Bennett v. Dart et al
Filing
103
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 9/23/2019. Mailed notice(gel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PRESTON BENNETT,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-04268
v.
Judge John Robert Blakey
THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Preston Bennett sues Defendants Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart
and Cook County. He alleges that Defendants violated Section 202 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act (Rehab Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), in connection with their shower and toilet
facilities in Division 10 of the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC).
Plaintiff moves to certify the following class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3):
All inmates housed in Division 10 at the Cook County Department of
Corrections from June 27, 2016 to the date of entry of judgment, who
were prescribed either a walker, crutch, or cane by the medical staff and
were denied an accommodation for toileting and showering.
[27] at 1. For the reasons explained below, this Court denies Plaintiff’s motion
without prejudice.
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I.
Background
Plaintiff—an amputee who relies upon crutches to ambulate—is a former
detainee at CCDOC who seeks, individually and on behalf of the proposed class,
injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. [6] ¶¶ 2-10, 7; [27] (Ex. 4) at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to provide grab bars in Division 10’s shower
and toilet facilities, as well as a fixed bench in Division 10’s shower facilities, deprived
him, and other detainees prescribed a crutch, cane, or walker, of rights guaranteed
under Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehab Act. [6] ¶¶ 37−38. 1
Plaintiff entered CCDOC on March 29, 2018. Id. ¶ 2. After receiving a medical
intake evaluation, medical staff prescribed Plaintiff crutches and entered an order to
that effect in CCDOC’s management system, known as C-COMS. Id. ¶ 10; [27] (Ex.
5) at 1. Defendants assigned Plaintiff to CCDOC’s Division 10, which routinely
houses detainees with physical disabilities; he remained in Division 10 until his
release on July 23, 2018. [27] (Ex. 6).
Division 10’s shower facilities do not have grab bars or a fixed bench. [27] (Ex.
2) at 58:2-16. CCDOC instead provides a portable chair, available upon request. [27]
(Ex. 2) at 56:6-21. Division 10 maintains four portable chairs total for the inmates
housed in that division. [73] (Ex. 1) at 35:12-14. The chair has small wheels, handles,
and netting on its back. [73] (Ex. 2). Plaintiff testified that the portable chair had a
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, [6], brings allegations based upon ramps at the Leighton Courthouse.
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 27−36. At the parties’ motion hearing, Plaintiff conceded that the ramp allegations
remain irrelevant for purposes of his motion for class certification.
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sign directing users: “Do Not Use Without Assistance.” [66] (Ex. 1) at 80:21−81:9.
According to Plaintiff, no staff member ever assisted him in using it. Id.
From March 29, 2018 until April 5, 2018, Defendants assigned Plaintiff to Tier
4 within Division 10. [27] (Ex. 6). Plaintiff testified that Defendants did not make
the portable chair available on Tier 4. [66] (Ex. 1) at 82:11–83:23. Following his
reassignment to Tier 2 on April 5, 2018, Plaintiff first showered using the following
method:
I would go ask the officer was the chair there. If the chair wasn’t there,
I’ll ask him can he go get the chair for me. He will slide the chair into
the dayroom. I will put my crutches on the wall and grab hold of the
chair and scoot on it as if it was a skateboard or a scooter into the shower
area. I would then turn around and sit on it, wash up what I could,
stand up, hold on to it, finish washing up, rinse off, and repeat the
process in reverse to get the chair back to the officer.
Id. at 16:20−17:7. According to Plaintiff, sometimes when he requested the chair, it
would already be in use in another wing, and therefore he waited until it became
available. Id. at 81:20−82:10.
With respect to Division 10’s toilet facilities, Plaintiff testified that neither his
various cells in Division 10, nor the “dayroom” bathroom, contained grab bars. Id. at
15:8−16:6. Evidence presented by Plaintiff suggests that at times, CCDOC used the
portable chair as a toilet chair, in addition to a shower chair, to accommodate disabled
inmates. See, e.g., [73] (Ex. 2). According to Plaintiff, when using the bathroom in
Division 10, he used the following processes:
I usually use my crutches to lower myself. And use the wall and my
crutches to – or whatever is closest to the toilet depending on which
toilet I’m at to raise myself. And if I’m out in the dayroom, I will have
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to use the wall or the toilet next to me to raise myself. But I use my
crutches to lower myself.
[66] (Ex. 1) at 15:24−16:6.
On June 16, 2018, Plaintiff fell and injured himself while using the chair. [27]
(Ex. 7) at 4; [73] (Ex. 7). He submitted a grievance and received medical treatment
in the following days. Id. In addition to Plaintiff’s complaints, Plaintiff submitted
numerous grievances from other Division 10 detainees who complained of inadequate
shower and toilet facilities, such as the lack of grab bars, slippery floors, and the
problems obtaining and using the portable chair. [74] at 16−33.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action suits. Courts must
complete a two-step analysis when determining whether to grant a motion for class
certification. First, plaintiffs must satisfy Rule 23(a)’s four requirements:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
(numerosity);
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality);
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class (adequacy of representation).
Lacy v. Cook Cty., 897 F.3d 847, 864 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
Second, plaintiffs must also satisfy one of Rule 23(b)’s conditions. Id. Here,
Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires both that common
questions predominate and that proceeding as a class remains superior to other ways
of adjudicating the case. Priddy v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 870 F.3d 657, 660 (7th
Cir. 2017).
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit instructs that a class “must be
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sufficiently definite that its members are ascertainable.” Lacy, 897 F.3d at 864 (citing
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff bears
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that certification should
be granted. Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015).
III.
Analysis
A district court may only certify a class if the plaintiff satisfies all four
requirements under Rule 23(a). McCaster v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 845 F.3d 794,
800 (7th Cir. 2017).
As relevant here, Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of
“questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). A question
meets this requirement if it “generates a common answer, such that determination of
the question will ‘resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke.’” Balderrama-Baca v. Clarence Davids & Co., 318 F.R.D. 603,
610 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)).
In sum, “the class members’ claims must depend on a common contention that is
‘capable of classwide resolution.’” McCaster, 845 F.3d at 800 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564
U.S. at 350). The currently defined class falls short of this requirement.
Plaintiff advances two alternative legal theories. One theory assumes that the
ADA and Rehab Act’s Structural Standards do not apply, in which case the lawfulness
of Defendants’ actions turns upon whether Defendants afforded the class reasonable
accommodations. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Division 10 must comply with
the ADA and Rehab Act’s Structural Standards, which require that Division 10
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provide a grab bar for each accessible shower and toilet. This Court cannot, at least
on the current record before it, find commonality.
Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation theory frustrates the commonality
requirement. He currently defines the class to include individuals prescribed any of
three different types of aid: a cane, crutch, or walker. Because he broadly defines the
class, the nature and severity of the class members’ disability and ability to ambulate
varies. Compare [6] ¶¶ 6–9 (detailing Plaintiff’s difficulty ambulating because his
right leg is amputated) with [99] at 9 (citing testimony of one putative class member
with a knee injury who can stand pain-free if he receives shots); [74] at 18 (detailing
the nature of the class members’ disabilities as ranging from an amputated leg to a
serious back injury). Class dissimilarities frequently impede the Court’s ability to
generate common answers. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350; see also Parko v. Shell Oil
Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1860 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that factual dissimilarities among
the class members such as likely “variance in property values” reflected the fact that
common issues did not dominate).
Indeed, in this case, given the dissimilarities among the class members,
Defendants’ accommodation may or may not have been reasonable for any individual
class member depending upon the nature and severity of that class member’s
disability. Thus, in order to determine the legality of Defendants’ conduct, this Court
would need to engage in a fact-specific inquiry for each individual. In doing so, this
case would devolve into an amalgamation of various individual ADA claims, any of
which may or may have merit. McCaster, 845 F.3d at 801. For this reason, Plaintiff
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has not demonstrated that the class’ reasonable accommodation theory satisfies the
commonality requirement. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
Plaintiff’s proposed class also remains distinguishable from the proposed class
in Lacy, where the plaintiffs advanced similar alternative legal theories. In that case,
though, the class members shared a common physical impairment: “confine[ment] to
wheelchairs.” Lacy, 897 F.3d at 865. Although differences likely existed as to the
nature and severity of the Lacy class member’s individual disabilities, the class was
sufficiently homogenous, particularly as it related to the class members’ ability to
ambulate, so as not create the factual issues present here. See, e.g., [74] at 18
(detailing the nature of the class members’ disabilities as ranging from an amputated
leg to a serious back injury).
In fact, the court in Lacy observed that the
reasonableness of an accommodation is a fact-specific inquiry that “may preclude
class certification in some cases, for instance if the plaintiffs [] had alleged a variety
of disabilities.” 897 F.3d at 865. As currently defined, Plaintiff’s class encompasses
a variety of disabilities, hindering this Court’s ability to determine whether
Defendants’ conduct was unlawful on a classwide basis. For this reason, Plaintiff
fails to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement as it relates to his reasonable
accommodation theory.
Plaintiff’s alternative theory similarly cannot serve as the basis for finding
commonality. This theory posits that Division 10 must comply with the ADA and
Rehab Act’s Structural Standards, which require a shower and accessible toilet to
have at least one grab bar nearby. [27] at 7. If viable, this theory might ostensibly
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satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement because the class claims do not
require this Court to engage in any individualized determinations as to what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation. Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259, 2015 WL
1995576, at *4 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 2015) (finding commonality based upon the
“threshold question” of whether six courthouses had to comply with the ADA and
Rehab Act’s structural requirements including providing accessible bathrooms with
nearby grab bars). But for this Court to determine whether the ADA and Rehab Act’s
Structural Standards control—thereby mooting the reasonable accommodation
inquiry—it would need to rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s case. Yet doing so prior to
ruling on class certification runs afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.
Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1058 (7th Cir. 2016). Thus, this Court cannot
find commonality on the record before it.
Finally, although this Court maintains authority to modify the class definition,
Lacy, 2015 WL 1995576, at *7 n.5, it declines to do so in this instance. Although a
more limited class definition might cure Plaintiff’s commonality problem, he has not
presented evidence showing whether a revised class definition would satisfy the
ascertainability and numerosity requirements. 2
Accordingly, this Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
The Court cannot properly evaluate the remaining Rule 23 requirements based upon the
information currently in the record.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s motion for class certification [27]
is denied without prejudice. All dates and deadlines stand.
Dated: September 23, 2019
Entered:
____________________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge
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