Laff v. Berryhill
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 1/27/2021: Mailed notice (lp, )
Case: 1:18-cv-03395 Document #: 34 Filed: 01/27/21 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:2186
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELIZABETH L., 1
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security, 2
Defendant.
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No. 18 C 3395
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Elizabeth L.’s claim for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 10]
is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied.
In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security
Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last
name.
1
Andrew Saul has been substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
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BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a claim for SSI, alleging disability since
April 7, 2012. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which
she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which
was held on January 25, 2016. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the
hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert also testified.
On February 11, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding
her not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration
Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626
(7th Cir. 2005).
II.
ALJ DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential
evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her application date of February 25, 2013. At step
two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
arthritis in both knees, obesity, and bipolar disorder with agoraphobia. The ALJ
concluded at step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet
or medically equal a listed impairment. Before step four, the ALJ determined that
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Plaintiff retained the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
with the following additional limitations: only occasional stooping, crouching, and
use of ramps or stairs; no kneeling, crawling, or work involving ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; no balancing on wet or uneven surfaces; only occasional exposure to
hazards and vibrations; and limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, with
occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.
At step four, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At step
five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience
and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not disabled
under the Social Security Act.
DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a Plaintiff is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the Plaintiff
presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform her former
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occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even
in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high. Substantial evidence . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and
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means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in
evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is
adequately supported”) (citation omitted).
However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved
of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838
F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has
adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every
piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide
some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to
a Plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate
the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful
appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir.
2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to
fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately
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articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a Plaintiff is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors
his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made several errors, including failing to
accommodate all of Plaintiff’s limitations in the RFC assessment. Among other
things, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC does not incorporate all of her mental
limitations, particularly those affecting social functioning and concentration,
persistence, and pace.
The ALJ noted the numerous occasions in the record where Plaintiff was
found to be depressed, quick to anger, sad, irritable, anxious, and exhibiting other
psychological symptoms including occasional suicidal ideation, crying spells,
difficulty sleeping, throwing things at people in anger, and hitting her son and
husband. In forming Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that she was moderately
limited in her ability to work in coordination with others; to complete a normal
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms; to perform at a consistent pace; to accept instructions and respond
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appropriately to criticism; and to get along with co-workers and peers without
exhibiting behavioral extremes. The ALJ concluded that all of these restrictions
would be accommodated by limiting her to “simple routine repetitive tasks” and
“occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” (R. 21.) The
Commissioner contends that these restrictions account for all of Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations. The Court disagrees, because “[t]he ALJ neither cited
evidence that [Plaintiff] could meet [concentration and task-based] benchmarks nor
addressed the evidence that she could not.” Lothridge v. Saul, -- F.3d --, 2021 WL
37503, at *1, 6 (7th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (finding reversible error where the ALJ failed
to determine whether the claimant could meet requirements of attendance and
staying on task given the noted deficits in concentration, persistence, and pace).
“The law does not require ALJs to use certain words, or to refrain from using
others, to describe the pace at which a claimant is able to work.” Martin v. Saul, 950
F.3d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “[w]hat we do require – and our recent
precedent makes plain – is that the ALJ must account for the ‘totality of a
claimant’s limitations’ in determining the proper RFC.” Id. The ALJ did not
adequately support her RFC finding with respect to the totality of Plaintiff’s nonfunctional limitations and their effect on, for example, her concentration, pace, and
ability to work well with others. See Lothridge, 2021 WL 37503, at *5 (criticizing the
ALJ for limiting the claimant “to ‘simple instructions and tasks with restricted
interactions with others’ without addressing her ability to stay on task for a full
workday or to perform at the required speed”).
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When forming the RFC, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s alleged limitations,
citing Plaintiff’s ability to babysit a four-year-old, which included playing with the
child, reading stories, and watching TV, and stating that “[a]ll these activities
would appear to be impossible if she was as limited as she has stated.” (R. 22.) The
ALJ also found it “impossible” for Plaintiff to have severe pain and mental
limitations and yet make breakfast for her son and lay out his clothes; care for and
feed her cats; and cook meals three times a day. (Id.)
By focusing on these activities, the ALJ “cherry-picked and overstated the
evidence that she cited to support her residual functional capacity finding . . . Yet
the ALJ overlooked, or at least did not acknowledge and engage with, the
limitations with those tasks . . . .” Lothridge, 2021 WL 37503, at *6. The ALJ should
have, but did not, discuss evidence supporting disability, including Plaintiff’s
dependence on family members to assist her with activities of daily living, including
the care of the children in her home. Similarly, the ALJ did not consider that
Plaintiff had difficulty getting along with others, and intrapersonal conflicts were
only minimized by her choice to self-isolate.
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s allegedly poor concentration and memory
was contradicted by her statements that she watched television and played
computer games, and that “she was okay with the games.” (R. 22.) But the ALJ did
not describe the nature of the computer games and whether they were the type that
required any concentration at all, let alone the type of day-long concentration
required by an employer. See Lothridge, 2021 WL 37503, at *5 (“Whether [claimant]
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is congenial or able to add sums in a short-term encounter or examination has little
or no apparent bearing on whether she can maintain pace or stay on task for an
entire workday.”); Martin, 950 F.3d at 374 (“[S]omeone with problems concentrating
may not be able to complete a task consistently over the course of a workday, no
matter how simple it may be.”).
The ALJ also gave little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating
psychologist Dr. Givens, who opined that she had marked limitations in most
functional areas and was extremely limited in her ability to perform even simple
work. The ALJ disregarded that opinion in part because of its alleged inconsistency
with the treatment notes made by a licensed clinical social worker, which “show
that the claimant mainly had family problems that caused her some level of
anxiety.” (R. 23.) This statement by the ALJ suggests that the source of Plaintiff’s
anxiety was relevant to its effect on Plaintiff’s ability to work, but its significance is
left unexplained.
The Court does not hold that the ALJ’s judgment about the issues of
concentration and ability to work with others was incorrect, but “but we cannot
uphold an administration determination that failed to explain the outcome
adequately.” Lothridge, 2021 WL 37503, at *5. Because the decision was not
supported by substantial evidence, it must be remanded for further proceedings.
The Court will not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff but
emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were omitted
from the opinion because no error was found.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No.
10] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should
be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
Order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
January 27, 2021
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