Kalamaras v. Kijakazi
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 11/17/2022: Mailed notice (lp, )
Case: 1:21-cv-04491 Document #: 18 Filed: 11/17/22 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:660
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THEODORO K., 1
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 21 C 4491
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Theodoro K.’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse or remand the Commissioner’s
decision [Doc. No. 10] is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 13] is granted.
In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security
Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last
name.
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BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since
July 26, 2018. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which
he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A
telephonic hearing was held on January 26, 2021, and all participants attended the
hearing by telephone. Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing and was
represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified.
On February 11, 2021, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding
him not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration
Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626
(7th Cir. 2005).
II.
ALJ DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential
evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of July 26, 2018. At step
two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
multiple sclerosis; adjustment disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder. The ALJ
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concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not
meet or medically equal any listed impairments.
Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional
limitations: can stand four hours and walk two hours out of an eight-hour workday,
but cannot exceed a combined total on his feet of more than four hours per day;
requires the opportunity to stand for two-to-three minutes after sitting for thirty
minutes; can occasionally push and pull with the left lower extremity and left upper
extremity; can frequently reach with the left upper extremity; can frequently handle
and finger with his left hand; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl; can never work at unprotected heights or near moving mechanical parts; can
only occasionally be exposed to extreme cold; and is restricted to understanding,
remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. At step four,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his past relevant work
as a retail store manager, HVAC installer, stock clerk, or inventory clerk. However,
at step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not
disabled under the Social Security Act.
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DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff
presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former
occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that
the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386,
389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three,
precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps
one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the
burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in
other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
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II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even
in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and
means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)
(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in
evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is
adequately supported”) (citation omitted).
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However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved
of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838
F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has
adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every
piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide
some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to
a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate
the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful
appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir.
2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to
fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately
articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir.
1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors
his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
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III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons,
including: (1) the ALJ failed to support his finding of no listing level severity
pursuant to listing 11.09; (2) the ALJ failed to support his finding that Plaintiff
could perform unskilled work within the context of a full-time work environment;
and (3) the ALJ failed to support his rejection of the opinions of Dr. Zara Schulman
and Dr. George Katsamakis. Each argument will be addressed below in turn.
A.
Listing Level Severity
For his first argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by “summarily
dismiss[ing] listing 11.09.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 8.) In assessing listing 11.09 in his step
three analysis, the ALJ stated as follows:
I considered whether the claimant meets listing 11.09. However, the
claimant is able to walk without the use of two crutches, two canes, or a
walker. He did not demonstrate marked physical functioning. Physical
examinations showed he exhibited normal range of motion and normal
or near normal strength in his extremities following treatment. He
exhibited an abnormal gait without the use of an assistive device.
Further, as discussed below, the claimant did not demonstrate marked
limitation in any broad mental functioning areas. The medical and
objective evidence showed moderate limitation of his ability to
concentrate, persist or maintain pace and mild limitation of the
remaining areas of mental functioning.
(R. 20 (citations omitted).)
Plaintiff attacks the ALJ’s step three analysis as cursory. As an initial
matter, the Court disagrees with that characterization. Furthermore, and in any
event, as a general matter, “a statement that the individual’s impairment(s) does
not medically equal a listed impairment constitutes sufficient articulation of this
finding [and] [a]n adjudicator’s articulation of the reason(s) why the individual is or
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is not disabled at a later step in the sequential evaluation process will provide
rationale that is sufficient for a subsequent reviewer or court to determine the basis
for the finding about medical equivalence at step 3.” Social Security Rule (SSR) 172p. See also Lisa S. v. Saul, No. 19 C 862, 2020 WL 5297028, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,
2020). Accordingly, an ALJ’s step three analysis, even if cursory, does not warrant
remand if the ALJ’s decision otherwise fulsomely assesses a claimant’s physical and
mental limitations. The Court finds that the ALJ did so here. Plaintiff does not
grapple with the concept that the reasoning underlying a step three analysis can be
set forth anywhere in the decision. See Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he ALJ provided the discussion of Curvin’s severe and non-severe
impairments, the objective medical evidence, and her credibility directly after step 3
when he determined her RFC. This discussion provides the necessary detail to
review the ALJ’s step 3 determination in a meaningful way. We do not discount it
simply because it appears elsewhere in the decision. To require the ALJ to repeat
such a discussion throughout his decision would be redundant.”). 2
Additionally, with respect to the mental component of listing 11.09, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erroneously “relied solely upon [a] cursory assessment of the
so-called paragraph B functional criteria for mental listings.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 9.) In
advancing that argument, Plaintiff contends that “[t]hough the ALJ determined
that there was only moderate (as opposed to marked) limitation in the area of
Plaintiff argues in particular that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Dr.
George Katsamakis that would support a finding of listing level severity under listing
11.09. However, as detailed below, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr.
Katsamakis’ opinions was properly supported.
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concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the medical record suggests
otherwise.” (Id.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff himself concedes that he “does not
necessarily argue that listing level severity should have been established at Step 3
based solely upon his mental impairments.” (Id. at 12.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s
argument concerning the mental aspect of listing 11.09 ultimately amounts to a
request that the evidence be re-weighed. The Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to
reweigh the evidence in relation to the ALJ’s mental impairment findings, which is
forbidden. See Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021).
B.
Concentration, Persistence, or Pace
For his second argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s “RFC assessment
fall short of accommodating Plaintiff’s non-exertional deficits.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 11.)
In advancing that argument, Plaintiff focuses on the functional area of
concentration, persistence, or pace, asserting that the ALJ failed to sufficiently
“explain or justify [his] finding that Plaintiff can perform simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks on a full time basis.” (Id. at 13.) With respect to the functional area
of concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a moderate
limitation. (R. 21.) In finding that Plaintiff did not have more than a moderate
limitation in that area, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff is able to drive, prepare meals,
and manage funds. (Id.) The ALJ further noted that mental status examinations
showed Plaintiff exhibited normal thought content, normal thought processes, and
normal memory. (Id.) The ALJ also elsewhere noted that Plaintiff “reported he was
able to return to work thirty to thirty five hours a week in November and December
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2020.” (Id. at 25.) As stated above, in his RFC assessment, the ALJ limited Plaintiff
to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks. (Id. at 22.)
Plaintiff argues that “an ALJ may not rely upon catch-all terms like ‘simple,
repetitive tasks’ without explaining how such restrictions account for the
individual’s mental deficits.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 13.) However, an ALJ’s use of catchall
phrases (such as “simple, routine tasks”) in an RFC, without more, does not
necessitate remand. See Recha v. Saul, 843 F.App’x 1, 4 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that
the use of boilerplate language, by itself, is not reversible error). Furthermore,
crucially, Plaintiff has not articulated what sort of verbiage the ALJ should have
used with respect to his asserted limitations with concentration. See Martin v. Saul,
950 F.3d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Although [the claimant] complains that the pace
requirements are too vague, there is only so much specificity possible in crafting an
RFC. The law required no more.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s challenge regarding
concentration, persistence, and pace must fail. See Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d
492, 498 (7th Cir. 2019) (“It is unclear what kinds of work restrictions might
address Jozefyk’s limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace because he
hypothesizes none.”).
Plaintiff also contends that “the ALJ failed to account for the interplay
between Plaintiff’s physical pain and other symptoms and his ability to sustain
concentration, persistence, or pace.” (Pl.’s Memo. at 13.) The Court finds that
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not sufficiently consider his impairments
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together in combination must fail as it amounts to an impermissible request that
the evidence be re-weighed. See Cindy P. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 C 6708, 2022 WL
2802328, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2022) (“While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not
sufficiently assess her impairments in combination, the Court agrees with
Defendant that Plaintiff’s contention in that regard amounts to an invitation for the
Court to reweigh the evidence.”).
C.
The Opinions of Drs. Zara Schulman and George Katsamakis
For his final argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly
discounted the opinions of Dr. Zara Schulman, his treating physician, and Dr.
George Katsamakis, his treating neurologist. Because Plaintiff filed his claim on
March 28, 2019, the ALJ was required to evaluate the medical opinion evidence
under regulations applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c (2017). Under these regulations, the ALJ “will not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s]
medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). An ALJ is instead required to articulate
“how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior
administrative medical findings in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b). Factors to be considered in this evaluation include supportability,
consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that
tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical
finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (c). Supportability and consistency are the two
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most important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)
(“The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources
in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.”). An ALJ’s decision must explain how she considered the
factors of supportability and consistency, but she is not required to explain how she
evaluated the other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
In this case, the ALJ assessed Dr. Schulman’s opinions as follows:
I considered the opinions of Zara Schulman MD dated June 16 and July
29, 2020. I found the opinions to be persuasive to the extent they support
the reduced standing and walking limitations adopted limiting the
claimant to a combined limit of standing no more than four hours and
walking no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday. To that
extent, Dr. Shulman’s opinions were well supported by her treatment
records that showed the claimant responded well to medication and
exhibited a wide based gait with the ability to walk without an assistive
device with some balance deficits and circumlocution. To the extent Dr.
Shulman’s opinion assessed greater limitations, it was inconsistent with
the longitudinal record as a whole that showed the claimant exhibited
greater function with normal passive range of motion, strength, and the
ability to walk without an assistive device.
(R. 27 (citations omitted).) So, the ALJ found Dr. Schulman’s opinions persuasive to
the extent they were supported by her treatment records, but rejected Dr.
Schulman’s more extreme opinions as unsupported by and inconsistent with the
medical record as a whole. Given the ALJ’s explicit rationales, the Court finds that
the ALJ properly assessed and explicated supportability and consistency in partlyaccepting and partly-discounting Dr. Schulman’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(b)(2).
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As for Dr. Katsamakis’ opinions, the ALJ explained as follows:
I considered the opinion of George Katsamakis, MD dated January 4,
2021. I found the opinion to be persuasive to the extent it supported a
reduced range of work at a light exertional level with no more than four
hours of walking. While Dr. Katsamakis indicated some limitations in
all broad mental functioning areas, his opinion in that regard was
unpersuasive as he failed to specify the extent of the limitation other
than describing it as “serious” which is vague and ill-defined. Further,
Dr. Katsamaki’s opinion that the claimant required two canes, two
crutches, or a walker is inconsistent with the claimant’s testimony that
he used one cane and inconsistent with the medical evidence that
showed he exhibited an improved stance and gait with the ability to
walk unassisted. Dr. Katsamakis further opined the claimant would
miss more than three days per month of work, but he failed to specify
the reason for such absences. Dr. Katsmakis treatment records do not
support a need for excessive absences nor does the longitudinal
evidence. The longitudinal records reflect the claimant responded well
to treatment and his symptoms stabilized with no further progression
noted on diagnostic imaging.
(R. 27 (citations omitted).) So, the ALJ found Dr. Katsamakis’ opinions persuasive
to a certain extent, but otherwise discounted the opinions because, in sum, they
were imprecise, inconsistent with Plaintiff’s own reports, inconsistent with the
medical record, unsupported by specific explanations, and unsupported by the
doctor’s treatment records. Again, given the ALJ’s explicit rationales, the Court
finds that the ALJ properly assessed and explicated supportability and consistency
in largely rejecting Dr. Katsamakis’ opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s final argument must fail.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not well
taken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse or remand the Commissioner’s
decision [Doc. No. 10] is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 13] is granted.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
________________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
November 17, 2022
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