Fowler v. The Illinois Sports Facilities Authority et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 6/29/2018.Mailed notice.(jlj, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DUSTIN FOWLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ILLINOIS SPORTS FACILITIES AUTHORITY
and CHICAGO WHITE SOX, LTD.,
Defendants.
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18 C 964
Judge Gary Feinerman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Dustin Fowler, a professional baseball player, brought this suit against the Illinois Sports
Facilities Authority and Chicago White Sox, Ltd. (together, “the White Sox”) in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, after he was seriously injured while playing at Guaranteed Rate
Field, the White Sox’s stadium. Doc. 1-1. The complaint characterizes Fowler’s claims as
negligence claims arising under Illinois law. Defendants removed the suit to this court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that federal question jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because
Fowler’s claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and thus in fact are federal claims. Doc. 1. Fowler moves to
remand. Doc. 32. The motion is granted.
Background
On June 29, 2017, the New York Yankees played the White Sox at Guaranteed Rate
Field. Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6-8. Fowler made his Major League debut that day, playing right field for
the Yankees. Id. at ¶ 9. When Fowler ran into the wall on the right foul line while attempting to
catch a foul ball, his knee made contact with a metal electrical box, resulting in serious injury
that required surgery and ended his season. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. According to Fowler, the metal box
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was positioned behind and between the wall and railing next to the right foul line, without any
kind of padding or covering. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 15, 17. Fowler sued the White Sox, alleging that
the club negligently installed the box in a position where it was undetectable and posed an
unreasonable risk of injury to players. Id. at ¶¶ 25, 34.
The terms of Fowler’s employment as a professional baseball player are governed by the
2017-2021 Basic Agreement, a collectively bargained agreement between the Major League
Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association. Doc. 1 at ¶ 3.
Discussion
As noted, the White Sox premise federal jurisdiction on the ground that Fowler’s
negligence claims, which he characterizes as arising under Illinois law, are completely
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (providing that federal law governs
“[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.”). The
complete preemption doctrine “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one
stating a federal claim.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). “Once an area
of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted
state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal
law” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a). Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d
795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ne. Rural Elec.
Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 707 F.3d 883, 894 (7th Cir. 2013).
Settled precedent holds that § 301 completely preempts state law claims “founded
directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson v. Stewart, 422 F.3d 463, 467-69 (7th Cir.
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2005); In re Bentz Metal Prods. Co., 253 F.3d 283, 285-86 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Complete
preemption under § 301 “covers not only obvious disputes over labor contracts, but also any
claim masquerading as a state-law claim that nevertheless is deemed ‘really’ to be a claim under
a labor contract.” Crosby, 725 F.3d at 797. “[T]o determine whether a purported state-law claim
‘really’ arises under Section 301, a federal court must look beyond the face of [the] plaintiff’s
allegations and the labels used to describe her claims and evaluate the substance of plaintiff’s
claims.” Id. at 800 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 301 preemption is not boundless. “[A] state-law claim is ‘completely preempted’
only when it is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). A state law claim is not completely preempted where a
defendant contending that the claim requires interpretation of a CBA advances a frivolous or
insubstantial reading of the agreement; rather, preemption applies only where the defendant’s
interpretation of the CBA is arguable or plausible. See Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 659 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“Because defendants’ interpretation is plausible, and demonstrates a genuine dispute
between the parties that can affect liability, it is a sufficient basis for preemption.”); Cramer v.
Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A creative linkage between the
subject matter of the claim and the wording of a CBA provision is insufficient; rather, the
proffered interpretation argument must reach a reasonable level of credibility.”); Boogaard v.
Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 891 F.3d 289 (7th Cir.
2018).
Under Illinois law, the elements of a negligence claim are “the existence of a duty of care
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by
that breach.” Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Ill. 2012); see also Johnson
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v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2009) (same). Pertinent here, “[a]
possessor of land … owes its invitees a common law duty of reasonable care to maintain its
premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Clifford v. Wharton Business Grp., 817 N.E.2d 1207,
1214 (Ill. App. 2004); see also Reid v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 545 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir.
2008) (same). “[I]t is axiomatic that no legal duty arises unless the harm is reasonably
foreseeable.” Clifford, 817 N.E.2d at 1214; see also Snow v. Power Constr. Co., 78 N.E.3d 587,
606 (Ill. App. 2017) (same); Buerkett v. Ill. Power Co., 893 N.E.2d 702, 709 (Ill. App. 2008)
(same).
As noted, Fowler alleges that the White Sox violated their duty of care when they
installed a hidden, unpadded box in the wall on the right foul line. The White Sox contend that
Fowler’s claim is preempted by § 301 because resolving the claim requires interpretation of
Article XIII of the Basic Agreement. Doc. 35 at 6-7. Article XIII establishes a joint Safety and
Health Advisory Committee, “comprised of an equal number of members representing the
Association and representing the Clubs,” “to deal with emergency safety and health problems as
they arise” and “to engage in review of, planning for and maintenance of safe and healthful
working conditions for Players.” Doc. 1-2 at p. 70, Art. XIII(A)(1). Committee meetings can be
called by any member who believes an emergency safety problem requires attention, and
otherwise occur at least once a year “for purposes of review and planning.” Id. at p. 70, Art.
XIII(A)(2). The Committee can make non-binding recommendations to the clubs and players.
Id. at p. 71, Art. XIII(A)(3). The Players Association is not required to raise a safety issue with
the Committee before filing a formal grievance in arbitration. Id. at p. 71, Art. XIII(A)(4).
The White Sox argue that, by establishing the Committee and empowering it to plan for
and maintain safe working conditions for the players, Article XIII “lessens the scope of the
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White Sox’s duty” to independently ensure the safety of the facilities, as “they c[an] reasonably
rely on the Joint Committee’s guidance in that regard.” Doc. 35 at 17. Put another way, the
White Sox conclude from Article XIII that, absent any objection from the Committee, the injury
that Fowler suffered when he ran into the box was not reasonably foreseeable—and therefore
that his negligence claim fails. See Clifford, 817 N.E.2d at 1214.
If the White Sox’s argument were plausible, then a court would need to interpret Article
XIII to determine whether (or to what extent) the White Sox owed Fowler a duty of care, and
Fowler’s negligence claim would be completely preempted. See Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at
1016-25; Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653-58 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 891
F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2018). But the White Sox’s reading of Article XIII is not plausible. No club
could have reasonably believed, based on the text of Article XIII, that the Committee would be
able to identify safety risks so comprehensively and effectively that, as long as the Committee
raised no objections, the club could simply assume that nothing in its premises posed an
unreasonable risk to players.
Comparison with Duerson v. National Football League, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill.
May 11, 2012), and Dent v. National Football League, 2014 WL 7205048 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2014), the two cases upon which the White Sox most heavily rely, helps to illustrate the point.
In Catalano v. Menard Inc., 2017 WL 2720432 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2017), another case cited by
the White Sox, the court held that a storeowner had no duty to ensure the safety of its automatic
sliding doors because the technicians it paid to service the doors had reported that they were in
working order. Id. at *6. As the court explained, relying on Cunis v. Brennan, 308 N.E.2d 617,
619 (Ill. 1974), the storeowner could not have foreseen that the doors would cause injury because
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a non-party who was better qualified to evaluate them had concluded that they were safe.
Catalano, 2017 WL 2720432, at *6.
That principle explains the results in Duerson and Dent. In Duerson, the estate of a
former Chicago Bears player alleged that the National Football League (“NFL”) negligently
failed to inform him of the risks of brain injury after repeated concussions, 2012 WL 1658353, at
*1, and in Dent, a group of former players alleged that the league negligently failed to curb
excessive prescription of pain medication by the clubs, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1. In both cases,
the courts found that the players’ state law claims were completely preempted by § 301 because
certain provisions in the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement could “be interpreted to impose
a general duty on the NFL clubs to diagnose and treat” players’ medical conditions, which would
allow the league to “reasonably rely on the clubs” to appropriately handle the players’ medical
issues. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4; see also Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *8 (“[B]ecause
the CBAs expressly and repeatedly allocate so many health-and-safety duties to the clubs, the
CBAs can fairly be interpreted, by implication, to negate any such duty at the league level.”).
Those CBA provisions required each club to employ an orthopedic surgeon as a club physician,
to pay the cost of all medical care provided to players by club staff, and to have a club physician
conduct a pre-season examination of each player. See Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4; Dent,
2014 WL 7205048, at *4-5. From those provisions, the courts explained, one could reasonably
conclude that the clubs—who directly employed medical staff to serve the players—bore the
primary responsibility for the players’ medical care. And as in Catalano, the NFL could
reasonably rely on the clubs and their expert employees, who were much better positioned to
monitor the players’ health than the league.
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That principle is inapposite here. Article XIII leaves no doubt that the clubs were in a
vastly better position than the Committee to assess the safety of their own premises. The clubs
did not give up any control over their premises to the Committee, nor did they even grant it any
consistent supervisory role. The Committee may act only if called to session by one of its
members, or in one of its annual meetings “for purposes of review and planning.” Doc. 1-2 at
p. 70, Art. XIII(A)(2). And Article XIII acknowledges that players can take their safety concerns
straight to arbitration, without attempting to convene the Committee. Id. at p. 71, Art.
XIII(A)(4). When the Committee does address a safety concern, its recommendations are only
advisory, leaving final authority over the premises with the clubs. Id. at p. 71, Art. XIII(A)(3).
It would have been wholly unreasonable for any club to delegate its responsibility to ensure the
safety of its playing field to the intermittent and weak Committee described in Article XIII.
That conclusion applies with particular force to a small, hidden hazard like the metal box
that injured Fowler. Because the box was hidden from players’ view (as Fowler alleges, Doc. 11 at ¶ 17, and the White Sox do not dispute), no player could have realized the risk it posed and
attempted to convene the Committee to address the problem. And it strains credulity to suppose
(and the White Sox do not assert) that the Committee would examine such granular details of
individual ballparks in its occasional meetings “for purposes of review and planning.” It follows
that the White Sox’s interpretation of Article XIII is not plausible, that the Basic Agreement
therefore will not affect the White Sox’s duty of care to Fowler, and therefore that Fowler’s
claims are not completely preempted under Section 301. See Baker, 387 F.3d at 659; Cramer,
255 F.3d at 692.
The White Sox also argue, briefly, that determining Fowler’s damages will require
interpretation of the CBA provisions stating that players shall receive their full salary and
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“reasonable medical and hospital expenses” while injured. Doc. 35 at 26. But those provisions
determine the clubs’ obligations to their own injured players, not the obligations of clubs that
allegedly injure another teams’ player, which is the situation presented here. Doc. 1-2 at 349
(providing, in the Uniform Player’s Contract that players enter into with the individual clubs for
which they play, that a player is entitled to “reasonable medical and hospital expenses incurred
by reason of the injury” on the conditions that written notice of the injury is “served upon and
received by the Club” and that the club may designate the player’s health care providers).
Conclusion
Because Fowler’s claims are not completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, they are
true state law claims. And because complete preemption is the sole ground on which the White
Sox premise removal, Doc. 1, any other grounds for removal have been forfeited. See W.C.
Motor Co. v. Talley, 63 F. Supp. 3d 843, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that “the proponent of
subject matter jurisdiction, as with any party that bears the burden on a particular point, may
forfeit an argument that could have been made to support jurisdiction”) (citing cases). Fowler’s
motion to remand accordingly is granted. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois.
June 29, 2018
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United States District Judge
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