Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute et al
Filing
161
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 11/5/2021: Mailed notice (lp, )
Case: 1:18-cv-00573 Document #: 161 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:1487
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JANAY E. GARRICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE,
Defendant.
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No. 18 CV 573
Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim
November 5, 2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
In this employment discrimination action Professor Janay Garrick has filed
against Moody Bible Institute (“Moody”), a post-secondary Christian educational
institution, Moody moves to stay discovery on the ministerial exception issue. For
the following reasons, the motion is granted:
Background 1
This action concerns Professor Garrick’s employment with Moody as an
instructor of secular courses. Moody adheres to a “complementarian” doctrine that
forbids women from acting as religious leaders, while Professor Garrick subscribes
to “egalitarian Christian” beliefs regarding gender equality in the ministry. (R. 98,
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 80, 85.) In the most recent iteration of her complaint,
Professor Garrick alleges that she suffered pervasive sex discrimination during her
Additional background facts are set forth in the court’s September 25, 2019 and
October 13, 2020 memorandum opinion and orders granting in part and denying in
part Moody’s motions to dismiss the complaint, (R. 91; R. 126), and in the August
12, 2021 order denying Moody’s motion to reconsider the partial denial of the
motion to dismiss, (R. 134).
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employment, and that Moody ultimately fired her because of her sex, but under the
guise that she was “not aligned with [Moody’s] doctrinal statement as it related to
gender roles in ministry.” (Id. ¶¶ 85, 86.)
But while the facts giving rise to this case are relatively straightforward, the
procedural history is not.
In her initial complaint, Professor Garrick alleged
retaliatory discharge and breach of contract under Illinois law, and retaliation
under Title IX. (R. 1, Pl.’s Compl.) Moody moved to dismiss, (R. 18), prompting
Professor Garrick to amend her complaint. (R. 67, Am. Compl.)
Professor Garrick asserted in the amended complaint claims for sex
discrimination, retaliation, and religious discrimination under Title VII, and hostile
work environment under both Titles VII and IX. (R. 67, Am. Compl.) Moody again
moved to dismiss, arguing (among other things) that principles of “church
autonomy” precluded these claims. (R. 68; R. 69.) According to Moody, Professor
Garrick’s claims were barred because she qualified as a “minister” within the
meaning of the ministerial exception under Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). (R. 69 at 9-14.) In that case, the
Supreme Court recognized that religious organizations are “free [under the First
Amendment] to hire and fire their ministerial leaders without governmental
interference,” including via the application of federal discrimination laws. Grusgott
v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., 882 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89). Moody also argued that even if Professor Garrick was
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not a “minister,” her complaint invited excessive entanglement into religious
matters, and should be dismissed for that reason. (R. 69 at 9-14.)
The court rejected Moody’s ministerial exception argument pointing out that:
(1) the exception was an affirmative defense; and (2) the facts Moody relied upon to
make the argument came from Moody’s submissions, not the complaint. (R. 91 at
15-17.) But the court agreed that Professor Garrick’s claims as plead arose from her
advocacy for women in ministry positions in contravention of Moody’s doctrinal
views, and as such intruded into Moody’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
rights. (Id. at 17-19.) Nevertheless, the court noted that there were “strains of
Garrick’s Title VII claims that may not be tied to Moody’s religious beliefs,”
including complaints about antagonistic treatment by male colleagues and
preferential treatment of male faculty members with respect to job duties and
performance. As such, the court granted Professor Garrick leave to replead any
Title VII claims that were “untethered from her disagreements with Moody’s
religious views.” (Id. at 19.)
Professor Garrick attempted to do so in her second amended complaint,
alleging hostile work environment, retaliation, and two counts of sex discrimination
under Title VII. (R. 98, Sec. Am. Compl.) Moody again moved to dismiss, once more
arguing religious autonomy, and that the second amended complaint failed to state
a claim for hostile work environment. (R. 101.) The court dismissed Professor
Garrick’s hostile work environment claim with prejudice, but otherwise denied
Moody’s motion, reasoning that “[t]his time around, Garrick has crafted her Title
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VII claims to steer clear of the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment” by “portray[ing] Moody’s religious justification as a pretext for gender
discrimination.” (R. 126 at 10, 14-15 (emphasis in original).)
Moody then moved for reconsideration of the partial denial, arguing in
relevant part that any inquiry into whether a religious reason for an adverse
employment action is pretextual ran afoul of the First Amendment’s religious
freedoms under Hosanna-Tabor. See generally R. 128. But the court rejected this
argument, reasoning that: (1) Hosanna-Tabor dealt with the ministerial exception;
(2) the court already concluded in dismissing Professor Garrick’s first amended
complaint that her allegations did not trigger that exception; (3) Moody did not ask
the court to reconsider that conclusion or raise the argument in its most recent
motion to dismiss; and (4) Moody failed to convince it that Hosanna-Tabor should be
applied to someone in a secular position, like Professor Garrick. (Id. at 6 (citing Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020)).) In other
words, the religious autonomy doctrine did not prevent courts from adjudicating the
issue of pretext when the ministerial exception did not apply.
(Id. (collecting
cases).)
The court also denied Moody’s alternative request that it certify an
interlocutory appeal, reasoning that Moody had not demonstrated a “substantial
ground for difference of opinion” or cited “a single decision indicating that the First
Amendment bars any inquiry into whether a religious employer’s proffered
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doctrinal reason for an adverse employment action was the actual reason.” (R. 134
at 10.)
At a status hearing on September 1, 2021, the court set a discovery schedule
on the threshold matter of whether the ministerial exception applies here,
recognizing that discovery as to the merits would proceed only if the initial phase
demonstrated that it does not. (R. 137; R. 146 at 2-6.) At the same hearing, the
court referred the case to this court for a settlement conference, (R. 146 at 8;
R. 137), and Moody advised that it was contemplating an interlocutory appeal from
the court’s denial of its motion to reconsider, (R. 146 at 9).
At the September 10, 2021 preliminary settlement discussion hearing, this
court scheduled a settlement conference to take place on November 16, 2021, and
struck the discovery schedule with the parties’ agreement in light of the impending
settlement discussions.
(R. 140.)
Three days later, Moody filed its notice of
interlocutory appeal from: (1) the partial denial of Moody’s motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint; and (2) the denial of Moody’s motion to reconsider that
same ruling. (R. 142.) In response, the Seventh Circuit ordered Moody to file a
jurisdictional brief and directed Professor Garrick to respond to it. (R. 148 at 2-3.)
Professor Garrick then moved this court to reinstate the ministerial exception
discovery, arguing that her Seventh Circuit-ordered response required it, because
Moody’s jurisdictional brief was “[i]n essence, . . . its opening appellate brief,” going
“far beyond the question of . . . jurisdiction,” and “weav[ing] in all of [Moody’s]
arguments about the core issue in this case: whether Ms. Garrick can conduct
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discovery and ultimately go to trial regarding Moody’s reason for terminating her.”
(R. 148). Noting that it saw no benefit to the parties “expending more resources on
discovery prior to completing settlement discussions merely because Plaintiff has to
now file a brief with the Seventh Circuit,” this court ordered Professor Garrick to
explain “the upside” to reinstating such discovery. (R. 150.) In her supplemental
brief, Professor Garrick argued that “if Moody is allowed to postpone discovery, it
has, in essence, ‘won’ its appeal before even convincing the Seventh Circuit that
there is a basis for jurisdiction,” because “the avoidance of any and all discovery,
even that limited to the ministerial exception,” is “the very result it seeks in its
appeal.”
(R. 151 at 2-3 (emphasis in original).).
This court ultimately granted
Professor Garrick’s motion without a response from Moody, reasoning that she “no
longer agree[d] to the stay.” (R. 152.)
Four days later on October 8, 2021, Moody moved to stay discovery pending
the outcome of the parties’ settlement conference and Moody’s Seventh Circuit
appeal.
(R. 153.) Professor Garrick opposes the motion.
(R. 154.) This court
entered and continued the motion pending the results of the settlement conference,
indicating in so doing that Moody need not respond to Professor Garrick’s already
served written discovery requests until further order of the court.
(R. 157.)
Professor Garrick has since withdrawn her request for a settlement conference, (R.
158), so the sole issue before this court now is whether a discovery stay is
appropriate pending a ruling on Moody’s appeal.
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Standard
Courts have broad discretion in guiding the course of discovery. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b); see also James v. Hyatt Regency Chi., 707 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.
2013). The decision whether to grant a stay is no different. Indeed, that decision is
“incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). In considering a motion
to stay discovery, courts analyze and balance several competing interests, including:
“(i) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving
party, (ii) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and streamline the
trial, and (iii) whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and
on the court.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1007 (N.D. Ill.
2009). These factors, “although not necessarily binding, help provide guideposts for
the exercise of discretion.” Witz v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., No. 19 CV
6715, 2020 WL 8254382, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 30, 2020). This court considers each in
turn below, and notes that its analysis is also premised on the overarching directive
to “construe[ ], administer[ ], and employ[ ]” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
a manner that “secure[s] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of each
action that comes before it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Analysis
Regarding the prejudice factor, the only argument Professor Garrick offers in
support is that her case has been delayed for years already and would be delayed
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further still if discovery is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal and/or any
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. (R. 146, Sept. 1, 2021 transcript at 4-5;
R. 154, Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) In response, Moody posits that “speculating about the
outcome of [its] Seventh Circuit appeal is premature,” and suggests that if the court
is unwilling to stay discovery indefinitely, it could either: (1) “stay discovery for four
months, and require the parties to provide an update on the progress of the appeal
at that time;” (2) obtain the parties’ agreement not to seek extensions of Seventh
Circuit deadlines (noting that Professor Garrick has already sought one such
extension); or (3) ask the parties to seek expedited review of the appeal. (R. 155,
Def.’s Reply at 1-2.) But the first option simply asks this court to put off what it
could decide today, and the second and third provide no certainty either.
In any case, this court finds that the prejudice factor favors a stay. Although
there has not been any discovery since the case was filed over three and a half years
ago, Professor Garrick alleges no tactical disadvantage or injury resulting from that
or any stay, nor does she otherwise argue that a continued delay would harm her
ability to litigate this case. See Witz, 2020 WL 8254382, at *1 (concluding that the
prejudice factor favored a stay because the plaintiff had not “made a showing that
any potentially discoverable documents in Defendant’s possession [were] likely to be
lost or inadvertently destroyed” or “explained how a stay of discovery would
increase the expense of litigation”). Simply put, “[d]elay, in and of itself, does not
constitute undue prejudice.” Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co.,
No. 15 CV 1067, 2015 WL 13650951, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2015); see also Mac
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Naughton v. Asher Ventures, LLC, No. 17 CV 4050, 2018 WL 11361070, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 27, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that staying discovery
“accomplishes nothing other than to drag it out for no reason,” where there was “no
evidence that delaying discovery [would] negatively impact [the plaintiff’s] ability to
litigate his claims). Yet that is all Professor Garrick argues here. 2 Furthermore,
the delay she complains of was primarily occasioned by her having to perfect a
complaint that was acceptable.
The simplification factor also favors a stay. The court declines to prejudge
the merits of Moody’s interlocutory appeal. As discussed, the appeal argues that
the court wrongfully allowed Professor Garrick’s Title VII claims to proceed because
they allege that Moody’s stated religious reason for her termination was really a
pretext for sex discrimination. There can be no doubt that a favorable ruling for
Moody may resolve the entire case, rendering any discovery taken to that point
meaningless and wasted. A stay of discovery would allow the parties to focus on
their arguments before the Seventh Circuit, and Professor Garrick has not shown
that discovery at this point would further them.
Lastly, the burden factor likewise tips in favor of a stay. Staying discovery
would preserve the parties’ resources if Moody’s appeal proves successful.
Moreover, Professor Garrick’s written discovery requests far exceed the scope the
court authorized because they seek merits-related information rather than focusing
Moreover, Moody correctly points out that Professor Garrick herself has asked the
court to stay proceedings, belying her claim that she would be unduly prejudiced by
a stay here. See R. 105 (Plaintiff’s motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of
a case before the Supreme Court).
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on the job duties and responsibilities associated with her teaching position. By way
of example, Professor Garrick’s written discovery requests seek “[c]omplete, dated
copies of all faculty manuals, handbooks, policies, rules, guides, and/or other
documents containing information for faculty members that were distributed by
Moody to its faculty from 2010 to the present,” and asks Moody to identify “all
current or former Instructors who were terminated as a result of . . . performance
related issues not involving ‘ministerial’ reasons, from 2010 to present, and identify
all documents which describe the personnel action and basis therefore.” (R. 153,
Def.’s Mtn. at 5.) In other words, Professor Garrick appears to be skipping over the
court’s two-pronged discovery approach, ignoring that merits-based discovery may
not be warranted at all.
This factor thus also counsels in favor of a stay.
Ultimately, the discovery contemplated would not “secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination” of this action at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Moody’s motion to stay discovery is granted.
ENTER:
____________________________________
Young B. Kim
United States Magistrate Judge
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