Hampton v. Democratic Party of Illinois et al

Filing 37

OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion and Order, the Court denies DPI's motion to dismiss 25 . Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 10/30/2018. Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALAINA HAMPTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ILLINOIS,
FRIENDS OF MICHAEL J. MADIGAN,
DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, and
13TH WARD DEMOCRATIC
ORGANIZATION,
Defendants.

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No. 18 C 2069
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Alaina Hampton worked for several years in various roles for organizations
engaging in political activity in support of Democratic Candidates and the Democratic Party of
Illinois. While serving in these roles, Hampton alleges she experienced persistent, severe sexual
harassment from Kevin Quinn, who was her direct supervisor. Hampton now brings this single
count lawsuit alleging that Defendants the Democratic Party of Illinois (“DPI”), Friends of
Michael J. Madigan, Democratic Majority, and 13th Ward Democratic Organization retaliated
against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Defendant DPI now moves to dismiss [25] the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) arguing that it
was never Hampton’s employer for purposes of Title VII liability. Because Hampton has
adequately alleged that DPI, through its Chairman, exercised substantial control over her
employment, the Court denies DPI’s motion to dismiss Hampton’s Title VII claim.

BACKGROUND 1
Hampton worked for various political campaigns between 2012 and 2016 in a variety of
roles. Consistent success and positive feedback for her performance was the theme during her
tenure as a campaign worker. Her supervisor during this time was City of Chicago Alderman
Marty Quinn (“Alderman Quinn”).
After Hampton worked on Juliana Stratton’s successful campaign for the Illinois House
of Representatives 5th District in the Spring of 2016, Alderman Quinn and Michael Madigan, the
Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, arranged for Hampton to work at the Chicago
Heights Economic Development Corporation. Madigan was, at all relevant times, the Chairman
of all Defendants. As part of this arrangement, Hampton had an obligation to work for the
Defendants, assisting with various Democratic political campaigns.
Between July 2016 and April 2017, Hampton worked for three separate campaigns. She
received compensation for this work from Friends of Michael J. Madigan and Democratic
Majority. While working for these campaigns, Hampton’s direct supervisor was Kevin Quinn
(“Quinn”), Alderman Quinn’s brother. Defendants employed Quinn during at this time and
Quinn received his salary from Friends of Michael J. Madigan. Quinn directed Hampton’s work
on a daily basis. Alderman Quinn also served as Hampton’s supervisor during this period. He,
too, received a salary from Friends of Michael J. Madigan for this work.
In August 2016, shortly after Hampton began working under Quinn, Quinn began
pursuing a romantic relationship with Hampton. Over the following five-month period, Quinn
called Hampton and sent her text messages on numerous occasions asking her out and
commenting on her appearance. In one text message sent in September 2016, he told her she
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The facts in the background section are taken from the FAC and are presumed true for the purpose of
resolving DPI’s motion to dismiss. See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011); Local 15,
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2007).

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was “smoking hot” in refence to a picture on Facebook of her in a bathing suit. Doc. 9-1 at 26.
Over the ensuing months, Quinn continued to pursue dates with Hampton despite her repeatedly
informing him that she wanted to keep their relationship strictly professional.
In February 2017, Hampton reported Quinn’s behavior to Alderman Quinn. She read
examples of the text messages she had received from Quinn to Alderman Quinn. Alderman
Quinn told Hampton that she should block Quinn’s phone number and that she would no longer
report to Quinn. However, Alderman Quinn next assigned Hampton to work as a precinct
officer, which required reporting directly to Quinn. In April 2017, Hampton quit working for
Defendants because she could no longer tolerate working with Quinn.
Hampton sent a letter to Madigan on November 1, 2017, notifying him of her experience
working under Quinn. Madigan did not respond to her letter. But on November 13, 2017, a
lawyer who serves as special counsel to Madigan and the Defendants contacted Hampton.
Hampton met with the lawyer on November 15, 2017, at a coffee shop. During the meeting,
Hampton asked about getting a position with the Defendants in the upcoming election cycle.
The lawyer told Hampton she would follow up with her about it, but never did.
Hampton contacted the lawyer again in December to ask if Hampton could directly
contact Alderman Quinn to discuss working on the next 5th District campaign. The lawyer never
returned her message regarding this request. Hampton again reached out in January and the
lawyer again told her she would follow up later, but never did. Finally, in January, Hampton
contacted Alderman Quinn directly regarding opportunities to work for the Defendants, but he
did not respond. Hampton subsequently learned that Defendants would not hire her because
Defendants were not involved in the 5th District race, which was untrue.

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LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not
its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.
1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in
the plaintiff’s favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim’s basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
ANALYSIS
DPI moves to dismiss Hampton’s retaliation claim, arguing that she has not pleaded an
employment relationship between herself and DPI. To assert a retaliation claim under Title VII,
a plaintiff must allege the existence of an employment relationship. Knight v. United Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 1991). Hampton argues that her allegations
are sufficient to support a claim that she had an employment relationship with DPI under either a
“joint employer” theory or a “de facto or indirect employer” theory.
A plaintiff may pursue a Title VII claim under the theory that an entity was one of her
joint employers, Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 895–96 (7th Cir.
2015), or under a de facto or indirect employer theory, Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d
697, 702 (7th Cir. 2015). But the touchstone of both tests is control. Compare Whitaker v.

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Milwaukee County, Wis., 772 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2014), with Love, 779 F.3d at 702. Thus,
to determine if an entity constitutes an employer, the Seventh Circuit looks to “whether the
putative employer exercised sufficient control, and whether the ‘economic realities’ are such that
the putative employer can be held liable under Title VII.” Love, 779 F.3d at 702. In this control
analysis, ‘the key powers are, naturally, those of hiring and firing.” Id. at 703 (quoting E.E.O.C.
v. State of Ill., 69 F.3d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1995)). But courts typically will not resolve the
question of whether an employment relationship exists at the pleading stage because it requires a
fact intensive inquiry. See Penteris v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 894, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 2015).
Hampton’s allegations that DPI exercised sufficient control to be liable under Title VII
are summarized as follows. DPI, along with the other Defendants, share a Chairman: Madigan.
All Defendants share a common purpose: electing Democratic candidates in Illinois. As the
Chairman of all four Defendants, Madigan controls their bank accounts, has the ability to transfer
money between the accounts, and controls the employment decisions for each Defendant.
Madigan took an active role in assigning Hampton to various positions working for the
Defendants and he made these decisions in his capacity as Chairman of DPI. This last point is
not contained in the FAC itself; however, it is consistent with the allegations of the FAC and is a
factual elaboration on her alleged interactions with the Defendants and Madigan. Geinosky v.
City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (a party may “elaborate on his factual
allegations so long as the new elaborations are consistent with the pleadings”).
This is not like the two cases DPI has cited in support of its contention that dismissal at
this stage is appropriate. In Shah v. Littelfuse Inc., the court rejected plaintiff’s joint employer
theory arguments because he did not allege any facts that “[defendant] controlled [plaintiff’s]

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work conditions, assignments, evaluations, or performance.” No. 12 CV 6845, 2013 WL
1828926, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2013). Whereas here, Hampton alleges that Madigan, in his
capacity as Chairman of DPI, made decisions about where Hampton worked and had the ultimate
authority over her employment, which is “key” to the control analysis. Love, 779 F.3d at 703.
And in Garzon v. Arrowmark Colorado Holdings, LLC, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim
against one employer where the plaintiff’s joint employer theory was not supported by
allegations that the putative employer exerted control over her employment; she only alleged that
it exerted day-to-day control over the operations of her actual employer. No. 16 C 11525, 2017
WL 6988659, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2017). The court held that this allegation was irrelevant
to the control analysis for Title VII liability because it said nothing about the control the
defendant exerted over the plaintiff herself. Id. Here, on the other hand, Hampton alleges that
the Chairman of DPI directly asserted control over her employment, determining where she
worked and whether she was employed by Defendants at all.
At this early stage, Hampton has done enough to put DPI on notice of the basis for her
claim and plausibly alleged that DPI exerted control over her employment with Defendants to
establish an employment relationship. Thus, the Court denies DPI’s motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies DPI’s motion to dismiss [25].

Dated: October 30, 2018

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

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