Maysonet, Jr. v. Guevara et al
Filing
138
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 6/11/2020. Mailed notice. (dm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE JUAN MAYSONET, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-2342
v.
Judge Mary M. Rowland
REYNALDO GUEVARA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jose Juan Maysonet, Jr. brings suit under federal and state law
against six Defendant police officers, former Cook County State’s Attorney Frank
DiFranco, Cook County, and the City of Chicago (the “City”), challenging his arrest,
prosecution, and conviction for a double homicide in 1990. Before the Court is
Defendant City of Chicago’s motion to bifurcate Plaintiff’s Monell claims and to stay
Monell discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) [94]. For the reasons
stated below, the City’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction for the murders of
Torrence and Kevin Wiley in 1990. After spending 27 years in prison, Maysonet’s
conviction was vacated on November 15, 2017. Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §1983, and various state law causes of action, claiming that several City of
Chicago police officers, together with Di Franco, violated his due process rights by (1)
manipulating and coercing Maysonet into giving a false confession, (2) fabricating
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inculpatory evidence, (3) suppressing exculpatory evidence, (4) conspiring to deprive
Maysonet of his constitutional rights, and (5) failing to intervene to protect those
rights. Maysonet also alleges, pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that these actions were facilitated by or carried out
pursuant to City policies and that the City failed to adequately train, supervise,
investigate and discipline its officers. At present, the City seeks to bifurcate Plaintiff’s
Monell claims and stay Monell discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one
or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Seventh Circuit has emphasized that only one of the above
criteria, prejudice or judicial economy, needs to be satisfied for a court to grant
bifurcation, but the court must ensure that “doing so will not prejudice the nonmoving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d
692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007). The district court has considerable discretion in deciding
whether to bifurcate claims. See e.g., Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th
Cir. 2000). “[T]he decision to grant or deny bifurcation is a heavily fact-intensive
analysis, dependent upon costs and benefits of bifurcation under the unique
circumstances of each case.” Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL 1161500, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2012).
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ANALYSIS
I.
Judicial Economy
The City argues that bifurcation would avoid unnecessary litigation and
discovery. Because Maysonet’s Monell claim is contingent on a finding of liability
against the Defendant officers, the City argues, the Monell claim may not need to be
adjudicated at all.
A. Pendency of Monell Claim on Individual Officer Liability
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that “a municipality can be held liable
under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an
inconsistent verdict.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir.
2010) (emphasis in original). Inconsistency is assessed by considering “the nature of
the constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set
forth.” Id.
Maysonet alleges several theories of Monell liability against the City, including
that the City maintained policies that facilitated the fabrication of evidence, abusive
interrogation methods, and the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Although the
parties do not dispute that most of these theories would require a finding of
misconduct on behalf of the Defendant officers, Maysonet argues that his suppression
of exculpatory evidence claim is not contingent on individual officer misconduct.
Maysonet alleges:
[M]embers of the Chicago Police Department … systematically suppressed
exculpatory and/or impeaching memos and other information in files that
were maintained solely at the police department and were not disclosed to
the participants of the criminal justice system. As a matter of widespread
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custom and practice, these clandestine files were withheld from the State’s
Attorney’s Office and from criminal defendants, and they were routinely
destroyed at the close of the investigation, rather than being maintained as
part of the official file.
(Dkt. 1 at ¶214). According to Maysonet “a jury might find that the individual
defendants put investigative materials where they were supposed to in police
department files, but that the City had no mechanism for ensuring those files were
turned over to Plaintiff or the attorneys involved in his criminal prosecution.” (Dkt.
107 at 6-7). 1 Courts in this district have recognized that under similar facts, Monell
liability against the City is not necessarily dependent on a finding of liability against
the individual officers. For instance, in Gomez v. Guevara et al., the court denied
bifurcation:
[W]ith respect to the evidence suppression allegations, the jury could
presumably find that the Defendant Officers put the evidence in its
proper place within the Chicago Police Department files, but that the
City had no mechanism for guaranteeing that those files were turned
over in the litigation process. This finding would not be contingent on
the jury determining that the individual officers intentionally
suppressed evidence. . . . Therefore, Gomez’s asserted Monell claim could
still proceed independent of the Defendant Officers individual liability.
Accordingly, bifurcation would not serve the interests of judicial
economy on this ground.
No. 18c3335, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155120, *8; *10 (N.D. Ill. April 8, 2019); see also
Cage v. City of Chicago, No. 9 C 3078, 2010 WL 3613981, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2010)
The City, citing to Mitchell v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7375, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2019), contends that
this argument should be rejected because Maysonet’s Complaint does not allege that the City’s filing
system prevented production of exculpatory information. (Dkt. 94-1 Ex. 5 at 2). The Court disagrees.
Maysonet alleges that a “clandestine” filing system prevented the disclosure of exculpatory
information. (Dkt. 1 at ¶214). The Plaintiff in Mitchell, on the other hand, alleged “only that the
individual defendants intentionally withheld or destroyed exculpatory information … and only that
the City’s policy was to systematically suppress[ ] evidence pertaining to … fabricated and coerced
statements.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).
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(jury could hold the City liable for a policy of not providing exculpatory evidence to
the defense despite the individual actors not intending to withhold evidence).
Additionally, because each of the individual Defendants asserts a defense of qualified
immunity in this case, this too creates the possibility that a jury could find the City
liable for Monell violations despite the individual officers being shielded from
liability. See Cage, 2010 WL 3613981, at *2 (“Moreover, some of the individual
defendants have asserted a defense of qualified immunity, and if [plaintiff] can
establish it was the policy of the Chicago Police Department crime lab to withhold
exculpatory evidence, a verdict could exist against the municipality but in favor of
the individual defendants.”); Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Thus when a plaintiff loses his claim against a police officer based
on qualified immunity, he can still recover against the municipality if he can prove a
constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy or custom.”). 2
Accordingly, bifurcation weighs against the interests of judicial economy.
B. Increased Discovery Burden and Expense
Given the expansive breadth and scope of Maysonet’s Monell allegations and
discovery requests to date, the City next argues the increased discovery burden and
expense of proceeding with the Monell claim is grounds for bifurcation. Although the
Court acknowledges the significant burden of Monell discovery, this burden is
The City argues that the individual Defendants’ assertions of qualified immunity will not create
inconsistent verdicts because the constitutional violations alleged by Maysonet are clearly established.
It is too early to reach this conclusion. Indeed, the assertion of qualified immunity, unless brought in
bad faith, reflects an expectation that the evidence may reveal ambiguities such that the court or a
jury could find that the officers did not violate clearly established law.
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mitigated by the fact that Monell discovery including written policies and training
manuals, employee records, and samples of homicide and or CR files have or will be
produced in other cases involving a similar group of Chicago Police Officers including
Rivera v. Chicago, No. 12c4428 (N.D. Ill.); Fields v. Chicago, No. 10c1168 (N.D. Ill.);
Ryes v. Guevara, et al, No. 18c1028 (N.D. Ill.); Gomez, No. 18c335 (N.D. Ill.); Reyes &
Solache v. Guevara, Nos. 18 18c1028 & 18c2312 (N.D. Ill.); Almodovar v. Guevara,
Nos. 18c2341 & 18c2701 (N.D. Ill.); Sierra v. Guevara, No. 18c3029 (N.D. Ill.); and
Bouto v. Guevara, No. 19cv2442 (N.D. Ill.). Other courts have reached similar
conclusions. See e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 18-CV-7951, 2019 WL 4278501,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2019), objections overruled, 429 F. Supp. 3d 537 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (“This is …. one of several cases alleging the same pattern and practice of
fabricating incriminating evidence and hiding exonerating evidence against a similar
group of Chicago Police Officers that is currently being litigated in several courts in
the Northern District of Illinois. At least one of these cases, Rivera, has already been
tried to a jury, and gone through Monell discovery. As such, much of the discovery on
Monell liability has already been done by the City at least once, and it will not need
to expend significant time or resources to complete it.”); Cadle v. City of Chicago, No.
15 C 4725, 2015 WL 6742070, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015) (“The City is very familiar
with this type of discovery, and the Court has no doubt that the City has produced
similar information in other cases. The incremental burden of doing so again here
does not militate heavily in favor of bifurcation.”). Although the discovery in these
cases does not completely overlap in terms of time period or subject matter, it overlaps
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enough to decrease the burden of discovery. Additionally, to the extent the City finds
Plaintiff’s Monell discovery requests overly broad or unduly burdensome, “the parties
can seek assistance from the Court to tailor the requests as necessary after making
independent good faith attempts to do so.” Estate of McIntosh v. City of Chicago, 2015
WL 5164080, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015).
Moreover, much of the evidence required to litigate the individual claims will
be relevant to the Monell claim and vice a versa, such that bifurcation could result in
two rounds of depositions and document production. See e.g., Gomez, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 155120, at *11 (denying bifurcation of Monell claim in part because in § 1983
cases “there is a significant overlap in the witnesses, experts, and evidence” such that
it “could create double work in the sense of, for example, needing to depose witnesses
or solicit testimony first regarding [plaintiff’s] specific case and a second time
regarding how the City’s policies impacted that case work.”). The City argues that all
but one of the Defendant officers, as well as some third-party officers and witnesses,
have already been deposed on Monell-related questions, such that they would not
need to be deposed again. But in the case that there is a second trial, Plaintiff would
certainly seek the right to ask these individuals Monell-related questions and request
Monell-related documents that were not produced earlier. Thus, because bifurcation
would likely duplicate discovery efforts and expense, and because the burden of
unitary discovery is lessened by the expanse of similar litigation, the interests of
judicial economy weigh against bifurcation. 3
In the alternative, the City requests the Court to stay Monell discovery and revisit the issue of
bifurcation after summary judgment assuming Plaintiff’s claims will have been narrowed. The Court
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II.
Prejudice
The Court also considers whether bifurcation would avoid prejudice to the
Defendants and concurrently addresses any prejudice to Maysonet from bifurcation.
The City argues that if the claims against the Defendant officers and the Monell claim
against the City are tried together, there is risk that the jury will impute evidence
against the officers to the City and evidence against the City to the individual officers.
Limiting instructions and other evidentiary tools are the proper mechanism to
address this concern. See e.g., Giles v. Ludwig, No. 12–cv–6746, 2013 WL 6512683, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013) (denying bifurcation because “any potential prejudice that
might arise from a unitary trial can be mitigated through the use of limiting
instructions, motions in limine, and the Rules of Evidence”). “Though the Court is
cognizant of the possibility of prejudice to the individual officers [and the City] if the
claims are tried together, our system generally trusts jurors to understand and follow
limiting instructions regarding consideration of evidence against some defendants
and not others ….” Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 897. Moreover, determining potential
prejudice to parties at trial is often “premature and too speculative” at this stage of
the litigation. McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *9; Estate of Loury by Hudson v. City
of Chicago, No. 16-CV-04452, 2017 WL 1425594, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2017); see
also Jackson v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 6746, 2017 WL 8199322, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
12, 2017) (“[T]he better time to evaluate [prejudice from trying individual and Monell
declines to do so. As noted, there is likely to be significant overlap between the Monell claim and the
individual claims such that it is more efficient to conduct unitary discovery. Also, the Court does not
wish to referee the inevitable disputes about the scope of Monell versus non-Monell discovery.
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claims together] is shortly before trial, when the court (and the parties) will have a
much better understanding of the evidence and its relevance to the individual and
Monell claims.”). Defendants have not established that bifurcation is necessary to
avoid prejudice in this case.
By contrast, despite the City’s assurances to the contrary, bifurcation would
prejudice Maysonet. The City asserts that if “any one of the Defendant Officers are
found to have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, bifurcation of Plaintiff’s
Monell claim will not affect his recovery of any damages that a jury may award him”
because the City agrees to “entry of a judgment against it for the amount of
compensatory damages … that would be awarded by the jury, plus reasonable
attorney’s fees, without requiring Plaintiff to prove the elements of Section 1983 for
municipal liability.” (Dkt. 94 at 9). Because Maysonet is not entitled to any additional
compensatory damages and he does not seek injunctive relief, the City argues that
bifurcation would allow Plaintiff to recover the same amount of damages without
having to litigate his Monell claim at all.
This argument overlooks the important nonmonetary considerations a plaintiff
has in litigating a Monell claim against a municipality. See e.g., Loury, 2017 WL
1425594, at *5 (“Plaintiff has other important objectives—most notably, deterrence
and reform— that would be furthered by a judgment holding the City liable for the
Defendant Officers' alleged misconduct.”); McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *10 (“A
judgment against a municipality can be a catalyst for change, because it not only
holds that entity responsible for its actions and inactions, but also can encourage the
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municipality to reform the patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations,
as well as alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue.”) (internal quotations
omitted). These nonmonetary interests are not moot simply because Maysonet does
not pursue injunctive relief. That “argument misunderstands the policy value in
finding that the City’s policy and practices were constitutionally deficient, and the
precedential value of such findings for other plaintiffs in future cases who might seek
to hold the City liable for similar policies.” Bouto v. Guevara, 19-cv-2441, 2020 WL
956294, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2020). 4
Although some courts in this district have found that the City’s willingness to
consent to a judgment against it for compensatory damages adequately serves
nonmonetary interests, see Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 1049, 2019 WL 3776616,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2019); Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060,
1083–84 (N.D. Ill. 2018), others have found “such stipulations insufficient to justify
bifurcation, noting that the plaintiff is entitled to be the master of her own complaint
and pursue claims even if they have a minimal pecuniary reward.” Rodriguez v. City
of Chicago, No. 17 CV 7248, 2018 WL 3474538, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2018) (citing
McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *9; Warren v. Dart, No. 09 CV 3512, 2012 WL
1866372, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012)). Further, courts in this district have
particularly taken issue with similar consents to judgment as offering little, if any,
The City’s argument that because the policies at issue are 25 years old and have been revised, any
impact of a judgment that those policies violate the constitution would be limited at best is equally
unavailing. The City has not shown that the pertinent policies have been meaningfully reformed such
that a finding of Monell liability in this case would have no impact on institutional reform or
deterrence.
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deterrent effect where, as here, the proposal expressly denies any wrongdoing on the
part of the City. Rodriguez, 2018 WL 3474538, at *3 (“A proposed consent judgment
is particularly ill-designed to have any deterrent effect where, as here, it expressly
denies any wrongdoing on the City’s part.”); Loury, 2017 WL 1425594, at *5 (noting
same); Giles, 2013 WL 6512683, at *3.
The Court notes that bifurcation is essentially a means “to achieve a de facto
dismissal of the Monell claim.” Gomez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155120, *12-13; see also
Cadiz v. Kruger, No. 06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (“If
accepted, the City’s bifurcation strategy would allow it to avoid the merits of virtually
any Monell claim alleging police misconduct.”) and Kuri v. Folino, 409 F. Supp. 3d
626, 653 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (denying plaintiff’s motion to pursue bifurcated Monell claim
after trial on individual claims explaining: “Since [plaintiff] is not able to collect
anything in addition to th[e] [amount of compensatory damages awarded against the
individual officers], regardless of any Monell claims, and since he has not brought
claims against the City for injunctive relief, there is no live case or controversy
against the City on which [plaintiff] can move forward.”).
This Court will not deprive a plaintiff, particularly one who has spent 27 years
in prison on a conviction that has been vacated by the state courts, a merits
determination on a Monell claim. Monell claims are difficult to prove and consent to
judgment agreements like that proposed here may pose a benefit to someone in
Maysonet’s position. But the Court will not force Maysonet to accept such an
agreement and forfeit a merits determination on his Monell claim through the vehicle
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of bifurcation. See Cadiz, 2007 WL 4293976, at *11 (the court “does not believe that
the City should be allowed to deprive a plaintiff of a merits determination of a Monell
claim by the expedient of agreeing to pay a judgment against its officers that the City
may be statutorily or contractually obligated to pay anyway.”). The City’s motion is
denied. 5
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to bifurcate and stay
discovery is denied without prejudice.
E N T E R:
Dated: June 11, 2020
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge
Because the Court has determined that bifurcation would prejudice the Plaintiff, it declines to
address Maysonet’s argument that bifurcation would violate the Seventh Amendment.
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