Bondoc v. Kijakazi

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Heather K. McShain on 9/24/2024. Mailed notice. (evw, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STEVE B.,
Plaintiff,
No. 21 CV 3433

v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Magistrate Judge McShain

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steveantonio (Steve) B. appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision denying his application for benefits. For the following reasons, plaintiff’s
motion to reverse and remand [14]1 is denied, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [18] is granted, and the decision denying the application for benefits is
affirmed.
Background
A.

Procedural Background

On February 28, 2019, plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning on November
29, 2016. [13-1] 26. Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on June 12, 2019, and upon
reconsideration on November 12, 2019. [Id.] Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing,
which was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on November 30, 2020. [Id.]
36–62. In a decision dated December 28, 2020, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not
disabled and denied his application. [Id.] 26–31. The Appeals Council denied review
on April 27, 2021, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. [Id.] 5. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955 & 404.981; Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d
893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court [1], and the Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).2
Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers are taken
from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except for citations to the administrative record
[13], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner of each page.
2 The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case by a United States Magistrate
Judge [8, 9].
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B.

The ALJ’s Decision

In evaluating a claim for disability benefits, ALJs follow a five-step, sequential
process. Apke v. Saul, 817 F. App’x 252, 255 (7th Cir. 2020). The ALJ must evaluate
the following:
(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s
impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the
[Commissioner] ...; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work;
and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.
Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000)). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
“An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding
that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends
the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford,
227 F.3d at 868.
The ALJ reviewed plaintiff’s disability claim in accordance with the SSA’s fivestep sequential evaluation process. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period, i.e., from his
alleged onset date of November 29, 2016 through his date last insured of December
31, 2016. [13-1] 28. At step two, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last insured,
there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a
medically determinable impairment.” [Id.] 29. The ALJ therefore ended the analysis
and did not proceed to step three. The ALJ accordingly found that plaintiff was not
under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from November
29, 2016, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2016, the date last insured.
[Id.] 31.
Legal Standard
Courts “apply a very deferential standard of review to the ALJ’s decision.”
Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). In its “extremely limited” role, id., the Court must “ensur[e] that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards.” Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 472 (7th Cir. 2024)
(citing Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018)). “A reviewing court
‘will not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine
credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as
substantial evidence supports it.’” Chavez v. O’Malley, 96 F.4th 1016, 1021 (7th Cir.
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2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900). See also Stephens,
888 F.3d at 327 (“Although this Court reviews the record as a whole, it cannot
substitute its own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or
reweighing the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled.”).
Substantial evidence is “not a high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). “An ALJ need not specifically address
every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and
[her] conclusions.” Bakke v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 2023). “If
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the court ‘must affirm the ALJ’s
decision even if reasonable minds could differ about the ultimate disability finding.’”
Chavez, 96 F.4th at 1021 (quoting Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his conditions were not
“medically determinable impairments.” [15] 7–9. Plaintiff also asserts that to the
extent the ALJ made an alternative finding on the issue of severity, the ALJ’s decision
that plaintiff’s impairments were not severe was not supported by substantial
evidence. [Id.] 10–15.
A.

The ALJ Committed an Error of Law

To be entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must be
“aged, blind, or disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1). The Act defines disability as the
inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve months.” Id. at § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
As noted, in evaluating a claim for disability benefits, ALJs follow a five-step,
sequential process. Fetting, 62 F.4th at 336; Apke, 817 F. App’x at 255. At step two,
the ALJ determines whether a claimant has one or more medically determinable
physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. The regulations state that to
be considered “medically determinable,” the alleged “impairment(s) must result from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. In other
words, “a physical or mental impairment must be established by objective medical
evidence from an acceptable medical source.” Id. The regulations instruct that ALJs
“will not use [a claimant’s] statement of symptoms, a diagnosis, or a medical opinion
to establish the existence of an impairment(s).” Id. Only after the ALJ establishes
that a claimant has a medically determinable impairment will the ALJ determine
whether the impairment(s) is severe. Id. “An impairment or combination of
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impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). The claimant
bears the burden of proof at steps one through four of the sequential analysis. Fetting,
62 F.4th 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868). Therefore, it is
plaintiff’s burden to establish that an alleged impairment is medically determinable
and that an impairment is severe.3
This case involves a very narrow relevant period of disability: November 29,
2016 (the alleged onset date) through December 31, 2016 (the date last insured).
Plaintiff alleged disability due to rheumatoid arthritis and chronic pain. 4 [13-1] 228.
At step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that “[t]hrough the date last
insured, there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the
existence of a medically determinable impairment.” 5 [13-1] 29. See also [id.] 31
(“Accordingly, there were no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the
existence of a medically determinable impairment through the date last insured.”).
The ALJ therefore ended the analysis there and concluded that plaintiff “was not
under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from November
29, 2016, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2016, the date last insured.” 6
[Id.]
Before summarizing the record evidence, the ALJ stated that “[a]lthough there
is evidence in the record that the claimant suffered from osteoarthritis, polyarthritis,
rheumatoid arthritis, emphysema, hypertension, GERD, and hyperlipidemia, there
is no evidence in the record to establish there [sic] conditions as severe impairments
prior to his date last insured of December 31, 2016.” [13-1] 29 (emphasis added). And
later in the decision, in finding the opinions of the state agency medical consultants
persuasive, the ALJ stated that their opinions were “consistent with and supported
by the medical evidence of record that shows the claimant did not any [sic] severe
impairments established prior to his date last insured.” [Id.] 30 (emphasis added).
As previously explained, however, the regulations break step two into two
distinct and sequential determinations: (1) whether the plaintiff has a medically
determinable impairment and, only if the answer is yes, (2) whether the impairments
Charles M. v. O’Malley, 23-cv-50068, 2024 WL 1363668, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2024); Martinez v.
Saul, No. 19-CV-152, 2020 WL 6293215, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 2020).
4 The ALJ’s decision stated that “claimant alleges limitations resulting from rheumatoid arthritis and
emphysema that he states restrict his ability to work.” [13-1] 29. However, plaintiff’s pre-hearing
memorandum before the ALJ, [13-1] 228–29, the transcript of the hearing before the ALJ, [id.] 38–62,
and the briefing on review before this Court focus on rheumatoid arthritis and do not mention
emphysema. Review of the ALJ’s consideration of plaintiff’s emphysema is therefore not before the
Court.
5 Following this statement, the ALJ’s decision cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). This section of the
regulations involves how ALJs consider and articulate medical opinions and prior administrative
findings for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. The Court is not sure how this particular section
of the regulations is relevant to the ALJ’s step two analysis and notes it is likely a typo.
6 See supra n.5.
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are severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (“After we establish that you have a medically
determinable impairment(s), then we determine whether your impairment(s) is
severe.”) (emphasis added). The ALJ’s decision, however, makes incompatible
findings that plaintiff has no medically determinable impairments and that plaintiff
has no severe impairments.7 The ALJ therefore improperly combined these two
separate findings in one conclusion that “there were no medical signs or laboratory
findings to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable impairment
through the date last insured.” [13-1] 31.
B.

The ALJ’s Error Was Harmless

“Normally a failure to apply the correct legal standard requires us to remand
the case to the ALJ for further proceedings.” Karr, 989 F.3d at 513 (citing Meuser v.
Colvin, 838 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 2016)). “But if the error leaves us convinced that
the ALJ would reach the same result on remand, then the error is harmless and a
remand is not required.” Id. (citing Lambert v. Berryhill, 896 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir.
2018)). See also Samson v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Rev. Bd., 732 F. App’x 444, 446
(7th Cir. 2018) (“But the ALJ’s error of law about the report does not require a remand
if the error is harmless.”). In other words, “[a]n error is harmless if, upon examination
of the record, the court can ‘predict with great confidence what the result of remand
will be.’” Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 654 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Butler v.
Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Upon reviewing the record and the ALJ’s consideration of the evidence, the
Court is convinced that on remand, the ALJ would conclude that plaintiff had no
medically determinable impairments from November 29, 2016 through December 31,
2016, or find that he did but that these impairments were not severe, and the result
on remand either way would still be a finding of “not disabled.”
As the Commissioner points out, there is no record evidence from the relevant
period, i.e., November 29, 2016 through December 31, 2016. [19] 1, 3. Nor does
plaintiff point to any record evidence from this window of time that the ALJ failed to
consider. See [15]. But “the lack of a diagnosis or treatment for a medically
determinable impairment prior to the date last insured does not absolve the ALJ of
the responsibility to determine whether that impairment nonetheless arose at an
earlier time.” Ibrahim I. v. Saul, No. 17-cv-05983, 2020 WL 1820598, at *4 (Apr. 10,
The Commissioner’s brief also appears to blur the lines: “Plaintiff then argues that temporary
resolution of pain was not enough to show that his impairments were not medically determinable (Brf.
at 9). Not so. An impairment must last or be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months
to satisfy the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509.” [19] 5. The duration requirement is not
taken into consideration until a medically determinable impairment is established. See, e.g., Aida U.
v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-5669, 2022 WL 4109717, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2022) (“If a claimant establishes
that she has one or more physical or mental impairments, the ALJ then determines whether the
impairment(s) standing alone, or in combination, are severe and meet the twelve-month durational
requirement[.]”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)).
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2020). And although “an ALJ should consider the record as a whole, it is well-settled
that evidence which pre-dates or post-dates a claimant’s disability period is relevant
to the disability determination only to the extent that such evidence is probative of
the claimant’s conditions and impairments during the disability period.” Edward G.
v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-1872, 2023 WL 4243213, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2023)
(collecting cases).
In summarizing the record evidence, the ALJ first noted that during a
February 2016 visit to his primary care physician, plaintiff denied joint pain and
examination of the musculoskeletal system was normal, showing that plaintiff had
normal gait, reflexes, and sensation. [13-1] 29 (citing [id.] 353–54). During a June
2016 visit, plaintiff denied joint pain or swelling and examination of the right lower
extremity was normal. [Id.] (citing [id.] 362–63). The ALJ then summarized the
findings of an August 2, 2016 x-ray of plaintiff’s right knee:
An August 2016 X-ray of the right knee showed extensive bony reactive
changes and degenerative cyst formation seen involving both the lateral
and medial malleolar articulations to the talus, and anterior talotibial
articulation. This may represent postuaumatic [sic] changes especially
at the medial malleolar level. The remainder of the talar dome itself
appears fairly well preserved. Subtalar joints appear to be intact. Mild
soft tissue swelling is seen both lateral and medial malleolar. (Exhibit
4F/15). X-rays of the right knee had normal appearance to the lateral
and medial joint compartment without evidence of narrowing or
significant arthritic changes. Patella appears to be unremarkable. No
significant intraosseous lesions are appreciated. There does appear to
be a large suprapatellar pouch effusion, which may reflect significant
synovial inflammatory changes. (Id.).
[Id.] 29–30 (quoting [id.] 364). The ALJ noted the results of an August 14, 2016 follow
up visit, during which plaintiff was treated for exacerbation of knee pain and reported
that a course of Diclofenac had helped but not completely. [Id.] 30 (citing [id.] 368).
X-rays showed extensive osteoarthritis of the ankle, which was less symptomatic, and
moderate knee bursitis, which was still somewhat painful. [Id.] (citing [id.] 368). A
musculoskeletal examination of plaintiff’s right lower extremity showed mild
tenderness to palpation and mild crepitus to the right knee, and the ankle was normal
on examination. [Id.] (citing [id.] 368).
Continuing on, the ALJ’s decision noted that x-rays of plaintiff’s left wrist in
September 2016 showed findings consistent with significant osteoarthritis, greatest
at the first metacarpal carpal joint. [13-1] 30 (citing [id.] 372). The ALJ quoted the
impressions noted from these x-rays: “Bone densities seen along the proximal radial
aspect of the first metacarpal and along the dorsal lateral aspect of the lunate.
Technically, chip or avulsion type fractures cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation
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with associated symptoms is recommended.” [Id.] (quoting [id.] 372). And in
summarizing notes from an October 2, 2016 follow up visit, the ALJ noted that
plaintiff’s wrist pain had responded to NSAIDs, the pain was better, and his
functioning had recovered. [Id.] (citing [id.] 376). The ALJ noted that labs showed
significant inflammatory process but x-rays showed only degenerative joint disease,
and that plaintiff was referred to Rheumatology. [Id.] (citing [id.] 376).
At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff asserted that after the date last
insured, he was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis in the summer of 2017, and
plaintiff requested that the ALJ relate that diagnosis back to predate the date last
insured. [13-1] 42 (citing [id.] 393). See also [id.] 229 (plaintiff’s brief before the ALJ
asserting he was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis in July 2017). Plaintiff argued
that it was clear he was having issues with rheumatoid arthritis prior to his actual
diagnosis and that those issues did preclude his ability to work full time. [Id.] at 42.
In her decision, the ALJ did consider record evidence post-dating plaintiff’s date last
insured. The ALJ noted that plaintiff’s diagnosis in May 2017 was polyarthralgia.
[Id.] 30 (citing [id.] 386). The ALJ cited records noting that in July 2017, plaintiff’s
rheumatoid arthritis was under control with Diclofenac. [Id.] (citing [id.] 393). And
the ALJ observed that plaintiff was not started on Methotrexate until November
2017. [Id.] (citing [id.] 403).
“Records from medical treatment that took place after [the] last date
insured . . . are relevant only to the degree that they shed light on [claimant’s]
impairments and disabilities from the relevant insured period.” Million v. Astrue, 260
F. App’x 918, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2008). See also Stile v. Colvin, No. 14 C 4379, 2017 WL
2908783, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2017) (same). “A retrospective diagnosis may be
considered only if it is corroborated by evidence contemporaneous with the eligible
period.” Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estok v. Apfel,
152 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir.1998)). And “the Seventh Circuit has recognized that
worsening of a claimant’s condition after the date last insured does not provide a basis
for granting benefits during the relevant time period.” Vincent A. v. Berryhill, No. 16
C 7136, 2019 WL 2085104, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2019) (quoting Rubio v. Astrue,
No. 10 C 6529, 2011 WL 3796755, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011)). See Ray v. Saul,
861 F. App’x 102, 107 (7th Cir. 2021); Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir.
2011); Thomas v. Astrue, 352 F. App’x 115, 116 (7th Cir. 2009). See also Elsen v. Saul,
19-cv-259, 2019 WL 6799427, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2019) (“But evidence that a
condition worsened after a claimant’s date last insured is not itself a basis for
granting benefits during the period of coverage.”).
Plaintiff points to records that the ALJ did consider or that occurred much
later after the December 31, 2016 date last insured. [15] 2–5, 7–8, 11–12. For
example, plaintiff highlights his treatment with a rheumatologist starting in
February 2018 and abnormal examinations from November 2017 through 2018 and
into 2019. This evidence certainly relates to ailments that plaintiff complained of and
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was seen for earlier in time, and it clearly demonstrates that plaintiff’s conditions
may have progressed and worsened. But such evidence does not show that during the
relevant period, from November 29, 2016 through December 31, 2016, plaintiff was
disabled or even that he had a severe impairment. Plaintiff has not met her burden
to establish that there is evidence in the record from which the ALJ could infer that
plaintiff’s polyarthralgia and/or rheumatoid arthritis was disabling during that brief,
critical window. “The law requires that a claimant demonstrate his disability within
the prescribed period of eligibility, not prior to nor subsequent to the dates in
question.” Jolene C. v. Saul, No. 18 CV 50015, 2019 WL 3037070, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July
11, 2019) (quoting Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir. 1971)). See also
Franks v. Saul, No. 19-CV-979, 2020 WL 6268807, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2020)
(same).
After evaluating the record evidence, the ALJ turned to the opinion evidence.
The state agency medical consultants opined that there was insufficient evidence to
determine whether plaintiff was disabled prior to his date last insured. [13-1] 30
(citing [id.] 66, 73–76). The ALJ found that these opinions were persuasive because
they were consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of record showing
that plaintiff did not have any severe impairments established prior to the date last
insured. [Id.] In evaluating the treating source statements completed by plaintiff’s
physician, Dr. Duong, the ALJ found the June 10, 2019 opinion not persuasive
because it was completed several years after the date last insured and did “not reflect
the limitations or abilities that might have been present for the claimant during the
time period considered in this decision.” [Id.] (citing [13-1] 342–44; [13-2] 47–50). Dr.
Duong also completed a treating source statement on December 9, 2019, which stated
that plaintiff was limited as of August 14, 2016. [Id.] (citing [id.] 435–37). The ALJ
summarized Dr. Duong’s opinion but found that the limitations suggested by Dr.
Duong were not persuasive because they were not consistent with or supported by
the medical evidence of record. [Id.] 30–31.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Dr. Duong,
who was plaintiff’s treating provider during the time period at issue. [15] 12. The
Seventh Circuit has stated that it “typically expect[s] an ALJ to consider an opinion
by a doctor who treated the claimant after the relevant period if it offers a
retrospective diagnosis that is corroborated by evidence produced during the relevant
period.” Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at
742). See also McHenry v. Berryhill, 911 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that it
has “previously held that a medical advisor’s retrospective diagnosis may be
considered only if corroborated by evidence contemporaneous with the period of
eligibility”) (citing Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 742; Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 667
(7th Cir. 2008)).
First, there is no indication that Dr. Duong’s June 10, 2019 treating source
statement referred to plaintiff’s abilities and limitations during the relevant period
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of disability, i.e., November 29, 2016 through December 31, 2016. [13-1] 342–44. The
ALJ did not err in finding this opinion not persuasive or relevant. Again, “evidence
which pre-dates or post-dates a claimant’s disability period is relevant to the
disability determination only to the extent that such evidence is probative of the
claimant’s conditions and impairments during the disability period.” Edward G.,
2023 WL 4243213, at *6 (collecting cases). Therefore, these treating source
statements are “relevant only to the degree that they shed light on [claimant’s]
impairments and disabilities from the relevant insured period.” Million, 260 F. App’x
at 921–22. There is nothing in Dr. Duong’s June 10, 2019 treating source statement
to suggest that he was referring to plaintiff’s abilities during the relevant period
rather than at the time he completed the form.
Second, the ALJ found Dr. Duong’s December 19, 2019 treating source
statement not persuasive because there was no evidence that a cane had been
prescribed prior to the date last insured, plaintiff reported improvement in pain with
Diclofenac and functioning returned, and although scans showed inflammation,
examinations were not consistent with that finding. [13-1] 30–31 (citing [id.] 435–37).
Although plaintiff takes issue with each of these findings, [15] 13–14, plaintiff has
not raised any error warranting remand or demonstrated that the ALJ’s findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s concerns amount to a
disagreement over how the ALJ weighed and considered the evidence, but this
reviewing Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ by
reevaluating the facts, reweighing the evidence, or resolving debatable evidentiary
conflicts as long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Chavez, 96 F.4th
at 1021; Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900; Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327.
Despite the ALJ’s error of law in combining the two separate and distinct
evaluations that make up step two of the sequential analysis, the Court finds that
the ALJ’s decision would not change on remand. Although the ALJ’s articulation
might leave something to be desired, [15] 9 (“Plaintiff may only guess at her reasoning
based on things implied but left unstated in her decision.”), the Court finds that the
ALJ’s discussion of the record evidence and consideration of the opinion evidence
adequately provided a “logical bridge” between the evidence and her conclusions.
Bakke, 62 F.4th at 1066. Again, substantial evidence is “not a high threshold: it
means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Karr, 989 F.3d at 511. On the very specific question of
whether plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment, and, if so, whether that
impairment was severe, during the relevant period of November 29, 2016 through
December 31, 2016, the Court is satisfied that the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence. On remand, although the ALJ may correct her error of law and
change her articulation of her findings, the Court is confident that the ALJ’s
conclusions at step two of the sequential analysis would remain the same and result
in the same finding of not disabled.

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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand [14] is
denied, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [18] is granted, and the decision
denying the application for benefits is affirmed.

_____________________________________

HEATHER K. McSHAIN
United States Magistrate Judge
DATE: September 24, 2024

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