Moorer v. City of Chicago, The et al

Filing 95

ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 2/19/2020: Defendants' motion to dismiss 71 is granted in part, denied in part. Count 1 is dismissed with prejudice, but the remaining counts are not dismissed. A status hearing is set for March 6, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS MOORER,
Plaintiff,

No. 18 CV 3796

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER M. PLATT, et
al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [71] is granted in part, denied in part. Count 1
is dismissed with prejudice, but the remaining counts are not dismissed. A
status hearing is set for March 6, 2020 at 9:30 a.m.
STATEMENT
A jury acquitted plaintiff Thomas Moorer of murder charges after he spent
about seven years in pretrial detention. The first amended complaint brings dueprocess and wrongful-detention claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts 1 and 2), and
supplemental state-law claims for false imprisonment and spoliation of evidence
(Counts 3 and 4). [63].* The defendants, the Chicago police officers involved in the
investigation and arrest, move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A complaint must allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief. Warciak v.
Subway Restaurants, Inc., No. 19-1577, 2020 WL 559105, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 2020)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). I assume the facts
alleged in the complaint are true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.
2007).
Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Page numbers are taken
from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. The first amended complaint is the
operative complaint in this case, but there is another complaint in Case Number 19 CV 5058
(N.D. Ill.) that brings the same § 1983 claims against additional defendants. The two cases
have been consolidated for all purposes.
*

Someone murdered Edward Ramos. [63] ¶¶ 7–11. The killer (or killers) entered
Ramos’s apartment and shot Ramos and another man. Id. Witnesses provided
different descriptions of the perpetrators to police officers. Id. ¶ 15. In a General
Progress Report, the police reported that the victim’s brother said that the shooter
had the nickname “Boom.” Id. ¶ 16. The police reports go on to say that officers
examined the victim’s cell phone and found a number associated with Boom. Id. ¶ 18.
The officers identified Thomas Moorer as a suspect based on this information
(although Boom’s phone number in the cell phone was not Moorer’s, and Moorer used
the nickname Boomer). Id. ¶¶ 19, 25. The officers used Moorer’s photo in photo arrays
and witnesses picked him out of the array. Id. ¶¶ 20, 26.
Defendant McDermott had the victim’s cell phone at some point, but it was
never inventoried and is now missing. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. A General Progress Report of one
of the witnesses is also missing. Id. ¶ 23. The existing reports indicate that the search
of the cell phone happened at 1:30 a.m. and Moorer’s photo was inserted into photo
arrays at 1:35 a.m., yet also indicate that the phone was not found before 1:40 a.m.
Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
Moorer was arrested and put in physical line-ups, and witnesses identified him
as the killer. Id. ¶¶ 27, 29–30. By the time Moorer was arrested, the defendants knew
that his nickname was not Boom and that he did not have a phone number matching
the number in the victim’s phone. Id. ¶ 28. There was no forensic evidence
incriminating Moorer, and the defendants knew he had an alibi. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. He
was held in pretrial detention for nearly seven years, until his acquittal at trial. Id.
¶ 37–38.
Count 1: Due Process
Count 1 alleges that defendants violated Moorer’s right to due process by (1)
failing to turn over exculpatory evidence such as the victim’s cell phone and a General
Progress Report, and (2) fabricating evidence through misleading and suggestive
photo arrays and physical line-ups. The complaint includes allegations that
unspecified exculpatory evidence was withheld, and unspecified evidence was
manufactured, fabricated, or coerced. Id. ¶ 47.
Moorer was never convicted; his detention was entirely pretrial. “[T]he Fourth
Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a § 1983 claim
for unlawful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir.
2019). The defendants’ fabrication and concealment of evidence did not violate § 1983
via the due-process clause, because the process guaranteed by the Constitution did
not fail here—Moorer was acquitted. It took seven years and Moorer was seized
throughout that time, but that was not a due-process violation. Before Manuel v. City
2

of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017) (Manuel I), and Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667
(7th Cir. 2018) (Manuel II), the court of appeals suggested that pretrial detention can
be a deprivation of liberty cognizable under the due-process clause. See e.g., Cairel v.
Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence
during pretrial detention may cause a deprivation of liberty even if the case ends
without a conviction). But after Manuel II and Lewis, there is no overlapping
constitutional protection—the Fourth Amendment is the only safeguard against
wrongful pretrial detention. Lewis, 914 F.3d at 478–79 (a § 1983 claim for unlawful
pretrial detention rests exclusively on the Fourth Amendment) (overruling Hurt v.
Wise, 880 F.3d 831 (7th Cir 2018).
Anderson v. City of Rockford is not inconsistent with this proposition. In
Anderson, the state had successfully prosecuted the plaintiffs before post-conviction
relief granted them a new trial at which they were acquitted. Anderson, 932 F.3d 494
500, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2019). The process guaranteed by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963), is about assuring that the accused receive “a fair trial, understood as a
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Anderson, 932 F.3d at 505 (quoting
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). Unlike the plaintiffs in Anderson, Moorer
has no claim that his trial verdict was unworthy of confidence. He must look to the
Fourth Amendment for a constitutional violation that caused his detention.
Count 1 is dismissed with prejudice. Amendment would be futile because a
due-process claim is not plausible.
Count 2: Fourth Amendment Wrongful Detention
If probable cause existed to suspect Moorer of murder, then his pretrial
detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Manuel I, 137 S.Ct. at 918 (The
Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the
absence of probable cause); Anderson, 932 F.3d at 512–13 (Fourth Amendment claim
hinges upon showing the absence of probable cause to support plaintiffs’ arrests and
confinement). In addition to the absence of probable cause, Moorer must also allege
that defendants knew they lacked probable cause to arrest him. Coleman v. City of
Peoria, 925 F.3d 336, 351 (7th Cir. 2019). Defendants argue that the complaint pleads
the existence of probable cause, because it alleges that eyewitnesses identified Moorer
as the shooter. “Probable cause can be based on a single identification from a credible
eyewitness.” Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015).
Although the complaint does not come right out and say it, Moorer’s theory is
that the defendants knew the eyewitness identifications were false or unreliable and
therefore the identifications did not provide probable cause to believe Moorer was the
killer. This is a reasonable inference from the allegations. The complaint alleges that
the identification procedures were improper and suggestive, the officers knew of
3

Moorer’s alibi, they knew his nickname was not Boom, they knew he did not have a
matching phone number, and they reported conducting photo arrays at a time when
they could not have yet identified Moorer as a suspect.
The complaint adequately pleads defendants’ knowledge and the absence of a
reliable identification. This is enough to get past the pleading stage for a Fourth
Amendment claim. Moorer will have to prove that every defendant was personally
involved in the wrongful pretrial detention, it was unreasonable to credit the
eyewitness identifications, and nothing broke the chain of proximate causation from
a defendant’s conduct to Moorer’s damages. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d
649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (individual liability under § 1983 requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation); Cty. of Los Angeles, Calif. v.
Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548 (2017) (plaintiffs can recover damages that are
proximately caused by any Fourth Amendment violation). But these are issues for
another day.
Count 2 is not dismissed, and since defendants argue for dismissal of the statelaw claims only if all federal claim are dismissed, those counts are not dismissed
either.
ENTER:
Date: February 19, 2020
Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

4