Snyder et al v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 4/2/2018. The Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Jerome Davis 29 and grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand 18 . Defendants Motion to Dismiss Michael Zakaras 6 is denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the case to Cook County Circuit Court forthwith. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(lk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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SNYDER, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al.,
Defendant.
No. 18 C 583
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 26, 2018, Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Michael Zakaras removed
Plaintiffs’ state court action to this Court and subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Michael
Zakaras pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. (Dkt. No. 1).
On February 15, 2018, Plaintiffs Betsy and Jack Snyder filed a Motion to Remand their case
back to state court. (Dkt. No. 18). Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand,
attaching affidavits of individually named defendants Zakaras and Jerome Davis in support of
their fraudulent joinder theory. (Dkt. No. 26). Plaintiffs then moved to strike Davis’ affidavit.
(Dkt. No. 29). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Declaration of
Jerome Davis [29] is denied, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [18] is granted, and Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Michael Zakaras [6] is denied as moot.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 18, 2017, Plaintiffs Betsy and Jack Snyder, both Illinois citizens, filed suit
in the Circuit Court of Cook County Law Division against Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and
Michael Zakaras, individually and as an agent/employee of Wal-Mart. See Snyder, et al. v. Wal1
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2017 L 12954 (Ill. Cir. Ct.). Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of a slip and fall
incident at a Wal-Mart store in Illinois. Plaintiffs believed Zakaras to be the manager of the store
where the incident occurred. (Dkt. No. 18 at 1). Wal-Mart is a citizen of Delaware and
Arkansas, and Zakaras is a citizen of Illinois. (Id. at 2).
On January 26, 2018, Plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to file their Amended
Complaint instanter to add Jerome Davis, an Illinois citizen, as a defendant and to issue
summons for Davis. (Id. at Ex. C). That same day, January 26, 2018, Defendants removed the
case to federal court, attaching Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1). Defendants’ Notice
of Removal was filed with the Northern District of Illinois at 11:55 a.m. (See Dkt. No. 26, Ex. E
(CM/ECF Notice of Electronic Filing)). Plaintiffs then properly filed their Amended Complaint
in state court at 12:16 p.m., commenced service on Davis and served Defendants Wal-Mart and
Zakaras via email at approximately 1:40 p.m. that afternoon. (Dkt. No. 18, Ex. D). Defendants’
state court removal notice was file-stamped at 3:16 p.m. (Dkt. No. 18, Ex. H). On January 29,
2018, the Clerk of the Northern District of Illinois notified Plaintiffs that a notice of removal had
been filed in federal court. (Dkt. No. 27 at 7, Ex. B (1/29/18 Letter from Thomas G. Burton,
Clerk’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois)).
Upon removing the case, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Zakaras, an Illinois citizen,
pursuant to Rule 21 under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. (Dkt. No. 6.) In lieu of responding
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand the case for lack of
complete diversity based on the addition of Jerome Davis in their Amended Complaint. (Dkt.
No. 12; Dkt. No. 27 at 1, n.1). Plaintiffs argued alternatively that the Court should remand
because Defendants’ removal was procedurally deficient for attaching the original and not
amended state-court pleading. (Dkt. No. 12). Defendants argued in their Response to Plaintiffs’
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Motion to Remand that Davis was not a party to the case because he was not added until after the
case was removed and, even if he were a party, both Zakaras and Davis should be dismissed for
fraudulent joinder because neither can be held personally liable to Plaintiffs for actions beyond
the scope of their employment as Wal-Mart managers. (Dkt. No. 26). Defendants attached to
their Response affidavits of Michael Zakaras and Jerome Davis declaring under penalty of
perjury that they did not have any personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning
Plaintiffs’ alleged accident. (Dkt. No. 26, Ex. B-C). Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the
Declaration of Jerome Davis as an unsworn declaration because it was not properly notarized and
failed to otherwise qualify as an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1746. (Dkt .No. 29).
In summary, the parties dispute the following issues in their motions: (1) whether
Defendants’ removal was procedurally deficient; (2) when removal became effective and,
relatedly, which of Plaintiffs’ complaints is the operative complaint to be considered by this
Court in deciding Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand; and (3) if the Amended Complaint is the
operative complaint, whether Davis’ affidavit qualifies as an unsworn declaration under penalty
of perjury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1746 or should be stricken; and (4) whether Zakaras or, if
applicable, Davis should be dismissed under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder.
DISCUSISON
I.
Defendants’ removal was procedurally sound.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ Notice of Removal was deficient because Defendants
failed to attach Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Under 28 U.S.C. §1446(a), a removing
defendant is required to provide the district court with “a copy of all process, pleadings and
orders served upon [him] in such action.” A defendant’s failure to attach the operative complaint
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can constitute independent grounds for remand, as “a defect in the removal procedure means
failure to comply with §1446.” In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994).
When an amended complaint is filed, “it is well established that the amended pleading
supersedes the original pleading.” Wellness Cmty. v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49 (7th Cir.
1995) (citations omitted). In this case, however, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint was not filed
until after Defendants filed their Notice of Removal in federal court. Defendants did not attach
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint because it did not yet exist. Thus, Defendants’ Notice of
Removal was not defective as filed.
II.
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is the operative pleading.
Title 28 U.S.C. §1446(d) provides that, after filing a notice of removal in federal court, a
defendant “must promptly . . . give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a
copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State
court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” Courts differ in how they
interpret this statutory provision in determining when removal becomes effective. As the Eighth
Circuit explained:
Most courts hold that removal is effected by filing a copy of the notice of removal
in the state court. Some courts … have held that removal is effected simply by
filing the notice of removal in the federal court. Finally, a few courts have held
that the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction until the notice of
removal is filed with the state court.
Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 213–14 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has not addressed whether removal is effected simply by filing
notice of removal in the federal court or if removal is not effected until such notice is also filed
in the state court. District courts in this circuit have held that Section 1446(d) contains three
procedural elements—(1) filing notice with federal court, (2) providing written notice to all
adverse parties, and (3) filing notice with the state court—and that defendants must satisfy all
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three elements for removal to take effect. See, e.g., L & O P’ship No. 2 v. Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co., 761 F. Supp. 549, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“To effect removal, a defendant must comply with
all of the requirements of section 1446(d).”); Jeffery v. Cross Country Bank, 131 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) removal is effected by the
defendant’s taking three procedural steps: filing a notice of removal in federal court, giving
prompt written notice to adverse parties and filing a copy of the notice in state court. While it has
been held that removal is effected when the notice is filed in federal court, the rule most
consistent with the language of § 1446(d) is that removal is not effective until all the steps
required by the statute have been completed.”) (citation omitted); Neurology & Pain Mgmt.
Assocs., P.C. v. Bunin, No. 16 C 2856, 2017 WL 82512, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017)
(“‘Promptly after the filing of [the] notice of removal,’ the defendant seeking removal must also
provide written notice of the removal to all adverse parties and ‘shall file a copy of the notice [of
removal] with the clerk of such State court’ in order to give effect to the removal.”) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1446(d)).
Similarly, the majority of other circuits have held that removal is not effective at least
until the notice has been filed with the state court. See e.g., Browning v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 396 Fed. Appx. 496, 505 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) removal is effected
by the defendant’s taking three procedural steps . . . . Each step provides important notice to a
relevant actor: the federal court, the adverse parties, and the state court. Federal courts have
remanded cases based upon a showing of prejudice to one of these three actors arising from the
failure to provide notice.”); Anthony, 76 F.3d at 213 (“The only rule that logically follows from
28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) is that removal is effected when the notice of removal is filed with the state
court and at no other time.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 69 (3rd Cir. 1993)
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(“[N]otice to the state court . . . has been held necessary to terminate the state court’s
jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Stephens v. Portal Boat Co., 781 F.2d 481, 482 n.1 (5th Cir.
1986) (“[A] removal is not effective until notice is given to the state court.”) (citation omitted).
Here, the conclusion is the same regardless of whether Section 1446(d) is interpreted
such that filing notice of removal with the state court is sufficient to effect removal or if
providing notice to adverse parties is also required. Plaintiffs properly filed their Amended
Complaint in state court before Defendant filed notice of removal in state court or provided
notice to all adverse parties. Therefore, the Amended Complaint, with Davis added as a named
defendant, superseded the original Complaint and is the operative complaint the Court will
consider when addressing the parties’ motions. See Wellness Cmty., 70 F.3d at 49.
III.
Davis’ affidavit is an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1746.
Plaintiffs seek to strike the Affidavit of Jerome Davis attached to Defendants’ Response
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand on two grounds: (1) the Affidavit is an unsworn statement
because it was notarized four days after Davis signed it, and (2) the Affidavit does not qualify as
an unsworn statement under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because Davis’
signature appears only on the second page and not on the first page immediately beneath the
“under the penalty of perjury” language. (Dkt. No. 29). Plaintiffs are correct that the Affidavit
of Jerome Davis submitted by Defendants is an unsworn statement; however, it satisfies 28
U.S.C. § 1746 and may be considered as an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury.
“An affidavit is a statement reduced to writing and the truth of which is sworn to before
someone who is authorized to administer an oath.” Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 859 (7th Cir.
1985) (internal citations omitted). The Affidavit of Jerome Davis submitted by Defendants does
not qualify as an “affidavit” under this definition because he signed it on February 28, 2018 and
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it was not notarized until four days later on March 4, 2018. See, e.g., Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d
950, 954 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Owens’s submission was not literally an ‘affidavit’ because he did not
swear to the content in the presence of someone authorized to administer oaths.”) (internal
citations omitted); Cornelius v. Hondo, 843 F.Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ill 1994) (rejecting
affidavit where it was “clear that the affidavit was not signed in the presence of a notary public;
rather, the notarization was added after the fact”).
However, a court may accept an unsworn statement as an affidavit if it complies with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1746. Owens, 635 F.3d at 955. 28 U.S.C. §1746 provides:
Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order,
or requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be
supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration,
verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person
making the same (other than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required
to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public), such matter
may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved
by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of
such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and
dated, in substantially the following form:
...
(2)
If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or
commonwealths: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)”.
Accordingly, an unsworn declaration can qualify as an affidavit if “subscribed ‘under penalty of
perjury,’ as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746.” Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 567 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting Section 1746).
Plaintiffs argue that the Affidavit of Jerome Davis fails to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1746
because the language “under the penalty of perjury” precedes the body of his declaration and is
not on the same page of the affidavit that Davis actually signed. The Affidavit is two pages long:
the first page states “I, JEROME DAVIS, swear and declare under penalty of perjury that the
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following facts are true and correct of my own personal knowledge” and contains eight of the
nine declarations but no signature; the second page which clearly continues from the first
contains the last declaration and Davis’ signature. (Dkt. No. 26, Ex. C). Plaintiffs contend there
is no indication Davis actually acknowledged he is subject to penalty of perjury for false
statements made on the first page. (See Dkt. No. 29 at 3). Plaintiffs rely on Knights v. Williams,
in which the district court held that the defendant’s affidavit did not comply with 28 U.S.C. §
1746 because the defendant signed the document but left blank the signature block under the
statement that he understood he was subject to the penalty of perjury. No. 02 C 5017, 2005 WL
1838427, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2005). The district court found it “quite suspicious . . . that the
signer executed the document but specifically abjured from signing the portion of the document
on the same page that would subject him to penalties of perjury for any false statement(s).” Id.
Davis, on the other hand, specifically signed the signature block below both the penalty of
perjury language and all of the statements he attested were true. (Dkt. No. 26, Ex. C).
Moreover, “Title 28 U.S.C. § 1746 . . . only requires substantial compliance. The fact
that [the affiant] signed his declaration under penalty of perjury is sufficient.” Ticketreserve, Inc.
v. Viagogo, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777, n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2009) (internal citations
omitted); see also London v. Guzman, 26 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (distinguishing
between an unsworn declaration dated and signed “under penalty of perjury” and an unsigned
affidavit not made under penalty of perjury). 28 U.S.C. § 1746 requires only that the document
be “made under penalty of perjury and verified as true and correct.”
Mokry v. PartyLite
Worldwide, Inc., No. 07 C 0972, 2009 WL 2588888, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2009); see also
Hudson v. Preckwinkle, No. 13 C 8752, 2015 WL 1541787, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2015)
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(“The benefit of a sworn statement is that the Court recognizes that the affiant is putting himself
at risk in stating the facts that are contained within the statement.”). Davis has done that here.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Declaration of Jerome Davis [29] is dismissed.
IV.
Davis was not fraudulently joined and is not dismissed; therefore, Plaintiffs’ case is
remanded to state court and the Motion to Dismiss Zakaras is dismissed as moot.
Diversity jurisdiction is limited. “For a case to be within the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts, diversity of citizenship must be ‘complete’ meaning that no plaintiff may be a
citizen of the same state as any defendant.” McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir.
2006) (quoting Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. Amoco Tax Leasing IV Corp., 34 F.3d 1310,
1314–15 (7th Cir. 1994)). “The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction, and federal courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt
in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum in state court.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc.,
577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). While “[a] plaintiff typically may choose
its own forum, [] it may not join a nondiverse defendant simply to destroy diversity jurisdiction.”
Id. at 763 (citations omitted). Thus, in determining whether diversity of citizenship exists, courts
may disregard parties fraudulently joined. Id.; see also Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d
323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In determining whether there is diversity of citizenship, parties
fraudulently joined are disregarded.”).
“To establish fraudulent joinder, a removing defendant ‘must show that, after resolving
all issues of fact and law in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action
against the in-state defendant.’” Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992)). “In conducting
this analysis, a district court must turn to state law to determine whether the plaintiff has any
reasonable possibility of success.” Schur, 577 F.3d at 764; see also Poulos, 959 F.2d at 73
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(“[T]he federal court must engage in an act of prediction: is there any reasonable possibility that
a state court would rule against the non-diverse defendant?”). The parties agree that Illinois law
governs Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether there is a “reasonable
possibility” that an Illinois court would find in Plaintiffs’ favor on the negligence claims against
Zakaras or Davis.
“Under applicable Illinois law, a principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its agent
when the agent is acting within the scope of her employment.” Id. (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 543
N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Ill. 1989)). “[A]n agent who breaches a duty owed solely to her principal is
not independently liable to an injured third party.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Bovan v.
Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 897 N.E.2d 288, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)). “The law of agency does not
impute a duty that the principal owes to a third party onto an agent.” Hoidas v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 09 C 7409, 2010 WL 1790864, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (citing Bovan, 897
N.E.2d at 295). “Instead, the duty of care flows from the relationship between the parties.” Id.
(citing Bovan, 897 N.E.2d at 294). Thus, in their role as agents of Wal-Mart, Zakaras and Davis
“would not be personally liable for any tort they may have performed while working within the
scope of their employment.” Id. “Whether the employer is held vicariously liable for the agent’s
conduct, however, does not affect the agent’s independent tort liability.” Schur, 577 F.3d at 765
(citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 382 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ill. 1978)). “Thus, a claim with a
reasonable possibility to succeed must at least suggest an independent duty that the defendant
owes to the plaintiff.” Hoidas, 2010 WL 1790864 at *2. The question becomes whether Zakaras
or Davis owed Plaintiffs an independent duty.
“Whether a duty exists is a question of law.” Schur, 577 F.3d at 766 (citing Widlowski v.
Durkee Foods, Div. of SCM Corp., 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ill. 1990)). “It is well settled that every
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person owes a duty of ordinary care to all others to guard against injuries which naturally flow as
a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of an act, and such a duty does not depend
upon contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship, but extends to remote and
unknown persons.” Id. (citing Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968). “To determine whether an
individual owed a duty to another, a court considers whether the risk of harm was reasonably
foreseeable.” Id. (citing Widlowski, 562 N.E.2d at 968).
It is reasonably possible that an Illinois state court could find that Davis had an
independent duty to Plaintiffs. Davis was the manager of the Wal-Mart store where the incident
occurred. According to his affidavit, he worked the day of Plaintiff’s injury but his shift ended
six hours prior to the accident. (Dkt. 26, Ex. C) Defendants contend that Davis’s absence
supports a finding of fraudulent joinder. A store manager’s absence from the store at the time of
injury is not necessarily dispositive. See, e.g., Salah v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 16 C 1163,
2017 WL 131581, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2017) (“While it is true that [the defendant] was not
working at the time of Salah’s injury, he was the store manager and had responsibility for the
overall operation of the store.”); Lambert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 1124, 2015 WL
264817, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015) (“[The defendant] was managing the store close in time to
plaintiff’s injury.”) (emphasis added).
A manager may be liable where she is an “active tortfeasor,” meaning she caused the
incident or actively contributed to the act which caused the incident. See Brady v. Menard, Inc.,
No. 16 C 7509, 2017 WL 201375, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2017) (“Some allegations, such as the
failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition or the failure to provide adequate
rules or protocols, clearly could not generate liability for individual employees. However, others,
such as the failure to properly stack the wood or tie down the product, could present individual
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liability for the negligently stacking or tying employee.”); c.f. Odom-Green v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 13-00631-DRH, 2013 WL 5967738, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013) (“A store manager,
as an agent, cannot be held liable for a customer’s injuries unless the agent is an active
tortfeasor.”) (citing Northrop v. Lopatka, 610 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ill. App. 1993)). Plaintiffs allege
Davis created the unreasonably dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff’s injury by placing the
floor mats underneath the produce stand for storage purposes. See, e.g., Brady, 2017 WL
201375 at *2 (“[T]he Court reads the allegations to allege in part that [the nondiverse defendant]
may have been the one who improperly stacked or otherwise actively contributed to [the
plaintiff’s] injuries.”). In other words, Plaintiffs allege Davis was an active tortfeasor and,
therefore, liable for their injuries independent of any duty owed to them by Wal-Mart. See, e.g.,
Likens v. Menard, Inc., No. 15 C 2959, 2015 WL 3961635, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2015)
(finding the plaintiff “alleged that the employee was an active participant in the accident that
caused the injury” and had therefore presented a sufficient possibility of recovery against the
employee); c.f. Roh v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 13 C 8865, 2015 WL 232374, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 14, 2015) (employee was not an “active tortfeasor” where she “did not commit the act which
caused the incident or actively contribute to the act which caused the incident”).
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Davis pursuant to Rule 21 is denied. Because it is
reasonably possible a state court could find for Plaintiffs against Davis individually, he was not
fraudulently joined and must be considered in the determining whether complete diversity exists.
Complete diversity does not exist because Plaintiffs and Davis are all Illinois citizens.
Therefore, Defendants have failed to meet their burden to establish that removal was proper.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [18] the case to state court is granted.
Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Zakaras [6] is also denied as moot. See, e.g., Brady, 2017 WL 201375 at *3 (federal
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court’s analysis of whether a possible claim had been stated against the individual defendants for
purposes of determining whether joinder was fraudulent “does not necessarily foreclose
arguments under different state law standards”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Declaration
of Jerome Davis [29] and grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [18].
Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Michael Zakaras [6] is denied as moot.
____________________________________
Hon, Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Judge
Date: April 2, 2018
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