Haider v. Berryhill

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 6/23/2020:Mailed notice (lp, )

(IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MOHAMMED H., 1
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security, 2
Defendant.

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No. 18 C 2764
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Mohammed H.’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 13] is
granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied.

In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security
Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last
name.
1

Andrew Saul has been substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
2

BACKGROUND
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since

March 20, 2013 due to back, shoulder, hip, and knee pain. The claim was denied
initially and upon reconsideration, after which he timely requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on May 4, 2017. Plaintiff
personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel.
Vocational expert Lee Knutson also testified.
On September 6, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding
him not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration
Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626
(7th Cir. 2005).
II.

ALJ DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of March 20, 2013. At step
two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: spinal
disorder, left shoulder disorder, bilateral hip degenerative changes, and left knee
osteoarthritis. The ALJ concluded at step three that his impairments, alone or in

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combination, do not meet or medically equal a Listing. Before step four, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff retained the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work with the following additional limitations: never climbing
ladders, rope, or scaffolding; no more than occasional climbing of ramps/stairs,
balancing, stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, bending, or twisting; no more
than occasional overhead reaching and no more than frequent front/lateral reaching
with the left arm; no more than frequent use of the left hand to handle, finger, and
feel; allowed the use of a cane to get to and from the work station; and provided
with a sit/stand option allowing him to stand for one to two minutes after sitting for
thirty minutes. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be capable of
performing his past relevant work as a customer service clerk, leading to a finding
that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act.
DISCUSSION
I.

ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a Plaintiff is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the Plaintiff
presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments

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enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform her former
occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d

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at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
ALJ’s decision must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as
“the decision is adequately supported”) (citation omitted).
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning
behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th
Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a Plaintiff, “he must build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence
with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex
rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496
F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before
drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we
can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir.
2005).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a Plaintiff is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors
his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).

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III.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons,

including that in determining the RFC, she improperly rejected the opinion of the
treating physician and part of the consulting physician’s opinion.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to frequently reach with his
left arm to the front and laterally. In forming this opinion, she acknowledged that
“the state medical consultant imposes greater limitations on claimant’s use of upper
extremities,” but determined that “the claimant has no limitations reaching below
the shoulder level as evidenced by him driving, using a cell phone, preparing food,
feeding himself, washing himself, dressing himself, dusting, folding laundry, taking
out light garbage, and rinsing dishes.” (R. 23.) This finding with respect to
Plaintiff’s reaching ability was critical to the disability determination, as the
vocational expert testified that if he were limited to only occasional front and lateral
reaching, Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. (R. 58.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ improperly substituted her own
opinion in finding he was not as limited as the consultant suggested. Her decision
was based solely on certain activities of daily living, such as driving, using a phone,
eating, and doing some household chores, which showed that Plaintiff had “no
limitations.” Her conclusion, however, lacked any information about how Plaintiff
generally performed those activities, how long they took, how much pain may have
been involved, or how often he could perform them in an eight-hour time frame, and
it is well settled that “[a]n ALJ may not equate activities of daily living with those

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of a full-time job.” Jeske v. Saul, -- F.3d --, 2020 WL 1608847, at *8 (7th Cir. Apr. 2,
2020); see also Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The critical
differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job are that
a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help
from other persons . . . , and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as
she would be by an employer. The failure to recognize these differences is a
recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions by administrative law judges in social
security disability cases.”); Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[Plaintiff’s] ability to struggle through the activities of daily living does not mean
that she can manage the requirements of a modern workplace.”). Accordingly, the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could frequently reach during a standard workday
and workweek was not supported by substantial evidence. Because her ultimate
disability finding rested on this functional ability, the error requires remand.
Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reason, the
Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The
Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were
omitted from the opinion because no error was found. In particular, the Court
admonishes the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to
ensure that the treating physician rule is followed with respect to the opinions of
Dr. Dabawala.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
13] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should
be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Order.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

DATE:

___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge

June 23, 2020

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