Johnson v. Pfister et al
Filing
190
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/26/2024. Mailed notice. (mgh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Michael Johnson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Wexford Health Sources Inc.,
Marian Hollaway, Estate of
Saleh Obaisi, Wendy Olsen,
Randy Pfister, David Gomez,
John Baldwin, Rob Jeffreys,
Lieutenant Ronald L. Amos,
Correctional Officer Levon
Powell, and Other John Doe
Defendants,
Defendants.
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No. 19 C 4993
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Michael Johnson, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”) and later Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”),
brought this suit against various prison officials and healthcare
providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Eighth Amendment
violations arising from the medical care he did or did not receive
while incarcerated. He also sues Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
(“Wexford”), Charles Truitt--the current Warden of Stateville-and Latyoa Hughes--the current Acting Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)--in their official capacities
for the alleged violations.1
The “Wexford Defendants,” consisting of Wexford, Nurse Marian
Hollaway,2
and
the
Estate
of
Saleh
Obaisi,
and
the
“IDOC
Defendants,” consisting of Wendy Olsen, Randy Pfister, Truitt,
John Baldwin, Hughes, Lieutenant Ronald L. Amos, and Correctional
Officer Levon Powell, now move for summary judgment. For the
reasons given below, the motions are granted.
I.
The following facts are undisputed except where noted. On
December 3, 2016, Johnson injured his toe and eye while trying to
get into his bunk bed. Johnson Resp. to Wexford Defs.’ Statement
of Material Facts (“Resp. to Wexford SMF”) ¶¶ 14–15, ECF 172. He
was seen by Dr. Aguinaldo (not named as a defendant in this
lawsuit) on December 5, 2016, who ordered x-rays of Johnson’s skull
and toe. Id.
Sometime between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on December 17, 2016,
Nurse Hollaway, accompanied by Officer Powell, was doing medical
rounds and approached Johnson’s cell to provide him with previously
At the time of filing, David Gomez was the Warden of Stateville
and Rob Jeffreys was the IDOC Director. I grant Johnson’s request
to substitute the individuals currently in those roles for his
official capacity claims.
1
Nurse Hollaway’s last name is spelled as “Holloway” in the fifth
amended complaint, but she spells it “Hollaway” at her deposition,
so that is the spelling I use here.
2
2
prescribed Tylenol 3, a pain medication consisting of Tylenol plus
codeine. Id. ¶¶ 16–17; Johnson Resp. to IDOC Defs.’ Statement of
Material Facts (“Resp. to IDOC SMF”) ¶ 44, ECF 169. As Johnson
attempted to get down from his top bunk to retrieve the medication,
he fell onto the floor of his cell. Resp. to Wexford SMF ¶ 16.
Johnson told Nurse Hollaway that he was in pain, but when she
offered him the Tylenol 3, he did not take it. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
Johnson wanted to be taken on a stretcher to the health care unit,
but Nurse Hollaway told him that there was not a doctor on site
yet. Id. ¶ 18. Nurse Hollaway could see some blood on Johnson’s
lip and/or cheek and on the floor, but she could tell Johnson had
a pulse, was breathing, and was conversing in complete sentences.
Id. ¶¶ 23, 30; IDOC Defs.’ Resp. to Johnson’s Statement of Add’l
Material Facts (“IDOC Resp. to SAMF”) ¶ 15, ECF 180.
Nurse Hollaway completed her medical rounds and reported-according
to
her
testimony,
by
telling
a
coworker--what
had
happened. Resp. to Wexford SMF ¶ 24. Around 6:40 a.m., a medical
technician accompanied by Lieutenant Amos assessed Johnson in his
cell, where he was still on the floor. Resp. to IDOC SMF ¶¶ 29,
33. Another medical technician, defendant Olsen, was summoned to
Johnson’s cell at about 9:10 a.m. Id. ¶ 20. She entered Johnson’s
cell and assessed him. Id. ¶ 23.
Johnson was taken to the health care unit by another nurse at
1:30 p.m., where he was treated by Dr. Aguinaldo around 2:10 p.m.
3
Id. ¶ 31; Wexford Resp. to SAMF ¶ 18. Dr. Aguinaldo noted dried
blood in Johnson’s nose, but no swelling or tenderness, and that
Johnson was neurologically intact. Resp. to Wexford SMF ¶ 34. He
ordered x-rays of Johnson’s toe and gave him crutches. Id. The
next day, on December 18, 2016, Johnson told a nurse, “I don’t
need to see you. I just saw the doctor yesterday. I’m straight.”
Id. ¶ 36.
Johnson’s next appointment was on December 22, 2016, this
time with Dr. Obaisi. Id. ¶ 37. At the appointment, Dr. Obaisi
reviewed the results of Johnson’s toe x-ray with him, explaining
that he had a fracture, but that it was in a good position. Id.
Dr. Obaisi advised Johnson to follow up in a few weeks for further
examination. Id.
On December 23, 2016, Johnson received x-rays of his skull,
right
shoulder,
nasal
bones,
and
lumbar
spine.
Id.
¶ 38.
A
radiologist determined that all except the lumbar spine yielded
normal x-rays. Id. As for the spine, the radiologist found a “pars
interarticularis defect in the lumbar spine with spondylosis,”
which is “wear and tear.” Id.
Johnson saw Dr. Aguinaldo again on January 7, 2017, reporting
no new problems and requesting a renewal of his Boost nutritional
supplement, which Dr. Aguinaldo provided. Id. ¶ 39.
On January 11, 2017, Johnson saw Dr. Obaisi again and reported
continued toe soreness and back pain. Id. ¶ 40. Dr. Obaisi noted
4
that the x-ray of Johnson’s back was normal and diagnosed him with
a back sprain. Id. In response to Johnson’s complaint that the
Tylenol 3 he was prescribed upset his stomach, Dr. Obaisi changed
his prescription to Tramadol and Robaxin. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. A couple
of days later, Dr. Obaisi also issued a permit requesting that
Johnson be assigned to a low bunk. Id. ¶ 44. He also ordered
another x-ray of Johnson’s foot, which took place on January 15,
2017, and which a radiologist found showed a well-healing fracture.
Id. ¶¶ 42, 45.
At a follow-up four weeks later, Dr. Obaisi renewed Johnson’s
Boost prescription, increased his Tramadol prescription from 50 mg
to 100 mg, and extended his low bunk medical permit. Id. ¶¶ 47,
49, 51. Dr. Obaisi also requested that IDOC officials allow Johnson
to bring more ice than is typically allowed to his cell. Id. ¶ 51.
Dr. Obaisi saw Johnson for the final time on February 9, 2017,
where he reviewed Johnson’s chart and confirmed he was capable of
transferring prisons. Id. ¶¶ 52, 54. Before being transferred,
Johnson saw a nurse on February 16, 2017, reported his back still
hurt and received ibuprofen. Id. ¶ 55. He then went on a hunger
strike from February 17, 2017 through February 22, 2017. Id. ¶ 56.
Johnson saw a different physician on March 2, 2017, who gave him
Robaxin. Id. ¶ 57. Johnson was transferred from Stateville to
Pontiac on March 8, 2017. Id. ¶ 58.
5
Johnson filed several emergency grievances during his time at
Stateville and Pontiac, but the only ones that form the basis for
his claims were submitted on December 4, 2016--which recounts his
toe and eye injuries sustained while trying to get into his bed-and December 29, 2016--which recounts the fall and subsequent
events of December 17, 2016. Those grievances were denied by thenWarden of Stateville Pfister. See Fifth Am. Compl. Exhs. B–C, ECF
108-2, 108-3. Johnson appealed the denial of those grievances, but
the appeals were denied, with then-IDOC Director John Baldwin
signature appearing on the form concurring in those denials. See
id. Exh. J, ECF 108-10.
II.
“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.” Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). A deliberate indifference claim has both an
objective and a subjective component. First, a prisoner must
establish
that
he
had
an
objectively,
“sufficiently
serious”
medical need. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Second, he must demonstrate that “prison officials acted with a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’--i.e., that they both knew
of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v.
McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting and citing
6
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994); additional
citation omitted).
Wexford Defendants concede that Johnson’s toe injury was
sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the
inquiry, but contend that his back pain was not. IDOC Defendants
make no argument on the point. “A medical need is considered
sufficiently serious if the inmate’s condition ‘has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that
even
a
lay
person
would
perceive
the
need
for
a
doctor’s
attention.’” Roe, 631 F.3d at 857 (quoting Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, it is undisputed that Johnson
fell from the top bunk onto the floor of his cell, which resulted
at least in a bloodied nose and back pain. A lay person could
readily conclude that back pain resulting from a fall like that
would necessitate medical care.
A.
Johnson must next demonstrate that, as a subjective matter,
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The
first batch of defendants consists of those responding to Johnson’s
fall on December 17, 2016, including Nurse Hollaway, Officer
Powell, Lieutenant Amos, and Olsen. Johnson’s complaint as to these
defendants is that they did not secure him medical care quickly
enough. Specifically, he faults them for not calling the fall in
as an emergency, which would have brought more medical personnel
7
to his cell, and for not bringing him to the health care unit
sooner to be evaluated by a physician. But “[t]o show that a delay
in providing treatment is actionable under the Eighth Amendment,
a plaintiff must also provide independent evidence that the delay
exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged pain.” Petties
v.
Carter,
836
F.3d
722,
730–31
(7th
Cir.
2016)
(en
banc)
(citations omitted). Johnson does not put forth any evidence that
the approximately nine-hour period between when he fell and when
he saw Dr. Aguinaldo exacerbated any of his injuries. And to the
extent he claims the delay unnecessarily prolonged his pain, that
claim is belied by the fact that he admits Nurse Hollaway offered
him pain medication immediately after the fall, but he did not
take it. For this reason alone, summary judgment is appropriate as
to Nurse Hollaway, Officer Powell, Lieutenant Amos, and Olsen. But
there are additional reasons why Johnson fails to satisfy the
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test as to each of
these defendants.
Starting with Hollaway, some facts around her response to
Johnson’s fall are disputed, but it is undisputed that after the
fall, Johnson was breathing, had a pulse, and was conversing with
Hollaway. Furthermore, it is undisputed that she offered him
Tylenol 3, a pain medication, while he was lying on the ground,
8
but that he refused this medication.3 Based on this evidence, a
factfinder could not conclude that Hollaway’s determination that
Johnson
could
safely
remain
in
his
cell
exposed
him
to
a
substantial risk of excessive harm. At worst, her failure to get
him to the health care unit more quickly could be construed as
negligent, but negligence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 728 (“[S]howing mere negligence is not enough.” (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); additional citation
omitted)).
Defendant Olsen was summoned to Johnson’s cell at 9:10 a.m.
the morning of the fall, at which point Johnson claims she failed
to provide him with medical treatment. But like Hollaway, Johnson
lacks evidence that Olsen acted with the requisite deliberate
indifference to maintain his claim against her. She conversed with
him, entered his cell to assess him, and noted his complaints
before telling him that he could sign up for sick call. As with
Hollaway, the record is devoid of evidence from which a jury could
conclude that Olsen was constitutionally required to do more.
Johnson claims broadly that Hollaway and Olsen should have
given him more medical care than they did, but he does not identify
what ailment he needed care for at that moment. That the medical
Johnson argues that Hollaway was
pain medication to him even prior
that purpose that Hollaway came
morning--but does not explain why
3
9
already required to provide this
to the fall--indeed, it was for
to Johnson’s cell at all that
that matters.
care Hollaway and Olsen provided was adequate or, at worst,
negligent, is underscored by the care Johnson received when he
finally did see Dr. Aguinaldo around 2:10 p.m. that day. None of
the care Dr. Aguinaldo provided--a physical examination, cleaning
dried
blood
from
crutches--suggests
his
that
nose,
ordering
Johnson
was
x-rays,
suffering
and
from
giving
an
him
urgent
medical need when Hollaway and Olsen encountered him, and Johnson
does not explain with any specificity what more they should have
done.
Johnson
also
pursues
claims
against
Officer
Powell
and
Lieutenant Amos. Officer Powell accompanied Nurse Hollaway to
Johnson’s cell and witnessed his fall. Johnson maintains Officer
Powell should have helped him get medical attention because of the
fall. But as a non-medical official, Officer Powell is entitled to
“reasonably rel[y] on the judgment of medical professionals.”
Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019); see also
Greeno, 414 at 656 (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical
experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). While a lay person might
know that Johnson needed some care following his fall, the record
does not support Johnson’s contention that even a lay person would
have known that he needed more care than Nurse Hollaway provided,
especially because he declined the pain medication she offered.
10
Nor am I persuaded by Johnson’s argument that, when Officer Powell
saw him, he was not yet “under the care” of medical staff but
rather he was seeking to be under that care. He was under Nurse
Hollaway’s care as she examined him and offered him medication.
The same goes for Lieutenant Amos, who accompanied a medical
technician to Johnson’s cell. Johnson seeks to hold Lieutenant
Amos liable for the same reasons as Officer Powell, but as with
Officer Powell, Lieutenant Amos reasonably relied on the judgment
of the medical technician he was with when he saw Johnson.
B.
As for Dr. Obaisi, Johnson maintains that his failure to order
additional
imaging
of
Johnson’s
back
constituted
deliberate
indifference.4 In Johnson’s view, Dr. Obaisi should have ordered
an MRI when Johnson returned to him in January with back pain,
having already received an x-ray. Decisions about which type of
medical imaging is appropriate fall well beyond the ken of a lay
person, so Johnson must show that Dr. Obaisi’s decision not to
order an MRI between the time of Johnson’s fall on December 17,
2016 and Johnson’s departure from Stateville on March 8, 2017 was
“such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that [he] did not base
Johnson makes no argument regarding the treatment of his toe, so
to the extent his claim is based on that health issue, it is
waived.
4
11
the
decision
on
such
a
judgment.”
Petties,
836
F.3d
at
729
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stewart
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2021)
(“A medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment
decisions unless no minimally competent professional would have so
responded under those circumstances.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)). “[E]xpert medical evidence is often
required to prove this aspect of [the] claim.” Eagan v. Dempsey,
987 F.3d 667, 683 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Johnson has not submitted either a report or deposition from
a retained medical expert. Instead, his sole evidence that Dr.
Obaisi’s failure to order additional imaging reflected a complete
lack of medical judgment is the following deposition testimony
given by Dr. Aguinaldo:
Q. . . . Is there ever any instance where you would
request an MRI following a patient’s fall?
A. If that the case, if they really need MRI, most of
the time, I have to refer it--I have to refer it to the
medical director, sir.
Q. How often do you refer to the medical director for
MRIs?
A. It depends what’s the problem. Like, for instance,
that kind of problem, they keep on coming back to me,
and I ordered x-rays, and I did physical examination,
then I have to refer to the medical director. Then, it’s
up to the medical director that they order an MRI.
12
Q. How many times would you see a patient before you
would refer them to the medical director?
A. Let’s say, for instance, I see him today, and I see
him--I give some medication, and order some x-rays. I
did not find out anything. Then still complaining
something, and that’s the time I have to refer to the
medical director. So, the medical director decide
whatever kind of test he will order.
Q. So, you would see the patient twice before you refer
them to the medical director?
A. Probably after one time I refer right away. Not twice
already. That’s too much.
Aguinaldo Dep. 36:13–37:13, ECF 158-3. But a reasonable jury could
not conclude, based on this evidence alone, that Dr. Obaisi should
have ordered an MRI after Johnson’s first visit and receipt of an
x-ray. At most, this testimony suggests that Dr. Aguinaldo, “most
of the time” when presented with a patient complaining of pain and
who has received x-rays showing nothing, would refer the case to
the medical director for instruction on what to do next. See
Petties,
836
F.3d
at
728
(“[E]vidence
that
some
medical
professionals would have chosen a different course of treatment is
insufficient to make out a constitutional claim.” (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted)). It does not suggest that accepted
medical judgment would have compelled the medical director to order
an MRI. Setting aside that Johnson points to no evidence that Dr.
Obaisi indeed failed to refer the case to the medical director,
one can only guess based on this testimony what the medical
director would have done if he did. In other words, Johnson has
13
presented
no
evidence
that,
upon
any
application
of
medical
judgment, Dr. Obaisi should have ordered Johnson an MRI.
C.
Johnson’s claims against Pfister and Baldwin--the Warden at
Stateville and IDOC Director during the relevant period--are based
on denials of Johnson’s emergency grievances. Both Pfister and
Baldwin
argue
subordinates
that
so,
they
despite
delegated
their
review
signatures
of
grievances
appearing
on
to
the
denials, they never actually reviewed them. Accordingly, in their
view, they lacked personal knowledge of Johnson’s complaints and
on that basis cannot be held liable under § 1983. See, e.g., Neely
v. Randle, No. 12 C 2231, 2013 WL 3321451, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June
29, 2013) (“If there is ‘no personal involvement by the warden [in
an inmate’s medical care] outside the grievance process,’ that is
insufficient to state a claim against the warden.” (quoting Gevas
v. Mitchell, 492 F. App’x 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2012)). Like other
courts in this district, however, I am skeptical that prison
officials may escape liability simply by delegating grievance
review
to
an
unidentified
subordinate,
especially
where
the
grievance determinations bear the official’s signature. See Brown
v. Carter, No. 13 C 2775, 2017 WL 2362597, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May
31, 2017); Zirko v. Ghosh, No. 10 C 08135, 2015 WL 6447768, at *15
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2015); Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948, 2001
WL 755137, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2001).
14
I need not resolve that issue, however, because Pfister
reasonably relied on medical staff to make decisions regarding
Johnson’s treatment. “Prison directors and wardens are ‘entitled
to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of good
medical care.’” Gevas, 492 F. App’x at 660 (quoting Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009); additional citations
omitted).
Johnson
filed
a
grievance
on
December
29,
2016,
recounting his December 17th fall and how Wexford and IDOC staff
responded. See Fifth Am. Compl. Exh. C, ECF 108-3.5 The grievance
itself explains, however, that Johnson was seen by two medical
technicians and a sick call nurse, and that Johnson was “examined
by Dr. A” (presumably Dr. Aguinaldo), who ordered x-rays and gave
him crutches to assist him. Id. at 3. Far from suggesting Johnson
was not receiving treatment for his back pain, the grievance itself
Johnson does not cite in his summary judgment submissions to the
grievances on which he bases his claim against Pfister, so I
presume the possible candidates are those attached to his fifth
amended complaint. Because, as observed above with respect to his
toe injuries, Johnson’s submissions make clear that his claims are
premised on (1) how he was treated the day of his December 17,
2016 fall and (2) how his back pain was treated from that day on,
I decline to consider the grievances submitted on December 3, 2016,
and December 4, 2016, which concern events predating the December
17th fall and that Johnson has made no effort to pursue at this
stage. See Fifth Am. Compl. Exhs. A–B, ECF 108-1, 108-2. The
subsequent grievances attached to his fifth amended complaint came
after he was transferred from Stateville to Pontiac Correctional
Center, so Pfister would not have played any role in responses to
them. See id. Exh. E, ECF 108-5 (grievance submitted at Pontiac on
April 8, 2017); id. Exh. F, ECF 108-6 (grievance submitted at
Pontiac on July 1, 2017); id. Exh. G ECF 108-7 (grievance submitted
at Pontiac on December 10, 2017).
5
15
would have made clear to Pfister that Johnson was under the care
of medical providers, to whose judgment Pfister was entitled to
defer. Though the grievance goes on to request an MRI for back
pain, Pfister acted reasonably by leaving this specific medical
request to the medical professionals treating Johnson.
Johnson argues that Baldwin is similarly liable based on his
concurring in the denial of two of Johnson’s grievance appeals.
These adjudications were made on July 13, 2017 and July 27, 2017,
and they were in response to Johnson’s grievances filed on December
29, 2016 and December 4, 2016, respectively. See Fifth Am. Compl.
Exh. J, ECF 108-10. As explained above, Johnson has failed to
adequately develop any argument with respect to the events leading
him to file the December 4, 2016 grievance, so Baldwin cannot be
liable
for
concurring
in
the
denial
of
the
appeal
of
that
grievance. As for the appeal based on the December 29, 2016
grievance, Baldwin was justified in denying that appeal for the
same reasons that Pfister was justified in denying the grievance
--namely, he reasonably relied on the judgment of the medical
professionals who were--by the terms of the grievance itself-caring for Johnson. Indeed, the denial of the appeal expressly
states as its reason for denial: “Per medical - offender was seen
and received treatment deemed appropriate by facility medical
staff.” Id. at 2.
16
III.
Johnson also sues Wexford pursuant to Monell and the current
Warden of Stateville and Director of the IDOC in their official
capacities for his alleged injuries. But because Johnson’s claims
that he suffered constitutional violations at the hands of the
individual defendants fails, these claims fail too. See Johnson v.
Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2022) (dismissing Monell
claim against Wexford because “there is no proof of an underlying
constitutional violation by any individual Wexford defendant”).
Alternatively, summary judgment is appropriate on Johnson’s Monell
claim against Wexford because he bases that claim on arguing that
Wexford’s imaging policy delayed his receipt of an MRI, but as
explained above, failed to introduce evidence that an MRI was
required. And summary judgment is also warranted on his claim
against Truitt and Hughes because he supplies no evidence of a
pattern and practice of inappropriate medical decisions, instead
summarily responding to IDOC Defendants’ argument on this point
that he “has alleged a litany of inappropriate medical care
decisions made at the hands of the Defendants,” Resp. to IDOC Mot.
at 11, ECF 168, without substantiating these allegations with
evidence.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted as to
all defendants.
17
ENTER ORDER:
_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: March 25, 2024
18
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