Watkins v. United States of America

Filing 177

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated, the Court denies the Government's motion for summary judgment. R. 140 . Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 6/25/2020:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHASTITY WATKINS, Individually and as
Guardian of the Person and Estate of
A.G., a minor,
Plaintiff,

No. 18 C 4142
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VHS WEST
SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., MARY
LEUNG, R.N., and KARRI MACMILLAN,
D.O.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Chastity Watkins brings this medical malpractice action against the
United States, by and through its agents and employees Dr. Natasha Diaz and Dr.
Tyler Callahan (the “Government”), VHS West Suburban Medical Center, Nurse
Mary Leung, and Dr. Karri MacMillan. The Government moved for summary
judgment. R. 140. For the following reasons, that motion is denied.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all of
the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2018). To

defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of
evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th
Cir. 2018). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury
could not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Background
On November 4, 2015 at 1:34 a.m., Plaintiff Chastity Watkins, 36 weeks
pregnant, was admitted to the labor and delivery floor of West Suburban Hospital. R.
161 ¶ 9. Nurse Bruno-Camuy, the overnight nurse charged with Watkins’s care,
placed an external monitor on Watkins to record contractions and fetal heart rate. Id.
¶ 10. The last fetal heart rate recorded on the monitor occurred at approximately 6:50
a.m. Id. ¶ 11. Nurse Leung began her shift at 7:00 a.m. and took over Watkins’s care
from Bruno-Camuy. Id. ¶ 12; see R. 148 at 20-21 (Leung Dep. 24:22-26:2).
Doctors Diaz, Callahan, and MacMillan also began their shifts at 7:00 a.m. R.
161 ¶ 16. At the time, Diaz was the attending physician on the labor and delivery
floor, Callahan was a family practice physician completing a fellowship for caesarean
section privileges and the on-call fellow, and MacMillan was a family practice
physician completing her second year of West Suburban’s residency program. Id. ¶¶
6-8, 19, 32. Both Diaz and Callahan were employed by the federally funded clinic
“PCC.” Id. ¶¶ 7-8.

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Standard practice for West Suburban’s labor and delivery floor doctors was to
begin their shifts by receiving “sign-out” from the physicians on the prior shift, which
entailed discussing the important details about each patient’s case. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
After receiving sign-out on the morning in question, Diaz and MacMillan began
“rounding” together, which involved meeting and evaluating each patient and
deciding on a daily treatment plan. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. The parties dispute whether
Callahan was also rounding with Diaz and MacMillan that morning. See id. ¶ 20.
At West Suburban Hospital, residents carry “duty phones,” and nurses are
directed to contact the resident or a charge nurse if medical issues arise with patients
they are monitoring. Id. ¶ 24. According to Watkins’s medical records, at 7:28 a.m.,
Nurse Leung called MacMillan to report that she could not locate a fetal heart rate
for the baby and to request an internal monitor. R. 148 at 206. MacMillan testified
that they did not go to Watkins’s room because they were rounding. R. 167 ¶ 3.
MacMillan does not recall whether she told Diaz or Callahan about the contents of
Leung’s 7:28 a.m. call. R. 161 ¶ 27.
At 7:51 a.m., Leung called Diaz about Watkins, and Diaz responded that she
was still rounding but would be there shortly. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Around 8:00 a.m., the
nursing staff found A.G. underneath Watkins’s thigh not breathing. Id. ¶ 38. An
emergency call went out overhead directing medical personnel to immediately go to
Watkins’s room. Id. ¶ 39. Diaz and Callahan immediately went to the room and began
performing emergency medical procedures. Id. ¶¶ 40-43. Watkins’s baby was
transported to Lurie’s Children Hospital for immediate care and treatment and was

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later diagnosed with severe hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (brain damage due to
lack of oxygen). Id. ¶ 44.
Watkins’s negligence allegations concern Defendants’ conduct prior to A.G.
being found at 8:00 a.m. Id. ¶ 45. The Government moved for summary judgment on
Watkins’s malpractice claim against Diaz and Callahan.
Analysis
To prevail on a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements: “(1) the proper standard of care, (2) a deviation from that
standard, and (3) an injury proximately caused by that deviation.” Prairie v. Univ. of
Chicago Hosps., 698 N.E.2d 611, 614-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citing Purtill v. Hess, 489
N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ill. 1986)).
Watkins’s expert Dr. Andrew Hull testified that the loss of a fetal heart rate or
intermittent tracing for a patient being continuously monitored constitutes a medical
emergency, and had MacMillan informed Diaz about the substance of her 7:28 a.m.
call with Nurse Leung, the standard of care required the doctors to go immediately
to Watkins’s room. R. 167 ¶¶ 13, 15. The parties do not dispute that MacMillan never
informed Diaz or Callahan about the content of her call with Leung. However, Hull
further opines that Diaz and Callahan had an affirmative duty to ask MacMillan
about the call and/or why she stepped away to answer it, and that they breached the
standard of care by failing to do so. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 24. Hull continues that if Diaz and/or
Callahan had satisfied this duty, they could have immediately attended to Watkins
rather than waiting until 8:00 a.m. Id. ¶ 21.

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For purposes of summary judgment, the Government does not dispute
Plaintiff’s contention that Diaz and Callahan had a duty to ask MacMillan about the
substance of the call. However, the Government contends that to inquire about the
call, the physicians first had to know about the call, and that Watkins has not
adduced any evidence to show that Diaz and Callahan knew a call occurred. In short,
the Government argues that Watkins failed to provide evidence that Diaz and
Callahan were present when Leung called MacMillan.
To support its position, the Government points out that Diaz testified she could
not recall whether she was present when MacMillan received the call. See R. 148 at
125 (Diaz Dep. 53:14-18). As to Callahan, the Government argues it was impossible
for him to be present because he was in a different area of the hospital. R. 141 at 8.
Specifically, Callahan submitted an affidavit stating that the sign-out process took
longer than normal on the morning in question, that he was in the post-partum wing
on the opposite side of the floor from where laboring patients’ rooms are located when
he heard the emergency call, and that Watkins was the first patient he saw that
morning when he responded at 8:00 a.m. See R. 148 at 234 (Callahan Dec. ¶¶ 4, 6).
Watkins makes several arguments as to why it is a factual dispute whether
Diaz and Callahan were present, including by pointing out that it was standard
practice for Diaz, Callahan, and MacMillan to do rounds together, by challenging
Callahan’s memory, and by arguing that Callahan’s affidavit contradicts his
deposition testimony and is self-serving. But the Court need not address those

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arguments because what is dispositive here is that MacMillan testified that she was
with Diaz and Callahan when she received the call from Leung:
Q. When you got this call from Nurse Leung, what exactly were you
doing?
A: I was in the midst of rounding and discussing the – one of the two
patients that we thought would be imminently delivering.
Q: And when Mary [Leung] called, you were with Dr. Diaz and Dr.
Callahan; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Id. at 64 (MacMillan Dep. 49:24-50:6). The Government argues that MacMillan also
testified that she had no recollection of the call, and thus could not know whether
Diaz and Callahan were there when she received it. But to the extent MacMillan’s
testimony is inconsistent, it is inappropriate to resolve the inconsistencies at
summary judgment. See Holden Metal v. Wismarq, 2004 WL 1498152, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 2004) (“[Defendant] may very well be correct that [the witness] has been
inconsistent or that certain inferences should be drawn based on his testimony, but
these are arguments for the jury, not for summary judgment.”). The Government also
argues that being “present” does not necessarily mean that Diaz and Callahan were
aware the call occurred. See R. 168 at 10-11. But in so arguing, the Government asks
the Court to draw facts and reasonable inferences in its favor, which is impermissible
at this stage.
In short, it appears from the record that MacMillan, Diaz, and Callahan all
have clouded memories about what occurred on the morning of November 4, 2015 in
their care of Chasity Watkins. And there is conflicting evidence about Diaz’s and
Callahan’s whereabouts when MacMillan received the call from Leung. As the

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factfinder in Watkins’s case against the Government, the Court will ultimately have
to make these determinations based on the evidence at trial. But given the conflicting
testimony, doing so at this stage would run afoul of the well-settled standard applied
to motions for summary judgment.1
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court denies the Government’s motion for
summary judgment. R. 140.

ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: June 25, 2020

The Government raises two other arguments which the Court briefly addresses.
First, the Government argues that Diaz and Callahan cannot be vicariously liable for
a resident’s errors under Illinois law. Watkins clarifies in her response to the
Government’s motion that the claims against Diaz and Callahan are not based on
vicarious liability and thus the argument is moot. Second, the Government argues
that Watkins cannot establish a liability case against Diaz based on her response to
the 7:51 a.m. call because Watkins never disclosed such a theory as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). It is unclear whether Watkins seeks to
pursue this theory of liability and the issue appears more appropriately decided on a
motion in limine. The Government may raise the issue in its motions in limine and
the Court will decide the matter at that time.
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