Dominic White v. Deputy Chief Michael Hernandez et al

Filing 107

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 94) is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Milutinovic and the Village of Arlington Heights and against Plaintiff. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 2/16/2021. (For further detail see attached order.) Civil case terminated. Mailed notice. (dm, )

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DOMINIC WHITE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-5952

v.
JOHN GILMORE, DETECTIVE
PETAR MILUTINOVIC, and the
VILLAGE OF ARLINGTON
HEIGHTS,

Judge Mary M. Rowland

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dominic White brought this suit claiming false arrest and malicious
prosecution based on his arrest in September 2017 for alleged battery of John
Gilmore. Defendants the Village of Arlington Heights and Detective Petar
Milutinovic have moved for summary judgment in their favor. For the reasons stated
below, Defendants’ motion [94] is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are
material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
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adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884
F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court
“must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.”
Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving
party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative
inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016)
(internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier
of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in
support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation
omitted).
BACKGROUND 1
I. Events in August and September 2017
On the afternoon of August 28, 2017, John Gilmore went to the Village of
Arlington Heights, Illinois Police Department (AHPD) and reported to officer Nelson

The cited facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of
Facts in support of their motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 96) is abbreviated as “DSOF.”
White’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts (Dkt. 100) is abbreviated as “PSOF”.
Defendants responded to White’s statement at Dkt. 106. White responded to Defendants’
statement at Dkt. 102.
1

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Calzadilla that he was attacked in front of his Arlington Heights residence in the
early morning hours of August 26, by a 6’0”, tanned, white male wearing a pink or
peach shirt. (DSOF ¶5). 2 Gilmore stated he believed the man had followed him on
foot from a nearby street corner as Gilmore walked home from downtown Arlington
Heights. (Id.) Gilmore reported that he asked the man what he wanted and next
remembered waking up with abrasions to his head and face. (Id.) When Gilmore
awoke he noticed he was missing $200 which he speculated could have fallen from
his pocket as he was retrieving his phone to try (unsuccessfully) to take a picture of
the person, as he still had his wallet and phone. (Id.) Gilmore stated he was “half in
the bag” and could not further identify the person. (Id.) Gilmore said he did not
initially intend to file a report, but after talking to his family, he decided to report the
incident for the safety of his neighbors and himself. (Id.) At that point he did not
want to pursue criminal charges because he would not be able to recognize his
assailant. (Id.) Gilmore did provide Calzadilla photographs of his head injuries. (Id.)
The next day, August 29, Gilmore called the AHPD and again spoke to Officer
Calzadilla. (Id. ¶6). Gilmore reported that he now remembered his assailant’s voice
and it was that of White, who was a business acquaintance. (Id.) Gilmore said White
was experiencing hardship including a divorce that involved an order of protection,
and possible drug use. (Id.) He stated that White had been taking his hardship out
on those around him and had a “grudge” against Gilmore because Gilmore had asked
White’s boss to stop him from “bad-mouthing” Gilmore after Gilmore stopped using

2

All dates are from 2017 unless otherwise noted.
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White’s business services. (Id.) Gilmore gave Calzadilla White’s Arlington Heights
address and offered to review any video footage in the area that might have shown
White returning to his residence from Gilmore’s residence. Calzadilla reported that
Gilmore was not “absolutely certain” his assailant was White, but that Gilmore
wanted to pursue charges. (Id. ¶7).
Two days later, on August 31, Sgt. Buczynski assigned Detective Milutinovic to
investigate Gilmore’s battery report. (Id. ¶8). Milutinovic had been employed by the
AHPD since 2008 and had been a detective since 2012. (Id. ¶2). Before being assigned
to this investigation, Milutinovic did not know Gilmore or White. (Id. ¶9). Once
assigned, Milutinovic reviewed Calzadilla’s police reports of his interviews of
Gilmore. (Id. ¶10). Milutinovic also reviewed the photographs of Gilmore’s head
injuries; Milutinovic believed they were consistent with Gilmore’s assertion that he
was first struck from behind, which caused him to fall forward onto his condominium
steps. (Id. ¶11). Milutinovic then phoned Gilmore who stated he now had a better
memory of the incident and was certain that White was his assailant. (Id. ¶12).
Multinovic recalled two phone conversations with Gilmore before meeting him in
person on September 13. (Id.).
During their discussions, Gilmore repeated his prior statements and further
explained his relationship with White. He reported that he and White were friends
and former business acquaintances as Gilmore was a realtor and White was in the
mortgage business, that White was having difficulties with his family and
employment, and that the two had quit doing business and had a falling out when

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White alleged that Gilmore was badmouthing him to White’s boss. (Id. ¶13). Gilmore
added that White called him an “asshole” for calling White’s boss. (Id.).
Gilmore told Milutinovic that he walked about two blocks to his home from
downtown Arlington Heights before the attack, and that he first noticed someone
standing by bushes at a nearby intersection a half block from Gilmore’s apartment
building. (Id. ¶14). Gilmore told Milutinovic that as White closed in on him, Gilmore
pushed him away and told White to leave him alone, at which point Gilmore turned
around and was struck in the head. (Id. ¶15). Miltinovic reviewed about six hours of
footage from a Village video camera one block north of White’s residence. (Id. ¶16).
The camera is positioned at the northeast corner and faces the intersection. (Id.)
Milutinovic had reviewed White’s Department of Motor Vehicles photograph and a
mug shot of White but did not see anyone who looked like White pass through the
intersection on the video. (Id.) Milutinovic was aware there were multiple ways to get
to Gilmore’s residence from White’s without passing through that intersection. (Id.).
On September 11, at 7:05 p.m. Gilmore called the AHPD from the Shakou
Restaurant in Arlington Heights and reported that White had just threatened him in
the restaurant. (Id. ¶17). Officer Brandon Clabough responded to the restaurant and
reported that Gilmore said that White approached his table, leaned over and
whispered in his ear: “Don’t ever mention my name again or I’ll come back.” Gilmore
then reportedly said: “Did you just threaten me in public?” to which White stated:
“No, you fatass, you need a bigger chair”, before leaving. (Id.). Clabough also reported
that Gilmore identified a text he claimed was from White which was sent at 6:58 p.m.

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(after White left the restaurant) which read: “Please don’t mention my name
personally or professionally again.” (Id. ¶18). Gilmore also told Clabough about his
battery report against White, and that he was alarmed, felt threatened, feared for his
safety, believed White will return and hurt him, and was willing to sign complaints
against White. (Id. ¶19). The following day Sgt. Buczynski told Milutinovic about
Gilmore’s new complaint against White. (Id. ¶20). Milutinovic called Gilmore, who
essentially repeated what was in Clabough’s report. Gilmore also told Milutinovic he
was having dinner with Gary Cortesi and Tom Woznicki when the incident occurred.
(Id.). Milutinovic interviewed Cortesi and Woznicki, who confirmed that White
walked up to Gilmore and said something in his ear which they could not hear, but
both recalled White told Gilmore he is a “fat ass” and needed a bigger chair. (Id.).
II. Battery Complaint, White’s Arrest and Trial
On September 13, Milutinovic met Gilmore at his home to have Gilmore sign a
battery complaint. (Id. ¶21). Before Gilmore signed, Milutinovic again went over the
incidents of August 26 and September 11 but did not ask if Gilmore wanted to sign a
complaint for the September 11 incident. (Id.). When Milutinovic asked about
September 11, Gilmore stated he had previously told co-workers and other
acquaintances that he had reported White to the police for the August 26 battery, and
that he believed the September 11 incident occurred because White likely became
aware of the prior report. (Id. ¶22). Milutinovic believed the September 11 incident
was further support of Gilmore’s battery claim against White. (Id.). Milutinovic asked
Gilmore if he was willing to testify that White was his assailant and Gilmore

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responded “yes”. (Id. ¶23). He also asked, in accordance with his practice when an
identification was made, how certain Gilmore was on a scale of one to ten that White
was his assailant, and Gilmore said “ten.” (Id.) Milutinovic then presented Gilmore
with a misdemeanor battery complaint. (Id. ¶24). Gilmore attested in Milutinovic’s
presence that: “Dominic White…had, on or about August 26, 2017…, committed the
offense of battery in that he intentionally caused bodily harm to John Gilmore, in
that Dominic White struck Gilmore on the back of his head which caused Gilmore to
fall to the ground.” (Id.) As a result, Gilmore incurred abrasions to the back of his
head and face.” (Id.). 3
After Gilmore signed the criminal complaint, Milutinovic and Detective Joe
Murphy went to White’s residence to arrest White. (Id. ¶25). When no one responded
at White’s door, Milutinovic left his business card for White to contact him. (Id.) White
testified he called Milutinovic on September 13 and after learning about the charge,
stated he was not in Arlington Heights on August 26 and that White’s attorneys
would contact Milutinovic. (Id. ¶26). After speaking to White’s attorney, Timothy
O’Donoghue, Milutinovic interviewed White’s girlfriend Lauren Grybash on
September 26, who stated that she was continuously with White at her Palatine
residence from 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. on August 25 through the following morning,
including at the time Gilmore was allegedly attacked. (Id. ¶27). Milutinovic
memorialized and reported Grybash’s account. (Id. ¶28). Milutinovic told Gilmore

The misdemeanor complaint (Dkt. 96-12, Ex. I) was signed on September 21, 2017. Neither
party addresses why this date is different from September 13 but it does not impact the
Court’s analysis.

3

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about Grybash’s account and Gilmore confirmed he still wanted to move forward on
his complaint. (Id. ¶29).
Attorney O’Donoghue brought White to the station for processing on September
27. (Id. ¶30). White was arrested that day by Milutinovic for misdemeanor battery to
Gilmore. (Id. ¶1). Milutinovic filed a booking sheet with the arrest report showing
White was placed into custody at 9:30 a.m. (Id.). (Because of a computer issue, they
returned the following day to complete the booking process. (Id.)). A Cook County
Assistant State’s Attorney prosecuted the misdemeanor battery charge against
White. (Id. ¶31). White was found not guilty after a bench trial which began January
30, 2018 and continued until March 7, 2018. (Id. ¶33).
ANALYSIS
Milutinovic seeks summary judgment on the §1983 false arrest claim (Count I)
because he argues that he had probable cause to arrest White for battery. In the
alternative, Milutinovic contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants
further argue that dismissal of Count I requires that judgment be entered in the
Village’s favor on the indemnification claim (Count VI). 4
I. False Arrest Claim
“Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the
Fourth Amendment and section 1983. Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at
the time of arrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge
The remaining claims are state law claims against Gilmore for false arrest (Count III),
malicious prosecution (Count IV), and IIED (Count V). Count II was voluntarily dismissed
on October 15, 2019. (Dkt. 68). Gilmore asserts state law counterclaims against White for
civil battery and negligence.
4

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and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent
person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”
Dollard v. Whisenand, 946 F.3d 342, 353 (7th Cir. 2019), reh'g denied (Feb. 24, 2020)
(citations and quotations omitted). 5 Probable cause is evaluated objectively; it
requires an officer’s belief “be reasonable, not that it be correct.” Huff v. Reichert, 744
F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014). Probable cause must be “more than bare suspicion but
need not be based on evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even a showing
that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false.” Woods v. City of Chicago, 234
F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotations omitted). It is “not a high bar”
and “the existence of some contrary evidence does not defeat probable cause.” Hyung
Seok Koh v. Graf, 307 F. Supp. 3d 827, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citations and quotations
omitted).
Further, qualified immunity protects an officer who has “‘arguable’ probable
cause.” Huff, 744 F.3d at 1007 (emphasis added). “Arguable probable cause exists
when a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and ... possessing the same
knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable
cause existed in light of well-established law.” Id. (internal citation and quotations
omitted). Qualified immunity “gives public officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly

“Probable cause hinges on the elements of the relevant criminal statute.” Mahnke v.
Garrigan, 428 F. App'x 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). In Illinois, battery is: “A person commits
battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm
to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an
individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.
5

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applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
“[O]nce [a qualified immunity defense] is raised, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to defeat it.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2020). “To overcome
[Milutinovic’s] invocation of qualified immunity, [White] must show both (1) that the
facts make out a constitutional violation, and (2) that the constitutional right was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.” Abbott, 705 F.3d
at 713. Probable cause “inherently allows room for reasonable mistakes” and qualified
immunity “affords an added layer of protection by shielding officers from suit for
damages if ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light
of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.’” Id.
at 714 (citation omitted).
Here, White has the burden of defeating Milutinovic’s qualified immunity defense
“either by identifying a closely analogous case or by persuading the court that the
conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, notwithstanding the lack of an
analogous decision, no reasonable officer could have thought he was acting lawfully.”
Id. at 724. “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”
meaning that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting

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Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012)). White has not met
this burden.
White maintains that the qualified immunity question requires a jury to resolve
disputed facts. But the facts about what Milutinovic knew at the time of White’s
arrest are not in dispute. White believes Milutinovic should have interpreted those
facts differently and that he made investigatory mistakes. These arguments do not
defeat qualified immunity here. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)
(“Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.”).
The undisputed facts are that at the time of White’s arrest, Gilmore identified
White as the person who battered him to Milutinovic. It is well-settled that “[s]o long
as a reasonably credible witness...informs the police that someone has committed, or
is committing, a crime, the officers have probable cause to place the alleged culprit
under arrest, and their actions will be cloaked with qualified immunity [even] if the
arrestee is later found innocent.” Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 1999)
(internal citation and quotations omitted). See also Woods, 234 F.3d at 987.
White responds, however, that: (1) Milutinovic should not have believed Gilmore;
(2) Milutinovic should have done a better investigation; and (3) White’s girlfriend’s
confirmation of his alibi should have led Milutinovic to decide there was no probable
cause to arrest.
First as to Gilmore’s credibility, White contends Gilmore made “multiple
conflicting statements”. The undisputed facts show that while Gilmore could not
initially identify the person who attacked him, the next day he followed up his initial

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report stating that he remembered more and believed it to be White, and then in the
weeks following stated he was certain it was White and his confidence in his
identification was a “ten” on a scale of one to ten. White suggests that Gilmore’s
inability to initially identify White, who he had known for years, calls into question
the identification. But “[p]robable cause is a holistic, commonsense inquiry, and
officers are allowed to draw reasonable inferences based on their experience and
judgment.” Hyung Seok Koh, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 848–49.
White also challenges Gilmore’s credibility by arguing that Gilmore was a
“stumbling drunk” the night of the alleged attack. However White does not cite any
evidence that at the time of White’s arrest, Milutinovic knew Gilmore was a
“stumbling drunk” on August 26. The evidence shows only that Milutinovic knew
Gilmore had been drinking. 6 The testimony White cites showing Gilmore had “at least
6” drinks is from Gilmore’s deposition testimony in 2020, not from any evidence that
Milutinovic knew before September 27, 2017. See Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714 (focus is on
what officer knew at the time of the arrest). Importantly, White does not cite any
clearly established law requiring an officer to disbelieve a victim who did not identify
the suspect in his initial report to police or who had been drinking alcohol before he
was attacked. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit has explained that “[n]othing
suggests that a victim’s report must be unfailingly consistent to provide probable
cause” and the “credibility of a putative victim or witness is a question, not for police
The police report referred to Gilmore being “half in the bag” but did not explain further.
(Exh. D, Dkt. 96-6). Milutinovic was told that Gilmore was “three sheets to the wind”. PSOF
¶44. But there is no evidence that Milutinovic understood these statements to mean Gilmore
was a “stumbling drunk” on August 26.

6

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officers in the discharge of their considerable duties, but for the jury in a criminal
trial.” Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 725 (7th Cir. 1999), as amended (Jan. 7, 2000)).
Second, White complains about the quality of the investigation. He asserts that
Milutinovic did not try to talk to White or corroborate Gilmore’s story. It is true that
“[a] police officer may not close her or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the
circumstances of an arrest” and must pursue “reasonable avenues of investigation”
particularly when “it is unclear who committed the crime.” Sornberger v. City of
Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted).
But as explained, police have probable cause to arrest the suspect once “a reasonably
credible witness informs an officer that a suspect has committed a crime.” Abbott, 705
F.3d at 716 (citations omitted). There is “no constitutional obligation to conduct any
further investigation before making an arrest if they have received information from
a reasonably credible victim [] sufficient to supply probable cause…even if sound
police technique would have required such further investigation.” Woods, 234 F.3d at
997. And here Milutinovic did investigate. White does not contend that there is any
evidence of Milutinovic falsifying any reports, fabricating evidence, conspiring with
Gilmore, or having a bias against White.
White argues, however, that Milutinovic ignored exculpatory evidence. White
points to the video evidence which did not show him at Gilmore’s residence at the
relevant time. He also contends that Milutinovic did not consider that the “bad blood”
between the former friends meant Gilmore might have lied about White being his
assailant. These arguments do not help White meet his burden since he does not cite

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law requiring an officer to resolve potential inconsistencies or get to the bottom of a
grudge. Indeed “no clearly established precedent required [the officer] to resolve these
inconsistencies before arresting [the suspect].” Spiegel, 196 F.3d at 724. See also
Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2006) (“inconsistencies and
glitches that characterize real investigations do not disentitle police to rely on
eyewitness statements”); Anderer v. Jones, 385 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 2004),
amended on denial of reh'g, 412 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2005) (an officer has “no
constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of
uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.”) (citation and quotations omitted).
Finally, White relies on his statement that he was with his girlfriend, Lauren, the
night of the alleged battery, and Lauren confirmed that, along with details of what
they did that evening and that White remained at her house through the morning.
But a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same
knowledge as Milutinovic “could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed
in light of well-established law” (Huff, 744 F.3d at 1007, emphasis added) permitting
an arrest based on reasonably credible victim informing Milutinovic that White
committed the crime. Milutinovic also believed the September 11 incident further
established or was another indication of motive to support Gilmore’s battery claim
against White. (DSOF ¶22).
White does not cite any law undermining the conclusion that Milutinovic had
arguable probable cause. The cases White relies on either affirmed a finding of
qualified immunity (Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 1995)) or involved

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disputed issues of fact about the circumstances of the arrest (Gonzalez v. City of Elgin,
578 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2009); Meyer v. Robinson, 992 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1993)). 7 As
discussed, the relevant facts about what Milutinovic knew at the time of White’s
arrest are not in dispute.
White has not met his burden to defeat Milutinovic’s qualified immunity defense.
The Court does not need to decide whether Milutinovic had probable cause because
he had arguable probable cause, providing him with qualified immunity from White’s
claim here. 8
II. Indemnification and Remaining Claims
Under Illinois law, “[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from
an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” 745 ILCS 10/2109. The false arrest claim does not survive summary judgment against Milutinovic,
and so White’s indemnification claim against the Village also does not survive
summary judgment.
Because the Section 1983 false arrest claim does not survive summary judgment
and is the only remaining federal claim in this case, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §

White also relies on a number of cases from outside of this circuit that involve decisions
denying qualified immunity, for example, where there was evidence of any officer fabricating
statements on an arrest affidavit.
7

White does not explain the relevance of his discussion about whether there was probable
cause to charge White with disorderly conduct for the September 11th incident. (Dkt. 101 at
12-15). Rather it is undisputed that “Milutinovic believed the September 11 incident further
established or was another indication of motive to support Gilmore’s battery claim against
[White]” for the August 26 incident. (DSOF ¶22).
8

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1367(c)(3); Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, there is a presumption that the
court will relinquish jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.”). 9
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [94] is granted.
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Dominic White. The
Clerk is directed to close the case.
E N T E R:
Dated: February 16, 2021
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge

Although technically Gilmore was named in the §1983 false arrest claim (Dkt. 45), on
Gilmore’s oral motion to be dismissed from the case, the Court decided it had pendant state
jurisdiction (only) over him (see Dkt. 68). Indeed Gilmore is a private citizen and the record
does not reveal any basis under which he have acted under color of state law. See Barnes v.
City of Centralia, Illinois, 943 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Action is taken under color of
state law when it involves a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law... Section 1983
does not cover disputes between private citizens....”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

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