Tyson v. Cook County Jail et al

Filing 169

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 5/17/2021. Mailed notice. (mgh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
John Ernist Tyson

)
)
)
)
)

v.
Cook County, et al.

No. 18 C 1733

Memorandum Opinion and Order
The

complaint

in

this

case,

currently

in

its

fifth

iteration, 1 alleges that while plaintiff was incarcerated for
traffic violations on two separate occasions at Cook County Jail,
medical staff responsible for his care, including defendant nurses
Echols, Campbell, and Nwankwo (the “nurse defendants”), refused to
follow his physician’s orders to check his blood pressure prior to
administering heart medication he was prescribed for a serious
heart condition. During the first period of incarceration, which
began on or around December 7, 2017, plaintiff explained to the
nurse defendants that taking his medication when his blood pressure
was too low was dangerous and potentially life-threatening. The
nurses

nevertheless

refused

to

take

his

blood

pressure,

so

plaintiff declined his medication for approximately seven days. On
the eighth day, December 14, 2017, plaintiff took his medication
Plaintiff’s original, pro se complaint was followed by counseled
amended, second amended, and third amended complaints. The
complaint now under consideration is his Fourth Amended Complaint.
1

after

an

unnamed

following

day,

staff

member

plaintiff

took

suffered

a

his

blood

stroke,

pressure.

which

the

The

nurse

defendants and defendant Dr. Williamson failed to acknowledge or
treat, despite

plaintiff’s

complaints.

Plaintiff’s

stroke

was

eventually diagnosed after another physician at the jail ordered
him transferred to Stroger Hospital. Plaintiff suffered physical
and emotional injuries as a result of the stroke, and has required
physical therapy and assistive devices including a wheelchair, a
walker, and a cane to move from place to place.
On or around May 26, 2018, plaintiff was again incarcerated
at Cook County Jail, where he again found himself assigned to the
floor on which the nurse defendants had previously denied him
medical treatment. He asked a jail doctor and defendant Jail
Sergeant Maglaya to be placed in the jail’s medical unit; but
Maglaya ordered defendants Clark, Gluszek, and Guzik to take
plaintiff instead to his assigned floor. Prior to taking him to
that floor, these officers kicked and battered plaintiff while he
was restrained in hand- and leg-cuffs. Defendant Maglaya allegedly
made a video recording of this incident, but defendants failed to
preserve it. Plaintiff remained in custody at Cook County Jail for
approximately

four

days,

during

which

time

he

received

his

prescribed heart medication only once. He was later transferred to
another

facility

and

had

no

further

followed.
2

problems.

This

lawsuit

The Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserts six claims:
Count

I

claims

deliberately

that

“Cook

indifferent

to

County
his

Jail

serious

Medical
medical

Staff” 2

was

condition

in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count II asserts a Monell
claim against Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, and
the Cook County Sheriff based on a wide range of customs, policies,
practices,

and

procedures

that

plaintiff

claims

caused

the

foregoing Fourteenth Amendment violation, as well as on these
defendants’ failure to train and/or supervise medical staff and
establish

policies

and

procedures

necessary

to

prevent

such

violations. In Count III, plaintiff asserts a § 1983 excessive
force claim against the Sheriff, Maglaya, Clark, Gluszek and Guzik,
while Count IV asserts a claim under Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against
Dart, Cook County, and the Cook County Sheriff’s office based on
its customs, policies, practices, or procedures (or the lack
thereof) that plaintiff claims resulted in the unconstitutional
use of force against him. The fifth and sixth counts of the FAC
assert state claims for negligence against all defendants and
negligent spoliation of evidence against Cook County, the Cook

I presume this includes the nurse defendants and Dr. Williamson,
although the FAC does not state which individuals plaintiff intends
to include in this undefined group.
2

3

County

Sheriff’s

Office,

Sheriff

Dart,

Sergeant

Maglaya,

and

Officers Clark, Gluszek, and Guzik.
These claims are substantively identical to those asserted in
plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, which I dismissed in part on
April 14, 2020, on a motion brought by Sheriff Dart and Cook
County. 3 In particular, I concluded that plaintiff had not alleged
an adequate factual basis to state a plausible Monell claim based
on the allegedly unconstitutional use of force against him. I
declined, however, to dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim arising out
of deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, and
I further rejected the moving defendants’ requests to dismiss his
state claims as untimely and to sever his claims into two different
actions.
All defendants have now filed a joint motion to dismiss in
which they repeat some of the arguments I considered in connection
with the previous motion and raise new arguments not previously
invoked. For the reasons that follow, I grant the motion in part.
Defendants’ lead argument is that Sheriff Dart should be
dismissed from the action because the claims against him are
redundant of claims against the Cook County Sheriff’s office. This
argument is correct to the extent that Dart is sued in his official
The primary difference between the Third and Fourth Amended
Complaints is that three individuals previously named as
defendants have been dropped from the suit, while a fourth
defendant has now been identified by both his first and last names.
3

4

capacity. “[A]n official capacity suit is another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which the officer is an agent.” Sow
v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing

Kentucky

v.

Graham,

473

U.S.

159,

165–66

(1985)).

Accordingly, whether Dart is named as defendant in his official
capacity as the Sheriff of Cook County, or whether the Cook County
Sheriff’s Office itself is named, makes no difference to the
substance of plaintiff’s suit.
What does make a difference is whether plaintiff’s suit seeks
damages from Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity. 4 To state a
claim against a supervisory official such as Dart for individual
liability under § 1983, plaintiff must allege that Dart “directed
the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or it occurred
with his knowledge or consent.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (additional citation omitted). This means
that the complaint must articulate a factual basis to suggest that
Dart

knew

about

the

conduct

that

caused

the

constitutional

violation and “facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or
turn[ed] a blind eye,” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th
Cir. 1995) (citation and omitted), or that he “personally devised
As I noted in my April 14, 2020, decision, plaintiff’s pleadings
do not make clear whether he is suing Dart in his individual or
official capacity. Because the motion to dismiss the Third Amended
Complaint did not raise the issue, I did not resolve whether
plaintiff’s allegations adequately pled a claim against Dart in
his individual capacity.
4

5

a deliberately indifferent policy that caused a constitutional
injury,” Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir. 1998).
The allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint do not support
such an inference. Plaintiff’s generic allegations, which assert
on information and belief that the actions he claims caused him
injury were pursuant to official policies or customs (or the
absence of thereof) and were “directed, encouraged,
and/or

ratified

allowed,

by policymaking officers” of Cook County and its

Sheriff’s Office, are insufficient to establish Dart’s individual
responsibility for the alleged constitutional violations. With
respect to plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference, nothing
in the FAC suggests that Dart knew or should have known that the
nurse defendants refused to follow plaintiff’s medical orders in
the manner required for him to take his prescribed medication, or
that

Dart

himself

“devised”

Cook

County

Jail’s

policies

and

procedures relating to detainee medical care or had reason to
believe that they were inadequate to ensure that plaintiff would
receive his medications in the manner prescribed. And with respect
to plaintiff’s claim of excessive force, there is neither a factual
basis for imputing knowledge of the incident plaintiff describes
to Sheriff Dart, nor, as I explained in my decision of April 14,
2020, any ground for inferring that the incident was the product
of an official custom, practice, or policy for which Dart bears
personal responsibility. For these reasons, to the extent Dart is
6

sued pursuant to § 1983 in his individual capacity, he is dismissed
from those counts.
Defendants also seek dismissal of plaintiff’s two Monell
claims. The first of these asserts that plaintiff’s inability to
take his heart medication for some time during each of his two
periods of incarceration was the result of customs, policies, or
practices by Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office that
reflected

deliberate

indifference

to

his

serious

medical

condition. I previously concluded that plaintiff’s allegations
were sufficient to proceed to discovery on this claim, and nothing
in defendants’ latest submission persuades me to disturb that
conclusion. Plaintiff’s second Monell claim asserts that Cook
County and the Cook County Sheriff’s office had customs, policies,
or practices that resulted in the unconstitutional use of force
against plaintiff during his second period of incarceration. I
held the allegations supporting this claim deficient in my previous
ruling, and the FAC does not cure the flaws I identified. For these
reasons, the Monell claim asserted in Count II of the FAC may
proceed, but the Monell claim in Count IV is dismissed. 5

To be clear, plaintiff may proceed on the excessive force claim
he asserts in Count III of the FAC against defendants Maglaya,
Clark, Gluszek, and Guzik as individuals. Although defendants seek
dismissal of Counts II-VI inclusive, they articulate no argument
and cite no authority to support dismissal of this claim.
5

7

Defendants’

arguments

for

dismissal

of

plaintiff’s

state

claims do not warrant extensive discussion. The first is that the
negligence

claim

seeks

to

hold

each

defendant

named

in

the

complaint liable for the conduct of the others, fails to state the
specific duty he believes is owed by each, and alleges injuries
based on several different occurrences. It is true that a number
of paragraphs in the complaint lump defendants together; but read
as a whole, it is clear from plaintiff’s recitation of the events
which defendants engaged in which conduct, and the basic grounds
on which plaintiff seeks to hold each responsible for his or her
actions. None of the authorities defendants cite persuades me that
Rule 8 requires more.
Nor am I convinced that the face of the pleadings establishes
that the Illinois’ Tort Immunity Act (“TIA”) shields defendants
from liability for the conduct alleged. Conspicuously, defendants’
motion does not cite a single case to support dismissal on this
ground, and for good reason: as immunity under the statute is an
affirmative defense on which defendant bears the burden of proof,
it is not ordinarily susceptible to resolution at the pleadings
stage. See Harris v. City of Chicago, 479 F.Supp.3d 743, 753 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (declining to dismiss complaint based on TIA immunity,
noting that immunity is “an affirmative defense” that warrants
dismissal “only when the factual allegations in the complaint
unambiguously

establish

all

the
8

elements

of

the

defense”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The allegations
in the FAC do not establish defendants’ immunity. Among other
reasons,

the

complaint

asserts

deliberate

indifference

to

plaintiff’s rights, which is equivalent to “willful and wanton”
conduct that is excluded from the scope of immunity under the state
statute. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404–05 (7th Cir.
2007) (the “willful and wanton [standard] is ‘remarkably similar’
to

the

deliberate

indifference

standard”)

(alterations

in

original, citations omitted); see also Padilla v. Perez, No. 15 C
5862, 2017 WL 345553, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan 24, 2017) (declining to
hold defendants immune from liability under the TIA at the pleading
stage where alleged acts may have risen to the level of “willful
and wanton” conduct). While it is possible that a fully developed
factual record will allow one or more of the defendants named in
this

count

to

establish

immunity

under

the

TIA

provisions,

plaintiff is entitled to discovery to determine the scope of each
defendant’s role in the negligent conduct he alleges.
This leaves only plaintiff’s claim for negligent spoliation
of evidence, which he asserts against defendants Dart, Maglaya,
Gluszek, and Guzik. The thrust of this claim is that defendant
Maglaya captured on video the alleged use of excessive force on
plaintiff, but that the defendants failed to preserve this evidence
although they had a duty to do so. Defendants’ observation that
the FAC does not plead any duty on their part “to wear body cameras
9

or portable audio/video recorders in the first place” misses the
point, as that is not the duty plaintiff claims they breached. Nor
is defendants’ statements that plaintiff “is silent on whose duty
it was to maintain the alleged footage” accurate: the FAC asserts
that each defendant named in this count had such a duty, and that
they breached that duty by failing to preserve that evidence after
a grievance plaintiff filed concerning the incident put them on
notice of their duty to do so. That is sufficient.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity are dismissed, as is Count
IV of the FAC. The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied. In the
three years since plaintiff filed his original complaint, he has
had

ample

opportunity

to

articulate

viable

claims,

which

defendants have had several opportunities to challenge. It is time
to move on. The parties are directed to conclude discovery on the
surviving claims of the Fourth Amended Complaint with no further
amendments.
ENTER ORDER:

Dated: May 17, 2021

_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

10