Lamb v. Smith
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 10/11/2019. Mailed notice (mc, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTOINE LAMB, M15463,
Petitioner,
v.
KIM SMITH, Warden,
Taylorville Correctional Center,
Respondent.
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No. 18 C 2377
Judge Sara L. Ellis
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Antoine Lamb, currently incarcerated at Taylorville Correctional Center, is
serving a seven-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual assault by
force, and criminal sexual assault by a person holding a position of authority. Lamb has
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lamb raises three grounds for
relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress Lamb’s
statements, (2) ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and (3) the trial court’s
imposition of an indefinite mandatory supervised release (“MSR”) term in violation of state
sentencing guidelines and the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Court reaches Lamb’s claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; however, Lamb has not shown that the state court’s
decision on this issue was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. The Court finds the remainder of Lamb’s claims procedurally defaulted or not
cognizable on federal habeas review. Thus, the Court denies Lamb’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the state appellate court opinions on direct and postconviction review. The Court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are correct
for the purposes of habeas review because Lamb has not pointed to clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 846 (7th
Cir. 2002). The Court thus adopts the state court’s recitation of the facts and begins by
summarizing the facts relevant to the petition.
I.
Lamb’s Trial
On April 25, 2009, Lamb, his girlfriend at the time (L.D.), the victim (S.S.), and S.S.’
brothers were playing cards and drinking at L.D.’s home. At the time of the incident, S.S. was
almost fifteen years old. L.D. had one glass of vodka, and Lamb drank the remainder of the
bottle. Between midnight and one a.m., the game ended, and everyone dispersed. S.S. went
downstairs to watch the end of a movie.
After the movie ended, S.S. went up to her room. S.S. closed the door but did not lock it.
She then got into bed wearing a tank top, bra, and black track shorts. S.S.’ bed had two sheets on
it; S.S. only got under the first sheet. S.S. heard her bedroom door open and Lamb enter. Lamb
proceeded to get into bed with S.S. Lamb asked if S.S. saw him as a father figure, to which S.S.
agreed. Lamb left after fifteen to twenty minutes.
S.S. left the room thereafter, going downstairs for a brief window of time. She heard a
door open and shut and returned to her room believing Lamb had gone to bed. S.S. got back in
bed, under both sheets. A few moments later, Lamb reentered S.S.’ room and got under both
sheets. S.S. testified that Lamb began to touch her during this encounter, removing her shorts.
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She said Lamb touched “her butt” and her “vaginal area.” Doc. 12-9 ¶ 8. Lamb did not say
anything and left the room shortly after.
After Lamb left the bedroom, S.S. got up, put on her shorts, and returned to bed. After a
short period of time, Lamb reentered the bedroom again. Lamb got back into the bed with S.S.
and asked why she had put her shorts back on. S.S. did not answer Lamb. Lamb asked S.S. to
take off the shorts, and, when she did not comply, he took them off for her. S.S. testified that
Lamb began touching her again and tried to “stick his penis inside [her] vagina area.” Id. ¶ 9
(alteration in original). S.S. further testified that Lamb was “on top of” her and that she started
to scream. Id. S.S. pushed Lamb, and he left the room. Before leaving, Lamb said “I’m still the
same old grouchy Darnall.” 1 Id. S.S. put her underwear in the corner of her closet and then
went downstairs. She fell asleep in front of the television.
S.S. did not tell anyone of the incident that night. The next morning, Lamb drove S.S.
and her brothers to their grandmother’s house. Lamb dropped the siblings off and picked them
up later that afternoon. S.S. had planned on telling her grandmother about the incident but
decided against it because her grandmother had been sick.
On Monday, at school, S.S. told one of her friends about the incident. Another friend
saw her crying and came over to help. S.S. told both of them what had happened. S.S.’ friends
took her to speak to a coach. Afterward, L.D. took her to the hospital.
Later that day, two police officers waited at Lamb’s home for him to return from work.
The officers took Lamb to the police station for questioning. Lamb was not under arrest at this
time. The detectives read Lamb his Miranda warnings. Lamb acknowledged his rights and
agreed to speak to the officers.
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Darnall is a nickname some kids call Lamb.
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Lamb initially told the police officers that he remembered playing the card game, going
to bed, and then waking up on the couch. He claimed not to remember anything in between the
game and waking up. After about an hour, the officers told Lamb that S.S. made an allegation
against him. Lamb informed the detectives that he did not see S.S. in that way, stating that “if it
happened, it was an accident,” and then “I didn’t do it. I don’t remember, but it’s possible if she
says it.” Id. ¶ 21. He acknowledged that he had not known S.S. to be a liar. Lamb also said that
his biggest fear was that he did it and now owed S.S. an apology. Lamb also provided a written
statement along these lines. The following day, officers again interviewed Lamb, reading Lamb
his Miranda rights and proceeding after Lamb agreed to speak with the officers. During this
second interview, when asked if Lamb recalled entering S.S.’ bed, Lamb responded, “I don’t
doubt that it probably happened.” Id. ¶ 23.
The state charged Lamb in a five-count indictment, with Lamb proceeding to a jury trial
on May 10, 2010, on three of the counts. S.S., L.D., one of S.S.’ brothers, and two of S.S.’
friends testified. Two of the officers who conducted the investigation also testified, as did two
forensic scientists who tested a sexual assault evidence collection kit taken from S.S., and the
nurse who collected that kit. The nurse noted she did not observe any trauma on S.S.’ body but
that such a finding was not unusual. Although chemical tests indicated the presence of semen on
S.S.’ underwear, no sperm or seminal fluid was found on any of the swabs taken for the evidence
collection kit.
Lamb moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the state’s case, which the trial
court denied. After the defense rested without presenting evidence, the jury found Lamb guilty
of one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and two counts of criminal sexual assault.
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After the trial, on July 30, 2010, the trial court held a hearing regarding Lamb’s pro se
motion to suppress, which he filed before the trial began on August 27, 2009. Lamb moved to
suppress the statements he made to the police, claiming that these statements were coerced. At a
pre-trial hearing, the trial court informed Lamb that it was at the discretion of his attorney to file
the motion to suppress and therefore did not rule on the motion. The trial court did not revisit the
motion until the July 30, 2010, hearing at which the court found that even if the statements in the
motion were true, Lamb did not suffer any prejudice.
The trial court sentenced Lamb to seven years in prison and an indefinite term of MSR.
II.
Direct Appeal
With the assistance of counsel, Lamb filed a direct appeal on October 13, 2011, raising
evidentiary issues that occurred at trial, including the admission of testimony by a nurse that
Lamb claimed was hearsay, and objecting to the imposition of an indefinite term of MSR. On
March 28, 2012, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Lamb filed a petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) with the Illinois Supreme Court on
April 20, 2012. In his PLA, Lamb claimed that the appellate court erred in affirming the
judgment of the trial court regarding the nurse’s hearsay testimony. The Illinois Supreme Court
denied the PLA on September 26, 2012.
III.
State Post-Conviction Proceedings
Lamb then filed a pro se post-conviction petition pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1
on February 20, 2013. Lamb argued that (1) the police officers’ continued questioning of him
after he asked for an attorney violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment, (2) his trial
attorney was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress his statements to the police, (3) the
trial court’s seating of a biased juror denied him his right to a fair trial under the Sixth
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Amendment, and (4) the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on his pro se motion to
suppress his statements to the police. The trial court appointed post-conviction counsel for
Lamb, but post-conviction counsel did not raise any additional claims outside of Lamb’s original
post-conviction petition. Subsequently, on September 22, 2014, Lamb filed a pro se amended
post-conviction petition raising two additional claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial and the propriety of one detective’s testimony before the grand jury. The state
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court granted on
May 7, 2015.
Lamb then filed a post-conviction appeal. He argued that (1) the appellate court should
remand for an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction claim that his trial attorney was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, and (2) the appellate court should remand for a
new second-stage proceeding regarding post-conviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in
agreeing to the dismissal of his claims. On August 21, 2017, the Illinois Appellate Court found
that Lamb had not made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial or post-conviction
counsel and affirmed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition.
Lamb filed a PLA with the Illinois Supreme Court on November 14, 2017. In his PLA,
Banks argued that the appellate court erred in ruling that trial and post-conviction counsel
rendered effective assistance of counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA on January
18, 2018. Lamb then timely filed his federal habeas petition on March 29, 2018.
LEGAL STANDARD
A habeas petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if the challenged state court
decision is either “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal
law as determined by the United States Supreme Court or if the state court decision “was based
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on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly
established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme] Court on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the
Court].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–05, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).
An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs if the state court correctly identified the
legal rule but unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. See id. at 407.
The Court uses an objective standard to determine whether a state court’s application of Supreme
Court precedent is unreasonable. Id. at 409; Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618, 624 (7th Cir.
2011).
ANALYSIS
Lamb presents the following claims in his petition: (1) ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failing to move to suppress Lamb’s statements to the police; (2) ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel; and (3) trial court error in imposing an indefinite MSR term that
(a) contradicts the Illinois state sentencing guidelines and (b) violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution. Respondent argues that Claim 1 does not have merit. Respondent
further contends that Claim 2 and Claim 3(a) are not cognizable on federal habeas review.
Finally, Respondent maintains that Lamb procedurally defaulted Claim 3(b) because he did not
raise the issue in any state court proceedings.
I.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel (Claim 1)
To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Lamb must show (1) “that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) “that there
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is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In considering the first prong, the Court indulges “a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance” and may not let hindsight interfere with its review of counsel’s decisions. Id. at 689.
In regard to prejudice, a “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. This means a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,”
likelihood of a different outcome in the case. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189, 131 S. Ct.
1388, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770,
178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)). The Court need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if one
provides the answer. That is, if the Court determines that the alleged deficiency did not
prejudice Lamb, it need not consider the first prong. Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1092 (7th
Cir. 2014). In reviewing the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision, the Court must apply a “‘doubly
deferential’ standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit
of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15, 134 S. Ct. 10, 187 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2013) (quoting
Cullen, 564 U.S. at 188).
Lamb argues that he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not file a
motion to suppress the statements he made to the police after his arrest. Lamb maintains that
counsel’s decision to not file a motion to suppress was not based on strategy but instead on
counsel’s mistaken belief that a jury would believe the officers over him. Moreover, Lamb
contends that his statement to police was a critical component of the state’s case and so its
admission unfairly prejudiced him. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Lamb’s claim, finding
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that “there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant even if trial
counsel had successfully moved to suppress defendant’s statements.” Doc. 12-9 ¶ 53.
Initially, the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision is not contrary to clearly established law,
where the court correctly cited to Strickland as the governing standard. Garth v. Davis, 470 F.3d
702, 710 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A decision applying the correct legal rule to the facts of a case is not
‘contrary to’ within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).”). Lamb also has not shown that the Illinois
Appellate Court unreasonably applied federal law in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in finding that he did not satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The appellate
court reached its conclusion by finding that even if the trial court had suppressed Lamb’s
statements to the police, the other evidence against him was “overwhelming and uncontradicted.”
Id. ¶ 54. In other words, “even if a motion to suppress had been successful, the case was not
going away,” with the state having “plenty of powerful evidence” against Lamb. Avila v.
Richardson, 670 F. App’x 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2016). As the appellate court recounted, S.S.
testified at trial that Lamb entered into her room three times, touched her on her vaginal area and,
on the third time, tried to insert his penis inside of her. Her testimony regarding these facts
remained relatively consistent throughout police questioning and testimony at trial. Lamb seizes
on certain inconsistencies in S.S.’ testimony and claims that without his statement, prior
statements and reports would have undermined her trial testimony. But the appellate court found
that the inconsistencies shown on cross-examination of S.S. were minor and did not discredit
S.S. as a witness. The Illinois Appellate Court therefore concluded that Lamb had not proven
that, but for the alleged errors of the trial counsel, a reasonable probability existed that the result
of the trial would have been different. Given the volume of evidence and consistency of the
testimony against Lamb, the Court finds that the Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably
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apply Strickland to Lamb’s claims of ineffective counsel regarding the decision to not suppress
Lamb’s statements to the police officers. See Ebert v. Gaetz, 610 F.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2010)
(finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress because it was
highly unlikely that the admission of a changed statement would result in a significant
reweighing of the “totality of the circumstances”). Accordingly, the Court denies Lamb’s claim
for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to file a motion to suppress.
II.
Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel (Claim 2)
The Court next turns to Lamb’s second claim alleging ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. Respondent argues that Lamb’s claim is not cognizable on federal habeas
review. The power of federal habeas review is remedial and limited to the violation of a
petitioner’s federal rights. Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004). A federal
court may intervene only if the state court has erred and deprived the petitioner of a right under
federal law. Id. States do not have an obligation to provide post-conviction relief or counsel to
aid a defendant pursuing such relief. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S. Ct.
1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and
when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require
that the State supply a lawyer as well.” (citation omitted)). Indeed, the habeas statute forecloses
Lamb’s claim concerning post-conviction counsel, stating that “[t]he ineffectiveness or
incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not
be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). Thus,
the Court has no basis to consider Lamb’s claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel on federal habeas review.
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III.
Indefinite MSR Term (Claim 3)
Finally, the Court addresses Lamb’s claim regarding the imposition of an indefinite
period of MSR. Lamb argues that the trial court’s imposition of an indefinite MSR term is
inconsistent with state sentencing guidelines and violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution.
First, the Court cannot address Lamb’s claim that the imposition of an indefinite MSR
term is inconsistent with state sentencing guidelines. As discussed in connection with his claim
for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, federal courts may not “reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S. Ct.
475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). Instead, “in conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited
to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Id. Lamb’s contention that the trial court improperly applied state sentencing rules does not
implicate federal law and so does not present a cognizable federal habeas claim. Dellinger v.
Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002).
Next, the Court finds that Lamb procedurally defaulted his claim regarding any violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A petitioner must fairly present his claims to all levels of the
Illinois courts to avoid procedural default. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848, 119 S. Ct.
1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). To be “fairly presented,” a petitioner must pursue his claim
through one complete round of state court review, either on direct appeal or in post-conviction
proceedings. Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). In Illinois, this means
appeals up to and including the filing of a PLA to the Illinois Supreme Court. O’Sullivan, 526
U.S. at 845–46; Duncan v. Hathaway, 740 F. Supp. 2d 940, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2010). When a
petitioner has failed to present his federal claim to the state courts and the opportunity to raise
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that claim has subsequently passed, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claim and it is
not available for federal habeas review. Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 380 (7th Cir. 2009).
Lamb first raised his concern regarding double jeopardy in this petition, having failed to
raise it in any proceeding before the state courts. He did argue on direct appeal that the appellate
court should remand his case to the trial court for imposition of a definite MSR term, but he did
not invoke any federal law basis for this argument. And Lamb did not even raise this more
general MSR claim through one complete round of state court review, omitting it from his direct
appeal PLA. Because Lamb did not raise the specific issue regarding his double jeopardy
concern through one complete round of state court review before raising it in this habeas petition,
he has procedurally defaulted this aspect of his claim. Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1025.
A petitioner may nonetheless pursue a procedurally defaulted claim if he can establish
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or can
demonstrate that the Court’s failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991);
Johnson v. Loftus, 518 F.3d 453, 455-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Cause exists where “some objective
factor external to the defense impeded [the petitioner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s
procedural rule.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d
286 (1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prejudice exists where the
petitioner shows that the violation of his federal rights “worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Lewis, 390 F.3d
at 1026 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816
(1982)). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is “limited to situations where the
constitutional violation has probably resulted in a conviction of one who is actually innocent.”
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Dellinger, 301 F.3d at 767. This requires new, reliable evidence of the petitioner’s innocence in
light of which “no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 377 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995)).
Lamb has not provided any basis for this Court to find cause or prejudice to excuse his
procedural default nor has any new evidence come to light to suggest Lamb’s actual innocence.
Therefore, the Court need not consider this aspect of Lamb’s claim. See Crockett v. Hulick, 542
F.3d 1183, 1193 (7th Cir. 2008).
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the Court must issue or
deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to a petitioner. A habeas
petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability only if he can make a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct.
1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). To make a substantial showing,
the petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
893 n.4, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983)). The requirement of a certificate of
appealability is a threshold issue and a determination of whether one should issue neither
requires nor permits full consideration of the factual and legal merits of the claims. “The
question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that
debate.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342.
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For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there can be no showing of a substantial
constitutional question for appeal, as reasonable jurists would not find this Court’s rulings
debatable. See Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at
484–85, 120 S. Ct. 1595). Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Lamb’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and declines to issue a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c).
Dated: October 11, 2019
______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge
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