Alloyed Enterprises Co. v. Microsoft Corporation

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing this case, including the original, amended, and proposed amended complaints, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. All remaining motions are denied as moot. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/29/2021. Mailed notice. (mma, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALLOYED ENTERPRISES CO.,
Plaintiff,
Thomas Madison Glimp,
Proposed substitute
plaintiff,
vs.
MICROSOFT CORP., et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 21 C 4468

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
On August 23, 2021, an entity called Alloyed Enterprises Co., a limited liability
company claiming to have places of business in Chicago; Boulder, Colorado; and
Ashburn, Virginia, filed a lawsuit against what the caption of the case referred to as
"Microsoft Corporation, RCN Telecom Services LLC, & Comcast Corporation of the
Department of Homeland Security." Alloyed sought relief under a myriad of federal
statutes for what it contended was a campaign by DHS and the National Security
Agency to retaliate for supposed whistleblower activity. Alloyed was not represented by
counsel but instead filed a purported "pro se appearance" by Thomas Glimp, its
principal. Alloyed filed, along with the complaint, a torrent of other motions seeking
permission to appear "pro se" through Mr. Glimp (who is not an attorney), to expedite
discovery, to direct the U.S. Marshal to serve summons while waiving any fees, for a

declaratory judgment, for an injunction, "for partial summary judgment of equitable
replevin and attachment," and other relief. Alloyed also sought leave to file the
complaint and other filings under seal—which it had already done.
The Court entered an order on August 24, 2021 denying Alloyed's request to file
the case under seal, and it directed the Clerk to unseal the case. The Court also denied
Alloyed's request to appear pro se. In the same order, the Court stated the following:
An entity like Alloyed Enterprises may not represent itself but rather must
appear through a licensed attorney. See United States v. Hagerman. 545
F.3d 579 at 581 (7th Cir. 2008). Mr. Glimp concedes he is not an attorney
and thus he may not serve as Alloyed Enterprises' counsel. And Alloyed
Enterprises has not shown that it qualifies for appointment of counsel
financially or otherwise.
Order of Aug. 24, 2021 (dkt. no. 22). The Court, in the same order, also made
preliminary comments regarding Alloyed's complaint, stating as follows:
[I]t is almost certainly subject to dismissal as frivolous and for failure to
comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8's requirement to provide a "short and plain
statement" of the plaintiff's claim. The complaint is a sprawling 87-page
document in which Alloyed Enterprises contends among other things that
certain of the defendants have hacked into plaintiff's devices for a fouryear period and have among other things "purposely misattributed speech
comprising inchoate terrorist activities to Plaintiff's person with the intent to
penalize Plaintiff by manipulating counter-terrorism and policing algorithms
to create cause to commence intrusive digital and physical search and
deprive Plaintiff of the beneficial use of private property while absconding
from due process obligations." This like many of the complaint's
allegations is (at least) borderline unintelligible and not explained in the
body of the complaint.
Id. Finally, returning to the issue of Alloyed's representation, the Court stated that
"[u]nless plaintiff Alloyed Enterprises files an appearance by counsel who is a member
of the bar of this District by no later than 9/10/2021 the Court will dismiss its complaint
as an improperly filed pro se complaint."
Alloyed then began an effort to work its way around the legal prohibition against
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an entity representing itself in court or acting through a non-lawyer. Specifically, on
September 1, Mr. Glimp filed a motion asking to "intervene" in the lawsuit "in his
capacities as President and Chairman of Alloyed Enterprises IL Company, a registered
operating member of Alloyed Enterprises Company." Dkt. no. 28, ECF p. 2 of 8. The
Court denied this motion on September 13, stating that Mr. Glimp had not shown a
viable basis to intervene in the case as an individual plaintiff. Order of Sept. 13, 2021
(dkt. no. 29). The Court, in the same order, extended the deadline for Alloyed to file an
appearance of counsel. Id. It later granted Alloyed's motion for a further extension of
this deadline, through October 14 but said that would be the last extension. Order of
Sept. 27, 2021 (dkt. no. 32).
On October 6, Mr. Glimp filed a motion to substitute himself as the plaintiff and to
amend his complaint. As the basis for this, Mr. Glimp's motion described a "transfer of
interests from the constituents of Alloyed Enterprises Company into a special purpose
vehicle," namely a trust of which he is the trustee. This, Mr. Glimp said, would permit
him to proceed pro se. The Court does not know, and is not inclined to analyze at this
point, the appropriateness of this arrangement and will instead grant the motion to
substitute and will proceed to assess the proposed amended complaint as well as the
original complaint.
In the amended complaint, Mr. Glimp says that he is suing for "injuries afflicted
against [his] small business following his delivery of whistleblower tips and reports
against dealers of specialty marine re-insurance whom the record reflects effectuated
mortgage-backed securities fraud against the Treasury." Am. Compl. ¶ 2. In a nutshell,
he alleges retaliation consisting of falsely branding him as involved in terrorism, id. ¶ 4,

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"sieging his computing and internet services and facilities," id. ¶ 3, and engaging in
"extra-jurisdictional search, surveillance, and interdiction" and restricting his "access to
open markets by precipitative impairments to the proper functioning of essential
computing, telephone, and internet devices," id. ¶ 5.
Mr. Glimp attributes all of this activity to the government—DHS and, perhaps, the
National Security Agency—which he says is acting through Microsoft, Comcast, RCN,
AT&T, the Illinois State Police, the Chicago Police Department, and the Cook County
Sheriff, all of which he refers to as "Department of Homeland Security assignees." The
story, as told in the complaint, is as follows.
Mr. Glimp says that he "acquire[d] access to insider knowledge that others are
without means to obtain" due his "personal proximity to persons of influence in United
States politics," including former Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson, having grown up
"a few miles" from Paulson. Id. ¶ 35. In 2016, Mr. Glimp says, he learned that a friend's
father and a godfather's neighbor were responsible for possibly "trillions" of dollars in
harm to the U.S. Treasury, via mortgage-backed securities fraud, affected from the
brokerage of Wilmington Trust. Mr. Glimp says that he "corroborated" this in some way
via a conversation with a neighbor of someone named Warren Wamberg, in which the
neighbor implicated Wamberg and someone named Kenneth Kies. Id. ¶¶ 36-39. Mr.
Glimp says that he then filed a "whistleblower" report with the FBI, "to hedge against the
risks of becoming a loose end who knew too much." Id. ¶ 40. He also made additional
reports against Kies to the SEC and other regulatory agencies.
The story next turns to the defendants named by Mr. Glimp in his amended
complaint, which include the aforementioned defendants as well as AT&T. He says that

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some of them (Microsoft, Comcast, and RCN's parent) are clients of Kies's firm, which
from Mr. Glimp's description seems as though it may be a lobbying firm.
Telecommunications carriers, he says, are required to provide DHS and its "assignees"
(local police agencies, evidently) with access to their facilities to conduct "counterterrorism interdiction campaigns of its own design." Id. ¶¶ 53-55. This, Mr. Glimp
contends, includes computer hacking as well as trespass on internet "easements" and
computing devices. Id. ¶ 58. He also says that DHS engages in data-mining to allow it
to predict acts of domestic terrorism but that its models are prone to error. Id. ¶¶ 59-61.
Mr. Glimp says that in 2017 he retained a patent law firm to file claims to what he
refers to as "intellectual property improvements" (without identifying what they were).
Id. ¶ 66. He claims, however, that law firm personnel were "parties to an association"
with the aforementioned Wamberg, a maritime reinsurance dealer; the firm invited him
to open "a Lloyds of London account"; this somehow involved Mr. Glimp with Wamberg;
and the law firm did not disclose its relationship with Wamberg "despite [its] knowledge
of Mr. Glimp's delivery of testimony against Wamberg." Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
The law firm, Mr. Glimp alleges, bamboozled him into signing a power of attorney
and then used it "to file a document [with] the PTO without Mr. Glimp's informed
consent." Id. ¶ 69. This document, Mr. Glimp says, "contained a recipe for biological
terrorism," involving "a plan to manufacture a virulent permutation of the highly
pathogenic e. Coli bacteria using gene splicing methods"—methods that Mr. Glimp says
he, in fact, knows nothing about. Id. ¶¶ 70-71.
Mr. Glimp believes that the publication of this document—since removed from
the PTO database, he says—"raised flags" and triggered DHS's "counterterrorism

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algorithms." Id. ¶ 73. He also cites other events that he claims are suspicious. He
says he attended a writing class; someone from his hometown suburb was there; she
worked for Microsoft; and she supposedly asked him "bizarre leading questions" about
his affinity for "the Q-Anon computer hacker association." Id. ¶ 76. Mr. Glimp see this,
it appears, as evidence of a net being drawn around him—particularly given his later
computer-related troubles.
Mr. Glimp also says that while engaged in work activities, he was assigned to
work with a person from Palestine. He says that "in conversations with the National
Security Agency, the NSA's FOI/PA liaison told Mr. Glink that dialog with this individual
would cause Mr. Glimp being flagged as a terrorist and subject to FISA surveillance."
Id. ¶ 81.
Following these events, Mr. Glimp alleges, his computers and internet service
"began to malfunction on a near-constant basis." Id. ¶ 83. He contends that native
software on his computers was impaired by external intervention; documents and files
that he created were altered; Microsoft Excel doesn't perform calculations accurately;
Microsoft Word "has printed materials inconsistently with what was displayed on
screen"; and so on. He also contends that cellular carrier AT&T disrupted his service;
someone falsely told Alloyed's lender that the company was out of business; forms that
he filed were "defaced" by unknown third parties; other software doesn't perform as it is
supposed to; he has been unable to download or use certain software; and his attempts
to get an enhanced, and more secure, form of internet service have been rebuffed.
Mr. Glimp attributes all of this to a scheme of retaliation that he claims is directed
by DHS and involves Microsoft, RCN, Comcast, and AT&T, as well as state and local

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police agencies. He derives this conclusion, it appears, from the fact that the problems
he describes began to occur at some point after his claimed whistleblower activity. Mr.
Glimp (and, before him, Alloyed in the original complaint) sues for violation of the
antitrust laws; the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; the Dodd-Frank Act;
and other statutes. Among other things, Mr. Glimp contends that persons "deployed" by
DHS broke into his home, office, and computers "where they set forth seizing digital and
physical papers, effects, and other articles," including correspondence, business
materials, and "a piece of the U.S.S. Constitution from Boston Yard," replacing them
with forgeries—which, Mr. Glimp seems to say, he cannot now provide because they
"do not meet the Court's criteria for originals." Id. ¶¶ 137-38. He says that the NSA's
"FOI/PA Officer" "resoundingly verified" that he "has almost certainly been flagged as a
terrorist," falsely. Id. ¶ 141.
A court has the authority to dismiss a complaint if it is fantastical or so
insubstantial to be absolutely devoid of merit. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1984). "A suit that is utterly frivolous does not engage the jurisdiction of
the federal courts." Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2010). Put another way,
a plaintiff "must present a 'substantial' federal question in order to invoke the jurisdiction
of a federal court," and if he does not do so his case is subject to dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Douglas v. DuComb Center, 28 F. App's 562, 563 (7th Cir.
2002) (citing Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537).
This is the case here. Mr. Glimp attributes all of the bad things that he says have
happened to him to a vast conspiracy, directed by the government, including the
National Security Agency, which he seems to contend has engaged in a surveillance

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effort against him under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. All of this is
happening, he claims, because he made complaints against Wamberg and Kies—who
he doesn't claim to know, doesn't claim to have worked with, and doesn't claimed to
have talked to or otherwise communicated with. None of it is in the least bit plausible.
Mr. Glimp's amended complaint—like Alloyed's original complaint—consists only
of "claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios." Walton v. Walker, 364 F. App'x
256, 258 (7th Cir. 2018). The primary feature is a claimed sprawling conspiracy by
which Mr. Glimp attempts to tie together obviously unconnected events and link them to
a "whistleblower complaint" he made, admittedly without any personal knowledge,
against business tycoons that he does not claim to know and with whom he does not
claim to have worked. The Court can, and does, rely upon its "judicial experience and
common sense," id., in determining that Mr. Glimp's amended complaint (like Alloyed's
original complaint) is utterly implausible and therefore fails to invoke the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.
The Court adds that Mr. Glimp filed, just the other day, a motion asking to join
more defendants to the case, specifically Brian Anderson (as well as, it appears,
Anderson's spouse)—who committed the apparent wrong of telling Mr. Glimp that he
(Anderson) "is a member of a private marine association" and that "an insurance policy
impaired him from performing the lease agreement for the condo Mr. Glimp rents in
Chicago," Mot. for Lv. to Amend (dkt. no. 46) ¶ 3—as well as the Burham Park Plaza
Condominium Association. These defendants' alleged wrongs likewise appear to relate
to the alleged scheme (which Mr. Glimp calls "a spurious FISA campaign") to deny him
secure internet service. The purported claims against the Andersons and the

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condominium association—to the effect that they are being used as the instruments of
those supposedly targeting Mr. Glimp—are equally implausible and frivolous and are
likewise dismissed.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing this
case, including the original, amended, and proposed amended complaints, for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. All remaining motions are denied as moot.
Date: November 29, 2021
________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

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