F. Supp. at 816).
Accordingly, the Court does not consider Tannen’s affidavits to determine whether or not
he acted negligently or did what the complaint alleges he failed to do. While the plaintiffs have
not submitted any evidence to contradict Tannen’s affidavits, they are not required to do so at
this stage of the case.6 See Momans, 2000 WL 33976543, at *4 (on a motion to remand, the
plaintiff need not respond to defendants’ evidence going to the merits of plaintiff’s claims);
Peters, 1995 WL 358843, at *4 (same). Instead, the Court considers uncontested jurisdictional
facts in the defendants’ affidavits and declaration to determine whether Tannen and TLG had
anything to do with the conduct alleged in the complaint.
Unlike other cases where courts have found fraudulent joinder based on a non-diverse
defendant’s sworn statement that it had nothing to do with the alleged conduct, see, e.g., Faucett,
6
The plaintiffs submitted an unsworn and unsigned “statement of undisputed facts” as an
exhibit to their motion to remand. Mot. to Remand, Ex. 5, ECF No. 21. Because the statement of
facts is unsigned and unsworn, however, the Court does not consider it for purposes of resolving
the motion to remand. See Peters, 1995 WL 358843 at *3 (courts may look beyond the pleadings
on a motion to remand to consider “summary judgment-type evidence” such as sworn
testimony); Rivera v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 F. Supp. 3d 722, 729-30 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(disregarding statements that were not signed when considering a motion for summary
judgment).
9
960 F.2d at 655, the jurisdictional facts provided by Tannen and Warren show just the opposite.
Although Tannen did not provide legal counsel to Dillon Transport regarding the accident on
which the lawsuit was based before the trial, he began providing the company with legal advice
and representation regarding the Texas lawsuit before the trial ended, on the evening of
December 17, 2015, while the jury was still deliberating and Dillon Transport was attempting to
settle the case in an effort to avoid an adverse verdict. See Tannen Affidavit I ¶¶ 22-46, ECF No.
23-2; Warren Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1-6. The Tannen affidavits also show that he continued to
provide legal advice and representation to Dillon Transport throughout 2016, while the company
engaged in post-trial briefing, appeals, mediation, and settlement negotiations in an attempt to
minimize the impact of the adverse jury verdict. See Tannen Aff. II ¶¶ 21-24, n.3-5, Exs. F-J,
ECF No. 24-1. Based on these facts, it is clear that Tannen was involved in conduct that Dillon
Transport alleges was negligent and the cause of its $2.5 million damages. The affidavits and
declarations, therefore, do not establish that Dillon Transport has no reasonable possibility of
recovering against Tannen and his firm, TLG, for professional negligence.7 See Robles v.
Nexstar Media Grp., Inc., 17 C 08551, 2018 WL 898464, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2018) (finding
7
The Tannen affidavits state that Tannen and TLG did not provide legal services related
to the Texas lawsuit to Dillon personally. Tannen Aff. I ¶¶ 16-18, ECF No. 23-2. Dillon does not
present any sworn statements or other evidence to dispute this assertion. In tort cases, the
existence of a duty between the non-diverse defendant and the plaintiff may be considered a
jurisdictional fact, which can be established by a defendant’s uncontradicted sworn statement.
See Hernandez v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.. No. 05 C 5963, 2006 WL 1647438, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June 5, 2006) (finding fraudulent joinder and holding that defendant’s uncontested evidence
showing non-diverse defendant never owed the plaintiff a duty established that the plaintiff could
not state a cause of action for negligence against the non-diverse defendant). However, even if
the Court accepts as uncontradicted Tannen and TLG’s sworn statement that it never represented
Dillon personally, this fact does not impact the Court’s conclusion. Dillon Transport and Dillon
allege the same claims against Tannen and TLG. A finding that the defendants have not
established fraudulent joinder of Dillon Transport would require remand, regardless of whether
Dillon’s claims against the defendants have no reasonable possibility of success because Tannen
never owed a duty to Dillon personally.
10
that fraudulent joinder was not established and granting remand where non-diverse defendant’s
declaration did not establish that defendant had “absolutely nothing” to do with the conduct
alleged); Siegel v. H Grp. Holding, Inc., No. 07 C 6830, 2008 WL 4547334, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
9, 2008) (same).
To the extent that the defendants assert that the complaint allegations regarding
negligence are conclusory and may therefore be ignored, the Court disagrees. While not
expansive, the allegations pled identify specific acts of negligent omission on Tannen’s part,
such as failing to issue timely pre-verdict demand letters, failing to initiate timely settlement
negotiations, and failing to advise the plaintiffs about the prospects of an adverse verdict.
Further, the Tannen defendants’ characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims against Tannen as
relating solely to pre-verdict conduct is simply not correct. See Tannen Resp. to Mot. to Remand
2, ECF No. 24; Tannen Submission in Supp. of Removal 2, ECF No. 23. Their reading of the
complaint is too narrow. The complaint asserts that Tannen had a duty to provide Dillon
Transport with legal counsel beginning in December 2015 and continuing thereafter. It
specifically alleges both that Tannen failed to initiate timely pre-verdict settlement negotiations
and failed to advise his client of the steps it should take to protect itself from an adverse verdict;
the latter omission may reasonably be interpreted both as an allegation that Tannen failed to
prevent an adverse verdict and that he failed to protect the plaintiffs from the consequences of
that adverse verdict. Construing the complaint liberally and in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, as an Illinois court would be required to do, the Court therefore finds that the plaintiffs’
allegations include Tannen’s post-verdict conduct that occurred in 2016.
The defendants also argue that according to the plaintiffs’ own allegations, it is
impossible for Tannen and TLG to be held liable for the plaintiffs’ damages. Specifically, they
11
point to an allegation in the complaint stating that “[h]ad timely negotiations occurred before
trial or during the trial the attorneys for [the plaintiffs] would have settled” the case within Dillon
Transport’s insurance policy limit. Notice of Removal 8, ECF No. 1; Warren Resp. to Mot. to
Remand 11, ECF No. 25; Tannen Submission in Supp. of Removal 7-8, ECF No. 23. The
defendants assert that, based on this claim, Tannen cannot be held liable for failing to settle the
case because he was not retained until the day after the jury began deliberating. See id. The
defendants also point to the plaintiffs’ allegation that on December 17, 2015, the Texas plaintiffs
were not interested in settling the case for $5 million, the maximum amount covered by Dillon
Transport’s insurance policies. Compl. Counts V-VIII, ¶ 29, ECF No. 1-1. The Warren
defendants argue that the Tannen defendants’ conduct cannot be the proximate cause of Dillon
Transport’s $2.5 million out-of-pocket loss if the Texas plaintiffs were unwilling to settle for $5
million on the day Tannen became involved in the lawsuit. Warren Resp. to Mot. to Remand 11,
ECF No. 25.
The defendants’ arguments are based upon a narrow and inaccurate reading of the
complaint. The cited allegations are only two of many contained in the plaintiffs’ pleading, and
neither indicate that Dillon Transport’s claims against Tannen and TLG have no chance of
success. An allegation that the case would have settled if negotiations had taken place before or
during the trial does not preclude additional claims that Dillon Transport’s damages were caused
by other negligent pre- and post-verdict acts that occurred after Tannen was retained.
Furthermore, the claims against Tannen include his failure to advise Dillon Transport on how to
protect itself from the adverse verdict, which includes conduct that took place throughout 2016.
See supra at 11. Tannen’s own affidavits suggest that the final settlement reached in December
2016, which required Dillon Transport to pay $2.5 million in personal assets, was the result of
12
nearly a year of post-trial legal work; the plaintiffs allege that Tannen’s alleged negligence
during that time caused Dillon Transport to settle for more than it otherwise would have. The
Court, therefore, finds that Dillon Transport’s allegations do not show that it has no reasonable
possibility of stating a claim for professional negligence against the Tannen defendants.
*
*
*
As stated at the outset, defendants seeking removal that depends on a finding of
fraudulent joinder face the very high burden of showing that the plaintiff’s case against the nondiverse defendants has no chance of success. The plaintiffs’ prospects for success against Tannen
may well be dubious, but that is not enough to warrant disregarding those claims in assessing the
Court’s jurisdiction. Because defendants Tannen and TLG and plaintiffs Dillon Transport and
Dillon are all citizens of Illinois, complete diversity as required by Section 1332 does not exist.
This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the case and grants the plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, it will not address the Warren defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This case is remanded to the Circuit Court of
Cook County.
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge
Date: June 12, 2018
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