TenPas v. McGladrey LLP Health and Welfare Plan et al
Filing
60
OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion and Order, the Court denies Lincoln's motion for summary judgment 47 and grants Ten Pas' motion for summary judgment 44 . The Court enters judgment for Ten Pas and terminates this case. Status hearing set for 12/11/19 is stricken. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 12/10/2019. Mailed notice(rj, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HARLAN TEN PAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 18 C 3694
Judge Sara L. Ellis
OPINION AND ORDER
On August 31, 2014, Harlan Ten Pas, a former tax attorney with McGladrey LLP
(“McGladrey”), suffered a heart attack that required hospitalization and stents in his artery.
Within a week, he suffered two strokes and had to take a medical leave of absence from work.
Ten Pas now brings this action against Lincoln National Insurance Company (“Lincoln”), the
administrator of McGladrey’s long-term disability plan for employees, pursuant to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Ten Pas seeks a
declaratory judgment that Lincoln erred by setting his “first day of Disability,” Doc. 48 ¶ 11, on
August 31, 2014, thereby reducing his monthly disability payments by several thousand dollars
because of a raise he received on September 1, 2014. The parties now bring cross-motions for
summary judgment. The Court finds that setting Ten Pas’ first day of Disability on August 31,
2014, contravenes the plain language of the ERISA policy and that Lincoln unreasonably
calculated his benefits according to his pre-September 1 salary. Consequently, the Court grants
summary judgment to Ten Pas.
BACKGROUND
I.
Ten Pas’ Heart Attack and Strokes
Ten Pas was a lead tax partner at the Chicago office of McGladrey, a tax and consulting
firm, now known as RSM US LLP. On Friday, August 29, 2014, Ten Pas worked a full day at
the office. He worked part of the day on Saturday, August 30, and Sunday, August 31, before
going to his summer cabin in Wisconsin for the Labor Day weekend. While at his cabin, Ten
Pas suffered chest pains and went to Oconomowoc Memorial Hospital in Wisconsin. The
treating cardiologist admitted Ten Pas to the intensive care unit. On Monday, September 1,
which was Labor Day, Ten Pas underwent cardiac angioplasty. The procedure included the
placement of a drug-eluting stent to keep an occluded artery open. Physicians discharged Ten
Pas the next day, Tuesday, September 2, with several diagnoses, including myocardial infarction,
i.e. a heart attack.
On Wednesday, September 3, Ten Pas returned to work at the office. Ten Pas went home
in the afternoon after experiencing some numbness, and later that day was admitted to the
emergency room at Highland Park Hospital in Highland Park, Illinois. Ten Pas was “found to
have subacute infarction,” i.e. a stroke. Doc. 48 ¶ 33. Ten Pas remained at the hospital
Wednesday night and Thursday, before returning home on Friday, September 5. On Saturday,
September 6, Ten Pas went to Highland Park Hospital again, and underwent a CT scan. The
treating physician noted that he had suffered an intracranial hemorrhage. Ten Pas remained
hospitalized until Highland Park transferred Ten Pas to the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago on
September 12. The Rehabilitation Institute discharged Ten Pas to his home on October 20.
2
II.
The Long-Term Disability Insurance Policy
Ten Pas was a participant in McGladrey’s long-term disability plan for employees, which
Lincoln administered according to the terms of McGladrey’s Group Long-Term Disability
Insurance Policy (the “Policy”). The Policy pays “a Total Disability Monthly Benefit,” id. ¶ 16,
to “Class 1” employees after an “Elimination Period” of 180 days of Disability, id. ¶¶ 11, 13.
The Elimination Period “begins on the first day of Disability” and employees may return to fulltime work during that period so long as they accrue 180 days of Disability, “caused by the same
or a related Sickness or Injury,” within a one-year period. Id. ¶ 11.
Ten Pas was a Class 1 employee, eligible for long-term Disability benefits equal to 60%
of his basic monthly earnings. His benefits could “not exceed the amount shown in the
Employer’s financial records [or] the amount for which premium has been paid[.]” Id. ¶ 19.
McGladrey paid premiums on a monthly basis as a percentage of their payroll.
The Policy calculates an employee’s benefits according to the employee’s monthly salary
on the “Determination Date.” Id. ¶ 19. The Determination Date is defined as “the last day
worked just prior to the date the Disability begins.” Id. “Disability” or “Disabled” means “Total
Disability or Partial Disability.” Id. ¶ 7. Total Disability and “Totally Disabled” are defined as:
“During the Elimination Period . . . due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable
to perform each of the Main Duties of his or her Own Occupation.” Id. ¶ 7. Partial Disability or
“Partially Disabled” are defined as: “During the Elimination Period . . . due to an Injury or
Sickness the Insured Employee[] is unable to perform one or more of the Main Duties of his or
her Own Occupation; or is unable to perform such duties full-time; and is engaged in Partial
Disability Employment.” Id. ¶ 8. Main Duties are defined as job tasks that: “are normally
required to perform an occupation” and “could not reasonably be modified or omitted.” Id. ¶ 10.
3
The Policy also contains a provision defining Active Work:
ACTIVE WORK or ACTIVELY AT WORK means an
Employee’s full-time performance of all Main Duties of his or her
Own Occupation, for the regularly scheduled number of hours, at:
1. the Employer’s usual place of business; or
2. any other business location where the Employer requires
the Employee to travel.
Unless disabled on the prior workday or on the day of absence, an
Employee will be considered Actively at Work on the following
days:
1. a Saturday, Sunday or holiday that is not a scheduled
workday;
2. a paid vacation day or other scheduled or unscheduled nonworkday; or
3. a non-medical leave of absence of 12 weeks or less,
whether taken with the Employer’s prior approval or on an
emergency basis.
Id. ¶ 21. Relevant to this case, the Active Work terminology is incorporated in two sections of
the Policy titled “Effective Dates” and “Individual Termination.” Id. ¶¶ 20, 22; Doc. 48-1
at 115. The Effective Dates section states:
An Employee’s initial amount of coverage becomes effective at
12:01 a.m. on the latest of:
1. the first day of the Insurance Month following the date the
Employee becomes eligible for the coverage;
2. the date the Employee resumes Active Work, if not
Actively at Work on the day he or she becomes eligible;
3. the date the Employee makes written application for
coverage . . .
4. the date the Company approves the Employee’s Evidence
of Insurability, if required.
Id. ¶ 20. The Individual Termination section, under a provision titled “Continuation Rights,”
provides that: “Ceasing Active Work results in termination of the Insured Employee’s eligibility
for insurance, but . . . [i]f an employee is absent due to Total Disability or is engaged in Partial
Disability Employment, coverage may be continued during[] the Elimination Period; provided
the Company receives the required premium from the Employer.” Id. ¶ 22.
4
III.
Initial Determination of Disability Benefits
In January 2015, McGladrey and Ten Pas began submitting paperwork to Lincoln for Ten
Pas to receive long-term Disability benefits. McGladrey submitted an Employer’s Statement that
indicated Ten Pas’ last full day of work was September 5, 2014, and that his regular scheduled
work week was forty hours per week, eight hours per day. Ten Pas submitted an Employee’s
Statement wherein he also indicated that his last full day of work was September 5. McGladrey
and Ten Pas also submitted two Physician Statements from doctors at the Rehabilitation Institute.
The first was from Dr. Elliot Roth, who Ten Pas first saw on September 16, 2014. Dr. Roth
indicated that Ten Pas’ symptoms began to appear on August 31, and that this was the date
“recommend(ed) [that] the patient stop work.” Id. ¶ 40. The second was from Dr. Susan
Keeshin, who Ten Pas first visited on October 27, 2014. Dr. Keeshin indicated that Ten Pas’
symptoms first appeared, and that he was first unable to work, on September 2.
Ten Pas’ last day of work was significant because Ten Pas earned $12,500 bi-weekly
until the pay period ending August 31, 2014. On September 1, Ten Pas received a raise that
increased his bi-weekly salary to $15,000. Given the discrepancy in the dates from Dr. Roth and
Dr. Keeshin on the one hand, and from Ten Pas and McGladrey on the other, Lincoln attempted
to confirm Ten Pas’ last full day of work. Lincoln contacted McGladrey’s benefits specialist and
asked for documentation substantiating Ten Pas’ work the first week of September. In response,
McGladrey indicated that Ten Pas was in the office on September 3 and that he worked from
home on September 4 and 5. McGladrey did not have any time sheets documenting Ten Pas’
hours. Lincoln also spoke to Dr. Roth, Dr. Keeshin, and to Ten Pas’ spouse. Ten Pas’ spouse
related that Ten Pas worked at the office the morning of September 3 and that he worked
remotely from the hospital on September 4 and 5.
5
Lincoln requested information regarding Ten Pas’ duties as a lead tax partner from
McGladrey. McGladrey responded by submitting a “New Partner Sketch.” Id. ¶ 42. It listed
some of his job requirements as: energetic leadership, high-quality technical expertise,
management of net services of at least $1 million, billable hours, and significant involvement in
sales to new clients. In a Disability Claim Job Analysis, McGladrey described Ten Pas’ job
duties as: “Tax partner responsible for reviewing and approving tax returns, tax planning memos
and tax research memos.” Id. ¶ 43. McGladrey also noted that Ten Pas supervised ten to fifteen
people and that he was required to travel for work 10-15% of the time. Id.
On March 4, 2015, Lincoln informed Ten Pas that it had approved his long-term
Disability claim and that it was “continuing to investigate his ‘date of disability and salary as of
the date of disability.’” Id. ¶ 58. Lincoln explained that it was “[c]urrently . . . using a date of
disability of 08/31/2014 and a salary of $25,000.00 per month,” and that it would issue a formal
determination after obtaining additional documentation from McGladrey and Ten Pas’
physicians. Id.; Doc. 48-4 at 220. Shortly thereafter, Ten Pas submitted an amended Physician
Statement from Dr. Roth. Dr. Roth crossed out his previous response that Ten Pas’ symptoms
first appeared on August 31 and instead wrote September 6. Dr. Roth also amended the “date
you recommend(ed) the patient stop work” from August 31 to September 6. Doc. 48 ¶ 60.
Lastly, Lincoln reviewed Ten Pas’ medical records. Besides describing Ten Pas’
multiple hospitalizations, the records indicated that he “had no significant medical problems
prior to acute [myocardial infarction] on 8/31,” and that he “had recent drug eluting stent
placement on 9/1/2014 which was complicated by suspected periprocedural embolic stroke with
subsequent hemorrhagic conversion.” Id. ¶ 70.
6
On May 27, 2015, Lincoln sent Ten Pas a letter informing him that it had approved his
Disability claim. The letter recounted the conflicting information surrounding his last day of
work and Lincoln’s subsequent investigation. Lincoln concluded that Ten Pas’ Disability date,
“the first day of Disability” under the Policy, id. ¶ 11, was August 31, 2014. Lincoln further
stated that Ten Pas had paid disability premiums for the pay period ending August 31, 2014,
based on a semi-monthly salary of $12,500. Thus, Lincoln calculated Ten Pas’ benefits
according to his monthly salary on August 31: $25,000. His benefits, calculated at 60% of his
monthly salary, came out to $15,000 a month. 1 Had Lincoln calculated Ten Pas’ benefits
according to his monthly salary after September 1, which was $30,000 a month, his monthly
Disability benefits would have been $18,000 a month.
IV.
First Appeal
On November 20, 2015, Ten Pas appealed Lincoln’s determination. Ten Pas argued that
he was able to continue working and performing the Main Duties of his job consistently during
the first week of September, and therefore he was not disabled before the stroke on September 6.
Ten Pas also argued that even if he was unable to perform his duties after August 31, he was not
“capab[le] of becoming ‘disabled’ until he was no longer ‘Actively at Work,’ which would occur
on the next business or work day following the [Labor Day] holiday weekend, Tuesday,
September 2, 2014.” Id. ¶ 72.
As part of the appeal, Ten Pas submitted additional documentation, including a personal
affidavit detailing the work that he performed during the week of September 1 through
September 5. Ten Pas noted that on the evening of September 1 he worked remotely from the
hospital, and that he had e-mailed some of his co-workers, “informing them of the heart attack
and angioplasty” and encouraging them to “[k]eep the ship upright for a day or two.” Id. ¶ 80.
1
Social Security disability income further reduced Ten Pas’ benefits.
7
On September 2, Ten Pas continued to work remotely, “which included reviewing received emails and sending e-mails, with clients and co-workers.” Id. ¶ 82. On Wednesday, September 3,
Ten Pas, “having been advised by [his] doctors that [he] was able to resume normal activities,”
returned to the office. Id. ¶ 84. He sent and received e-mails at the office before he began
experiencing numbness in the afternoon when he was admitted to Highland Park Hospital. Ten
Pas continued to receive and send e-mails from the hospital over the next two days.
Ten Pas also submitted affidavits of three co-workers, each stating that Ten Pas worked
remotely “at various times on September 1 through September 5.” Id. ¶ 85. The affidavits stated
that: “The realities of our profession are such that we are sometimes required to perform work
remotely from space out of the office, including the preparation and transmittal of electronic
correspondence and responding to electronic correspondence.” Id.
Finally, Ten Pas submitted an affidavit from Dr. Roth, which stated:
In completing the Original [Attending Physician Statement], I
mistakenly indicated August 31, 2014 as the date that Harlan “stop
work.” The entry was mistaken for two reasons. First, I had and
have no personal knowledge of Harlan’s condition prior to
September 16, 2014, the date that I first saw him. Second, nothing
in Harlan’s medical records suggest that prior to Harlan’s stroke on
September 6, 2014, Harlan was unable to work.
Id. ¶ 86. Dr. Roth opined that Ten Pas should have stopped working on September 6 rather than
August 31 as he had initially indicated.
On February 19, 2016, Lincoln informed Ten Pas that it would uphold its initial decision.
The determination letter recounted Ten Pas’ hospitalizations and concluded that “[a]lthough it
was reported that [Ten Pas] did answer/send emails from his laptop while in the hospital at times
and/or was working from home, we find that he did not at any point return to full-time
performance of all main duties of his own occupation, for the regularly scheduled number of
8
hours.” Id. ¶ 89. The letter continued: “Therefore, [Ten Pas] was not Actively at Work and he
was disabled as of 08/31/2014.” Id.
V.
Second Appeal
On May 27, 2016, Ten Pas sought a final administrative appeal on the same grounds as
his previous appeal. He argued that the Policy “expressly provides that an individual who is
actively at work on the last day of the work week remains, for the purposes of the Policy,
actively at work until, at the earliest, the next business day.” Id. ¶ 92. On July 8, 2016, Lincoln
informed Ten Pas that it would again uphold its initial decision. The final determination letter
stated that Ten Pas was “‘Actively at Work’ up until [his] medical condition as of 08/31/2014
and the events following. [Ten Pas] never resumed all full-time performance of all main duties
after 08/31/2014. . . . Therefore, [Ten Pas] was not ‘Actively at Work’ after 08/31/2014.” Id.
¶ 96.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
To determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must pierce the pleadings and
assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 & advisory committee’s notes. The party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material
fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on mere pleadings alone but must use the
evidentiary tools listed above to identify specific material facts that demonstrate a genuine issue
for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). Although a
9
bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, Bellaver v.
Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000), the Court must construe all facts in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
The same standard applies when considering cross-motions for summary judgment. Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 176 v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 293 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2002).
The summary judgment standard operates differently when the Court reviews the
determination of an ERISA plan administrator. Where a benefits plan governed by ERISA
grants the administrator discretion to determine eligibility and construe the plan terms, courts
employ an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 615
F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Fischer v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Bos., No. 05 C 3256,
2008 WL 4874302, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2008) (“[T]he umbra of the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard of review has the effect of nearly eclipsing the requirement to construe all inferences in
favor of the non-movant.”), aff’d, 576 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 2009). This has been described as the
“least demanding form of judicial review.” Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653,
658 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The administrator’s decision “may not be deemed
arbitrary so long as it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for that
decision.” Geiger v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
The Court need only ask “whether the administrator’s decision was completely unreasonable.”
Kobs v. United Wis. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2005).
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that Lincoln was vested with authority to interpret the provisions of the
Policy, and therefore the Court must employ the deferential standard of review. The parties
10
dispute when Ten Pas’ Disability began and hence whether his benefits should reflect his salary
increase on September 1, 2014. Ten Pas argues he is entitled to summary judgment because it
was arbitrary of Lincoln to determine that Ten Pas became Disabled on August 31 when he was
Actively at Work the entire holiday weekend. Lincoln responds that Ten Pas misconstrues the
Active Work provision because it is unrelated to the date of Disability. Lincoln further argues
that it is entitled to summary judgment because its determination regarding the date of Disability
was reasonable in light of the evidence. To this, Ten Pas responds that even if he was not
Actively at Work, the medical evidence creates a factual dispute regarding his date of Disability,
and therefore the case must go before a jury. The Court first considers Lincoln’s interpretation
of the Active Work provision.
I.
Active Work Provision
Ten Pas argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he was not capable of
becoming Disabled until September 2 when he was no longer Actively at Work. Ten Pas points
out that an employee is “Actively at Work on . . . a Saturday, Sunday or holiday that is not a
scheduled workday.” Id. ¶ 21. Therefore, Ten Pas argues that he was Actively at Work on
Sunday, August 31, and Monday, September 1. Thus, the Determination Date—“the last day
worked just prior to the date the Disability begins,” id. ¶ 19—was, at the earliest, Monday,
September 1.
In response, Lincoln first contends that Ten Pas ignores the language immediately
preceding the Active Work definition that states: “Unless disabled on the prior workday or on the
day of absence, an Employee will be considered Actively at Work[.]” Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis added).
According to Lincoln, “Active Work ends when disability begins.” Doc. 53 at 7. Since Ten Pas
11
became disabled on Sunday, August 31, Lincoln argues that Ten Pas became “disabled . . . on the
day of absence,” and was no longer Actively at Work the following Monday. Id.
The Court agrees that an employee cannot be both Actively at Work and Disabled at the
same time. But the Policy does not define “day of absence,” nor does the context suggest that
Sundays qualify as one. McGladrey’s regular workweek ran Monday through Friday, and the
word “absence” suggests an employee’s “failure to be present at a usual or expected place.” See
Absence, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/absence (last accessed November 26, 2019). In other words, missing
work on a regularly scheduled workday would be a “day of absence.” But Ten Pas was not
required to work on the weekend so failing to work on a Sunday would not count as a “day of
absence” that would remove him from Active Work status.
Lincoln’s nonetheless argues that Active Work has nothing to do with the date of
Disability or the Determination Date because Active Work and Actively at Work are specifically
defined terms whose meaning only applies to the provisions that incorporate them. See Schultz,
670 F.3d at 838 (“Plan language is given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the plan must be
read as a whole, considering separate provisions in light of one another and in the context of the
entire agreement.”); Lafayette Life Ins. Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042–43
(N.D. Ind. 2011) (“A contract’s definitions apply only when the defined term is actually used;
when undefined terms are used they are given their plain and ordinary meaning.”). The
Determination Date does not refer to Active Work. The Policy provisions that do refer to it are
the “Effective Dates” and “Individual Termination” sections, which provide that an employee’s
coverage becomes effective when they begin Active Work and terminates when they end Active
Work. Doc. 48-1 at 113–16. Lincoln argues that the Active Work terminology simply ensures
12
that an employee remains covered on weekends, holidays, and other non-medical leaves of
absence even though they are not at the office on those specific days.
Contrary to what Lincoln argues, the Active Work provision is relevant to ascertaining
the Determination Date. In the definition of the Determination Date— “the last day worked just
prior to the date the Disability begins,” Doc. 48 ¶ 19— the Policy does not define “the last day
worked” or “the date the Disability begins.” But, as already discussed, Active Work and
Disability do not overlap. Lincoln made this point in the appeal determination letters where it
described Active Work and Disability as different sides of the same coin. Id. ¶ 89, 96 (“Your
client was ‘Actively at Work’ up until your client’s medical condition as of 08/31/2014[.]”).
Consider also that the Individual Termination section allows an employee to remain covered
while on Disability if the employer continues to pay the required premiums. This is only
necessary if an employee cannot remain Actively at Work while on Disability.
In this case, each term can also be understood as the antithesis to the other because the
only justification for removing Ten Pas from Active Work was his Disability. Because Sunday
and Monday are not “days of absence” on which he could become Disabled under the Active
Work provision, he must have remained Actively at Work through the holiday weekend, and Ten
Pas could not have become Disabled until the following Tuesday. This accords with the
definition of Disability because it was the first regularly scheduled workday that he could not
perform the regular duties of his occupation.
Having determined that it was unreasonable to set the date of Disability any earlier than
Tuesday, September 2, the only remaining question is how to interpret “the last day worked.” It
cannot mean the last regularly scheduled workday because such a reading would render the term
“workday” superfluous and arbitrarily narrow the plain meaning of “last day worked.” Ten Pas,
13
for example, worked on Saturday, August 30, and Sunday, August 31, even though these were
not regularly scheduled workdays. Nor can the term mean the last day the employee actually
worked because this would be incongruous with other portions of the Policy. For instance,
McGladrey pays premiums for disability benefits on a monthly basis as a percentage of its
payroll, and Lincoln does not pay benefits that exceed “the amount for which premium has been
paid.” Id. ¶ 19. So, if an employee receives a raise while on a four-week paid vacation,
McGladrey would begin to pay a higher premium while that employee was out of the office. If
the “last day worked” reaches back to before the employee began his vacation, and then the
employee falls ill shortly before returning to work, Lincoln would pay benefits according to the
pre-vacation salary, and McGladrey would have paid the higher premiums for naught. The only
reasonable interpretation of the Policy is to read the “last day worked” in conjunction with the
Active Work provision. Under this scenario, the employee on paid vacation would still be
Actively at Work and receive benefits tied to his salary increase while on vacation. Similarly,
Ten Pas’ “last day worked” could not have fallen any earlier than Monday, September 1, and
Lincoln should have calculated his monthly benefits according to his September 1 salary.
Consequently, Ten Pas is entitled to summary judgment, and the Court need not consider any
further argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Lincoln’s motion for summary judgment [47]
and grants Ten Pas’ motion for summary judgment [44]. The Court enters judgment for Ten Pas
and terminates this case.
Dated: December 10, 2019
______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?